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Washington Search & Seizure
INTRODUCTION
I am pleased to be joined by Law Review members Linda W.Y.
Coburn, Jason Amala, Gordon Hill, Erica Horton, Kylee MacIntyre,
Joshua Osborne-Klein, and the rest of the Seattle University Law Review
staff, along with Kelly Kunsch of the Seattle University Law Library for
his work on the index, and Grace Mottman, my Administrative Assistant,
in publishing this Survey of Washington Search and Seizure Law. This
marks the fourth publication of the Survey that was originally authored
by Justice Robert F. Utter, Washington Supreme Court (retired) in 1985,
with updates published in 1988 and 1998.
This Survey is intended to serve as a source to which the Washing-
ton lawyer, judge, law enforcement officer, and others can turn to as an
authoritative starting point for researching Washington search and sei-
zure law. In order to be useful as a research tool, revisions to the law and
new cases interpreting the Washington Constitution and the United
States Constitution require periodic updates to this Survey to reflect the
current state of the law. Many of these cases involve the Washington Su-
preme Court's interpretation of the Washington Constitution. Also, as the
United States Supreme Court has continued to examine Fourth Amend-
ment search and seizure jurisprudence, its decisions and their reflections
on Washington law are also discussed.
Often the rules and approaches in interpreting the Washington Con-
stitution differ in certain areas from the analysis used by the United
States Supreme Court in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Where
that occurs, this Survey has identified the independent approach adopted
by the Washington Supreme Court.
Article I, Section 7 of the Washington Constitution is a counterpart
to the Fourth Amendment. That section provides that "no person shall be
disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of
law." The Washington Supreme Court historically applied the analytical
framework outlined in State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 61-62, 720 P.2d
808, 811 (1986), in its case-by-case determination of the scope of protec-
tion afforded under Article I, Section 7, and in situations where greater
individual protection exists under the Washington Constitution than un-
der the Fourth Amendment.
Gunwall adopted the following six neutral interpretive factors: (1)
the textual language of the state constitution; (2) the significant differ-
ences in the texts of parallel provisions of the federal and state constitu-
tions; (3) the state constitutional and common law history; (4) the pre-
existing state law; (5) the differences in structure between the federal and
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state constitutions; and (6) matters of particular state interest or local
concern. Id.
This analytical framework adopted in Gunwall provides the struc-
ture and foundation from which Washington courts continue to define the
scope of Article I, Section 7. In more recent cases under Article I, Sec-
tion 7, the Washington Supreme Court has relaxed the earlier strict re-
quirement that counsel provide a "Gunwall analysis" in order to have the
court rule on a state constitutional law issue instead of applying, where
possible, principles developed in previous cases. State v. White, 135
Wn.2d 761, 769, 958 P.2d 982, 986 (1998). Recognizing the structural
approach to state constitutional interpretation, however, continues to
provide a reasoned approach to resolving issues of state constitutional
law.
This Survey contains updated case comments and statutory refer-
ences that are current through March 2005, and focuses primarily on sub-
stantive search and seizure law in the criminal context; it omits discus-
sion of many procedural issues. In addition, all references to Wayne R.
LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, have
been updated to the Fourth Edition, published in 2004.
-CHARLES W. JOHNSON
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CHAPTER 1:
TRIGGERING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND
ARTICLE I, SECTION 7: DEFINING SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
This chapter addresses three questions: (1) what is a search; (2)
what is a seizure of the person; and (3) what is a seizure of property?
These questions represent the threshold inquiry in any search or
seizure problem. Unless a true search or seizure has occurred within the
meaning of the federal or state constitution, constitutional protections are
not triggered. This chapter first discusses when a search has occurred,
from entries into the home to the taking of blood samples. The chapter
then discusses when a seizure of the person has occurred, be it an arrest
or an investigatory stop. The chapter concludes with a discussion of
when, for constitutional purposes, personal property has been seized.
1.0 DEFNING "SEARCH" PRE-KA TZ:
"CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED AREAS"
Prior to 1967, the United States Supreme Court defined the appli-
cability of Fourth Amendment protections in terms of "constitutionally
protected areas." Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59, 87 S. Ct. 1873,
1883, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1040, 1052 (1967); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S.
427, 438-39, 83 S. Ct. 1381, 1388, 10 L. Ed. 2d 462, 470 (1963);
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510-12, 81 S. Ct. 679, 682-83,
5 L. Ed. 2d 734, 738-39 (1961). The Fourth Amendment's guarantees
applied only to those searches that intrude into one of the "protected
areas" enumerated within the Fourth Amendment: "persons" (including
the bodies and clothing of individuals); "houses" (including apartments,
hotel rooms, garages, business offices, stores, and warehouses); "papers"
(such as letters); and "effects" (such as automobiles). See generally 1
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.1(a), at 422-31 (4th ed. 2004).
However, in Katz v. United States, the United States Supreme Court
rejected the rigid "constitutionally protected area" test:
[T]he correct solution of Fourth Amendment problems is not neces-
sarily promoted by incantation of the phrase "constitutionally pro-
tected area.". . . [T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his
own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion .... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.
389 U.S. 347, 350-52, 88 S. Ct. 507, 510-11, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576,
581-82 (1967). Katz thus defined the scope of search protections as the
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individual's "reasonable expectation of privacy." 389 U.S. at 360, 88 S.
Ct. at 516, 19 L. Ed. 2d at 587 (Harlan, J., concurring). The nature of this
new test and the degree of continued vitality of the old "constitutionally
protected area" test will be examined in the following sections. See I
LaFave, supra, § 2.1, at 422-45.
1.1 DEFINING "SEARCH" POST-KATZ:
THE "REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY"
In a concurring opinion in Katz, which has since come to be ac-
cepted as the Katz test, Justice Harlan explained that the Katz holding
extends search and seizure protections to all situations in which a defen-
dant has a "reasonable expectation of privacy." Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 360, 88 S. Ct. 507, 516, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 587 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring); see 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure §
2.1, at 422-45 (4th ed. 2004). A reasonable expectation of privacy is
measured by a "twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expecta-
tion be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."' Katz,
389 U.S. at 361, 88 S. Ct. at 516, 19 L. Ed. 2d at 588 (Harlan, J., concur-
ring); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31, 121 S. Ct. 2038,
2041, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94, 100 (2001); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S.
35, 39, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1628, 100 L. Ed. 2d 30, 36 (1988); State v.
Carter, 151 Wn.2d 118, 127, 85 P.3d 887, 891 (2004); State v. Young,
123 Wn.2d 173, 189, 867 P.2d 593, 601 (1994) (en banc); State v. Boot,
81 Wn. App. 546, 550, 915 P.2d 592, 594 (1996).
In addition, the expectation of privacy must be one "which the law
recognizes as 'legitimate."' Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-44 n.12,
99 S. Ct. 421, 430-31 n.12, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387, 401-02 n.12 (1978). The
test of "legitimacy" may be just another reformation of the "reasonable-
ness" test, discussed supra. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 95-96, 110
S. Ct. 1684, 1687, 109 L. Ed. 2d 85, 95 (1990) ("A subjective expecta-
tion of privacy is legitimate if it is 'one that society is prepared to recog-
nize as reasonable."') (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143-44 n.12, 99 S. Ct.
at 430-31 n.12, 58 L. Ed. 2d at 401-02 n.12).
A burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during the off season
may have a thoroughly justified subjective expectation of privacy,
but it is not one which the law recognizes as "legitimate." . . . Le-
gitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source
outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of
real or personal property law or to understandings that are recog-
nized and permitted by society.
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Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143-44 n.12, 99 S. Ct. at 430-31 n.12, 58 L. Ed. 2d at
401-02 n.12; see also United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751, 91 S.
Ct. 1122, 1126, 28 L. Ed. 2d 453, 458 (1971) (despite actual expectations
of privacy, authorities may use testimony of criminal informants consis-
tently with the Fourth Amendment); State v. Clark, 129 Wn.2d 211,226,
916 P.2d 384, 393 (1996) (en banc) ("A person has no expectation of
privacy under the Fourth Amendment in a home where illegal business is
openly conducted."); State v. Hastings, 119 Wn.2d 229, 232, 830 P.2d
658, 660 (1992) (en banc) (no expectation of privacy where illegal busi-
ness is openly conducted).
In applying this "legitimacy" test, the United States Supreme Court
has held that when a police investigative device is capable of detecting
only the presence of unlawful articles, the use of the device does not con-
stitute a search. Illinois v. Caballes, U.S. -, _, 125 S. Ct. 834,
837, _ L. Ed. 2d _, _ (2005) ("any interest in possessing contra-
band cannot be deemed 'legitimate,' and thus, governmental conduct that
only reveals the possession of contraband 'compromises no legitimate
privacy interest."') (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109,
123, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1661-62, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85, 100 (1984)). Thus, in
federal courts, a canine sniff does not normally constitute a "search."
Caballes, __ U.S. at __, 125 S. Ct. at 838, _ L. Ed. 2d at __ (2005)
("[Tlhe use of a well-trained narcotics-detection dog---one that 'does not
expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from
public view' . .. during a lawful traffic stop, generally does not implicate
legitimate privacy interests.") (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S.
696, 707, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2644-45, 77 L. Ed. 2d 110, 121 (1983)).
In contrast, Washington has not adopted the federal Supreme
Court's blanket holding that dog sniffs are not searches. State v. Boyce,
44 Wn. App. 724, 730, 723 P.2d 28, 31 (1986) ("As long as the canine
sniffs the object from an area where the defendant does not have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy, and the canine sniff itself is minimally
intrusive, then no search has occurred."). Washington law requires a
case-by-case analysis when officers use sensory-enhancing techniques in
the course of their investigations. State v. Jackson, 150 Wn.2d 251, 264,
76 P.3d 217, 224 (2003) (en banc) (installation of "sense-enhancing"
GPS tracking on vehicle constitutes search and seizure under Article I,
Section 7); Young, 123 Wn.2d at 188 ("a dog sniff might constitute a
search if the object of the search or the location of the search were sub-
ject to heightened constitutional protection"); State v. Stanphill, 53 Wn.
App. 623, 631, 769 P.2d 861, 865 (1989) (dog sniff of package at post
office is not a search); State v. Wolohan, 23 Wn. App. 813, 818, 598 P.2d
421, 424 (1979) (dog sniff of parcel in bus terminal is not a search).
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Similarly, in Washington, unlawful activity in a public toilet stall
carries no legitimate expectation of privacy. State v. Berber, 48 Wn.
App. 583, 590-91, 740 P.2d 863, 868-69 (1987) (a police officer's
glance over the defendant's shoulder while standing over an open toilet
in a public restroom was not a violation of the defendant's privacy
rights).
In addition, there is no legitimate expectation of privacy under the
Fourth Amendment when one party consents to the recording of a con-
versation. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 726, 104 S. Ct. 3296,
3309, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530, 548 (1984); United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S.
741, 744, 99 S. Ct.. 1465, 1467, 59 L. Ed. 2d 733, 738 (1979). Thus, a
defendant who utilized a telephone answering service whereby both he
and the caller were aware that a third party was taking messages had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the recorded message and, thus, no
search occurred when the records were subpoenaed. Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735, 740, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 2580, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220, 226 (1979).
See infra § 1.3(a) for a discussion of State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 68-
69, 720 P.2d 808, 816 (1986) (en banc) (holding that the use of pen reg-
isters to record telephone numbers dialed without valid legal process in
violation of Article I, Section 7).
Similarly, Washington courts have found that there is no Article I,
Section 7 violation when a party consents to the recording of a conversa-
tion. Clark, 129 Wn.2d at 221; State v. Pulido, 68 Wn. App. 59, 63, 841
P.2d 1251, 1253 (1992). The Washington Legislature has specifically
allowed law enforcement agencies to record conversations when the par-
ties have consented to the recording. RCW 9.73.030(1)(a) ("[I]t shall be
unlawful for any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or the
state of Washington, its agencies, and political subdivisions to intercept,
or record any . . . [p]rivate communication transmitted by telephone,
telegraph, radio, or other device between two or more individuals . . .
without first obtaining the consent of all the participants in the commu-
nication.") (emphasis added).
In State v. Townsend, the Washington Supreme Court gave an ex-
pansive reading to RCW 9.73.030(l)(a), holding that a party has "con-
sented" to the recording of electronic messaging communications if the
party has knowledge that the communications will be recorded. 147
Wn.2d 666, 676, 57 P.3d 255, 260 (2002) (en banc). Accordingly, be-
cause the Townsend defendant, at a minimum, constructively knew that
his attempts to arrange sexual encounters with a minor over an Internet
instant messaging service were automatically recorded by the receiving
computer, the defendant was deemed to have consented to the recording
of the communications. Id.; see also In re Marriage of Farr, 87 Wn.
[Vol. 28:467
Washington Search & Seizure
App. 177, 184, 940 P.2d 679, 682-83 (1997) (holding that because an
answering machine's only purpose is to record messages, a defendant
who has knowingly left messages on the answering machine has implic-
itly consented to the recording and has no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy as to the recording).
1.2 DEFINING "SEARCH" POST-KA TZ: CONTINUING VITALITY OF
"CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED AREAS"
Although the concept of "constitutionally protected areas" does not
"serve as a talismanic solution to every Fourth Amendment problem,"
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 n.9, 88 S. Ct. 507, 511 n.9, 19
L. Ed. 2d 576, 582 n.9 (1967), the concept retains considerable clout.
The United States Supreme Court has referred to "constitutionally pro-
tected areas" since Katz and has given special deference to the areas spe-
cifically enumerated within the Fourth Amendment. For example, the
Fourth Amendment prohibits police from making a warrantless and non-
consensual entry into a suspect's home, absent exigent circumstances, to
effect a routine felony arrest. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576,
100 S. Ct. 1371, 1374-75, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 644 (1980); see also Kyllo
v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 2043, 150 L. Ed. 2d
94, 102 (2001) ("We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology
any information regarding the interior of the home that could not other-
wise have been obtained without physical 'intrusion into a constitution-
ally protected area,' constitutes a search-at least where (as here) the
technology in question is not in general public use."') (citation omitted).
The Fourth Amendment protects an individual's privacy in a vari-
ety of settings. In no setting is the zone of privacy more clearly defined
than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an indi-
vidual's home-a zone that finds its roots in clear and specific constitu-
tional terms: "The right of the people to be secure in their ... houses ...
shall not be violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV. That language unequivo-
cally establishes the proposition that "[a]t the very core [of the Fourth
Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and
there be free from unreasonable government intrusion." Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S. Ct. 679, 683, 5 L. Ed. 2d 734,
739 (1961); see also Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34, 121 S. Ct. at 2043, 150 L. Ed.
2d at 102 ("[I]n the case of the search of the interior of homes-the pro-
totypical and hence most commonly litigated area of protected privacy-
there is a ready criterion, with roots deep in the common law, of the
minimal expectation of privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged to
be reasonable."). In terms that apply equally to seizures of property and
seizures of persons, courts have drawn the Fourth Amendment line at the
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entrance to the house. Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511, 81 S. Ct. at 683, 5 L.
Ed. 2d at 739. Article I, Section 7 of the Washington Constitution has a
similar emphasis on protection of privacy in private homes. Const. art. I,
§ 7 ("No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home in-
vaded, without authority of law.") (emphasis added); see also State v.
Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d 103, 112, 960 P.2d 927, 931 (1998) (en banc) ("'the
closer officers come to intrusion into a dwelling, the greater the constitu-
tional protection"') (quoting State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d 173, 185, 867
P.2d 593, 599 (1994) (en banc)); State v. Groom, 133 Wn.2d 679, 685,
947 P.2d 240, 244 (1997) (en banc) ("Article I, section 7 is more protec-
tive of the home than is the Fourth Amendment"); State v. Solberg, 122
Wn.2d 688, 699, 861 P.2d 460, 466 (1993) (en banc) (the state constitu-
tion prohibits police officers from arresting a suspect without a warrant
while the suspect is standing within the doorway of a residence); State v.
Weller, 76 Wn. App. 165, 167, 884 P.2d 610, 612 (1994) (the defen-
dant's porch was not a constitutionally protected area). Houses, then, are
"constitutionally protected areas" because, as under the pre-Katz analy-
sis, "houses" are specifically enumerated in the Fourth Amendment and
Article I, Section 7 of the Washington Constitution.
However, while "[t]he Fourth Amendment generally prohibits the
warrantless entry of a person's home," this prohibition does not apply
where the police obtain voluntary consent, either from the individual
whose property is searched, or from a third person who possesses com-
mon authority over the premises. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177,
181, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2797, 111 L. Ed. 2d 148, 156 (1990). Under the
Fourth Amendment, the police may reasonably rely on the apparent au-
thority of the person consenting to the entry. Id. at 188, 110 S. Ct. at
2801, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 161. But see State v. Leach, 113 Wn.2d 735, 738,
782 P.2d 1035, 1037 (1989) (en banc) (implied consent by a third party
is ineffective where a suspect is present and objecting to the search).
Under Article I, Section 7, in certain circumstances the duty of an
officer to obtain consent is greater than under the Fourth Amendment.
For example, in Ferrier, the Washington Supreme Court considered the
validity of a "knock and talk" procedure, in which police officers obtain
consent to conduct a warrantless search of a residence by knocking on
the resident's door and asking for permission to enter and search the
house. 136 Wn.2d at 106. The Ferrier court held that, while consent is an
exception to the Article I, Section 7 requirement of a search warrant, the
burden is on the state to prove that consent was obtained. Id. at 111.
In addition, the Ferrier court held that the officer's failure to warn
the defendant that she had the right to refuse consent "violated [the de-
fendant's] state constitutional right to privacy in her home and, thus, viti-
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ated the consent she gave." Id. at 115. However, the stricter Ferrier con-
sent rule is not applicable in other circumstances. See State v. Thang, 145
Wn.2d 630, 636-37, 41 P.3d 1159, 1162 (2002) (en banc) (if officers do
not intend to search a residence without a warrant, the Ferrier rule is in-
applicable, and the court should apply a "totality of the circumstances"
test); State v. Bustamante-Davila, 138 Wn.2d 964, 981, 983 P.2d 590,
598-99 (1999) (en banc) (officer accompanying INS investigation need
not follow the Ferrier "knock and talk" rule); State v. Khounvichai, 110
Wn. App. 722, 728, 42 P.3d 1000, 1003 (2002) (Ferrier rule is limited to
"situations where police seek to conduct a search for contraband or evi-
dence of a crime without obtaining a search warrant").
1.3 SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS OF POST-KA TZ ANALYSIS
1.3(a) Residential Premises
As described above, an individual has a privacy interest in the inte-
rior of his or her home. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
589-90, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1381-82, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 652-53 (1980);
State v. Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d 103, 960 P.2d 927 (1998) (en banc); I
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.3(b), at 565-72 (4th ed.
2004). Although "a man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he
expects privacy ... objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to
the 'plain view' of outsiders are not 'protected' because no intention to
keep them to himself has been exhibited." State v. Clark, 129 Wn.2d
211,229-30, 916 P.2d 384, 394 (1996) (en banc) (quoting Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S. Ct. 507, 516, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 587-88
(1967)); see also State v. Ross, 141 Wn.2d 304, 313, 4 P.3d 130, 135
(2000) (en banc) ("Under the 'open view' doctrine, detection by an offi-
cer who is lawfully present at the vantage point and able to detect some-
thing by utilization of one or more of his senses does not constitute a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."); State v. Rose,
128 Wn.2d 388, 392, 909 P.2d 280, 283 (1996) (en banc) (where the
"open view" doctrine is satisfied, the object under observation is not sub-
ject to any reasonable expectation of privacy; no violation was found
where the officer looked through an unobstructed window of the defen-
dant's mobile home with the aid of a flashlight); State v. Smith, 118 Wn.
App. 480, 484-85, 93 P.3d 877, 879 (2003) (a person does not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in areas of a home's curtilage impli-
edly open to the public); State v. Drumhiller, 36 Wn. App. 592, 595, 675
P.2d 631, 633 (1984) (legitimate expectation of privacy means more than
subjective expectation of not being discovered; defendants' claimed pri-
vacy expectation in home was not reasonable when defendants posi-
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tioned themselves in front of a picture window with the lights on and
drapes open). See infra § 5.6 for a discussion of the plain view doctrine.
A search of a home can occur even when government officers do
not themselves enter the home. Specifically, a search can occur when the
"[g]ovemment uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore
details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without
physical intrusion." Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40, 121 S. Ct.
2038, 2046, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94, 106 (2001). Similarly, a search occurs,
triggering the Fourth Amendment, when the government monitors an
electronic device to determine whether a particular article or person is
within an individual's home at a particular time. United States v. Karo,
468 U.S. 705, 714-15, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 3302-03, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530, 541
(1984); see also Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158, 158, 84 S. Ct. 1186,
1186, 12 L. Ed. 2d 213, 213 (1964) (Clark, J., concurring) (the Fourth
Amendment is implicated when a microphone used by police officers
"penetrate[s]" the petitioner's premises in a manner sufficient to consti-
tute trespass). Consistent with the federal courts' analysis, the Washing-
ton Supreme Court has held that infrared surveillance of a home was a
search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d
173, 186, 867 P.2d 593, 599-600 (1994) (en banc).
The privacy interest in a home is not confined to houses, but ex-
tends to other types of residences. See, e.g., Stoner v. California, 376
U.S. 483, 490, 84 S. Ct. 889, 893, 11 L. Ed. 2d 856, 861 (1964) (hotel
rooms); State v. Murray, 84 Wn.2d 527, 534, 527 P.2d 1303, 1308
(1974) (en banc) (apartments); State v. Davis, 86 Wn. App. 414, 419, 937
P.2d 1110, 1113 (1997) (motel rooms). There is a reduced expectation of
privacy in motor vehicles that are readily mobile but can also be used for
sleeping. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 389, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2068,
85 L. Ed. 2d 406, 412 (1985) (mobile motor home); see also State v.
Gluck, 83 Wn.2d 424, 427, 518 P.2d 703, 706 (1974) (en banc) ("[W]hat
may be an unreasonable search of a house may be reasonable in the case
of a motor car.").
In addition, there is a reduced privacy interest when several persons
or families occupy premises in common rather than individually, e.g.,
tenants sharing common living quarters but maintaining separate bed-
rooms. State v. Alexander, 41 Wn. App. 152, 155-56, 704 P.2d 618, 620
(1985).
The expectation of privacy in residential premises may persist even
when a home is fire-damaged and arson is suspected. Michigan v. Clif-
ford, 464 U.S. 287, 292, 104 S. Ct. 641, 646, 78 L. Ed. 2d 477, 483
(1984); State v. Carey, 42 Wn. App. 840, 852-53, 714 P.2d 708, 714
(1986).
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A person may relinquish the privacy interest in an activity or object
in the home by making the activity or object observable to persons out-
side. State v. Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d 400, 408, 47 P.3d 127, 131 (2002)
(en banc) ("[I]f an officer detects something by using one or more of his
or her senses, while lawfully present at the vantage point where those
senses are used, no search has occurred."); Drumhiller, 36 Wn. App. at
595 (defendants had no reasonable privacy interest in activity in their
home when they positioned themselves in front of picture window with
lights on and drapes open). Cf State v. Jordan, 29 Wn. App. 924, 927,
631 P.2d 989, 991 (1981) ("The fact that the occupants had not com-
pletely succeeded in shutting the curtains does not diminish the reason-
ableness of their expectation of privacy."). However, a person does not
relinquish the privacy interest in the home by opening the door in re-
sponse to a police officer's knock. State v. Holeman, 103 Wn.2d 426,
429, 693 P.2d 89, 91 (1985) (en banc); see also State v. Ferrier, 136
Wn.2d 103, 960 P.2d 927 (1998) (en banc).
Furthermore, persons may waive their right to privacy by willingly
admitting a visitor, e.g., an undercover police officer, into the premises to
conduct an illegal transaction. Thus, the Washington Supreme Court
found that a defendant waived any right to privacy by willingly admitting
a stranger into a motel room to conduct a drug transaction. State v.
Carter, 127 Wn.2d 836, 848, 904 P.2d 290, 296 (1995) (en banc); see
also State v. Dalton, 43 Wn. App. 279, 284-85, 716 P.2d 940, 944
(1986) (student invited officer into college dormitory to conduct an ille-
gal drug transaction; warrantless entry upheld as nonintrusive since po-
lice were invited in and took nothing except what would have been taken
by a willing purchaser).
People using their home telephones have no Fourth Amendment
privacy interest in the phone numbers dialed, Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735, 745-46, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 2582, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220, 230 (1979),
nor is there a privacy interest in the contents of a phone call when a re-
cording machine's speaker makes incoming calls audible to anyone pre-
sent in the room. United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000, 1011 (9th Cir.
1983); see also In re Marriage of Farr, 87 Wn. App. 177, 184, 940 P.2d
679, 682-83 (1997) (holding that because an answering machine's only
purpose is to record messages, a defendant who has knowingly left mes-
sages on the answering machine has implicitly consented to the recording
of the message).
The Washington Constitution, however, provides broader protec-
tion to a telephone user's privacy interests than does the federal constitu-
tion. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 69, 720 P.2d 808, 816 (1986) (en
banc) (specifically overruling Bixler v. Hille, 80 Wn.2d 668, 497 P.2d
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594 (1972) (en banc), which held that a pen register does not intercept
telephonic communications, and declining to follow Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1979)). The Gunwall
court found that a home telephone customer's privacy rights under Arti-
cle I, Section 7 were violated when the police, without valid legal proc-
ess, obtained by means of pen register or other device, a record of the
local and long distance telephone numbers dialed on the customer's tele-
phone. Id. at 68-69. A pen register is a device that records or decodes
electronic or other impulses that identify the numbers dialed or otherwise
transmitted on the telephone line to which such device is attached. See 18
U.S.C. § 3127(3). The Gunwall court also considered whether the police
may obtain telephone toll records and held that toll records could only be
secured under "authority of law," which includes legal process such as a
search warrant or subpoena. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d at 69.
Courts in some jurisdictions have held that common hallways of
multiple-dwelling buildings that are accessible to the public are not pro-
tected areas. See, e.g., United States v. Acosta, 965 F.2d 1248, 1252-53
(3d Cir. 1992); 1 LaFave, supra, § 2.3(b), at 565-72. Even if a building
is secure and not accessible to the public, some courts have found no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy to the common hallways. See, e.g., United
States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1240, 1242 (9th Cir.1993) (apartment
dweller of "high security" apartment building has no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in the common areas of the building; search is valid even
though officer trespassed). But see State v. Breuer, 577 N.W.2d 41, 46-
47 (Iowa 1998) (expectation of privacy is reasonable in the hallway of an
apartment building that only has two units and visitors usually wait at the
outer door before entering the building); People v. Beachman, 98 Mich.
App. 544, 552, 296 N.W.2d 305, 308 (1980) (Fourth Amendment protec-
tions extend to the lobby of a locked residential hotel). See generally 1
LaFave, supra, § 2.3(b), at 565-72.
The Fourth Amendment is also triggered when an officer enters a
person's home to search for someone who does not live there. See Stea-
gald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 213-14, 101 S. Ct. 1642, 1648, 68
L. Ed. 2d 38, 46 (1981); see also State v. Williams, 142 Wn.2d 17, 24, 11
P.3d 714, 718 (2000) (en banc) (citing Steagald with approval).
In addition, the Fourth Amendment is triggered when a housing in-
spector enters to conduct an administrative search. See Camara v. Mu-
nicipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 1730-31, 18 L. Ed. 2d
930, 935 (1967); City of Seattle v. McCready, 124 Wn.2d 300, 309, 877
P.2d 686, 691 (1994) (en banc); see also Columbia Basin Apartment
Ass'n v. City of Pasco, 268 F.3d 791, 805 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he Wash-
ington Constitution requires a Washington statute, court rule, or judicial
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opinion authorizing the issuance of [administrative] warrants."). How-
ever, in Washington, municipal courts have no "inherent authority to is-
sue administrative search warrants." McCready, 124 Wn.2d at 309. Thus,
Washington courts "must rely on an authorizing statute or court rule" for
such authority. Id. Accordingly, in McCready, the court found that in the
absence of a statute or court rule authorizing the issuance of warrants for
civil infractions, Washington courts are limited to issuing administrative
warrants to search for evidence of a crime. Id. at 309-10. See infra §
2.9(a).
1.3(b) Related Structures: The Curtilage
The "curtilage" of residential premises consists of "all buildings in
close proximity to a dwelling, which are continually used for carrying on
domestic employment; or such place as is necessary and convenient to a
dwelling, and is habitually used for family purposes." United States v.
Potts, 297 F.2d 68, 69 (6th Cir. 1961); see also State v. Dodson, 110 Wn.
App. 112, 123, 39 P.3d 324, 331 (2002) ("Open curtilage is that area ap-
parently open to the public, such as the driveway, the walkway, or any
access route leading to the residence."). Prior to Katz, the curtilage
served as the controlling standard of an individual's privacy interest:
Structures within the curtilage were protected and structures outside the
curtilage were not. See 1 LaFave, supra, § 2.3(d), at 587-90 (4th ed.
2004). In the aftermath of Katz, the curtilage has been considered "part
of [the] home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes." Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170, 180, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1742, 80 L. Ed. 2d 214, 225
(1984).
The United States Supreme Court has identified four factors that
should be reviewed in determining the extent of a residence's curtilage:
[T]he proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home,
whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the
home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps
taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people
passing by.
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301, 107 S. Ct. 1134, 1139,
94 L. Ed. 2d 326, 334-35 (1987). The Dunn Court expressly declined to
adopt a "bright-line" rule that the curtilage extends no farther than the
nearest fence surrounding a fenced house. Id. at 301 n.4, 107 S. Ct. at
1140 n.4, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 335 n.4. Rather, a court is to use the factors
identified above as a tool in determining whether the area in question is
so intimately tied to the home as to fall within "the home's 'umbrella' of
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Fourth Amendment protection." Id. at 301, 107 S. Ct. at 1140, 94 L. Ed.
2d at 335.
However, the expectation of privacy in structures located and
viewed from outside the curtilage, but on private property, is the same as
the expectation of privacy in those structures viewed from public places.
Id. at 304, 107 S. Ct. at 1141, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 337. Thus, in Dunn, the
Court held that police officers standing in an open field could look into
the defendant's barn, even if the defendant had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the barn. Id. See also 1 LaFave, supra, § 2.3(d)-(e), at 587-
98.
Similarly, Washington courts have not recognized a privacy interest
in those areas of the curtilage that are impliedly open to the public. See
State v. Thompson, 151 Wn.2d 793, 807, 92 P.3d 228, 235 (2004) (en
banc) ("It is clear that the police with legitimate business may enter areas
of curtilage which are impliedly open. In so doing, the police are free to
use their senses."); State v. Ross, 141 Wn.2d 304, 312, 4 P.3d 130, 135
(2000) (en banc) ("An officer with legitimate business, when acting in
the same manner as a reasonably respectful citizen, is permitted to enter
the curtilage areas of a private residence which are impliedly open, such
as access routes to the house."); State v. Rose, 128 Wn.2d 388, 392, 909
P.2d 280, 283 (1996) (en banc) (officer entitled to walk up onto a porch
which was the usual access route to the house); see also State v.
Chaussee, 72 Wn. App. 704, 709-10, 866 P.2d 643, 647 (1994) (no ex-
pectation of privacy in common access road leading to defendant's resi-
dence). A court will, however, consider a combination of factors when
analyzing the admissibility of evidence, including whether police officers
have done the following: (1) spied into the residence; (2) acted secretly;
(3) acted after dark; (4) used the most direct access route; (5) tried to
contact the resident; (6) created an artificial vantage point; or (7) made
the discovery accidentally. State v. Myers, 117 Wn.2d 332, 345, 815 P.2d
761, 769 (1991) (en banc) (citing State v. Seagull, 95 Wn.2d 898, 905,
632 P.2d 44, 50 (1981) (en banc)); see also State v. Niedergang, 43 Wn.
App. 656, 662, 719 P.2d 576, 579 (1986) (car parked in cul-de-sac not
within curtilage). However, a court will not apply these factors as a fixed
formula. Ross, 141 Wn.2d at 309 n.1.
1.3(c) Adjoining Lands and "Open Fields"
Certain lands adjacent to a dwelling fall within the privacy protec-
tion surrounding the residence. Thus, "[t]he protection afforded by the
Fourth Amendment, insofar as houses are concerned, has never been re-
stricted to the interior of the house, but has extended to open areas im-
mediately adjacent thereto." Wattenburg v. United States, 388 F.2d 853,
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857 (9th Cir. 1968) (reasonable expectation of privacy extends to back-
yard of lodge); see also Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104
S. Ct. 1735, 1741, 80 L. Ed. 2d 214, 224 (1984) (individual may have
legitimate expectation of privacy in "area immediately surrounding the
home"). But see United States v. Basile, 569 F.2d 1053, 1056 (9th Cir.
1978) ("The Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures does not extend to open fields."). The applicability
of federal search and seizure protections to areas immediately surround-
ing the home is determined by the Katz test of reasonable expectation of
privacy. 1 LaFave, supra, § 2.3(f), at 598-606 (4th ed. 2004).
Adjoining lands that are used as normal access routes by the gen-
eral public are only "semi-private" and therefore do not always enjoy
Fourth Amendment protections. Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western
Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 865, 94 S. Ct. 2114, 2115-16, 40 L. Ed. 2d
607,611 (1974); United States v. Magana, 512 F.2d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir.
1975). Thus, Fourth Amendment protections will not apply to a police
investigation that is restricted to places where visitors could be expected
to go. State v. Dodson, 110 Wn. App. 112, 123, 39 P.3d 324, 331 (2002);
State v. Gave, 77 Wn. App. 333, 337, 890 P.2d 1088, 1090 (1995)
(driveway, walkway, or access routes leading to residence or to porch of
residence are all areas of "curtilage" impliedly open to the public); see
also State v. Solberg, 122 Wn.2d 688, 698-99, 861 P.2d 460, 465 (1993)
(en banc) (unenclosed front porch held to be a public place, not a consti-
tutionally protected area); State v. Graffius, 74 Wn. App. 23, 24, 871
P.2d 1115, 1118 (1994) (driveway commonly used for guests and mem-
bers of the public not protected); State v. Coburne, 10 Wn. App. 298,
314, 518 P.2d 747, 757 (1973) (apartment building common parking lot
not protected).
On the other hand, when the police enter onto adjoining lands that
are not used as an access area by the general public, the Fourth Amend-
ment guarantees do apply. For example, a Washington court found that a
warrantless intrusion into a backyard, which was enclosed by a six-foot
fence and padlocked gate, violated the Fourth Amendment. State v.
Mierz, 72 Wn. App. 783, 791, 866 P.2d 65, 70-71 (1994), aff'd, 127
Wn.2d 460, 901 P.2d 286 (1995); see also Fixel v. Wainwright, 492 F.2d
480, 484 (5th Cir. 1974) (backyard behind a four-unit apartment build-
ing, which is not used as a common passageway by tenants, is protected).
But see State v. Niedergang, 43 Wn. App. 656, 662, 719 P.2d 576, 579
(1986) (car parked in common area near suspect's dwelling was not con-
sidered within curtilage).
Under the old "constitutionally protected areas" analysis, the pri-
vacy protections did not apply to "open fields." Hester v. United States,
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265 U.S. 57, 59, 44 S. Ct. 445, 446, 68 L. Ed. 898, 900 (1924). Conse-
quently, a defendant could not invoke constitutional privacy protections
with respect to police intrusions onto open fields, wooded areas, vacant
lots in urban areas, open beaches, reservoirs, or open waters. See 1 La-
Fave, supra, § 2.4(a), at 617-26.
The "open fields" doctrine has been reaffirmed under the Katz
analysis on the grounds that an expectation of privacy in open fields is
unreasonable. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179, 104 S. Ct. at 1741, 80 L. Ed. 2d at
224 ("[O]pen fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activi-
ties that the Amendment is intended to shelter from government interfer-
ence or surveillance."). Moreover, a person in possession of land falling
within the purview of the open fields doctrine cannot create a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the area by taking steps to conceal activities
such as posting "no trespassing" signs or erecting fences around the se-
cluded areas. Id. at 182, 104 S. Ct. at 1743, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 227 (issue
was whether "government's intrusion infringes upon the personal and
societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment"); Dodson, 110 Wn.
App. at 123 (presence of "no trespassing" signs is not dispositive of the
homeowner's reasonable expectation of privacy).
Even land within the curtilage may be protected only from certain
types of surveillance. Thus, aerial surveillance is not precluded merely
because precautions have been taken against ground surveillance. Cali-
fornia v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1812, 90 L. Ed. 2d
210, 217 (1986) (aerial surveillance of marijuana growing in a fenced
backyard does not implicate Fourth Amendment and officer's observa-
tions were merely from a public vantage point); see also Florida v. Riley,
488 U.S. 445, 450, 109 S. Ct. 693, 696-97, 102 L. Ed. 2d 835, 842
(1989) (surveillance of a residential backyard by a helicopter is not a
"search" requiring warrant under Fourth Amendment). However, if
highly sophisticated equipment is used in conducting the aerial surveil-
lance, the Fourth Amendment may be implicated. Dow Chem. Co. v.
United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1826, 90 L. Ed. 2d
226, 238 (1986).
In addition, the fact that police commit a common law trespass
while observing an object or activity in an open field does not render the
intrusion a search under the federal constitution. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 183,
104 S. Ct. at 1741, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 224-25. Thus, an intrusion may be
onto the land itself as well as by aerial surveillance and yet still not be
considered a search. Id. at 177, 104 S. Ct. at 1741, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 224-
25.
Under the Washington Constitution, aerial surveillance at certain
altitudes without the aid of enhancement devices does not constitute a
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search. State v. Cord, 103 Wn.2d 361, 365, 693 P.2d 81, 87 (1985) (ae-
rial surveillance of defendant's property at an altitude of 3,400 feet with-
out the aid of visual enhancement devices does not constitute a search,
even though surveillance was conducted with the aim of discovering
marijuana plants); State v. Myrick, 102 Wn.2d 506, 514, 688 P.2d 151,
155 (1984) (en banc) (observation of defendant's marijuana plants at an
altitude of 1,500 feet with the unaided eye was not a search); State v.
Wilson, 97 Wn. App. 578, 581, 988 P.2d 463, 465 (1999) ("Aerial sur-
veillance is not a search where the contraband is identifiable with the
unaided eye, from a lawful vantage point, and from a nonintrusive alti-
tude.").
The relevant inquiry under Article I, Section 7, however, is not
whether the observed object was in a "protected place" or whether the
defendant had a legitimate and subjective expectation of privacy in the
observed location; rather, the appropriate inquiry is whether "the State
unreasonably intruded into the defendant's 'private affairs."' Myrick, 102
Wn.2d at 510; Wilson, 97 Wn. App. at 581; see also State v. Cockerell,
102 Wn.2d 561, 566, 689 P.2d 32, 36-37 (1984) (en banc) (holding that
while an aerial surveillance at the altitude of 800 feet was acceptable, a
second plane that flew at an altitude of 200 feet was an "unreasonable
intrusive overflight"). The nature of the property may also be a factor in
determining what constitutes "private affairs," but the fact that the loca-
tion of the search is an open field is not conclusive. Myrick, 102 Wn.2d
at 513.
Moreover, the Washington Supreme Court has suggested that even
when an individual has no subjective expectation of privacy, an intrusion
may nevertheless constitute a search. Thus, "merely because it is gener-
ally known that the technology exists to enable police to view private
activities from an otherwise nonintrusive vantage point, it does not fol-
low that these activities are without protection." State v. Young, 123
Wn.2d 173, 186, 867 P.2d 593, 599 (1994) (en banc) (citing Myrick, 102
Wn.2d at 513). The focus is on "those privacy interests which citizens of
this state have held, and should be entitled to hold, safe from governmen-
tal trespass absent a warrant." State v. Rankin, 151 Wn.2d 689, 695, 92
P.3d 202, 205 (2004) (en banc) (quoting Myrick, 102 Wn.2d at 511); see
also Cord, 103 Wn.2d at 365; State v. Seagull, 95 Wn.2d 898, 903, 632
P.2d 44, 47 (1981) (en banc). In both Cord and Myrick the police used no
visual enhancement devices; in addition, their vantage points for observ-
ing the contraband were lawful. Cord, 103 Wn.2d at 365; Myrick, 102
Wn.2d at 514; see also State v. Hanson, 42 Wn. App. 755, 762, 714 P.2d
309, 314, aff'd, 107 Wn.2d 331, 728 P.2d 593 (1986) (search warrant for
marijuana fields obtained by use of photos and testimony of officer taken
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from a "plain view" vantage point was sufficient); State v. Jeffries, 105
Wn.2d 398, 413-14, 717 P.2d 722, 731 (1986) (en banc) ("storage areas"
that are visible to the naked eye will not be protected by either state or
federal provisions against search and seizure); cf Oliver, 466 U.S. at
183, 104 S. Ct. at 1743-44, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 227 ("Nor is the govern-
ment's intrusion upon an open field a 'search' in the constitutional sense
because that intrusion is a trespass at common law. The existence of a
property right is but one element in determining whether expectations of
privacy are legitimate."). For a general discussion of aerial surveillance,
see Bradley W. Foster, Warrantless Aerial Surveillance and the Right to
Privacy: The Flight of the Fourth Amendment, 56 J. Air Law & Com.
719 (1991); 1 LaFave, supra, § 2.7, at 728-85.
1.3(d) Business and Commercial Premises
The Fourth Amendment privacy protections extend to most busi-
ness and commercial premises. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476
U.S. 227, 235, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1825, 90 L. Ed. 2d 226, 235 (1986);
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311, 98 S. Ct. 1816, 1819, 56
L. Ed. 2d 305, 310 (1978) (OSHA inspector's entry into the nonpublic
working areas of electrical and plumbing business constituted a search);
Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368, 88 S. Ct. 2120, 2124, 20 L. Ed.
2d 1154, 1159 (1968) (union official has reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in his or her office, even when it is shared with other union offi-
cials); see also See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545-46, 87 S. Ct.
1737, 1740-41, 18 L. Ed. 2d 943, 947-48 (1967) (absent consent or
emergency, administrative inspectors ordinarily must obtain special ad-
ministrative warrants in order to conduct routine inspections of commer-
cial buildings for possible health and safety violations). However, unlike
searches of private homes, the legislature may authorize warrantless ad-
ministrative searches of commercial property without violating the
Fourth Amendment. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702, 107 S. Ct.
2636, 2644, 96 L. Ed. 2d 601, 614 (1987). If the legislative authorization
does not contain rules governing the procedure that inspectors must fol-
low, however, general Fourth Amendment restrictions will apply. Dono-
van v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 599, 101 S. Ct. 2534, 2538, 69 L. Ed. 2d
262, 269 (1981). One of the factors considered in determining whether
warrantless administrative inspections are allowed is whether a business
has been extensively regulated historically (such as businesses dealing
with liquor and firearms). Burger, 482 U.S. at 707, 107 S. Ct. at 2646, 96
L. Ed. 2d at 617 (automobile junkyards have historically been regulated);
Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 313, 98 S. Ct. at 1821, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 312 (distin-
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guishing the liquor and firearms industries from ordinary businesses on
the basis of"a long tradition of close government supervision").
The nature of the place as either a personal residence or business
may also affect the determination of whether an area is curtilage or an
open field. Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 229, 106 S. Ct. at 1827, 90 L.
Ed. 2d at 238. If portions of business and commercial premises are open
to the public for inspection of wares, they are not considered private.
"[A]s an ordinary matter law enforcement officials may accept a general
public invitation to enter commercial premises for purposes not related to
the trade conducted thereupon . . . ." United States v. Berrett, 513 F.2d
154, 156 (1st Cir. 1975). Thus, the warrantless entry into the public
lobby of a motel or restaurant for the purpose of serving an administra-
tive subpoena is permitted although the "administrative subpoena itself
[does] not authorize either entry or inspection of [the] premises .... "
Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 464 U.S. 408, 413-14, 104 S. Ct. 769, 772-
73, 78 L. Ed. 2d 567, 572 (1984) (an employer may not insist on a judi-
cial warrant as a condition precedent to a valid administrative subpoena
unless government inspectors seek nonconsensual entry into "areas not
open to the public").
Courts have generally upheld police investigative entries into bus
terminals, pool halls, bars, restaurants, and general stores such as furni-
ture stores and variety stores. 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure §
2.4(b), at 626-38 (4th ed. 2004). But "[t]he 'implied invitation for cus-
tomers to come in' ... extends only to those times when the premises are
in fact 'open to the public'; the mere fact that certain premises are open
to the public at certain times does not justify entry by the police on other
occasions." Id.
Although a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in commercial
premises, the warrant requirements for administrative searches of com-
mercial premises may differ from those for searches in general. See infra
§ 6.4(b); see also 1 LaFave, supra, § 2.4(b), at 626-38.
1.3(e) Automobiles and Other Motor Vehicles
Constitutional protections against unreasonable searches apply to
automobiles and other motor vehicles. California v. Carney, 471 U.S.
386, 390, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2068, 85 L. Ed. 2d 406, 412 (1985). These
protections apply because "automobiles are 'effects' under the Fourth
Amendment, and searches and seizures of automobiles are therefore sub-
ject to the constitutional standard of reasonableness." United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538, 548
(1977). However, while in automobiles, both passengers and drivers pos-
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sess a reduced expectation of privacy. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S.
295, 303, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 1302, 143 L. Ed. 2d 408, 416 (1999).
The pervasive regulation of automobiles may dilute the reasonable
expectation of privacy that exists with respect to other property. See
Carney, 471 U.S. at 386, 105 S. Ct. at 2069, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 414; see also
Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424, 124 S. Ct. 885, 889, 157 L. Ed. 2d
843, 850 (2004) ("The Fourth Amendment does not treat a motorist's car
as his castle."). Thus, a person does not have as great an expectation of
privacy in a vehicle as in a home. Id. Even so, "[a] citizen does not sur-
render all the protections of the Fourth Amendment by entering an auto-
mobile." New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112, 106 S. Ct. 960, 965, 89
L. Ed. 2d 81, 89 (1986). However, when a vehicle is used as a home, its
owner has a lesser expectation of privacy when that vehicle is readily
mobile and licensed to operate on public streets. Carney, 471 U.S. at
393, 105 S. Ct. at 2070, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 414 (mobile home in public lot
was treated as a vehicle); cf State v. Johnson, 128 Wn.2d 431, 449, 909
P.2d 293, 303 (1996) (en banc) (lessened privacy interest for sleeper
compartment of a tractor-trailer rig).
Passengers in automobiles have an expectation of privacy that is in-
dependent of the driver. Thus, even when a driver is under arrest, "where
officers do not have articulable suspicion that an individual is armed or
dangerous and have nothing to independently connect such person to il-
legal activity," a search of a passenger in an automobile is invalid. State
v. Parker, 139 Wn.2d 486, 498, 987 P.2d 73, 80 (1999) (en banc).
The lesser expectation of privacy in a vehicle does not automati-
cally extend to closed containers within the vehicle. Chadwick, 433 U.S.
at 13, 97 S. Ct. at 2484, 53 L. Ed. 2d at 549. Nevertheless, a warrantless
search of containers does not violate the Fourth Amendment if officers
have probable cause to believe that the containers are concealing contra-
band. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 300, 119 S. Ct. at 1300, 143 L. Ed. 2d at
414; see also State v. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144, 150, 152, 720 P.2d 436,
440, 441 (1986) (en banc) ("During the arrest process... officers should
be allowed to search the passenger compartment of a vehicle for weap-
ons or destructible evidence. However, if the officers encounter a locked
container or locked glove compartment, they may not unlock and search
either container without obtaining a warrant.") (overruling State v.
Ringer, 100 Wn.2d 686, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983) (en banc)).
1.3(f) Personal Characteristics
The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people to be secure
in their persons against unreasonable searches and seizures. Personal
characteristics such as facial features and voice tone, which are continu-
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ally exposed to the public, generally do not fall within this constitutional
protection because an individual has no reasonable expectation that these
characteristics will remain private.
In Katz v. United States . . . [the Court] said that the Fourth
Amendment provides no protection for what "a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office." (citation
omitted). The physical characteristics of a person's voice, its tone
and manner, as opposed to the content of a specific conversation,
are constantly exposed to the public. Like a man's facial character-
istics, or handwriting, his voice is repeatedly produced for others to
hear. No person can have a reasonable expectation that others will
not know the sound of his voice any more than he can reasonably
expect that his face will be a mystery to the world.
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14, 93 S. Ct. 764, 771, 35 L.
Ed. 2d 67, 79 (1973) (subpoena of voice exemplars does not infringe on
protected Fourth Amendment interests). The Court reached the same re-
sult in United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21, 93 S. Ct. 774, 776, 35 L.
Ed. 2d 99, 103 (1973), in which the witness was required to furnish
handwriting samples. Likening a person's voice to a person's facial char-
acteristics, the Court held that "[h]andwriting, like speech, is repeatedly
shown to the public, and there is no more expectation of privacy in the
physical characteristics of a person's script than there is in the tone of his
voice." Id.; see also Bedford v. Sugarman, 112 Wn.2d 500, 512, 772 P.2d
486, 492 (1989) (en banc) (shelter program which required indigent al-
coholics and drug addicts to move into shared shelters in order to receive
benefits did not violate the right to privacy because it did not require
shelter residents to "disclose intimate personal information to obtain
shelter benefits").
In contrast to the seizure of voice exemplars and facial characteris-
tics, the taking of blood, urine, or DNA samples is considered a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 76, 121 S. Ct. 1281, 1287, 149 L. Ed. 2d 205,
215 (2001) (urine samples); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767,
86 S. Ct. 1826, 1834, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908, 918 (1966) (blood samples);
State v. Surge, 122 Wn. App. 448, 454, 94 P.3d 345, 348 (2004) (DNA
samples); State v. Baldwin, 109 Wn. App. 516, 523, 37 P.3d 1220, 1224
(2001) (blood samples); Robinson v. City of Seattle, 102 Wn. App. 795,
818-19, 10 P.3d 452, 465 (2000) ("[T]he collection and testing of urine
intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as
reasonable."). The police have probable cause to believe that a person's
sample will provide evidence of criminal activity justifying the seizure if
the facts and circumstances known to the officers justify their belief that
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the person is intoxicated and has committed a crime of which intoxica-
tion is an element. State v. Curran, 116 Wn.2d 174, 184, 804 P.2d 558,
564 (1991) (en banc), overruled on other grounds, State v. Berlin, 133
Wn.2d 541, 947 P.2d 700 (1997); see also State v. Schulze, 116 Wn.2d
154, 161, 804 P.2d 566, 570 (1991) (en banc) (no right to counsel prior
to undergoing a mandatory blood draw); State v. Komoto, 40 Wn. App.
200, 208, 697 P.2d 1025, 1031 (1985) (police may enter home of sus-
pected drunk driver if police "have probable cause to believe that the
suspect was under the influence, that he has committed a felony of which
being under the influence of alcohol is an element, and that he is pres-
ently at home.").
In Washington, mandatory blood testing has been found to not vio-
late the Fourth Amendment or Article I, Section 7 in a variety of con-
texts. For example, the Washington Supreme Court has upheld manda-
tory blood tests of putative fathers, see State v. Meacham, 93 Wn.2d 735,
739, 612 P.2d 795, 798 (1980) (en banc), and mandatory HIV tests of
convicted sexual offenders, see In re Juveniles A, B, C, D, E, 121 Wn.2d
80, 93-94, 847 P.2d 455, 460 (1993). The court has further concluded
that DNA testing of suspected sexual offenders presents only minimal
Fourth Amendment intrusion. State v. Kalakosky, 121 Wn.2d 525, 535-
36, 852 P.2d 1064, 1069-70 (1993) (en banc). In State v. Olivas, the
court held that "a state interest in law enforcement will justify drawing
blood from convicted persons without probable cause or individualized
suspicion." 122 Wn.2d 73, 93, 856 P.2d 1076, 1086 (1993) (en banc).
Similarly, in Surge, the court upheld a statute requiring mandatory DNA
tests of convicted sexual offenders in order to establish a DNA databank.
122 Wn. App. at 456.
Although, in certain circumstances, drawing blood constitutes a sei-
zure, a defendant may unknowingly consent. For example, implied con-
sent to the administration of blood tests may be found in certain circum-
stances when a person drives an automobile. RCW 46.20.308; see Bald-
win, 109 Wn. App. at 525 (upholding constitutionality of implied consent
statute); see also State v. Judge, 100 Wn.2d 706, 712, 675 P.2d 219, 223
(1984) (en banc) (consent to blood testing is implied when a driver is
arrested for negligent homicide or when unconscious while being ar-
rested for driving while intoxicated).
1.3(g) Personal Effects and Papers
The Fourth Amendment expressly protects the right of privacy in
"papers. . and effects .... ." U.S. Const. amend. IV. Although litigation
concerning the search, seizure, and use of the content of private papers
frequently centers on the Fifth Amendment bar against self-
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incrimination, see, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 473, 96 S.
Ct. 2737, 2745, 49 L. Ed. 2d 627, 638 (1976), the Fourth Amendment
can act as an additional bar because of the protection accorded "papers"
and "effects." LaFave and other commentators have argued that even
when the seizure and use of private papers is consistent with the Fifth
Amendment, the Fourth Amendment poses an absolute bar against the
use of the highly private content of such papers. 1 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 2.6(e), at 707-15 (4th ed. 2004). But see United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440-41, 96 S. Ct. 1619, 1623, 48 L. Ed.
71, 78 (1976) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in bank records,
checks, deposit slips, and other records relating to bank accounts); State
v. Farmer, 80 Wn. App. 795, 801, 911 P.2d 1030, 1033 (1996) (no right
of privacy in bank account for a person who writes or passes bad
checks); Peters v. Sjoholm, 95 Wn.2d 871, 876, 631 P.2d 937, 940
(1982) (en banc) (no need for search and seizure warrant where the seiz-
ing agency has probable cause to believe bank fund belongs to the rele-
vant taxpayer); Dep't of Revenue v. March, 25 Wn. App. 314, 320, 610
P.2d 916, 920 (1979) (no expectation of privacy in tax records from le-
gitimate inquiry by tax authorities). Also, a patient buying narcotic drugs
from a pharmacy only has a limited expectation of privacy, and thus stat-
utes allowing access to such records without warrants do not violate the
constitution. Murphy v. State, 115 Wn. App. 297, 307-08, 62 P.3d 533,
538 (2003).
A reasonable expectation of privacy does not continue in personal
effects if the individual's relinquishment of the effects occurred under
circumstances indicating that the individual retained no reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in the invaded place. State v. Reynolds, 144 Wn.2d
282, 287-88, 27 P.3d 200, 203 (2001) (en banc) (no expectation of pri-
vacy in contents of jacket that was abandoned during an arrest); State v.
Cheatam, 112 Wn. App. 778, 784, 51 P.3d 138, 141 (2002) (no expecta-
tion of privacy to private property maintained in police evidence locker);
State v. Dugas, 109 Wn. App. 592, 595, 36 P.3d 577, 579 (2001) (offi-
cers may search voluntarily abandoned property); State v. Putnam, 61
Wn. App. 450, 456, 810 P.2d 977, 980 (1991), modified and superseded
on reconsideration, 65 Wn. App. 606, 612, 829 P.2d 787, 790 (1992) (no
legitimate expectation of privacy where property was owned by third
party and the item had been abandoned); State v. Toney, 60 Wn. App.
804, 808, 810 P.2d 929, 930 (1991) (object discarded by suspect who is
not in police custody is considered abandoned property and may be
seized by police); State v. Whitaker, 58 Wn. App. 851, 853, 795 P.2d
182, 183 (1990) (police may retrieve voluntarily abandoned property
unless abandonment was result of unlawful police conduct). While an
20051
Seattle University Law Review
individual has an expectation of privacy in the contents of a zipped purse
inadvertently left in a store, a police search for identification was justi-
fied after learning that the purse contained drugs. State v. Kealey, 80 Wn.
App. 162, 173, 907 P.2d 319, 323 (1995).
The Washington Supreme Court rejected the holding in California
v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1630, 100 L. Ed. 2d 30,
38 (1988), and found a reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage left
at curb for collection under Article 1, Section 7 of the Washington Con-
stitution. State v. Boland, 115 Wn.2d 571, 578, 800 P.2d 1112, 1116
(1990) (en banc). But see State v. Hepton, 113 Wn. App. 673, 679, 54
P.3d 233, 237 (2002) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage
bags left in front of neighboring abandoned house); State v. Graffius, 74
Wn. App. 23, 31, 871 P.2d 1115, 1120 (1994) (no privacy right in gar-
bage can left partially open and exposing contraband to view); State v.
Rodriguez, 65 Wn. App. 409, 418, 828 P.2d 636, 642 (1992) (no reason-
able expectation of privacy in stolen goods hidden in a community gar-
bage receptacle).
A reasonable expectation of privacy also exists in the contents of
first-class mail and of sealed packages. United States v. Jacobsen, 466
U.S. 109, 114, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1656, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85, 94 (1984); State v.
Jackson, 82 Wn. App. 594, 603, 918 P.2d 945, 950 (1996) (seizure of
mail occurs when a package is detained or removed from the normal
flow of delivery; though temporary seizure is justified if authorities have
a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity); State v.
Bishop, 43 Wn. App. 17, 18, 714 P.2d 1199, 1199 (1986) (police did not
violate Fourth Amendment by reopening packages already opened by
security personnel). However, senders of mail have no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy that would protect the surrounding area of a package
from a canine sniff or that would protect their names and addresses on
the exterior of a package. State v. Stanphill, 53 Wn. App. 623, 627, 769
P.2d 861, 863 (1989) (release of information at request of police regard-
ing arrival of package did not unreasonably intrude into private affairs).
Senders of parcels by common carriers have only a limited expectation
of privacy; common carriers have the right to search parcels if they have
reason to believe that they contain contraband. State v. Gross, 57 Wn.
App. 549, 551, 789 P.2d 317, 319 (1990), overruled on other grounds,
State v. Thein, 138 Wn.2d 133, 149, 977 P.2d 582, 589 (1999) (en banc);
see infra § 5.31.
Placing a beeper inside an object does not, in and of itself, consti-
tute a search. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712, 104 S. Ct. 3296,
3302, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530, 539-40 (1984); State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d 173,
182, 867 P.2d 593, 597 (1994) (en banc). However, monitoring the
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beeper and thereby tracking the object may constitute a search of the lo-
cation but not of the object. Karo, 468 U.S. at 713, 104 S. Ct. at 3302, 82
L. Ed. 2d at 540; cf United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285, 103 S.
Ct. 1081, 1087, 75 L. Ed. 2d 55, 64 (1983) (monitoring beeper in chloro-
form container invaded no reasonable expectation of privacy because
monitoring occurred only while container was taken from store and
transported in automobile on public highways and did not occur when
container was moved into a residence); see also supra § 1.3(e).
1.3(h) Special Environments: Prisons, Schools, and Borders
Prisoners are not accorded the same expectations of privacy in their
cells and effects as citizens generally enjoy in their homes and effects.
Matter of Personal Restraint of Benn, 134 Wn.2d 868, 909, 952 P.2d
116, 137 (1998) (en banc) (convicted "prisoners have no legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy and ... the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on un-
reasonable searches does not apply in prison cells . . . .") (quoting Hud-
son v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3202, 82 L. Ed. 2d
393, 405 (1984)). Routine searches of inmates' cells are reasonable be-
cause security interests of the institution outweigh the minimal intrusion
into inmates' privacy. State v. Rainford, 86 Wn. App. 431, 438, 936 P.2d
1210, 1213 (1997) ("Washington courts have held that an inmate's ex-
pectation of privacy is necessarily lowered while in custody and that
warrantless searches may be conducted if reasonable."); State v. Brown,
33 Wn. App. 843, 848, 658 P.2d 44, 47-48 (1983) (reasonableness of an
inmate search must be determined by balancing the need for a particular
search against the invasion of personal rights; the strip search of an in-
mate after a visit with his wife during which there was considerable con-
tact was reasonable); State v. Justice, 29 Wn. App. 460, 460, 629 P.2d
454, 454 (1981) ("The reasonableness of a routine prison search, i.e., one
conducted without probable cause or even a suspicion, must be deter-
mined by balancing the need for the particular search against the inva-
sion of personal rights that the search entails.").
Probationers and parolees have a limited expectation of privacy,
permitting a search if reasonable. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112,
119-20, 122 S. Ct.. 587, 591-92, 151 L. Ed. 2d 497, 505 (2001); State v.
Fisher, 145 Wn.2d 209, 226-27, 35 P.3d 366, 376 (2001) (en banc);
State v. Lucas, 56 Wn. App. 236, 240, 783 P.2d 121, 124 (1989); see also
In re Juveniles A, B, C, D, E, 121 Wn.2d 80, 92, 847 P.2d 455, 460
(1993) (en banc) (mandatory HIV testing of sexual offenders does not
violate the right to privacy). See infra §§ 6.0, 6.2.
Customs officials may search persons and vehicles crossing the
border into the United States under 19 U.S.C. § 1467 (1994). See United
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States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, _, 124 S. Ct. 1582, 1586, 158
L. Ed. 2d 311, 317 (2004) ("[A]utomobiles seeking entry into this coun-
try may be searched."); see also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543, 566, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 3087, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116, 1133 ("[S]tops
for brief questioning routinely conducted at permanent checkpoints are
consistent with the Fourth Amendment and need not be authorized by
warrant."). Nevertheless, the statute does not obviate the requirement that
a particular search or seizure be reasonable within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S.
266, 272, 93 S. Ct. 2535, 2539, 37 L. Ed. 2d 596, 602 (1973) (although a
statute authorizes customs searches without probable cause or mere sus-
picion, no Act of Congress can authorize a violation of the Constitution).
Customs officers may not conduct warrantless searches based on less
than probable cause at locations other than an actual border. State v.
Quick, 59 Wn. App. 228, 233, 796 P.2d 764, 767 (1990). See infra §§
6.0, 6.3.
The federal and state constitutional prohibition against unreason-
able searches and seizures also applies to school officials acting under
the authority of the state. Bd of Educ. of Indep. School Dist. No. 92 of
Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828-29, 122 S. Ct. 2559,
2564, 153 L. Ed. 2d 735, 743 (2002). However, students in schools enjoy
only a limited expectation of privacy. Id. at 830-31, 122 S. Ct. at 2565,
153 L. Ed. 2d at 745; see also York v. Wahkiakum School Dist. No. 200,
110 Wn. App. 383, 385, 40 P.3d 1198, 1199 (2002) (schools may con-
duct searches of individual students if they have a reasonable suspicion);
State v. Slattery, 56 Wn. App. 820, 822-23, 787 P.2d 932, 933 (1990)
(warrantless search of high school student's car and locked briefcase fell
within "school search" exception to warrant requirement when initial
search of locker in response to a tip revealed $200 in small bills but no
marijuana). See infra §§ 6.0-6.1.
1.4 DEFINING SEIZURES OF THE PERSON
A seizure occurs when an officer, by physical force or by show of
authority, restrains an individual's freedom of movement. Kaupp v.
Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 629, 123 S. Ct. 1843, 1844, 155 L. Ed. 2d 814, 821
(2003); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553, 100 S. Ct. 1870,
1877, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 509 (1980). A person may be "seized" for pur-
poses of the Fourth Amendment even when an arrest has not occurred.
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1877, 20 L. Ed. 2d
889, 903 (1968); State v. Lyons, 85 Wn. App. 268, 270-71, 932 P.2d
188, 189-90 (1997). However, not every encounter with a police officer
amounts to a seizure. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nevada, Humboldt
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County, _ U.S. _, _, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2458, 159 L. Ed. 2d 292,
302 (2004); State v. Rankin, 151 Wn.2d 689, 696-97, 92 P.3d 202, 205-
06 (2004) (en bane); State v. Mendez, 137 Wn.2d 208, 222, 970 P.2d
722, 729 (1999) (en bane); State v. Crespo Aranguren, 42 Wn. App. 452,
455, 711 P.2d 1096, 1097 (1985).
In order to determine whether a seizure has occurred, courts apply
an objective test: "If a reasonable person would feel free to terminate the
encounter, then he or she has not been seized." United States v. Drayton,
536 U.S. 194, 201, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 2110, 153 L. Ed. 2d 242, 251 (2002);
see also State v. O'Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 574, 62 P.3d 489, 495 (2003)
(en bane) ("Under [A]rticle I, [S]ection 7, a person is seized only when,
by means of physical force or a show of authority his or her freedom of
movement is restrained and a reasonable person would not have believed
he or she is (1) free to leave, given all the circumstances, or (2) free to
otherwise decline an officer's request and terminate the encounter.") (in-
ternal quotation marks and citations omitted). For examples of cases in
which the objective test was not satisfied, see Drayton, 536 U.S. at 194,
122 S. Ct. at 2105, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 251 (finding no seizure when plain-
clothed police boarded bus, showed badges, and started asking passen-
gers questions); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573, 108 S. Ct.
1975, 1979, 100 L. Ed. 2d 565, 572 (1988) (finding no seizure when po-
lice caught up with and drove alongside a fleeing individual for a short
distance without any show of authority or command to stop); O'Neill,
148 Wn.2d at 577, 62 P.3d at 496-97 (2003) (officer does not necessarily
commit seizure by questioning suspects and asking for identification);
State v. Cerrillo, 122 Wn. App. 341, 350, 93 P.3d 960, 964 (2004) (find-
ing no seizure when officer knocked on window of parked car and asked
for identification).
Accordingly, an officer's request for identification or other infor-
mation relating to one's identity is unlikely to be viewed as an unlawful
seizure unless additional circumstances are present. Hiibel, _ U.S. at
__, 124 S. Ct. at 2458, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 302 (holding that "interrogation
relating to one's identity or a request for identification by the police does
not, by itself, constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure") (quoting I.N.S. v.
Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 1762, 80 L. Ed. 2d 247,
255 (1984)); State v. Hansen, 99 Wn. App. 575, 578, 994 P.2d 855, 856
(2000) (holding that "police questioning relating to one's identity, or a
request for identification by the police, without more, is unlikely to result
in a seizure"); Crespo Aranguren, 42 Wn. App. at 456, 711 P.2d at 1098
(finding that police acted properly in stopping defendants and using
"permissive" language to ask if they had come from the area of the re-
ported vandalism).
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However, under Article I, Section 7, "a mere request for identifica-
tion from a passenger for investigatory purposes constitutes a seizure
unless there is a reasonable basis for the inquiry." Rankin, 151 Wn.2d at
697. In Rankin, a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped for a traffic
infraction was asked for identification by the investigating officer. Id. at
691. The Washington Supreme Court held that a passenger's right of pri-
vacy is violated "when an officer requests identification from a passenger
for investigative purposes, absent an independent basis for making the
request." Id. at 692; see generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Sei-
zure § 5.1(a), at 5-15 (4th ed. 2004). For a discussion of the level of
proof needed to make seizures of the person, see infra §§ 2.1 (arrest) and
2.9(b) (Terry stop).
1.4(a) Consensual Encounters
A consensual encounter with an officer does not trigger the Fourth
Amendment, even when the individual has been approached by an offi-
cer and is aware of the officer's identity as an officer. United States v.
Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200-01, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 2110, 153 L. Ed. 2d
242, 251 (2002) (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S. Ct.
1319, 1324, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 236 (1983)); see also State v. Belanger, 36
Wn. App. 818, 820, 677 P.2d 781, 783 (1984). Factors reviewed by the
court in determining whether the scope of a Terry stop, infra 2.9(b), has
been exceeded and whether an arrest has occurred are the following:
[T]he officer's training and experience, the location of the stop, and
the conduct of the person detained. Other factors that may be con-
sidered in determining whether a stop was reasonable include "the
purpose of the stop, the amount of physical intrusion upon the sus-
pect's liberty, and the length of time the suspect is detained."
State v. Acrey, 148 Wn.2d 738, 747, 64 P.3d 594, 598-99 (2003)
(en banc) (quoting State v. Williams, 102 Wn.2d 733, 740, 689 P.2d
1065, 1069 (1984) (en banc)).
The degree of intrusion must also be appropriate with regard to the
type of crime under investigation and the probable dangerousness of the
suspect. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nevada, Humboldt County, _
U.S. _, , 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2458, 159 L. Ed. 2d 292, 302 (2004) ("To
ensure that the resulting seizure is constitutionally reasonable, a Terry
stop must be limited. The officer's action must be justified at its incep-
tion, and.., reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which jus-
tified the interference in the first place.") (internal quotation marks omit-
ted); State v. Wheeler, 108 Wn.2d 230, 235, 737 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1987)
(en banc).
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The "free to go" standard has not been abandoned under federal
law. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573-74, 108 S. Ct. 1975,
1979, 100 L. Ed. 2d 565, 572 (1988). But see Florida v. Bostick, 501
U.S. 429, 435-36, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2387, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389, 399 (1991)
("When police attempt to question a person who is walking down the
street or through an airport lobby, it makes sense to inquire whether a
reasonable person would feel free to continue walking. But when the per-
son is seated on a bus and has no desire to leave, the degree to which a
reasonable person would feel that he or she could leave is not an accurate
measure of the coercive effect of the encounter."). The United States Su-
preme Court has held that questioning by law enforcement officers re-
mains consensual until a reasonable person would believe that he or she
could not leave the presence of the officers or until he or she refuses to
respond to their inquiries and the police take further action. I.N.S. v.
Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 1763, 80 L. Ed. 2d 247,
255 (1984) (finding no seizure of the workplace or of the individual
workers when INS agents moved systematically through the factory in-
quiring about the workers' citizenship while other INS agents were sta-
tioned at the exits). See generally infra § 5.10 (discussing what consti-
tutes consent).
Police action does not exceed the proper purpose and scope of a
Terry stop (see supra § 1.4(a) and infra § 2.9(b)) when the purpose of the
stop is directly related to detaining and investigating the defendant in
connection with a robbery. State v. Thornton, 41 Wn. App. 506, 512, 705
P.2d 271, 275 (1985). While an unfounded hunch is insufficient to justify
a stop, the police may reasonably act on an individualized hunch or on
circumstances that appear incriminating to the officer based on his or her
past experience. State v. Samsel, 39 Wn. App. 564, 570-71, 694 P.2d
670, 675 (1985). Traffic stops that are pretext for conducting a criminal
investigation violate Article I, Section 7 of the Washington Constitution.
State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 352-53, 979 P.2d 833, 839 (1999) (en
banc). A court should consider "both the subjective intent of the officer
as well as the objective reasonableness of the officer's behavior" to de-
termine whether a stop was pretextual. Id. at 359. See generally infra §
4.7(a). For post-Terry analysis, see 4 LaFave, supra, § 8.1 (c), at 19-50.
1.4(b) Seizures in Vehicles
A seizure of an automobile driver occurs as soon as an officer in a
police car switches on the flashing light. State v. DeArman, 54 Wn. App.
621, 624, 774 P.2d 1247, 1248 (1989); State v. Owens, 39 Wn. App. 130,
132, 692 P.2d 850, 851 (1984). However, a seizure of the passenger in a
pulled-over vehicle does not occur until the officer takes further action
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(e.g., demanding that the passenger stay in or return to the car, or asking
for identification). State v. Mendez, 137 Wn.2d 208, 222, 970 P.2d 722,
729 (1999) (en banc); State v. Rehn, 117 Wn. App. 142, 149, 69 P.3d
379, 381 (2003) ("Apparently, barring exceptional circumstances, a pas-
senger is free to walk away from or stay at the traffic stop scene.").
Under both Article I, Section 7 and the Fourth Amendment, a sei-
zure also occurs when an officer stops automobiles pursuant to a system-
atic "spot check" for drivers' licenses or vehicle registration, or for "so-
briety checks." City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41, 121 S.
Ct. 447, 454, 148 L. Ed. 2d 333, 343 (2000); Michigan Dep't of State
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 449-50, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2485, 110 L. Ed.
2d 412 (1990); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555-56,
96 S. Ct. 3074, 3082, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116 (1976); City of Seattle v. Me-
siani, 110 Wn.2d 454, 457-60, 755 P.2d 775, 777 (1988) (en banc); State
v. Marchand, 104 Wn.2d 434, 437, 706 P.2d 225, 226 (1985) (en banc).
However, a police roadblock is only unconstitutional if the seizure is un-
reasonable. State v. Williams, 85 Wn. App. 271, 278, 932 P.2d 665, 668
(1997). To determine the reasonableness of spot checks or vehicle
checkpoints, the court will weigh the government's interest in the check-
points, the extent to which the program advances the government's goals,
and the amount of intrusion to the individual motorist. Illinois v. Lidster,
540 U.S. 419, 426, 124 S. Ct. 885, 890, 157 L. Ed. 2d 843, 852 (2004);
Williams, 85 Wn. App. at 278-79. In Mesiani, during the winter holiday
season, the City of Seattle instituted sobriety checkpoints, in which offi-
cers stopped drivers without individualized suspicion or probable cause.
110 Wn.2d at 455. While noting that there is a "very strong societal in-
terest in dealing effectively with the problem of drunken driving," the
Mesiani court found that the checkpoints violated Article I, Section 7 and
the Fourth Amendment because the City "failed to demonstrate the need
for sobriety checkpoints or that less intrusive alternatives could not
achieve most of the constitutionally permissible benefits sought, such as
the addition of more officers to its special enforcement unit." Id. at 459.
See generally 5 LaFave, supra, § 10.8(a), at 333-51; see also supra §
1.3(e) and infra § 5.21.
1.4(c) Seizures in Homes
The Fourth Amendment is triggered even though a person is de-
tained in his or her own home. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 696,
101 S. Ct. 2587, 2590-91, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340, 345 (1981); State v. Hole-
man, 103 Wn.2d 426, 428, 693 P.2d 89, 90 (1985) (en banc); see also
supra § 1.3(a). However, "even without probable cause or reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity, it is reasonable for an officer executing a
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search warrant at a residence to briefly detain occupants of that resi-
dence, to insure officer safety and an orderly completion of the search."
State v. King, 89 Wn. App. 612, 618-19, 949 P.2d 856, 860 (1998).
1.4(d) Civil Offenses
The Fourth Amendment is also triggered by a seizure of the person
even though the seizure pertains to civil, and not criminal, offenses. See
State v. Klinker, 85 Wn.2d 509, 514-15, 537 P.2d 268, 274 (1975) (en
banc). However, a seizure cannot occur without some governmental par-
ticipation. State v. Jackson, 82 Wn. App. 594, 603, 918 P.2d 945, 950
(1996); see also State v. Krajeski, 104 Wn. App. 377, 382, 16 P.3d 69, 72
(2001) ("Generally, the Fourth Amendment does not protect against un-
reasonable intrusions by private individuals.").
1.5 DEFINING SEIZURES OF PROPERTY
The Fourth Amendment protects a person's possessory interest in
effects as well as his or her privacy interest. United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696, 707, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2644, 77 L. Ed. 2d 110, 120 (1983). "A
'seizure' of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference
with an individual's possessory interests in that property." United States
v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1656, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85,
94 (1984); State v. Jackson, 82 Wn. App. 594, 603, 918 P.2d 945, 950
(1996). Put differently, an object is seized for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment when government agents exercise "dominion and control"
over the object. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 120, 104 S. Ct. at 1660, 80 L. Ed.
2d at 99; Jackson, 82 Wn. App. at 603-04. Thus, impounding a room or
securing a home constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
State v. Ng, 104 Wn.2d 763, 770, 713 P.2d 63, 67 (1985) (en banc) (cit-
ing State v. Bean, 89 Wn.2d 467, 472, 572 P.2d 1102, 1104-05 (1978)).
In some circumstances, interference with an individual's possessory
interests may also implicate an individual's liberty interests. For exam-
ple, in Place, the seizure of luggage at an airport was determined to "ef-
fectively restrain the person since he is subjected to the possible disrup-
tion of his travel plans in order to remain with his luggage or to arrange
for its return." 462 U.S. at 708, 103 S. Ct. at 2645, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 122;
see also 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.6, at 614-97 (4th
ed. 2004).
1.6 STANDING TO RAISE SEARCH AND SEIZURE CLAIMS
Traditionally, a criminal defendant alleging infringement of Fourth
Amendment rights first had to show "standing" to raise the claim. The
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defendant's burden was to demonstrate that the interest in the outcome of
the controversy stemmed from a violation of his or her rights rather than
from the violation of the rights of some third party. 6 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 11.3, at 126-254 (4th ed. 2004).
The "automatic standing" exception to this rule was created for the
defendant who is charged with an offense involving possession of prop-
erty as an element when the defendant challenges the search or seizure of
the property. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 263-64, 80 S. Ct.
725, 732, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697, 704 (1960); State v. Michaels, 60 Wn.2d 638,
646, 374 P.2d 989, 993-94 (1962) (en banc) (adopting the "automatic
standing" exception for Washington).
In 1978, the United States Supreme Court merged the concept of
standing with the substantive law of Fourth Amendment privacy analy-
sis. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138-40, 99 S. Ct. 421, 427-29, 58 L.
Ed. 2d 387, 397-99 (1978). Accordingly, the federal courts have aban-
doned the standing analysis in the Fourth Amendment context. Minne-
sota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 87-88, 119 S. Ct. 469, 472, 142 L. Ed. 2d
373, 378 (1998) ("[I]n order to claim the protection of the Fourth
Amendment, a defendant must demonstrate that he personally has an ex-
pectation of privacy in the place searched, and that his expectation is rea-
sonable; i.e., one that has 'a source outside of the Fourth Amendment,
either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to un-
derstandings that are recognized and permitted by society."') (quoting
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12, 99 S. Ct. at 430 n.12, 58 L. Ed. 2d at 402
n.12).
In contrast, Washington courts have continued to apply standing
analysis to challenges brought under Article I, Section 7. See, e.g., State
v. Reynolds, 144 Wn.2d 282, 286, 27 P.3d 200, 202 (2001) (en banc) (af-
firming Court of Appeals ruling that defendant lacked "standing" to chal-
lenge arrest of third person); State v. Williams, 142 Wn.2d 17, 23, 11
P.3d 714, 717-18 (2000) (en banc) (holding that defendant lacked
"standing" to challenge police entry of third party's home). But see State
v. Francisco, 107 Wn. App. 247, 252, 26 P.3d 1008, 1011 (2001)
("' [T]he better analysis forthrightly focuses on the extent of a particular
defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment' rather than on any theo-
retically separate, but invariably intertwined, concept of standing.")
(quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 139, 99 S. Ct. at 428, 58 L. Ed. 2d at 398).
As the Rakas concept of "personal" privacy interest developed, the
Supreme Court indicated some types of situations in which a defendant
does or does not have such an interest. Generally, an individual "who
owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood
have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of this right to ex-
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clude." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12, 99 S. Ct. at 430 n.12, 58 L. Ed. 2d
at 402 n. 12; see also State v. Mathe, 102 Wn.2d 537, 544, 688 P.2d 859,
863 (1984) (en banc) ("The landlord-tenant relationship will not support
an inference that a search is authorized, when the tenant is in exclusive
possession of the property."). Nevertheless, although "property owner-
ship is clearly a factor to be considered in determining whether an indi-
vidual's Fourth Amendment rights have been violated, property rights
are neither the beginning nor the end of [the] inquiry." United States v.
Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91-92, 100 S. Ct. 2547, 2553, 65 L. Ed. 2d 619,
628 (1980) (citation omitted). Accordingly, an "illegal search only vio-
lates the rights of those who have 'a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the invaded place."' Id. (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143, 99 S. Ct. at 430,
58 L. Ed. 2d at 401) (holding that unlawful possession of stolen goods
stored in the apartment of another does not confer on thieves a reason-
able expectation of privacy as to the interior of apartment). A person who
resides in an apartment with the permission of the lessee and who has a
key to the apartment may assert a privacy interest in the interior of the
apartment. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 141-42, 99 S. Ct. at 429-30, 58 L. Ed. 2d
at 399-400 (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, 80 S. Ct.
725, 734, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1960)).
A mere passenger in a motor vehicle may not assert a personal pri-
vacy interest in the interior of the vehicle, but may challenge his or her
own seizure. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148-50, 99 S. Ct. at 433-34, 58 L. Ed.
2d at 404-05; State v. Byrd, 110 Wn. App. 259, 264, 39 P.3d 1010, 1013
(2002) ("[A] passenger in a vehicle stopped by police officers can con-
test the lawfulness of the stop."); State v. Takesgun, 89 Wn. App. 608,
611, 949 P.2d 845, 846-47 (1998). In contrast, a person who is driving
the vehicle with the owner's permission may assert a privacy interest in
the interior of the vehicle. United States v. Lopez, 474 F. Supp. 943, 946
(C.D. Cal. 1979). An employee who maintains a separate office secured
by a locked door may assert a privacy interest in that office for public
employees. Ortega v. O'Connor, 764 F.2d 703, 705-06 (9th Cir. 1985),
rev'don other grounds, 480 U.S. 709, 736, 107 S. Ct. 1492, 1507, 94 L.
Ed. 2d 714, 735 (1987). In Ortega, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or
her office. 764 F.2d at 706. To distinguish other decisions in which it had
found no expectation of privacy in the workplace, the court emphasized
that this employer had implemented no general inspection policy that
would have allowed other employees to access the office in question. Id.
On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the Ninth Circuit's privacy analy-
sis, but applied a reasonableness standard rather than a probable cause
2005]
Seattle University Law Review
standard for public employees. Ortega, 480 U.S. at 719-21, 107 S. Ct. at
1498-99, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 724-26.
By merging the standing issue with a privacy analysis, the federal
courts abandoned the concept of automatic standing. Salvucci, 448 U.S.
at 92-93, 100 S. Ct. at 2553, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 629. Hence, although the
Fourth Amendment no longer governs searches of stolen goods, it does
apply to searches of legally possessed items discovered in the search of
stolen goods. Defendants who claimed that a stolen footlocker belonged
to their brother established a possessory interest as bailees sufficient to
have standing under Rakas. State v. Grundy, 25 Wn. App. 411, 415, 607
P.2d 1235, 1237 (1980) (discussing Rakas). But a defendant may not
claim an expectation of privacy in the interior of an acquaintance's purse
into which he has placed his belongings. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S.
98, 106, 100 S. Ct. 2556, 2562, 65 L. Ed. 2d 633, 642 (1980).
Unlike the Fourth Amendment, Article I, Section 7 of the Washing-
ton Constitution invests automatic standing upon anyone charged with a
possessory crime. See State v. Simpson, 95 Wn.2d 170, 179, 622 P.2d
1199, 1206 (1980) (en banc) (plurality opinion) (upholding the use of
automatic standing based on the state constitution); see also State v.
Chelly, 94 Wn. App. 254, 258, 970 P.2d 376, 378 (1999) ("[U]nder the
state constitution, a defendant who has been charged with an offense that
has possession as an element has automatic standing to challenge the
search that led to the discovery of the substance the defendant is charged
with possessing."); State v. Johnston, 38 Wn. App. 793, 793-94, 690
P.2d 591, 594 (1984). But see State v. Coss, 87 Wn. App. 891, 895-98,
943 P.2d 1126, 1127-29 (1997) (recognizing lack of binding authority
for automatic standing in Washington due to plurality opinion of Simp-
son); State v. Carter, 127 Wn.2d 836, 850-51, 904 P.2d 290, 296-97
(1995) (en banc) (affirming, but taking issue with Division One's aban-
donment of automatic standing doctrine); State v. Zakel, 119 Wn.2d 563,
569-71, 834 P.2d 1046, 1049-50 (1992) (en banc) (affirming the deci-
sion of Division Two, but refusing to decide whether the state constitu-
tion requires the automatic standing doctrine because the facts presented
did not properly raise the issue).
Although Washington's "automatic standing" doctrine has been
criticized by some courts, it explicitly remains valid under the state con-
stitution through Simpson's plurality opinion. State v. Jones, 146 Wn.2d
328, 332, 45 P.3d 1062, 1064 (2002) (en banc) (citing Simpson, 95
Wn.2d at 179); see also Carter, 127 Wn.2d at 850-51; Zakel, 119 Wn.2d
at 569-71; Coss, 87 Wn. App. at 895-98. In fact, the Washington Su-
preme Court has gone beyond Rakas on the basis of state statute. In State
v. Williams, 94 Wn.2d 531, 544, 617 P.2d 1012, 1020 (1980), a defen-
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dant was accorded standing to challenge the use of a codefendant's con-
versation that had been recorded in violation of the Washington Privacy
Act. RCW 9.73.030; cf Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 175,
89 S. Ct. 961, 966-68, 22 L. Ed. 2d 176, 187-88 (1969).
However, in order to invoke the automatic standing exception to the
general standing requirements in Washington, two requirements must be
met: (1) Possession must be an "essential" element of the offense for
which the defendant is charged and (2) the defendant must be in posses-
sion of the seized property at the time of the contested search. Jones, 146
Wn.2d at 332 (citing Simpson, 95 Wn.2d at 181).
Finally, the State may not raise the issue of lack of standing for the
first time on its appeal of a suppression order. Grundy, 25 Wn. App. at
415 (distinguishing Combs v. United States, 408 U.S. 224, 227, 92 S. Ct.
2284, 2286, 33 L. Ed. 2d 308, 311 (1972), where standing was raised on
appeal by the government as respondent); see also Coss, 87 Wn. App. at
895-98 (recognizing that the State, as respondent, may raise standing
issue on appeal for the first time).
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CHAPTER 2: STANDARDS OF PROOF
2.0 NATURE OF PROBABLE CAUSE: INTRODUCTION
This chapter summarizes the standards for probable cause for
searches and seizures conducted with or without a warrant. Sections 2.1
and 2.2 discuss the nature of the standard; sections 2.3 through 2.8 dis-
cuss specific types of information considered in the probable cause de-
termination. The final section, 2.9, summarizes the types of searches and
seizures for which probable cause is either not required or a lesser stan-
dard is applied.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides
that "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause." U.S. Const.
amend. IV. Probable cause requires reasonable grounds to believe that a
defendant is guilty of a crime. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371,
124 S. Ct. 795, 800, 157 L. Ed. 2d 769, 775 (2003). See generally 2
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.2 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing
the general nature of probable cause). The belief must be particularized
with regard to the person to be searched or seized. Id. The probable cause
requirement is a fact-based determination that represents a compromise
between the competing interests of enforcing the law and protecting the
individual's right to privacy. See generally Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1311, 93 L. Ed. 1879, 1890-91 (1949)
(probable cause must be based on more than mere suspicion). Police of-
ficers must have probable cause even for searches and seizures in which
no warrant is required. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
479-80, 83 S. Ct. 407, 413, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 450-51 (1963). In the case
of a valid search or seizure without a warrant, police may make the initial
determination of whether probable cause exists. See id. The grounds for
the search or seizure, however, must be strong enough to obtain a war-
rant. Id. For a warrant to be issued, a neutral and detached magistrate
must make the probable cause determination. Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S. Ct. 367, 369, 92 L. Ed. 436, 440 (1948). In addi-
tion, a suspect arrested without a warrant may not be detained for an ex-
tended period of time without a judicial determination of probable cause.
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 124-25, 95 S. Ct. 854, 868-69, 43 L.
Ed. 2d 54, 71-72 (1975). See generally 2 LaFave, supra, § 3.1, at 20-24.
Similarly, Article I, Section 7 of the Washington Constitution pro-
vides that "[n]o person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his
home invaded, without authority of law." The Washington Supreme
Court has held that this provision provides more protection than the
Fourth Amendment. State v. Rankin, 151 Wn.2d 689, 694, 92 P.3d 202,
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204 (2004) (en banc). Accordingly, when an informant's tip is the basis
of probable cause, Washington courts have rejected the federal totality of
circumstances test in favor of the Aguilar-Spinelli test, which requires a
showing of both the informant's basis of knowledge and his reliability.
State v. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d 91, 111-12, 59 P.3d 58, 68-69 (2002) (en
banc); State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 432, 443, 688 P.2d 136, 143 (1984);
State v. Cole, 128 Wn.2d 262, 287, 906 P.2d 925, 940 (1995) (en banc)
(different rules apply depending on whether the confidential informant is
a professional informant or a private citizen); State v. Murray, 110
Wn.2d 706, 711-12, 757 P.2d 487, 489-90 (1988) (en banc) (veracity of
informant established from evidence obtained through independent in-
vestigation that supported the substance of the informant's claims); State
v. Huft, 106 Wn.2d 206, 209-10, 720 P.2d 838, 840 (1986) (en banc)
(independent investigation of only innocuous details is insufficient to
corroborate information under either prong). See generally infra at § 2.5
(discussing the applicability of Aguilar-Spinelli test to informants).
Federal officers working with state officials must comply with the
Washington Constitution. State v. Johnson, 75 Wn. App. 692, 700, 879
P.2d 984, 989 (1994) (aerial photography by state officers working in
concert with a federal drug operation required federal officers' compli-
ance with state constitution); cf State v. Brown, 132 Wn.2d 529, 591,
940 P.2d 546, 579 (1997) (en banc) (evidence "independently and law-
fully obtained by federal officers acting pursuant to federal law may be
transferred to state authorities for use in a Washington State criminal
proceeding.") (quoting In re Teddington, 116 Wn.2d 761, 772-73, 808
P.2d 156, 161 (1991) (en banc)).
However, where a federal warrant is served, the federal standard for
probable cause applies even though the evidence will be used in state
courts. See Johnson, 75 Wn. App. at 699. And evidence obtained by fed-
eral officers under federal law is admissible in Washington even if its
seizure might have violated the Washington Constitution. Teddington,
116 Wn.2d at 772; see also State v. Bradley, 105 Wn.2d 898, 902-03,
719 P.2d 546, 548-49 (1986) (en banc) (holding that a border search by
federal officers "is equivalent to a search conducted in a different juris-
diction" and that neither Washington law nor the Washington Constitu-
tion can control federal officers' conduct).
The validity of a search warrant is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
State v. Maddox, 152 Wn.2d 499, 509, 98 P.3d 1199, 1204 (2004) (en
banc); State v. Jackson, 150 Wn.2d 251, 265, 76 P.3d 217, 225 (2003)
(en banc). Both an officer's decision and a magistrate's warrant authori-
zation are subject to judicial review, but the magistrate's determination is
given great deference by a reviewing court. Maddox, 152 Wn.2d at 509;
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Jackson, 150 Wn.2d at 265. The affidavit giving rise to the warrant is
evaluated in a common sense manner and not hypertechnically. Jackson,
150 Wn.2d at 265; State v. Helmka, 86 Wn.2d 91, 93, 542 P.2d 115, 116
(1975) (en banc). All doubts are resolved in favor of the warrant's valid-
ity. Maddox, 152 Wn.2d at 509; Jackson, 150 Wn.2d at 265. A magis-
trate is entitled to draw commonsense and reasonable inferences from the
information set forth in the affidavit. Maddox, 152 Wn.2d at 509; In re
Yim, 139 Wn.2d 581, 596, 989 P.2d 512, 520 (1999) (en banc) (citing
Helmka, 86 Wn.2d at 93).
The probable cause requirement may be satisfied even when police
officers make a reasonable mistake of fact. State v. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d
at 114-15, 117 (2002) (en banc) (officer included incorrect date of in-
formant's observations in affidavit); In re Yim, 139 Wn.2d at 597 (failure
to assert in affidavit that defendant lacked a license to sell explosive de-
vices was not critical when magistrate could reasonably infer that defen-
dant was probably engaged in the unlicensed manufacture and sale of
explosive devices); State v. Seagull, 95 Wn.2d 898, 900, 908, 632 P.2d
44, 46, 50 (1981) (en banc) (warrant valid even though officer misidenti-
fied tomato plant as marijuana).
However, if the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing
of "intentional material omissions or material omissions made with reck-
less disregard for the truth, and establishes the allegations at a hearing by
a preponderance of the evidence," then the omitted material must be con-
sidered in making a finding on probable cause. State v. Gore, 143 Wn.2d
288, 297, 21 P.3d 262, 268 (2001) (en banc); cf State v. Garrison, 118
Wn.2d 870, 872-73, 827 P.2d 1388, 1390 (1992) (en banc) (per curiam)
(mere showing of the omission of material that is critical to a finding of
probable cause is not a sufficient preliminary showing that the omission
was a reckless disregard for the truth). See generally Franks v. Delaware,
438 U.S. 154, 155-56, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 2676, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667, 672
(1978).
Allegations of a negligent or innocent mistake are not sufficient to
void a warrant. Gore, 143 Wn.2d at 296; Yim, 139 Wn.2d at 597. But
when police make an "inexcusable mistake of law" and incorrectly be-
lieve that certain conduct is unlawful, a search or seizure based on that
belief is invalid. State v. Melrose, 2 Wn. App. 824, 828, 470 P.2d 552,
555-56 (1970). A search or seizure is also unlawful if it is based solely
on a law subsequently held unconstitutional. State v. Swaite, 33 Wn.
App. 477, 483, 656 P.2d 520, 524-25 (1982) (law subsequently held void
for vagueness). See generally State v. Kinzy, 141 Wn.2d 373, 393, 5 P.3d
668, 680 (2000) (en banc) (evidence discovered as a result of an uncon-
stitutional search or seizure must be suppressed).
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2.1 PROBABLE CAUSE STANDARD: ARREST VERSUS SEARCH
Probable cause to arrest requires the same sufficiency of evidence
as probable cause to search. See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search
and Seizure § 3.2(d) (4th ed. 2004) (discussing the general nature of
probable cause). But see State v. Fisher, 104 Wn. App. 772, 780, 17 P.3d
1200, 1205 (2001) (Wash. CrR 3.2(l)(1) requires only a well-founded
suspicion that a probation violation has occurred in order to issue a bench
warrant for an admitted felon who is awaiting sentencing). However,
probable cause for a search does not always constitute probable cause for
arrest, and probable cause for arrest does not necessarily justify a search.
For a search, the officer must have probable cause to believe that
the items to be seized are connected with criminal activity and will be
found in the place to be searched. State v. Thein, 138 Wn.2d 133, 147,
151, 977 P.2d 582, 588, 590 (1999) (en bane) (requiring a nexus between
criminal activity and the item seized and a nexus between the item seized
and the place searched); State v. Jackson, 111 Wn. App. 660, 688, 46
P.3d 257, 272 (2002) (dictum) (rejecting generalization that criminals
commonly return to the scene of their crime); State v. Nordlund, 113 Wn.
App. 171, 182-84, 53 P.3d 520, 525-26 (2002) (affidavit's generalized
statements about the computer habits of sex offenders insufficient to jus-
tify search of the defendant's personal computer; no factual nexus be-
tween alleged crimes and information from computer that could show the
defendant's presence at home); State v. McReynolds, 104 Wn. App. 560,
570, 17 P.3d 608, 615 (2001) (inscribed crow bar alone provided insuffi-
cient nexus between alleged crimes and the defendant's residence).
When a search implicates First Amendment concerns, the court must
closely scrutinize the probable cause requirement. Nordlund, 113 Wn.
App. at 181-82 (search and seizure of a personal computer required
"scrupulous scrutiny" of the affidavit for probable cause).
To justify an arrest, the officer must have probable cause to believe
that an offense has been or is being committed and that the person to be
arrested committed the offense. State v. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d 64, 70, 93
P.3d 872, 875 (2004) (en banc); State v. Cerrillo, 122 Wn. App. 341,
350-51, 93 P.3d 960, 964-65 (2004). In addition, searches and seizures
must be supported by probable cause whether or not an arrest is made.
State v. Hudson, 124 Wn.2d 107, 112, 874 P.2d 160, 163 (1994) (en
banc).
Probable cause to arrest exists when the arresting officer has infor-
mation which would lead a person of reasonable caution to conclude that
the suspect has committed a crime. State v. Graham, 130 Wn.2d 711,
724, 927 P.2d 227, 233-34 (1996) (en banc). Probable cause to arrest is a
nontechnical standard and exists based on the facts and circumstances
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known to the officer at the time. State v. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d at 70; Gra-
ham, 130 Wn.2d at 724; State v. Baxter, 68 Wn.2d 416, 420, 413 P.2d
638, 641 (1966); State v. Lewellyn, 78 Wn. App. 788, 797-98, 895 P.2d
418, 423 (1995), aff'd, 130 Wn.2d 215, 922 P.2d 811 (1996) (suspect's
two prior DUI arrests supported by officer's observations, defendants'
driving, and field sobriety tests); State v. Garcia, 63 Wn. App. 868, 870-
75, 824 P.2d 1220, 1221-24 (1992) (hotel maid's observations of folded
papers in a drawer, diesel fuel smell, and telephone calls at all hours
were not sufficient by themselves, but, when combined with the police
information of the suspect's car on a drug trafficking tip sheet, did con-
stitute sufficient probable cause); State v. Griffith, 61 Wn. App. 35, 39,
808 P.2d 1171, 1173 (1991) (police had probable cause to arrest the de-
fendant on a DWI charge when the defendant drove erratically, hit a
roadway construction sign, did not stop in response to police emergency
flashers, and proceeded to a home); State v. Fore, 56 Wn. App. 339,
343-44, 783 P.2d 626, 629 (1989) (probable cause existed based on offi-
cer's observation of drug transactions in area with reported narcotics ac-
tivity and performed in a manner similar to undercover buys made by the
officer). However, probable cause cannot be supported by information
obtained by the police after an arrest. State v. Mance, 82 Wn. App. 539,
541-42, 918 P.2d 527, 529 (1996).
The facts and circumstances known to the officer must also be rea-
sonably trustworthy information. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d at 70; State v. Reeb,
63 Wn. App. 678, 681-82, 821 P.2d 84, 86 (1992) (information need
only be reasonably trustworthy, not absolutely accurate); State v. Smith,
102 Wn.2d 449, 455, 688 P.2d 146, 150 (1984) (en banc) (applying
Aguilar-Spinelli test to officer's reliance on .'street kids' whose reliabil-
ity the officers themselves apparently questioned").
2.2 PROBABLE CAUSE STANDARD: CHARACTERISTICS
2.2(a) Objective Test
Under both the federal and state constitutions, the probable cause
standard is an objective one. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96, 85 S. Ct.
223, 228, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142, 147 (1964); State v. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d 64,
70, 93 P.3d 872, 875 (2004) (en banc). The officer's subjective belief is
not determinative. State v. Huff 64 Wn. App. 641, 645, 826 P.2d 698,
701 (1992). Accordingly, an officer's good faith is not enough to justify
a search absent probable cause, and an officer's belief that probable
cause was not present is also not determinative. State v. Gaddy, 114 Wn.
App. 702, 706, 60 P.3d 116, 119 (2002), aff'd on other grounds by, 152
Wn.2d 64, 93 P.3d 872 (2004) (officer's good faith reliance on an agency
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"hot sheet" would not validate an arrest if the "hot sheet" was not based
upon probable cause); State v. Rodriguez-Torres, 77 Wn. App. 687, 693,
893 P.2d 650, 653 (1995) (officer's subjective belief that probable cause
did not exist was not dispositive); Huff 64 Wn. App. at 645-46 (officer's
subjective belief that an offense has been committed does not cure lack
of probable cause).
The probable cause standard is determined with reference to a rea-
sonable person with the expertise and experience of the officer in ques-
tion. See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897-98, 95 S. Ct. 2585,
2591, 45 L. Ed. 2d 623, 629 (1975) (border patrol officers are entitled to
draw inferences in light of their prior experience with aliens and smug-
glers); State v. Seagull, 95 Wn.2d 898, 906-07, 632 P.2d 44, 49 (1981)
(en banc) (magistrate could consider officer's experience in observing
marijuana in plant and crushed leaf form over an eight-year period). As a
result, an officer's particular training and expertise is highly important.
State v. Cole, 128 Wn.2d 262, 289, 906 P.2d 925, 941 (1995) (en banc)
(acknowledging officer's drug enforcement experience and ability to
identify marijuana smell); State v. Rodriguez-Torres, 77 Wn. App. at
693-94 (sufficient evidence to support probable cause when an officer
with specialized training in narcotics enforcement observed exchange of
money for hidden, cupped object in an area known for narcotics and de-
fendant fled upon notice of officer's presence). The information regard-
ing the basis of knowledge and an officer's specific training and experi-
ence must be included in the affidavit so that the magistrate may make an
independent determination of probable cause and establish more than the
officer's personal belief. State v. Jacobs, 121 Wn. App. 669, 678, 89
P.3d 232, 238 (2004) (noting that an affidavit's failure to indicate an of-
ficer's experience and education is not fatal to the resulting warrant's
validity if other facts establish probable cause); State v. Johnson, 79 Wn.
App. 776, 780, 904 P.2d 1188, 1189-90 (1995).
The affidavit establishing probable cause for a search warrant must
set forth sufficient facts to lead a reasonable person to conclude that there
is a probability that the defendant is involved in criminal activity and that
the evidence of the crime may be found in the place to be searched. Ja-
cobs, 121 Wn. App. at 676 (probable cause established by reliable infor-
mant and police detection of noxious odors); State v. Jackson, 150
Wn.2d 251, 264-65, 76 P.3d 217, 224-25 (2003) (en banc) (use of GPS
device justified when the defendant was alone with child the morning of
the crime, bloodstains and pubic hair were found on child's pillow and
sheets, and use of car was likely as defendant had limited time to visit the
victim or the victim's body); State v. Goble, 88 Wn. App. 503, 512-13,
945 P.2d 263, 268 (1997) (magistrate did not have probable cause to be-
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lieve methamphetamine contraband would be found at a house to be
searched since the informant provided only that the drugs came to the
suspect's post office box); Cole, 128 Wn.2d at 287-89 (reliable infor-
mant and police observation of marijuana smell established probable
cause).
Although a single fact in isolation may not be sufficient, probable
cause may exist when that fact is read together with other facts stated in
the affidavit. State v. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d 91, 110, 59 P.3d 58, 68 (2002);
State v. Tarter, 111 Wn. App. 336, 340-41, 44 P.3d 889, 902 (2002). The
item to be seized need not be at the place to be searched at the time the
warrant is issued, but the magistrate must have reasonable grounds to
believe it will be there at the time of the search. State v. Maddox, 116
Wn. App. 796, 804, 67 P.3d 1135, 1140 (2003) (magistrate could rea-
sonably infer that drugs or evidence of drug dealing were in the defen-
dant's home based on evidence that the defendant was dealing drugs
from his home); State v. McGovern, 111 Wn. App. 495, 499-501, 45
P.3d 624, 626-27 (2002) (magistrate could infer that evidence of drug
dealing would be found in defendant's home based on generalization that
drug dealers keep drugs at their home plus additional facts suggesting
that "this drug dealer probably keeps drugs at his or her residence");
State v. Perez, 92 Wn. App. 1, 7-8, 963 P.2d 881, 885 (1998) (sufficient
facts supported inference of large-scale drug dealing to support search of
alleged safe house); Goble, 88 Wn. App. at 509; cf State v. Thein, 138
Wn.2d 133, 150, 977 P.2d 582, 590 (1999) (en banc) (magistrate could
not infer that evidence might be found in the defendant's home based
solely on generalization that drug dealers likely keep drugs at their
homes). The State may not justify the issuance of a warrant with facts
that arose after its issuance unless those facts were reasonably inferable
at the time the warrant was issued. Goble, 88 Wn. App. at 508; cf State
v. Mance, 82 Wn. App. 539, 542, 918 P.2d 527, 529 (1996) (information
obtained after a defendant's warrantless arrest cannot be used to support
the initial probable cause for that arrest); see also 2 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 3.7(d), at 412-438 (4th ed. 2004).
2.2(b) Quantum of Evidence Required
Probable cause is a quantum of evidence "less than . . . would jus-
tify ... conviction," yet "more than bare suspicion." Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1310, 93 L. Ed. 1879, 1890
(1949). To make an arrest, the officer need not have facts sufficient to
establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but only reasonable grounds
for suspicion coupled with evidence of circumstances sufficiently strong
in themselves to justify a cautious and disinterested person in believing
2005]
Seattle University Law Review
that the suspect is guilty. State v. Scott, 93 Wn.2d 7, 11-12, 604 P.2d
943, 944-45 (1980) (en banc) (officers possessing description of car used
in robbery and license number of similar car used in robbery involving
similar modus operandi had probable cause to arrest persons who were
driving a similar vehicle toward the address where the car's license num-
ber was traced).
The exact quantum of evidence required is unclear and may depend
in part on the nature of the intrusion and the seriousness of the offense.
See generally 2 LaFave, supra, § 3.2(e), at 66-71.
2.2(c) Individualized Suspicion
Probable cause to arrest an individual exists only if police have rea-
sonable grounds to believe that the particular individual has committed
the crime. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371-74, 124 S. Ct. 795,
800-01, 157 L. Ed. 2d 769, 775-76 (2003) (noting that a police officer
may reasonably infer a common enterprise among passengers in a vehi-
cle, but that any inference must disappear if a guilty person among them
is singled out by the government); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91,
100 S. Ct. 338, 344, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 245 (1979); State v. Smith, 102
Wn.2d 449, 454-55, 688 P.2d 146, 149-50 (1984) (en banc) (police
lacked reasonable suspicion when they failed to check the suspect for
tattoos included in a warrant description and relied on tips from non-
corroborated "street kids"); State v. Larson, 93 Wn.2d 638, 645, 611
P.2d 771, 775 (1980) (en banc) (defendant's mere presence in a high-
crime area did not give rise to reasonable suspicion); State v. DeArman,
54 Wn. App. 621, 625, 774 P.2d 1247, 1249 (1989) (remaining mo-
tionless for 45 to 60 seconds at a stop sign but starting to move upon ap-
proach of an officer does not give rise to a reasonable suspicion of crimi-
nal activity).
There must be a sufficient nexus between the suspects to be
searched and the criminal activity. State v. Carter, 79 Wn. App. 154,
158, 901 P.2d 335, 337 (1995). For example, in Carter the police sent a
confidential informant to confirm complaints that an apartment was be-
ing used for illegal drug activity. Id. at 155-56. The informant observed
residents and non-residents buying, selling, and using illegal drugs, but
the informant was unable to identify any of the individuals by name. Id.
at 156. Based upon the informant's observations, the police obtained a
warrant to search "all 'persons at the residence at the time the warrant
i[s] being served as well as persons arriving and leaving the residence at
the time the warrant is being executed for controlled substances and pa-
pers of identification."' Id. at 156. Upon execution of the warrant, the
police found the defendant asleep on a mattress in the living room and
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discovered rock cocaine in his pants pocket. Id. at 157. The court held
that the warrant did not justify a search of the defendant's person because
the observations of the informant did not support the conclusion that only
illegal conduct occurred within the apartment and that any person present
was likely to be involved with criminal activity "in such a way as to have
evidence of the criminal activity on his person." Id. at 161 (quoting
Stokes v. State, 604 So.2d 836, 838 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)). However,
the court carefully noted that it was not deciding whether warrants with
"all persons present" language would be valid under different circum-
stances. Id.
Several exceptions exist, however, to establish authority of law
without a warrant. Individual suspicion is not required when a stop in-
volves neutral criteria. See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 423-24, 427,
124 S. Ct. 885, 889, 891, 157 L. Ed. 2d 843, 850, 852-53 (2004) (Fourth
Amendment does not presumptively or automatically require that brief,
information-seeking checkpoints on a highway be held unconstitutional,
but they must be reasonable); City of Seattle v. Yeager, 67 Wn. App. 41,
46-47, 834 P.2d 73, 76 (1992) (police may conduct Terry stop to check
validity of license when car had special license plate tabs indicating re-
stricted license). But cf City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,
41-42, 121 S. Ct. 447, 454, 148 L. Ed. 2d 333, 343 (2000) (drug check-
points unconstitutional when primary purpose was to uncover evidence
of ordinary criminal wrongdoing); City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d
454, 458, 755 P.2d 775, 777 (1988) (en banc) (sobriety checkpoints vio-
late state constitution).
- A warrantless search without individualized suspicion may also be
upheld in order to permit officers to investigate if the officers reasonably
believe that a felony has been committed and if there is a high probabil-
ity that the suspect will be found in the place to be searched. State v.
Silvernail, 25 Wn. App. 185, 189-91, 605 P.2d 1279, 1282-83 (1980)
(roadblock in which police stopped all cars exiting a ferry was proper,
despite lack of individualized suspicion, because the police had probable
cause to believe that suspects involved violent felony were on board).
Individualized suspicion is not required for some administrative
searches as well. See generally infra § 6.4(b), (c).
2.3 INFORMATION CONSIDERED: IN GENERAL
A court reviewing a probable cause determination considers only
the information that was available to the magistrate at the time that the
warrant was issued to the officer. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 481-82, 83 S. Ct. 407, 414, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 451-52 (1963);
State v. Murray, 110 Wn.2d 706, 709-10, 757 P.2d 487, 488 (1988) (en
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banc). Probable cause must be based on facts and not on mere conclu-
sions. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 113, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 1513, 12 L.
Ed. 2d 723, 727 (1964); State v. Thein, 138 Wn.2d 133, 145-47, 977
P.2d 582, 588 (1999) (en banc). In addition, probable cause must exist at
the actual time of arrest or search and it cannot be stale. See United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 904, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3411, 82 L. Ed. 2d
677, 686 (1984); State v. Maddox, 152 Wn.2d 499, 505-06, 98 P.3d
1199, 1202 (2004) (en banc) (delay in executing a warrant "may render
the magistrate's probable cause determination stale" but common sense
is the test for staleness based on the facts and circumstances identified in
the affidavit).
Affidavits for search warrants must be tested in a commonsense,
non-hypertechnical manner. In re Yim, 139 Wn.2d 581, 597, 989 P.2d
512, 520 (1999); State v. Fisher, 96 Wn.2d 962, 965, 639 P.2d 743, 745
(1982) (en banc); see infra § 3.3(b). "The support for issuance of a
search warrant is sufficient if, on reading the affidavits, an ordinary per-
son would understand that a violation existed and was continuing at the
time of the application." Fisher, 96 Wn.2d at 965 (quoting State v. Clay,
7 Wn. App. 631, 637, 501 P.2d 603, 607 (1972)). All doubts are resolved
in favor of the warrant's validity. Maddox, 152 Wn.2d at 509; State v.
Young, 123 Wn.2d 173, 195, 867 P.2d 593, 604 (1994) (en banc); State v.
Olson, 73 Wn. App. 348, 354, 869 P.2d 110, 113-14 (1994); State v.
Kennedy, 72 Wn. App. 244, 248, 864 P.2d 410, 412 (1993); State v.
Wilke, 55 Wn. App. 470, 476, 778 P.2d 1054, 1058 (1989).
Information need not be admissible at trial in order to support prob-
able cause. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 173, 69 S. Ct. 1302,
1309, 93 L. Ed. 1879, 1889 (1949); Bokor v. Dep't of Licensing, 74 Wn.
App. 523, 526, 874 P.2d 168, 169 (1994). For example, marital privilege
does not prevent a spouse's statements from being used to establish
probable cause. State v. Bonaparte, 34 Wn. App. 285, 289, 660 P.2d 334,
336 (1983). See generally infra § 7.3.
"[A] search warrant [will] not [be] rendered totally invalid if the af-
fidavit contains sufficient facts to establish probable cause independent
of the illegally obtained information." State v. Coates, 107 Wn.2d 882,
887, 735 P.2d 64, 67 (1987) (en banc). In Coates, for example, the police
obtained a search warrant based partially on facts that were obtained in
violation of the defendant's right to remain silent. Id. However, the court
upheld the search warrant because other facts in the affidavit supported a
finding of probable cause. Id. at 888.
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2.3(a) Hearsay
Hearsay from an informant can establish probable cause for a war-
rant as long as there is evidence providing reason to believe that the in-
formant is reliable and has an adequate basis of knowledge. Spinelli v.
United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416, 89 S. Ct. 584, 589, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637,
643 (1969); Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 113-14, 84 S. Ct. at 1513-14, 12 L. Ed.
2d at 727-29; State v. Huft, 106 Wn.2d 206, 209-10, 720 P.2d 838, 839-
40 (1986) (en bane) (tip regarding marijuana growing operation was
found insufficient because the basis of the informant's knowledge was
not shown); State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 432, 437-38, 688 P.2d 136, 140
(1984) (en bane) ("If the informant's information is hearsay, the basis of
knowledge prong can be satisfied if there is sufficient information so that
the hearsay establishes a basis of knowledge."); State v. Lund, 70 Wn.
App. 437, 449-50 n.9, 853 P.2d 1379, 1387 n.9 (1993) (noting a strong
motive to be truthful and an admission against penal interest can both
demonstrate veracity). As a result, a magistrate may rely on a police offi-
cer's affidavit or other testimony that relays hearsay information based
on a fellow officer's personal knowledge. State v. Lodge, 42 Wn. App.
380, 386, 711 P.2d 1078, 1083 (1985). The affidavit may also relate
hearsay from informants as long as there is a basis for crediting it. Huft,
106 Wn.2d at 209-10; Lund, 70 Wn. App. at 449-50 n.9.
Multiple hearsay may also be considered if the requirements are
met for each person in the chain of information. See Huft, 106 Wn.2d at
209-10 (concerned citizen information not sufficient without basis of
informant's knowledge); State v. Vanzant, 14 Wn. App. 679, 683, 544
P.2d 786, 789 (1975) (information passed to second detective by detec-
tive with personal knowledge of informant's reliability sufficient to es-
tablish probable cause for arrest). See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 3.2(d), at 56-59 (4th ed. 2004).
2.3(b) Prior Arrests, Prior Convictions, and Reputation
A magistrate or police officer making a probable cause determina-
tion may consider prior convictions that have probative value to the spe-
cific probable cause inquiry. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 173-74, 69 S. Ct. at
1309-10, 93 L. Ed. at 1889; State v. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d 91, 111 n.51, 59
P.3d 58, 68 n.51 (2002) (en banc); State v. Clark, 143 Wn.2d 731, 749,
24 P.3d 1006, 1015 (2001) (en bane) (defendant's prior conviction was
"helpful in establishing probable cause" when the conviction was of the
same general nature as the crime under investigation); State v. Sterling,
43 Wn. App. 846, 851, 719 P.2d 1357, 1359 (1986) (occupant's two
prior convictions for narcotics can be a factor in determining probable
cause). Without additional evidence, a prior record of the same type of
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criminal conduct is insufficient to establish probable cause. Beck v. Ohio,
379 U.S. 89, 97, 85 S. Ct. 223, 228, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142, 148 (1964); State
v. Hobart, 94 Wn.2d 437, 446, 617 P.2d 429, 434 (1980) (en banc).
However, prior acts may establish probable cause when the modus oper-
andi is similar and distinctive. See 2 LaFave, supra, § 3.2(d), at 60-66.
A prior criminal record does not justify a warrantless search.
Hobart, 94 Wn.2d at 446; State v. Duncan, 81 Wn. App. 70, 78, 912 P.2d
1090, 1095 (1996). See 2 LaFave, supra, § 3.2(d), at 56-59.
A general assertion of criminal reputation is insufficient to establish
probable cause. Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 416, 89 S. Ct. at 589, 21 L. Ed. 2d at
643-44. But see United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583, 91 S. Ct.
2075, 2081-82, 29 L. Ed. 2d 723, 733 (1971) (plurality opinion) (noting
that an officer's knowledge of a suspect's reputation is a "practical con-
sideration of everyday life" upon which an officer may rely in determin-
ing the reliability of an informant). Specific facts leading to a conclusion
that a suspect has a bad reputation may be considered. See 2 LaFave, su-
pra, § 3.2(d), at 56-59.
2.3(c) Increased Electrical Consumption
Standing alone, an increase in electrical use does not constitute suf-
ficient probable cause to issue a search warrant. Olson, 73 Wn. App. at
356; Sterling, 43 Wn. App. at 851; State v. McPherson, 40 Wn. App.
298, 301, 698 P.2d 563, 564 (1985). Evidence of increased power con-
sumption, absent other information, is an innocuous fact and cannot cor-
roborate an anonymous tip of suspected criminal activity. Young, 123
Wn.2d at 196. See also Huft, 106 Wn.2d at 211 ("[T]here are too many
plausible reasons for increased electrical use to allow a search warrant to
be issued based on increased consumption."). When the increase in
power consumption is combined with other factors, however, the in-
crease may be considered in determining whether probable cause exists.
State v. Cole, 128 Wn.2d 262, 291, 906 P.2d 925, 942 (1995) (en banc)
(increase in electrical consumption is a proper factor in determining
probable cause when combined with other suspicious factors); Young,
123 Wn.2d at 195; Sterling, 43 Wn. App. at 851-52 (400-500% increase
in power usage combined with suspicious facts supported probable cause
for search warrant). But see State v. Rakovsky, 79 Wn. App. 229, 239,
901 P.2d 364, 370 (1995) (evidence of power use three to four times
greater than the previous occupant's, as well as the absence of accumu-
lated snow on the roof when neighboring buildings had 20 to 30 inches,
did not constitute probable cause). An individual has a protected privacy
interest in power usage records such that a disclosure of this information
is prohibited unless there is written notice to the utility company that the
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person is suspected of criminal activity. RCW 42.17.314 (prohibiting the
inspection or copy of a person's utility records by law enforcement
unless the utility is provided a written statement that indicates the person
is suspected of committing a crime and there is a reasonable belief that
the records could determine or help determine whether the suspicion is
true). See generally Cole, 128 Wn.2d at 290 (a search warrant satisfies
the requirements of RCW 42.17.314); In re Maxfield, 133 Wn.2d 332,
341-42, 945 P.2d 196, 201 (1997) (en banc) (no reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity because electrical service was new and records showed
high electrical consumption pottery kilns were to be used at location);
State v. Maxwell, 114 Wn.2d 761, 767-69, 791 P.2d 223, 225-26 (1990)
(en banc) (telephonic request for utility record not admissible because
verbal request was in violation of RCW 42.17.314); In re Request of Ros-
ier, 105 Wn.2d 606, 613-16, 717 P.2d 1353, 1358-59 (1986) (en banc)
(recognizing the need to balance the public's interest in disclosure of in-
formation leading to arrests and the individual and societal interest in
preventing "fishing expeditions" by the government).
2.3(d) Polygraph Results
The results of a polygraph test may be considered in a magistrate's
probable cause determination, even though such results are inadmissible
at trial unless stringent conditions are satisfied. Clark, 143 Wn.2d at
749-50. Although the qualifications of the FBI agent who administered
the polygraph test in Clark were not set forth in the affidavit, the court
noted that information from a reliable informant has corroborative value
even if the informant's basis of knowledge is not specified. Id. (citing
State v. Lair, 95 Wn.2d 706, 712, 630 P.2d 427, 431 (1981) (en banc)).
In Clark, the FBI agent's basis of knowledge was the administration of
the polygraph test and his clinical and common sense observation of
Clark's performance. Id.
2.4 LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS' FIRST-HAND OBSERVATIONS
Because the existence of probable cause is dependent on a fact-
based inquiry, it is impossible to define broadly when an officer's obser-
vations are sufficient to constitute probable cause. However, the follow-
ing common factual situations provide some general guidance.
2.4(a) Particular Crimes: Stolen Property
Suspicious conduct suggesting that property is stolen does not al-
ways establish probable cause. For example, when officers saw two men
park a car in an alley, load it with cartons, drive away, and later return
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and repeat their conduct, the officers did not have probable cause to be-
lieve that the cartons contained stolen property. Henry v. United States,
361 U.S. 98, 103, 80 S. Ct. 168, 171-72, 4 L. Ed. 2d 134, 139 (1959).
In one case, officers stopped a vehicle after learning that its owner
had an outstanding warrant for a traffic violation. State v. Glasper, 84
Wn.2d 17, 18, 523 P.2d 937, 938 (1974) (en banc). The police then saw
an unpadded, unsecured television in the open trunk. Id. A passenger in
the car claimed ownership of the set, but was unable to identify the
brand. Id. at 18. The court held that the police had reasonable cause to
believe that the television was stolen. Id. at 21. Similarly, items wrapped
in a blanket on a street and thrown into bushes when police approached
were indicative of stolen property when police had previous experience
with similar situations. State v. Barber, 118 Wn.2d 335, 337-38, 823
P.2d 1068, 1069 (1992) (en banc). However, in another case, the exis-
tence of an expensive briefcase in a car not reported stolen was not suffi-
cient to establish probable cause for a vehicle search. State v. Ozuna, 80
Wn. App. 684, 688-89, 911 P.2d 395, 397-98 (1996). See generally 2
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.6(a), at 304-309 (4th ed.
2004).
2.4(b) Particular Crimes: Illegal Substances
The odor of an illegal substance may establish probable cause, as
long as the odor is detected by someone trained and experienced in de-
tecting illegal substances. State v. Jacobs, 121 Wn. App. 669, 678, 89
P.3d 232, 238 (2004); State v. Olson, 73 Wn. App. 348, 356, 869 P.2d
110, 114 (1994) (trained officer's detection of marijuana odor); State v.
Vonhof 51 Wn. App. 33, 41-42, 751 P.2d 1221, 1226 (1988) (odor com-
bined with experience in smelling the illegal substance constituted prob-
able cause). The affidavit must set forth the officer's training and experi-
ence in identifying the odor. See State v. Remboldt, 64 Wn. App. 505,
510, 827 P.2d 282, 285 (1992). But if the officer's experience and educa-
tion is not in the affidavit, the omission is not fatal to the search war-
rant's validity if other facts in the affidavit demonstrate probable cause.
Jacobs, 121 Wn. App. at 678. Odor may also be used in concert with
other suspicious activities to establish probable cause. See State v. Huff,
64 Wn. App. 641, 647-48, 826 P.2d 698, 701-02 (1992) (odor of
methamphetamine combined with furtive gestures and lying to police
during car stop created probable cause).
In the case of a drug enforcement dog sniff, an alert establishes
probable cause if the dog's training and reliability are known to the offi-
cers and set forth in the affidavit for a warrant. State v. Jackson, 82 Wn.
App. 594, 606-07, 918 P.2d 945, 952-53 (1996) (alert by police dog af-
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ter temporary seizure of Federal Express package constituted probable
cause); State v. Flores-Moreno, 72 Wn. App. 733, 740-41, 866 P.2d 648,
652-53 (1994) (probable cause established from observations of drug
deal combined with positive canine sniff); State v. Stanphill, 53 Wn.
App. 623, 632, 769 P.2d 861, 866 (1989) (corroborating canine sniff
overcame any deficiency in the reliability of an informant).
Identification of substances must also be accompanied by evidence
of the officer's expertise and training in identifying the substance in or-
der to establish probable cause. State v. Graham, 130 Wn.2d 711, 724,
725, 927 P.2d 227, 234 (1996) (en banc); State v. Solberg, 66 Wn. App.
66, 79, 831 P.2d 754, 761 (1992), rev'd on other grounds, 122 Wn.2d
688, 861 P.2d 460 (1993) (en banc) (officer's experience in identifying
marijuana grow operations); State v. Fore, 56 Wn. App. 339, 343-44,
783 P.2d 626, 629 (1989) (officer training relevant to surveillance of
drug transactions in park). Absolute certainty as to the identity of the
substance is not required. Graham, 130 Wn.2d at 725 (quoting Fore, 56
Wn. App. at 345).
However, the officer's experience and training on the characteris-
tics of those who cultivate illegal substances, without more, is not
enough to establish probable cause. Olson, 73 Wn. App. at 357 (officer's
experience that those who cultivate marijuana usually hide records and
materials in a safe house under their control does not satisfy probable
cause for search warrant of the safe house premises). But compare State
v. Perez, 92 Wn. App. 1, 7-8, 963 P.2d 881, 885 (1998) (sufficient facts
supported inference of large scale drug dealing to support search of al-
leged safe house) with State v. Thein, 138 Wn.2d 133, 150, 977 P.2d 582,
590 (1999) (en banc) (magistrate could not infer that evidence might be
found in the defendant's home based solely on generalization that drug
dealers likely keep drugs at their home). See 2 LaFave, supra, § 3.6(b), at
309-331.
2.4(c) Association: Persons and Places
Because of the individualized suspicion requirement, mere associa-
tion with a person whom police have grounds to arrest does not consti-
tute probable cause for arrest. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 587,
68 S. Ct. 222, 225, 92 L. Ed. 210, 216 (1948) (search of a car passenger
unjustified when the driver was arrested for possession of counterfeit
ration coupons). Mere proximity to others suspected of criminal activity
does not in itself establish probable cause for a search of the associate.
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S. Ct. 338, 342, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238,
245 (1979); State v. Crane, 105 Wn. App. 301, 312, 19 P.3d 1100, 1106
(2001); State v. Dorsey, 40 Wn. App. 459, 466, 698 P.2d 1109, 1113
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(1985) (probable cause based on association with others engaged in
criminal activity requires an additional circumstance that reasonably im-
plies knowledge of or participation in that activity). Race or color alone,
including "racial incongruity" ("a person of any race being allegedly 'out
of place' in a particular geographic area") can never constitute probable
cause of criminal activity. Barber, 118 Wn.2d at 346; see also United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885-87, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 2582-
83, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607, 619-20 (1975); United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d
1286, 1289 (9th Cir. 1982).
An individual's presence in a high-crime area is not sufficient, by
itself, to establish probable cause. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52,
99 S. Ct. 2637, 2641, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 362-63 (1979); Crane, 105 Wn.
App. at 312. Suspicion of dangerousness must relate to the person
searched, not to the area in which he is found. State v. Smith, 102 Wn.2d
449, 452-53, 688 P.2d 146, 148 (1984) (en banc) (general practice of
frisking individuals in particularly dangerous area of the city is not justi-
fied by probable cause). See generally 2 LaFave, supra, § 3.6(g), at 366-
370.
2.4(d) Furtive Gestures and Flight
A suspect's furtive gestures or flight, without more, cannot estab-
lish probable cause; however, they may be a factor in determining
whether probable cause exists. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-
24, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675-76, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570, 575-76 (2000) (finding
reasonable suspicion based on suspect's presence in area known for
heavy drug trafficking and suspect's unprovoked flight upon police arri-
val); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66-67, 88 S. Ct. 1889, 1904, 20
L. Ed. 2d 917, 936-37 (1968) (probable cause existed when strangers
tiptoed from apartment and fled from police officer); Graham, 130
Wn.2d at 725-26 (finding probable cause when the defendant quickly
concealed an object in his pants pockets, ignored the officers' request to
stop, looked nervous, and sweated profusely on a cold night); State v.
Hobart, 24 Wn. App. 240, 243, 600 P.2d 660, 662 (1979), rev'don other
grounds, 94 Wn.2d 437, 617 P.2d 429 (1980) (en banc) (defendant
grabbed his pocket and turned away from an officer after the officer
asked if the defendant had cocaine in his pocket). Furtive gestures, eva-
sive behavior, and flight from police are circumstantial evidence of
criminal activity. Graham, 130 Wn.2d at 725-26 (concealing item that
looked like rock cocaine in hand, ignoring an officer's request to stop,
and profuse sweating in cold temperature); State v. Glover, 116 Wn.2d
509, 514-15, 806 P.2d 760, 762-63 (1991) (en banc) (defendant's con-
duct of turning away from the officers, walking faster, playing with his
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ballcap, and looking toward the officers and then looking away, coupled
with officer's disbelief of defendant's statement that he lived at housing
complex constituted probable cause for criminal trespass); State v. Bax-
ter, 68 Wn.2d 416, 421-22, 413 P.2d 638, 642 (1966) (flight is an ele-
ment of probable cause); Huff 64 Wn. App. at 647 (furtive movements
and lying to police about identity support probable cause); cf State v.
Larson, 93 Wn.2d 638, 645, 611 P.2d 771, 775 (1980) (en banc) (sus-
pect's leaving at the time a police cruiser arrives does not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that it is reasonable to suspect the person of com-
mitting a crime).
However, probable cause is not negated merely because it is possi-
ble to imagine an innocent explanation for observed activities. Graham,
130 Wn.2d at 725 (quoting Fore, 56 Wn. App. at 344) (noting that abso-
lute certainty as to the identity of a suspicious substance is not required).
2.4(e) Response to Questioning
When combined with other circumstances, a suspect's response to
police questioning can establish probable cause. United States v. Ortiz,
422 U.S. 891, 897, 95 S. Ct. 2585, 2588, 45 L. Ed. 2d 623, 629 (1975)
(border patrol may consider nature of responses to questioning to help
establish probable cause). See also Huff, 64 Wn. App. at 647 (lying to
police about identity coupled with furtive gestures and identification of
illegal substance odor established probable cause); Glover, 116 Wn.2d at
514 (officer's disbelief of defendant's statement that he lived at housing
complex, combined with suspicious gestures, constituted probable cause
for criminal trespass).
A suspect's failure or refusal to answer an officer's questions, how-
ever, may not be taken into account. State v. White, 97 Wn.2d 92, 106,
640 P.2d 1061, 1069 (1982) (en banc); see Brown, 443 U.S. at 53 n.3, 99
S. Ct. at 2641 n.3, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 363 n.3. See generally 2 LaFave, su-
pra, § 3.6(f), at 360-66. Similarly, a suspect's silence after Miranda
warnings have been given may not be considered in determining prob-
able cause. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617-18, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 2244-
45, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91, 97-98 (1976). Nor may the suspect's failure to chal-
lenge the officer's actions be considered. Di Re, 332 U.S. at 594, 68 S.
Ct. at 228, 92 L. Ed. at 220 (officers could not infer probable cause from
suspect's failure to protest arrest or to proclaim innocence).
Although the United States Supreme Court has held that the Fourth
Amendment cannot compel a suspect to answer questions, a state may
make it a crime for a suspect to refuse to identify herself if the request
for identification is reasonably related to the circumstances that justified
the investigative stop. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nevada, Humboldt
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County, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2459-60, 159 L. Ed. 2d 292, 303-05 (2004);
see State v. Turner, 103 Wn. App. 515, 525-26, 13 P.3d 234, 239-40
(2000) (holding the defendant's refusal to provide his name combined
with the defendant's lunging at the officer were sufficient to satisfy a
conviction for obstruction of justice); State v. Contreras, 92 Wn. App.
307, 316, 966 P.2d 915, 919 (1998) (recognizing the defendant's right to
refuse to answer questions, but including the defendant's failure to pro-
vide his name upon request as one reason that supported a charge for ob-
struction of justice). See generally RCW 9A.76.020(l) (Washington's
obstruction of justice statute).
2.5 INFORMATION FROM AN INFORMANT: IN GENERAL
Different sets of rules govern information received from an infor-
mant depending on whether the informant is a criminal informant, a citi-
zen informant, a police informant, or an anonymous informant. This sec-
tion discusses general rules that apply to all informants; section 2.6 fo-
cuses on citizen informants; section 2.7 covers the rules for when the
informant is a fellow police officer; and section 2.8 deals with anony-
mous informants.
Traditionally, under the Fourth Amendment, information from an
informant could establish probable cause only when the facts and cir-
cumstances available to the police satisfied the two-prong Aguilar-
Spinelli test requiring that an informant's basis of knowledge and reli-
ability be established. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 415-16, 89
S. Ct. 584, 588-89, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637, 643 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378
U.S. 108, 114, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 1514, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723, 729 (1964); see 2
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.3(a), at 99-105 (4th ed. 2004).
See generally State v. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d 91, 112, 59 P.3d 58, 68-69
(2002) (en banc) (affidavit must establish informant's basis of knowl-
edge and veracity); State v. Bauer, 98 Wn. App. 870, 874-75, 991 P.2d
668, 671 (2000).
Under the "basis of knowledge" prong of the test, facts must be re-
vealed that enable the person making the probable cause determination to
decide whether the informant had a basis for the allegation of criminal
conduct. Under the "veracity" prong, facts must be presented so that the
magistrate can determine either the inherent credibility of the informant
or the reliability of the informant on the particular occasion. Spinelli, 393
U.S. at 415-16, 89 S. Ct. at 588-89, 21 L. Ed. 2d at 643; State v. Jack-
son, 102 Wn.2d 432, 435, 688 P.2d 136, 138-39 (1984) (en banc). An
informant's tip may provide police with grounds to stop a person only if
there is some indicia of reliability. State v. Smith, 102 Wn.2d 449, 455,
688 P.2d 146, 150 (1984) (en banc) (officers' reliance on street kids to
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lead them to suspect is not permissible when the officers questioned the
reliability of children). If either the basis of knowledge or veracity prong
is deficient, the police may cure the deficiency by corroborating the in-
formant's tip through an independent investigation. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d
at 112. So long as each link in the chain of information satisfies the two-
prong test, multiple hearsay may be considered. United States v. Carmi-
chael, 489 F.2d 983, 986 (7th Cir. 1973); State v. Morehouse, 41 Wn.
App. 334, 336, 704 P.2d 168, 169 (1985); State v. Luellen, 17 Wn. App.
91, 94, n.1, 562 P.2d 253, 255, n.1 (1977) (noting that hearsay-on-
hearsay may not always be sufficient to establish probable cause, but the
facts provided a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay).
In 1983, the United States Supreme Court replaced the Aguilar-
Spinelli test with a totality of the circumstances approach for determining
when an informant's tip may establish probable cause. Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 231-32, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2320, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 530
(1983). The Washington State Supreme Court, however, has held that
Article I, Section 7 of the Washington Constitution requires adherence to
the two-prong Aguilar-Spinelli test. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d at 111-12 (cit-
ing Jackson, 102 Wn.2d at 440). A Washington trial court may not use
the Gates "totality of the circumstances" test. State v. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d
64, 71 n.2, 93 P.3d 872, 876 n.2 (2004) (en banc); State v. Huft, 106
Wn.2d 206, 209-10, 720 P.2d 838, 840 (1986) (en banc); Jackson, 102
Wn.2d at 443. See 2 LaFave, supra, § 3.3(a), at 99-113.
2.5(a) Satisfying the "Basis of Knowledge" Prong by
Personal Knowledge
The best way to satisfy the "basis of knowledge" prong is to show
that the informant based his or her information on personal knowledge.
See, e.g., Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 1514, 12
L. Ed. 2d 723, 729 (1964); Vickers, 148 Wn.2d at 112; State v. Wolken,
103 Wn.2d 823, 827, 700 P.2d 319, 321 (1985) (en banc); Jackson, 102
Wn.2d at 437; Bauer, 98 Wn. App. at 875. For example, an informant's
statement that he had observed the defendant selling narcotics will satisfy
the basis of knowledge prong. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 304, 87
S. Ct. 1056, 1059, 18 L. Ed. 2d 62, 67 (1967). But see 2 LaFave, supra, §
3.3(a), at 100-01 (criticizing McCray for failing to require a showing
that the informant knew the substance was a narcotic). The affidavit need
only show that the informant had personal knowledge of the facts as-
serted. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d at 113 (affidavit did not need to establish that
informant had actually seen the weapons or ammunition used in a rob-
bery, but that the informant had personal knowledge of the facts asserted
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in the affidavit regarding the defendants' conversations about committing
an armed robbery).
The basis of an informant's knowledge may also be established by
hearsay. See Hufi, 106 Wn.2d at 211, 720 P.2d at 841 (1986); Jackson,
102 Wn.2d at 437. Similarly, an informant's statement from which the
court may infer the informant's first-hand knowledge of criminal activity
will satisfy this prong. State v. Anderson, 41 Wn. App. 85, 95, 702 P.2d
481, 489 (1985), rev'd on other grounds, 107 Wn.2d 745, 733 P.2d 517
(1987). However, an informant's personal knowledge of innocuous facts
about the defendant is insufficient to satisfy the basis of knowlege prong
without allegations establishing the informant's personal knowledge of
the criminal act. State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d 173, 196, 867 P.2d 593, 603
(1994) (en banc); Hufi, 106 Wn.2d at 211.
Under Article 1, Section 7 of the Washington State Constitution, a
deficiency in the basis of knowledge prong may be remedied by "inde-
pendent police investigatory work that corroborates the tip to such an
extent that it supports the missing elements . . . ." Jackson, 102 Wn.2d at
438. See also State v. Kennedy, 72 Wn. App. 244, 249-50, 864 P.2d 410,
413-14 (1993); State v. Adame, 39 Wn. App. 574, 576-77, 694 P.2d 676,
678 (1985). Thus, the credibility of an informant may be established by
police verification of the informant's statement of detailed criminal ac-
tivity not generally known or readily available. Anderson, 41 Wn. App.
at 94-95; see State v. Shaver, 116 Wn. App. 375, 380-81, 65 P.3d 688,
690-91 (2003) (confidential informant's credibility corroborated by offi-
cer's ongoing investigation of drug activity at a residence for many years
prior to informant's tip and officer's observations that residence was fre-
quented by known drug users). The corroborated information must itself
suggest criminal activity. "Merely verifying 'innocuous details,' com-
monly known facts or easily predictable events should not suffice to
remedy [the] deficiency . . . ." Jackson, 102 Wn.2d at 438; State v.
Maddox, 116 Wn. App. 796, 803, 67 P.3d 1135, 1139 (2003), aff'd, 152
Wn.2d 499, 98 P.3d 1199 (2004) (corroboration of alleged drug dealing
sufficient when police searched informant before a controlled buy, ob-
served his entrance and exit, and then re-searched the informant after the
controlled buy); State v. Maxwell, 114 Wn.2d 761, 769-70, 791 P.2d
223, 227 (1990) (en banc) (informant's observation of frequent visitors,
tin foil on windows, and suspicious conversation not sufficient evidence
of illegal activity); Kennedy, 72 Wn. App. at 249-50 (innocuous facts
combined with suspicious activity in outdoor resort sufficient to corrobo-
rate suspicion of drug activity); State v. Chatmon, 9 Wn. App. 741, 747,
515 P.2d 530, 534-35 (1973) (police corroboration of an informant's
description of a vehicle and its occupants was insufficient to raise a rea-
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sonable inference of criminal activity). However, the information may be
used to corroborate other cognizable information even if the informant's
basis of knowledge is not shown. State v. Lund, 70 Wn. App. 437, 450
n.10, 853 P.2d 1379, 1387-88 n.10 (1993) (anonymous police infor-
mant's tip of possible drug activity in prison not enough to establish
probable cause, but could be considered in corroborating another police
informant's similar information and for independent police investigation
of tip); State v. Lair, 95 Wn.2d 706, 712, 630 P.2d 427, 431 (1981) (en
banc) (hearsay or conclusory statements relayed by a reliable informant
may establish probable cause when used to corroborate information pro-
vided by an informant whose reliability has not yet been established). See
generally 2 LaFave, supra, § 3.3(f), at 174-202.
2.5(b) Satisfying the "Veracity" Prong by Past Performance
The veracity prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test may be met if the af-
fidavit supporting the search warrant contains sufficient facts from which
a magistrate can independently determine the veracity of the informant.
Vickers, 148 Wn.2d at 112; Maddox, 116 Wn. App. at 803, aff'd, 152
Wn.2d 499, 98 P.3d 1199 (2004) (informant's "track record" of two suc-
cessful controlled buys sufficient to support an inference of veracity). A
mere conclusion that the informant is a "credible person" is insufficient;
reasons for believing the informant to be credible must be presented.
Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 112, 84 S. Ct. at 1515, 12 L. Ed. 2d at 727; Jackson,
102 Wn.2d at 437; Lund, 70 Wn. App. at 449-50 n.10.
The fact that an informant's past information has led to convictions
is a sufficient showing of reliability. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d at 437. An in-
formant's reliability may also be established if the informant has previ-
ously provided information that was proven to be reliable even though it
did not result in an arrest. Shaver, 116 Wn. App. at 380-81 (confidential
informant had provided reliable information to the officer in the past);
see 2 LaFave, supra, § 3.3(b), at 113-131.
An informant who has assisted in an arrest may be credible. State v.
Lopez, 70 Wn. App. 259, 264, 856 P.2d 390, 393 (1993) (informant's
successful assistance in controlled buys established a track record of reli-
ability); Wolken, 103 Wn.2d at 827 (informant's reliability established by
previously providing information to authorities). Some courts have read
Aguilar to hold that general statements alleging past reliability of the de-
fendant are sufficient. See 2 LaFave, supra, § 3.3(b), at 113-131.
In the absence of circumstances showing unreliability, an officer
need not have personal knowledge of the informant's track record, but
may rely on information from fellow officers. State v. Vanzant, 14 Wn.
App. 679, 681-82, 544 P.2d 786, 788 (1975); see infra § 2.7(b).
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2.5(c) Satisfying the "Veracity" Prong by Admissions Against
Interest and by Motive
Hearsay from an informant can establish probable cause for a war-
rantless search, as long as there is evidence of a reason to believe that the
informant is reliable, including the motive for the informant to be truth-
ful. State v. Bean, 89 Wn.2d 467, 469-71, 572 P.2d 1102, 1103-04
(1978) (en banc) (offer of a favorable sentence recommendation gave
informant a strong motive to provide accurate information); Lund, 70
Wn. App. at 439-40, 449-50 n.9 (inmate had strong motivation to pro-
vide reliable information about prison drug smuggling when it was ex-
changed for benefits for his own criminal case); State v. Estorga, 60 Wn.
App. 298, 305, 803 P.2d 813, 817 (1991) (offer to drop charges in ex-
change for accurate information established strong motive to be truthful);
State v. Smith, 39 Wn. App. 642, 647, 694 P.2d 660, 663 (1984) (offer of
reduction in charge from felony to misdemeanor gave informant strong
motive to be truthful).
A statement against penal interest can also establish an adequate
basis of knowledge. Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 425, 89 S. Ct. at 593, 21 L. Ed.
2d at 649 (White, J., concurring); Shaver, 116 Wn. App. at 380-81 (con-
fidential informant relayed comments against penal interest made by
suspected drug dealer); Lund, 70 Wn. App. at 449-50 n.10 (informant
heard inmate's admission against penal interest that he was receiving
drugs smuggled into the prison by his attorney).
2.6 CITIZEN INFORMANTS:
VICTIM/WITNESS INFORMANTS IN GENERAL
The Aguilar-Spinelli test also applies to the use of information from
a citizen informant, such as a victim or witness. State v. Wible, 113 Wn.
App. 18, 22, 51 P.3d 830, 833 (2002) (affidavit must set forth the infor-
mant's basis of knowledge and reliability); State v. Tarter, 111 Wn. App.
336, 340, 44 P.3d 899, 901 (2002) (Aguilar-Spinelli test applied where
informants were named citizens); State v. McReynolds, 104 Wn. App.
560, 572-73, 17 P.3d 608, 616 (2001) (citizen informant was readily
identifiable through affidavit). But see State v. Nordlund, 113 Wn. App.
171, 181, 53 P.3d 520, 524 (2002) (State did not need to show the credi-
bility and reliability of citizen informants who supplied noncriminal and
nonaccusatory information which the magistrate could have inferred was
based on personal knowledge).
Personal knowledge can be established by an informant's personal
observations. Wible, 113 Wn. App. at 23; Tarter, 111 Wn. App. at 340.
The reliability of a named informant is presumed reliable if the circum-
stances which establish personal knowledge are sufficiently detailed.
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State v. Gaddy, 114 Wn. App. 702, 707, 60 P.3d 116, 120 (2003); Wible,
113 Wn. App. at 24 (no independent corroboration required); Tarter, 111
Wn. App. at 340 (State's burden is "relaxed" with regard to the veracity
of citizen informants); McReynolds, 104 Wn. App. at 572-73 (informant
was readily identifiable from affidavit and provided information in "en-
tirely unsuspicious circumstances"); State v. Bauer, 98 Wn. App. 870,
876 n.5, 991 P.2d 668, 671 n.5 (2000) (noting lack of authority for de-
fendant's argument that a citizen informant becomes a professional in-
formant-for-hire if the citizen is interested in a public hotline financial
award).
A higher showing of credibility is required for a citizen informant
whose identity is known by the police but is not revealed to the magis-
trate. Bauer, 98 Wn. App. at 876-77 (credibility established by facts that
informant was a concerned citizen, had been a Washington citizen for
more than nine years, was a registered voter, and feared retaliation).
Again, multiple hearsay is acceptable as long as each instance in the
chain meets the two-prong test. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 479
F.2d 936, 940-41 (7th Cir. 1973) (tip by service station employee about
stolen credit card from phone call to American Express was reliable);
State v. Huft, 106 Wn.2d 206, 209-10, 720 P.2d 838, 840 (1986) (con-
cerned citizen information not sufficient without basis of informant's
knowledge); State v. Vanzant, 14 Wn. App. 679, 683, 544 P.2d 786, 789
(1975) (information passed to second detective by detective with per-
sonal knowledge of informant's reliability sufficient to establish probable
cause for arrest). See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure
§ 3.4, at 218-269 (4th ed. 2004).
Naming an informant is not a sufficient ground on which to credit
an informer; it is, however, considered in the determination of whether
the informant is actually a citizen informant. State v. Duncan, 81 Wn.
App. 70, 78, 912 P.2d 1090, 1095 (1996); State v. Rodriguez, 53 Wn.
App. 571, 576, 769 P.2d 309, 312 (1989).
2.6(a) Satisfying the "Basis of Knowledge" Prong
The basis for the citizen informant's knowledge must be estab-
lished. See Huft, 106 Wn.2d at 211. Information showing the informant
personally has seen the facts asserted and is passing on firsthand infor-
mation satisfies the basis of the knowledge prong. State v. Smith, 110
Wn.2d 658, 663, 756 P.2d 722, 725 (1988) (en banc); State v. Jackson,
102 Wn.2d. 432, 437, 688 P.2d 136, 140 (1984) (en banc). However, if
the facts come from one who is not the eyewitness, or when the informa-
tion requires some expertise, such as the identification of the odor of
marijuana, the basis of the informant's knowledge must be demonstrated.
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State v. Boyer, Wn. App. _, 102 P.3d 833, 840 (2004) (affida-
vit failed to establish citizen informant's expertise in identifying co-
caine); see 2 LaFave, supra, § 3.4(b), at 240-248.
2.6(b) Satisfying the "Veracity" Prong by Partial Corroboration of
Informant's Tip and by Self- Verifying Detail
Washington courts require a showing of reliability for citizen in-
formants. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d at 72-73; State v. Ibarra, 61 Wn. App. 695,
698-99, 812 P.2d 114, 117 (1991) (noting the different types of infor-
mants). However, the burden for establishing an identified citizen infor-
mant's credibility is generally a reduced standard and the court will pre-
sume their reliability. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d at 72-73; Ibarra, 61 Wn. App.
at 699; State v. Franklin, 49 Wn. App. 106, 109, 741 P.2d 83, 85 (1987)
(noting that the standard is relaxed but the information must support an
inference of truthfulness and must establish a basis of knowledge). The
standard is generally not relaxed, however, when the citizen informant
remains unidentified to the magistrate. Huft, 106 Wn.2d at 211; Ibarra,
61 Wn. App. at 699.
Police must present the issuing magistrate with sufficient facts to
determine either the informant's inherent credibility or reliability, unless
the police corroborate the informant's tip. Duncan, 81 Wn. App. at 76;
State v. Huff 33 Wn. App. 304, 307-08, 654 P.2d 1211, 1213 (1982).
Naming an informant is not a sufficient ground upon which to credit an
informer; however, independent police corroboration of criminal activity
along the lines suggested by the informant may suffice. Jackson, 102
Wn.2d at 438; Duncan, 81 Wn. App. at 77. Corroboration must suggest
criminal activity, not just innocuous facts. State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d
173, 195-96, 867 P.2d 593, 603 (1994) (en banc); State v. Rakovsky, 79
Wn. App. 229, 239, 901 P.2d 364, 370 (1995) (absent information on
marijuana growing, no reasonable inference of criminal activity). The
corroborating information must point to suspicious activities along the
lines suggested by the informant. State v. Maxwell, 114 Wn.2d 761, 769,
791 P.2d 223, 227 (1990) (en banc).
2.6(c) Sufficiency of Information Supplied
Factors that have been considered in determining whether sufficient
information has been provided by a victim informant or witness infor-
mant include: (1) the particularity of the description of the offender or
the vehicle; (2) the size of the area in which the perpetrator might be
found; (3) the number of persons in the area; (4) the direction of flight;
(5) the activity or condition of the person arrested; and (6) the person's
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knowledge that his vehicle has been involved in other similar criminal
activity. See 2 LaFave, supra, § 3.4(c), at 248-69.
When a citizen can identify a suspect by name or by photograph,
the information is sufficient to establish probable cause. See Simmons v.
United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384, 88 S. Ct. 967, 971, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1247,
1253 (1968). The use of photo identification, however, is subject to chal-
lenge on certain deficiencies. Id. at 383-84, 88 S. Ct. at 971, 19 L. Ed. 2d
at 1253 (initial photo misidentification may reduce the trustworthiness of
a subsequent lineup or courtroom identification because the witness may
retain a memory of the photo and not their own personal observation).
Washington cases discussing particular fact patterns include the fol-
lowing: State v. Palmer, 73 Wn.2d 462, 464-65, 438 P.2d 876, 878
(1968) (finding probable cause for arrest 45 minutes after robbery victim
identified automobile by make, year, color, and dirty white top, and de-
scribed suspect by hair color and attire); State v. Kohler, 70 Wn.2d 599,
605, 424 P.2d 656, 660 (1967) (finding probable cause when two wit-
nesses provided police with descriptions of vehicle, clothing, and build
of suspects, and when probability was slight that two similar cars would
be traveling within limited area of Seattle at 12:30 a.m. ); State v. Baker,
68 Wn.2d 517, 520, 413 P.2d 965, 967-68 (1966) (finding probable
cause when robbery victims identified make, color, and license number
of suspect vehicle).
2.7 POLICE AS INFORMANTS
2. 7(a) Satisfying the "Veracity" and "Basis of Knowledge" Prongs
As with citizen informants under federal law, the veracity of police
informants' statements may be presumed. See United States v. Ventresca,
380 U.S. 102, 110, 85 S. Ct. 741, 747, 13 L. Ed. 2d 684, 690 (1965);
State v. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d 64, 71-73, 93 P.3d 872, 876 (2004) (en
banc).
Generally, there must be a showing that the officer had a basis for
his or her knowledge. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d at 72. In limited, complex
situations, when explaining the grounds for the belief may be difficult,
conclusory allegations will be sufficient. Jaben v. United States, 381
U.S. 214, 224-25, 85 S. Ct. 1365, 1370, 14 L. Ed. 2d 345, 352 (1965) (in
tax evasion case, affidavit need not explain every basis of the allegation).
2.7(b) Multiple Hearsay
An arresting officer need not have personal knowledge of the facts
establishing probable cause, but may rely on another officer's assess-
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ment. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568, 91 S. Ct. 1031, 1037, 28
L. Ed. 2d 306, 313 (1971) ("fellow officer rule"); Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d at
70-71 (officer may rely on information from a police bulletin or "hot
sheet" if the issuing agency has probable cause). However, probable
cause must actually exist for the arrest to be valid. Whiteley, 401 U.S. at
568-69, 91 S. Ct. at 1037-38, 28 L. Ed. 2d at 313-14; Gaddy, 152
Wn.2d at 70-71. See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.5(b), at
273-285 (4th ed. 2004). Good faith reliance by the arresting officer is
irrelevant. State v. Gaddy, 114 Wn. App. 702, 706, 60 P.3d 116, 119
(2002), aff'd, 152 Wn.2d 64, 93 P.3d 872 (2004).
Although determining probable cause on the basis of collective in-
formation in an agency is generally permissible, the chain of communi-
cation must be shown. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 12 Wn. App. 309, 310,
529 P.2d 873, 874 (1974). See generally 2 LaFave, supra, § 3.5(c), at
285-291. Whether the State must prove the reliability of the agency's
records may depend on whether the court considers the agency to be a
citizen informant. Compare State v. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d 64, 71-74, 93
P.3d 872, 876-77 (2004) (en banc) (treating Department of Licensing as
a citizen informant and finding Department's information presumptively
reliable regarding defendant's driving record ) with State v. Sandholm, 96
Wn. App. 846, 848, 980 P.2d 1292, 1293 (1999) (no evidence provided
to show reliability of information from WACIC radio).
2.8 INFORMATION FROM ANONYMOUS OR UNKNOWN INFORMANTS:
SATISFYING THE "VERACITY" PRONG
Generally, an anonymous informant's tip fails to meet the Aguilar-
Spinelli requirements of basis of knowledge and veracity unless the tip is
corroborated. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 413, 89 S. Ct.. 584,
587, 21 L.Ed. 2d 637, 641-42 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108,
114, 84 S. Ct.. 1509, 1514, 12 L.Ed. 2d 723, 729 (1964); State v. Young,
123 Wn.2d 173, 195, 867 P.2d 593, 604 (1994) (en banc); cf State v.
Murray, 110 Wn.2d 706, 712, 757 P.2d 487, 489 (1988) (en banc) (basis
of knowledge prong satisfied from informant's personal observations
even though police did not corroborate those observations). A named but
unknown informant is not presumed reliable. See State v. Sieler, 95
Wn.2d 43, 48, 621 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1980) (en banc) (reliability of
named but unknown telephone informant not significantly different from
anonymous telephone informant). If, however, a police investigation cor-
roborates the informant's information and constitutes more than public or
innocuous facts, the Aguilar-Spinelli test may be satisfied. Young, 123
Wn.2d at 195; State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 432, 438, 688 P.2d 136, 140
(1984) (en banc).
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2.9 SPECIAL SEARCHES AND SEIZURES REQUIRING
LESSER OR GREATER LEVELS OF PROOF
Administrative searches may require a lesser level of proof than
probable cause and are discussed in section 2.9(a). Terry investigatory
stops require less than probable cause and are covered in section 2.9(b).
Searches that intrude into an individual's body, on the other hand, re-
quire a greater level of proof and are discussed in section 2.9(c).
2.9(a) Administrative Searches
The protections of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 7
of the Washington Constitution extend to administrative and regulatory
searches. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 523-32, 87 S. Ct.
1727, 1727-33, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930, 930-38 (1967). Therefore, such
searches must either be conducted pursuant to a warrant or fall within
one of the narrowly drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement. Id.;
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84, 121 S. Ct. 1281, 1292,
149 L. Ed. 2d 205 (2001) (explaining that the "special needs" doctrine
upholds certain suspicionless searches performed for reasons unrelated to
law enforcement and finding a Fourth Amendment violation where ex-
tensive involvement of law enforcement and threat of prosecution were
essential to hospital program's success in forcing prenatal patients into
drug treatment); Thurston County Rental Owners Ass'n v. Thurston
County, 85 Wn. App. 171, 183, 931 P.2d 208, 215 (1997). Administra-
tive searches conducted pursuant to an exception to the warrant require-
ment must be reasonable in light of the individual's expectation of pri-
vacy and the asserted government interest. Murphy v. State, 115 Wn.
App. 297, 306-07, 62 P.3d 533, 538 (2003) (Washington statute author-
ized a warrantless survey of a patient's prescription information when
government's statutorily mandated interest in monitoring the flow of
drugs from pharmacies to patients outweighed a patient's limited expec-
tation of privacy).
Probable cause must exist for warrants issued for health and safety
inspections. City of Seattle v. McCready, 123 Wn.2d 260, 280, 868 P.2d
134, 144-45 (1994) (McCready 1) (en banc); Thurston County Rental
Owners Ass 'n, 85 Wn. App. at 183. If voluntary consent is given, a war-
rant is not required, and therefore, probable cause is not required. City of
Seattle v. McCready, 131 Wn.2d 266, 272-73, 931 P.2d 156, 159-60
(1997) (McCready III) (en banc); City of Seattle v. McCready, 124
Wn.2d 300, 303-04, 877 P.2d 686, 688 (1994) (McCready II) (en banc);
Thurston County Rental Owners Ass'n, 85 Wn. App. at 183; State v.
Browning, 67 Wn. App. 93, 96, 834 P.2d 84, 85 (1992) (building inspec-
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tor's entry into apartment without consent of occupant was unlawful be-
cause statute required consent of the occupant).
A municipal court may not issue an administrative warrant for in-
spection of a civil infraction, even if the infraction is supported by prob-
able cause; the authority extends only for criminal violations. McCready
II, 124 Wn.2d at 309 (administrative warrant held invalid when it was
issued for the violation of the housing code but there was no allegation
that the violation constituted a crime). This is because no statutory or
rule-based authority exists that allows municipal courts to issue warrants
for suspected civil infractions. McCready I, 123 Wn.2d at 273-74. See
generally State v. Lansden, 144 Wn.2d 654, 663, 30 P.3d 483, 487
(2001) (en banc) (observing that courts of limited jurisdiction have no
inherent authority to issue administrative search warrants but must rely
on an authorizing court's rules or statutes).
Inventory searches can also be justified without probable cause.
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374, 107 S. Ct. 738, 741-42, 93 L.
Ed. 2d 739, 745 (1987) (inventory search of car after drunk driving ar-
rest); State v. White, 135 Wn.2d 761, 766, 958 P.2d 982, 984 (1998) (in-
ventory searches pursuant to standard police procedures are "reason-
able"). The inventory search must be made pursuant to reasonable regu-
lations. Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 3-4, 110 S. Ct. 1632, 1635, 109 L.
Ed. 2d 1, 6 (1990) (opening of locked container during inventory search
held unconstitutional because there were no regulations to give police
discretion to open containers); White, 135 Wn.2d at 765-66 (inventory
searches pursuant to standard police procedures are reasonable but may
not be unlimited in scope and must be limited to those areas necessary to
fulfill its purpose). Washington, however, provides greater protection
against inventory searches. Id. at 768-69.
For a discussion of administrative searches in general, see infra §
6.4.
2.9(b) Terry Stops and Frisks
Police may stop an individual for investigation with less than prob-
able cause if they have reasonable and articulable facts that point toward
criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880, 20
L. Ed. 2d 889, 906 (1968); State v. Rankin, 151 Wn.2d 689, 698-99, 92
P.3d 202, 207 (2004) (en banc) (police may not request identification
from a passenger for investigatory purposes without an articulable suspi-
cion of criminal activity by the passenger); State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d
1, 8, 726 P.2d 445, 449 (1986) (en banc) (reasonable suspicion of drug
deal justified by officer receiving two reliable tips of purported drug
deals, by officer's experience with drug investigations, and by officer's
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own corroboration of some of the information); State v. Bailey, 109 Wn.
App. 1, 4, 34 P.3d 239, 240 (2001) (reasonable suspicion of liquor viola-
tion justified by defendant's sitting on the ground in a public area with
liquor bottles nearby, including one that still contained liquor); State v.
Coyne, 99 Wn. App. 566, 574, 995 P.2d 78, 83 (2000) ("suspicious"
story insufficient to justify reasonable articulable suspicion after reason
for initial police contact was eliminated); State v. Mitchell, 80 Wn. App.
143, 147, 906 P.2d 1013, 1016 (1995) (reasonable suspicion established
from defendant openly carrying a semi-automatic weapon while walking
in an urban residential neighborhood); State v. Walker, 66 Wn. App. 622,
626, 834 P.2d 41, 44 (1992) (no reasonable suspicion based on defendant
being startled when he saw the officer and attempting to avoid contact
with the officer); State v. Pressley, 64 Wn. App. 591, 595, 825 P.2d 749,
751 (1992) (two women on street comer acted suspiciously by hiding a
package and expressing surprise when police approached); State v.
DeArman, 54 Wn. App. 621, 625, 774 P.2d 1247, 1249 (1989) (no rea-
sonable suspicion when defendant remained motionless at a stop sign for
45 to 60 seconds and started to move away when the officer approached).
An investigatory stop requires a lower standard than probable
cause: reasonable suspicion. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-24,
120 S. Ct. 673, 675-76, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2000). As a result, a lesser
showing as to an informant's veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge
is required to meet the reasonable suspicion standard. Alabama v. White,
496 U.S. 325, 330, 1108 S. Ct. 2412, 2416, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301, 309
(1990). However, an investigative stop is not justified if there is no inde-
pendent basis to rely on an anonymous informant's tip. Kennedy, 107
Wn.2d at 7; State v. Sieler, 95 Wn.2d 43, 47, 621 P.2d 1272, 1274-75
(1980) (en banc); State v. Vandover, 63 Wn. App. 754, 822 P.2d 784
(1992). "'Indicia of reliability' requires: (1) knowledge that the source of
the information is reliable, and (2) a sufficient factual basis for the in-
formant's tip or corroboration by independent police observation." State
v. Jones, 85 Wn. App. 797, 799-800, 934 P.2d 1224, 1226 (1997) (hand
signal from unknown informant is not sufficient indicia of reliability).
A state may make it a crime for a suspect to refuse to identify her-
self during an investigative stop if the request for identification is rea-
sonably related to the circumstances that justified the stop. Hiibel v. Sixth
Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nevada, Humboldt County, _ U.S. _, _, 124 S.
Ct. 2451, 2459-60, 159 L. Ed. 2d 292 (2004). But cf Rankin, 151 Wn.2d
at 698-99 (police may not request identification from a vehicle passenger
for investigatory purposes without an articulable suspicion of criminal
activity by the passenger).
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Officers are also allowed to search and temporarily seize persons
and property when necessary to protect officer safety. State v. Rehn, 117
Wn. App. 142, 152, 69 P.3d 379, 382-83 (2003) (officer's articulable
concern about presence of firearms in vehicle justified exertion of some
control over the vehicle's passengers to alleviate that concern); State v.
King, 89 Wn. App. 612, 618-19, 949 P.2d 856, 860-61 (1998) (allowing
temporary seizure of person who was in the apartment with a gun during
a consent search); State v. Cotten, 75 Wn. App. 669, 683, 879 P.2d 971,
980 (1994) (officers conducting a consensual search of a house may
briefly seize dangerous weapons or instrumentalities in order to protect
themselves while conducting the search).
A valid Terry stop may include a search of the interior of a sus-
pect's car when necessary to guarantee officer safety. Kennedy, 107
Wn.2d at 12; State v. Larson, 88 Wn. App. 849, 856-57, 946 P.2d 1212,
1216 (1997) (officer may conduct a protective search of the interior of a
car when the driver returns to the vehicle for the registration). But see
State v. Henry, 80 Wn. App. 544, 553, 910 P.2d 1290, 1294 (1995) (offi-
cer may not convert a routine traffic stop into a more intrusive detention
without an objective basis to do so). Similarly, frisking a suspect for
weapons is justified if the officer has reasonable grounds to believe the
person is armed and currently dangerous. Terry, 392 U.S. at 29, 88 S. Ct.
at 1884, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 910-11; State v. Hudson, 124 Wn.2d 107, 112,
874 P.2d 160, 164 (1994) (en banc); State v. Hobart, 94 Wn.2d 437, 441,
617 P.2d 429, 431 (1980) (en banc). But ef State v. Reyes, 98 Wn. App.
923, 932, 993 P.2d 921, 926 (2000) (officer's search exceeded scope
permitted under Terry when officer admitted to looking for both weapons
and narcotics).
2.9(c) Intrusions into the Body
Under Article I, Section 7 of the Washington Constitution, taking a
blood sample is a search and seizure that must be supported by probable
cause. State v. Judge, 100 Wn.2d 706, 711-12, 675 P.2d 219, 222-23
(1984) (en banc); State v. Baldwin, 109 Wn. App. 516, 523-24, 37 P.3d
1220, 1224-25 (2001) (reasonable grounds existed to conduct blood test
when driver passed breath test but showed obvious signs of impairment);
State v. Dunivin, 65 Wn. App. 501, 507, 828 P.2d 1150, 1154 (1992). See
generally RCW 46.20.308(2) (authorizing warrantless blood test based
on reasonable grounds). In one case, the court upheld the seizure of
blood when officers believed a defendant who committed vehicular
homicide was driving while intoxicated. Dunivin, 65 Wn. App. at 507
(authority under RCW 46.20.308(3)); State v. Rangitsch, 40 Wn. App.
771, 775, 700 P.2d 382, 385 (1985). If probable cause exists, neither an
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adversarial hearing nor notice to defense counsel is required before a
search warrant to obtain a blood sample may be issued. State v. Kala-
kosky, 121 Wn.2d 525, 534-36, 852 P.2d 1064, 1069-70 (1993) (en
banc) (holding that a search warrant was valid to obtain a blood sample
from a suspect who had been arrested but not charged).
The Fourth Amendment allows warrantless searches, including
body searches of convicted persons, even without probable cause or in-
dividualized suspicion. State v. Audley, 77 Wn. App. 897, 904, 894 P.2d
1359, 1363 (1995) (no greater protection under state constitution). But
general privacy rights must be protected by requiring "special needs be-
yond normal law enforcement" for withdrawing blood. State v. Olivas,
122 Wn.2d 73, 93, 856 P.2d 1076, 1086 (1993) (en banc) (DNA testing
of convicted violent or sex offenders meets special needs requirement).

Washington Search & Seizure
CHAPTER 3:
SEARCH WARRANTS
3.0 INTRODUCTION: FOURTH AMENDMENT REQUIREMENTS
FOR SEARCH WARRANTS
The Fourth Amendment provides that "no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV. This provision was enacted partly in re-
sponse to the evils of general warrants in England and writs of assistance
in the American colonies. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626-
27, 6 S. Ct. 524, 530, 29 L. Ed. 746, 749-50 (1886); State v. Fields, 85
Wn.2d 126, 128, 530 P.2d 284, 285 (1975) (en banc). Such warrants and
writs had provided law enforcement officers virtually unlimited discre-
tion to search whenever, wherever, and whomever they chose. In adopt-
ing the Fourth Amendment, the Framers sought to curb the abuses that
accompanied these unconstrained licenses to search. See Chimel v. Cali-
fornia, 395 U.S. 752, 760-61, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 2038-39, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685,
692-93 (1969). This chapter focuses on the interpretation of Article I,
Section 7 of the Washington Constitution and the Fourth Amendment's
requirements for a valid search warrant and its execution.
Searches and seizures must generally be made pursuant to a war-
rant. See, e.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106, 85 S. Ct.
741, 744, 13 L. Ed. 2d 684, 687 (1965). The basic purpose of the warrant
process is to interpose a neutral and detached magistrate between the law
enforcement authorities and the individual whose effects are to be
searched. Once issued, the warrant also serves to limit the scope of the
search to the areas and items specified in the warrant. To be lawful, a
warrant must meet the following requirements: (1) It must be issued by a
neutral and detached magistrate; (2) the magistrate must determine that
there is probable cause to search or arrest and must support this determi-
nation by oath or affirmation; and (3) the warrant must describe with par-
ticularity the place to be searched and the items or persons to be seized.
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14, 68 S. Ct. 367, 368-69, 92
L. Ed. 436, 440 (1948); see also Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 560-61,
124 S. Ct. 1284, 1291-92, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1068, 1080-81 (2004).
There are, however, a number of situations in which searches and
seizures may be made without warrants-even when it would be feasible
to obtain them-and there are some circumstances when warrants alone
are insufficient. See infra § 3.3(a)-(d). For the most part, the standards
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discussed below apply to arrests as well as to search warrants. Issues per-
taining specifically to arrests are discussed in Chapter 4.
3.1 TYPES OF ITEMS THAT MAY BE SEARCHED AND SEIZED
Warrants may be issued not only for contraband or instrumentalities
of crime, but also for "mere evidence." Warden, Maryland Penitentiary
v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 306-07, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 1650, L. Ed. 2d 782,
792 (1967). When the State seeks a warrant for "mere evidence," it must
show probable cause to believe that the evidence will aid in apprehend-
ing or convicting the suspect. Id. at 307, 87 S. Ct. at 1650, 18 L. Ed. 2d
at 792; see also Wash. CrR 2.3(b); Wash. CrRLJ. 2.3(b). Warrants may
be issued for evidence containing incriminating statements; the Fifth
Amendment provides protection only where the act of producing evi-
dence is, itself, testimonial. See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27,
36, 120 S. Ct. 2037, 2043, 147 L. Ed. 2d 24, 36 (2000). Note, however,
that in a concurring opinion authored by Justice Thomas, Justices Tho-
mas and Scalia appear to believe that the Fifth Amendment may offer a
broader protection against the production of incriminating evidence gen-
erally rather than merely in situations where the act of production can,
itself, be deemed testimonial. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 49, 120 S. Ct. at 2050,
147 L. Ed. 2d at 44 (Thomas, J., concurring). Additionally, the Fifth
Amendment protects a person from being compelled to act as a witness
against him or herself; thus, it provides no protection from the production
of evidence by others. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 473, 96 S.
Ct. 2737, 2745, 49 L. Ed. 2d 627, 638 (1976).
3.2 WHO MAY ISSUE WARRANTS: REQUIREMENT OF NEUTRAL
AND DETACHED MAGISTRATE
One aspect of the protection provided by a warrant is the determina-
tion of probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate rather than
by a police officer. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14, 68 S.
Ct. 367, 368-69, 92 L. Ed. 436, 440 (1948).
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped
by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the sup-
port of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from
evidence. Its protection consists of requiring that those infer-
ences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of
being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive en-
terprise of ferreting out crime.
Id. at 13-14, 68 S. Ct. at 369, 92 L. Ed. at 440.
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In criminal matters in Washington, a district court's territorial juris-
diction is within the boundaries of the county. RCW 3.66.060. Thus, on
probable cause, a district court judge may issue a warrant for the search
and seizure of controlled substances outside the court's district, but
within the county, without the approval of the prosecutor. RCW
69.50.509; State v. Uhthoff, 45 Wn. App. 261, 264, 724 P.2d 1103, 1106
(1986). A district court may issue a warrant relating to the case even after
felony information has been filed in superior court. RCW 69.50.509;
State v. Stock, 44 Wn. App. 467, 475, 722 P.2d 1330, 1335 (1986). See
generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.2(a)-(f) (4th ed.
2004).
3.2(a) Qualifications of a "Magistrate"
Required qualifications of a magistrate are identified in constitu-
tional provisions, statutes, and court rules. The Fourth Amendment does
not require that a magistrate be an attorney or a judge so long as he or
she is "neutral and detached" and "capable of determining whether prob-
able cause exists for the requested arrest or search." Shadwick v. Tampa,
407 U.S. 345, 350, 92 S. Ct. 2119, 2122-23, 32 L. Ed. 2d 783, 788
(1972); State v. Porter, 88 Wn.2d 512, 515, 563 P.2d 829, 830-31 (1977)
(en banc). But see 2 LaFave, supra, § 4.2(c), at 492-93 (holding that be-
cause search warrants are more complex than arrest warrants, the use of
nonlawyers to issue search warrants should be constitutionally suspect).
States may impose more stringent requirements than those required
by the Fourth Amendment. For example, Washington limits those em-
powered to issue warrants to supreme court, court of appeals, superior
court, and district court judges, and "all municipal officers authorized to
exercise the powers and perform the duties of district judges." RCW
2.20.020(4). Case law has also specifically included court commission-
ers. See Porter, 88 Wn.2d at 514. But see State v. Walker, 101 Wn. App.
1, 7-8, 999 P.2d 1296, 1299 (2000) (finding court rule authorizing a
"court" to issue a bench warrant did not authorize a court clerk, acting
alone, to issue such a warrant); see also 2 LaFave, supra, § 4.2(c), at
490-93.
Even when the person issuing the warrant is a magistrate in title, he
or she must make an independent probable cause determination and may
not simply rubber-stamp warrants. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111,
84 S. Ct. 1509, 1512, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723, 727 (1964); State v. Woodall,
100 Wn.2d 74, 77, 666 P.2d 364, 366 (1983) (en banc).
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3.2(b) Neutrality
A magistrate who is capable of determining probable cause may
nevertheless be disqualified from issuing a warrant for failing to meet the
neutrality requirement. Thus, a state officer who acts as prosecutor or
investigator in a case is automatically disqualified from acting as a mag-
istrate in the same case. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 450,
91 S. Ct. 2022, 2029-30, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 573-74 (1971). Similarly, an
unsalaried magistrate who receives a fee for each search warrant issued
is not considered neutral. Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 250, 97 S.
Ct. 546, 548, 50 L. Ed. 2d 444, 448 (1977) (having a pecuniary interest
in issuing warrants compared with denying them renders a magistrate
neither neutral nor detached).
For the same reason, an administrative "warrant" signed by the pa-
role officer conducting a search is invalid. Hocker v. Woody, 95 Wn.2d
822, 825-26, 631 P.2d 372, 375 (1981) (en banc). Similarly, the magis-
trate's involvement in the execution of a warrant may constitute a viola-
tion of the neutrality requirement. Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S.
319, 326-28, 99 S. Ct. 2319, 2324-25, 60 L. Ed. 2d 920, 928-29 (1979)
(finding a judge who accompanied police on a raid of pornographic
bookstore was not neutral and detached when he added new materials
observed at the store to the previously signed search warrant).
On the other hand, the per se rule of Coolidge was held not to apply
to a case in which the pro tempore judge issuing the warrant was also a
prosecutor, but had not been involved in the prosecution of that particular
case. State v. Hill, 17 Wn. App. 678, 683, 564 P.2d 841, 843 (1977). A
search warrant's issuance has also been upheld when the issuing judicial
officer was aware from the affidavit that he might be a witness against
the defendant. State v. Smith, 16 Wn. App. 425, 427-28, 558 P.2d 265,
267-68 (1976); 2 LaFave, supra, § 4.2(b), at 489.
Washington has also refused to apply the Coolidge rule of per se
disqualification to a judge who issued a search warrant in a case that was
before him on special inquiry. State v. Neslund, 103 Wn.2d 79, 88, 690
P.2d 1153, 1158-59 (1984) (en banc). In Neslund, the judge had been
appointed to investigate the suspected criminal activity of the defendant
and one of the defendant's brothers. Id. at 81. During the special inquiry
proceedings, the judge asked another brother some questions; the judge
did not, however, question other witnesses, discuss the investigation, or
discuss the brother's testimony with anyone else involved in the investi-
gation. Id. The Neslund court did not per se disqualify the judge from
issuing warrants authorizing a search of the defendant's premises and the
seizure of particular items of the defendant's personal property; rather,
the court based its holding in part on the fact that the warrants were not
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issued in subsequent court proceedings "arising" from the inquiry. Id. at
82-83; cf RCW § 10.27.180 (special-inquiry judges disqualified from
participating in subsequent court proceedings arising from special in-
quiry).
The question of whether or under what circumstances a prosecuting
authority may, in an attempt to obtain a search warrant, present the same
evidence to a second magistrate after once being denied has not been
squarely addressed in Washington. However, commentators appear to
agree that a magistrate's initial probable cause determination is not a fi-
nal order and that principles of collateral estoppel or res judicata do not
preclude the government from presenting the same evidence to a second
judicial officer, so long as the government notifies the second officer that
the application was previously denied. See 2 LaFave, supra, § 4.2(e), at
499-500. The presentation of the same evidence to a second magistrate is
not tantamount to forum shopping unless the government visits numer-
ous magistrates before convincing one to issue the disputed warrant.
United States v. Savides, 658 F. Supp. 1399, 1404-05 (N.D. Ill. 1987);
cf United States v. Davis, 346 F. Supp. 435, 442 (S.D. Ill. 1972) (con-
demning magistrate who shopped to obtain a warrant after party has been
denied warrant by another magistrate).
3.2(c) Burden of Proof
Unless a magistrate is disqualified under the per se rule of Coo-
lidge, the defendant bears the burden of proving a magistrate's lack of
neutrality. See Hill, 17 Wn. App. at 683.
3.3 CONTENT OF THE WARRANT
3.3(a) Oath or Affirmation; Multiple Affidavits
The oath or affirmation clause of the Fourth Amendment requires
that the person presenting the supporting affidavit swear to the informa-
tion the affidavit contains. U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Washington Su-
preme Court has upheld a warrant, however, when the affidavit was not
sworn to, but was signed in the presence of the magistrate. State v. Doug-
las, 71 Wn.2d 303, 309-10, 428 P.2d 535, 539 (1967). Courts outside of
Washington have split on the question of whether a fictitious name affi-
davit is defective. See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.3(f),
at 523-24 (4th ed. 2004).
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3.3(b) Information Considered
The information establishing probable cause must not be stale at the
time it is presented to the judge:
A delay in executing the warrant may render the magistrate's
probable cause determination stale. Common sense is the test for
staleness of information in a search warrant affidavit. The infor-
mation is not stale for purposes of probable cause if the facts and
circumstances in the affidavit support a commonsense determina-
tion that there is continuing and contemporaneous possession of the
property intended to be seized.
State v. Maddox, 152 Wn.2d 499, 505-06, 98 P.3d. 1199, 1202 (2004)
(en banc).
In evaluating the staleness of facts underlying a warrant, courts ex-
amine the totality of the circumstances; the period of time between the
issuance and execution of the warrant is only one factor to be considered
in light of all other relevant circumstances including the nature and the
scope of the suspected criminal activity. Id. "The facts and circumstances
recited in the supporting affidavit must establish a reasonable probability
that the criminal activity is occurring at or about the time the warrant is
issued." State v. Perez, 92 Wn. App. 1, 8-9, 963 P.2d 881, 885 (1998).
See also State v. Higby, 26 Wn. App. 457, 460, 613 P.2d 1192, 1194
(1980) (holding that one sale of a small amount of marijuana did not
provide probable cause to search two weeks later). Other relevant factors
include the "nature of the criminal, the character of the evidence to be
seized, and the nature of the place to be searched." State v. Hosier, 124
Wn. App. 696, 715, 103 P.3d 217, 226 (2004).
The fact that a valid warrant could have been obtained had the affi-
ant provided sufficient information to the magistrate will not validate a
warrant issued in the absence of that information. See Whiteley v. War-
den, Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 565 n.8, 91 S. Ct. 1031,
1035 n.8, 28 L. Ed. 2d 306, 311 n.8 (1971). Thus, an otherwise insuffi-
cient affidavit cannot be rehabilitated by later production of information
that the affiant possessed but did not disclose to the magistrate when
seeking the warrant. Id. (holding that permitting the record to be ex-
panded with information known to the police, but not disclosed to the
magistrate, would "render the warrant requirements of the Fourth
Amendment meaningless"); cf Seattle v. Leach, 29 Wn. App. 81, 85, 627
P.2d 159, 162 (1981) (finding affidavit in support of administrative war-
rant not sufficient when it alleged comprehensive inspection program but
failed to describe the program).
[Vol. 28:467
Washington Search & Seizure
On the other hand, the Washington Supreme Court has ruled that
when a warrant is facially valid and an omission is neither intentional nor
made with a reckless disregard for the truth, the warrant can be valid
even though it is based on an affidavit containing an omission. See State
v. Cord, 103 Wn.2d 361, 368-69, 693 P.2d 81, 85-86 (1985) (en banc).
In Cord, the court held that although an affidavit in support of a search
warrant failed to state the altitude at which the officer allegedly observed
marijuana plants, the affidavit otherwise provided a sufficient basis for
the issuing judge to conclude that a crime had probably been committed.
Id. at 366. But see id. at 371 (Williams, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that
when aerial views are the means utilized to show probable cause, the af-
fidavit must reveal the altitude from which the identification was made
so that courts can guard against the issuance of warrants following un-
reasonably low, intrusive searches and so that courts make sure officers
do not engage in unreasonably high views of questionable reliability).
An affidavit must set forth the underlying facts; conclusory infor-
mation sworn to by the prosecutor is not enough to establish probable
cause. See Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 5, 47 S. Ct. 250, 251, 71
L. Ed. 505, 508 (1927); see also State v. Thein, 138 Wn.2d 133, 147, 977
P.2d 582, 588 (1999) (en banc). A prima facie showing of criminal activ-
ity is not required, although the affidavit must go beyond mere suspicion
or personal belief that evidence of a crime will be found on the premises
to be searched. State v. Yokley, 139 Wn.2d 581, 594-95, 989 P.2d 512,
519 (1999) (en banc); State v. Chasengnou, 43 Wn. App. 379, 385, 717
P.2d 288, 291 (1986) (citing State v. Rangitsch, 40 Wn. App. 771, 780,
700 P.2d 382, 388 (1985)); State v. White, 44 Wn. App. 215, 218, 720
P.2d 873, 875 (1986). At the same time, however, affidavits for search
warrants must be tested in a common-sense manner rather than by-
pertechnically. State v. Jackson, 150 Wn.2d 251, 265, 76 P.3d 217, 225
(2003) (en banc). Generally, an affidavit establishes probable cause to
support a search warrant if the affidavit sets forth facts sufficient to allow
a reasonable person to conclude both that the defendant is involved in
criminal activity and that evidence of the crime can be found at the place
to be searched. See Maddox, 152 Wn.2d at 509.
Evidence from a prior warrantless search conducted under an ex-
ception to general search and seizure rules may be used by the issuing
magistrate in determining probable cause. A magistrate may also rely on
hearsay statements from a police officer's affidavits. Chasengnou, 43
Wn. App. at 384; see also supra § 2.7(b).
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3.3(c) Oral Testimony and Oral Warrants
In Washington, a search warrant may be based on a single affidavit,
on several affidavits, or on oral testimony. Wash. CrR 2.3(c); Wash.
CrRLJ 2.3(c). The judge must record a summary of any additional evi-
dence on which the warrant was based. Wash. CrR 2.3(c).
Some states, including Washington, permit oral search warrants in
which an affiant makes a sworn telephonic statement to a judge. Wash.
CrR 2.3(c); see State v. Ringer, 100 Wn.2d 686, 701, 674 P.2d 1240,
1249 (1983) (en banc). However, after the magistrate has taken a sworn
telephonic statement, the magistrate must produce a written warrant on
which the court's signature must be affixed. State v. Ettenhofer, 119 Wn.
App. 300, 304-06, 79 P.3d 478, 480-82 (2003). When other means are
available to memorialize an affiant's sworn testimony, the State is not
allowed to use a reconstruction of the entire telephonic affidavit if no
original recording of the statement exists. State v. Myers, 117 Wn.2d
332, 338, 815 P.2d 761, 765 (1991) (en banc). See also State v. Smith, 87
Wn. App. 254, 257-59, 941 P.2d 691, 692-93 (1997) for a discussion of
the types of evidence that may be used to reconstruct a telephonic affida-
vit. For a discussion of various objections to this procedure, see 2 La-
Fave, supra, § 4.3(c), at 511-15.
3.3(d) Administrative Warrants
An administrative warrant may be based either on specific evidence
of an existing violation or on a general inspection program based on rea-
sonable legislative or administrative standards that are derived from neu-
tral sources. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320, 98 S. Ct.
1816, 1824, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305, 316 (1978); Leach, 29 Wn. App. at 84. See
generally infra § 6.4. However, an administrative warrant issued by a
magistrate without authority is no more valid than a warrant signed by a
private citizen. Seattle v. McCready, 123 Wn.2d 260, 272, 868 P.2d 134,
140 (1994) (en banc) (invalidating a warrant to enforce housing codes
issued on less than probable cause); see also State v. Lansden, 144
Wn.2d 654, 663, 30 P.3d 483, 487 (2001) (en banc) (observing that
courts of limited jurisdiction have no inherent authority to issue adminis-
trative search warrants but must rely on authorizing court rules or stat-
utes). A right of entry does not authorize the issuance of search warrants
for enforcement purposes unless there is probable cause or a statute au-
thorizing the court to issue warrants on less than probable cause.
McCready, 123 Wn.2d at 278.
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3.4 PARTICULAR DESCRIPTION OF PLACE TO BE SEARCHED
3.4(a) General Considerations
By requiring a particular description of the places to be searched,
the Fourth Amendment furthers two purposes: (1) It limits the risk that a
search will be conducted in the wrong location, and (2) it helps deter-
mine whether probable cause is present. See Steele v. United States, 267
U.S. 498, 501-02, 45 S. Ct. 414, 415-16, 69 L. Ed. 757, 759-60 (1925).
The description must be such that "the officer with a search warrant can,
with reasonable effort[,] ascertain and identify the place intended."
Steele, 267 U.S. at 503, 45 S. Ct. at 416, 69 L. Ed. at 760; State v. Bohan,
72 Wn. App. 335, 339-40, 864 P.2d 26, 27-28 (1993) (inquiring into
possibility that incorrect location might be searched); State v. Smith, 39
Wn. App. 642, 648-49, 694 P.2d 660, 664 (1984). The Fourth Amend-
ment requirement that the places to be searched be described with par-
ticularity serves to prevent general searches and leaves nothing to the
discretion of the officers executing the warrant. See Marron v. United
States, 275 U.S. 192, 196, 48 S. Ct. 74, 76, 72 L. Ed. 231, 237 (1927);
State v. Perrone, 119 Wn.2d 538, 545, 834 P.2d 611, 614-15 (1992);
State v. Rivera, 76 Wn. App. 519, 522, 888 P.2d 740, 742 (1995). How-
ever, carelessness on the part of the officers executing the warrant will
not necessarily render the warrant insufficient. Officers executing a war-
rant need only use "reasonable effort" to confine their search to the areas
delineated in the warrant. See State v. Cockrell, 102 Wn.2d 561, 570, 689
P.2d 32, 37 (1984) (en banc) (warrant identified place to be searched but
did not list an address; officers attempted to serve warrant on persons
outside the described area); see also State v. Fisher, 96 Wn.2d 962, 967,
639 P.2d 743, 746-47 (1982) (en banc).
If a warrant is invalid because it fails to specifically describe the
place to be searched, a search under the warrant cannot be upheld on the
ground that a magistrate made a probable cause determination; however,
the evidence seized may sometimes be admissible. See generally infra §
7.2. The use of a generic term or general description in a warrant is not a
per se violation of the Fourth Amendment if a more specific description
is impossible and if probable cause is shown. Perrone, 119 Wn.2d at
547; see also State v. Riley, 121 Wn.2d 22, 28, 846 P.2d 1365, 1369
(1993) (en banc) (holding that "[w]hen the nature of the underlying of-
fense precludes a descriptive itemization, generic classifications such as
lists are acceptable"). Furthermore, if a warrant separately and distinctly
describes two targets and it is thereafter determined that probable cause
existed for issuance of the warrant as to one target, but not the other, the
warrant may be treated as severable and upheld as to the one target. State
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v. Halverson, 21 Wn. App. 35, 37, 584 P.2d 408, 409 (1978); see also 2
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.5(c), at 588-92 (4th ed. 2004).
On the other hand, the severability doctrine must not be applied when
doing so would render the particularity standards of the Fourth Amend-
ment meaningless. Perrone, 119 Wn.2d at 556-57 (holding that a war-
rant authorizing a general search of materials protected by the First
Amendment was impermissibly broad and invalid in its entirety).
A court may examine five factors when determining whether inva-
lid portions of a warrant may be severed from valid portions: (1) whether
the warrant lawfully authorized entry into the premises; (2) whether the
warrant includes at least one particularly described item for which there
is probable cause; (3) whether the portion of the warrant that is valid is
significant when compared to the warrant as a whole; (4) whether the
searching officers found and seized any disputed items while executing
the valid part of the warrant; and (5) whether the officers conducted a
general search in flagrant disregard of the warrant's scope. State v.
Maddox, 116 Wn. App. 796, 807-09, 67 P.3d 1135, 1141-42 (2003).
The initial determination of whether a description is adequate is
made with reference only to the warrant itself. See State v. Stenson, 132
Wn.2d 668, 691-93, 940 P.2d 1239, 1252-54 (1997) (en banc). The affi-
davit and other incorporated documents may be considered if they are
attached to the warrant. Id. at 696. A description may appear adequate on
its face, but upon execution be found to be ambiguous or to contain er-
rors. Id. Whether such a warrant will be deemed sufficient depends on
the availability of other information that permits the officer to identify
the intended premises with reasonable certainty. Id.; State v. Rood, 18
Wn. App. 740, 743-44, 573 P.2d 1325, 1327-28 (1977).
Three types of information may be considered in determining a
warrant's adequacy: (1) physical descriptions of the premises contained
in the warrant or in the attached affidavit; (2) information based on the
officer's personal knowledge of the location or its occupants; and (3) the
officer's personal observations at the time of execution. Rood, 18 Wn.
App. at 744-45; see also Smith, 39 Wn. App. at 648-49 (finding that
search warrant identifying place to be searched as 8415 Carl Road,
Sumas, Washington, rather than correct address of 8415 Carl Road,
Everson, Washington, was such that police officer could, with reasonable
effort, ascertain and identify intended place); State v. Cohen, 19 Wn.
App. 600, 604, 576 P.2d 933, 936 (1978) (requiring only reasonable par-
ticularity). See generally 2 LaFave, supra, § 4.5(a)-(e). Earlier Washing-
ton cases include State v. Davis, 165 Wn. 652, 654-55, 5 P.2d 1035,
1036 (1931) (finding warrant sufficient despite incorrect street name be-
cause name listed was properly known and no one could have been mis-
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led) and State v. Andrich, 135 Wn. 609, 612, 238 P. 638, 639 (1925)
(holding warrant's error in house number was immaterial when officer
knew where accused lived and officer searched the correct house). Fi-
nally, clerical or ministerial errors will invalidate a warrant only if preju-
dice is shown. State v. Busig, 119 Wn. App. 381,388, 81 P.3d 143, 146
(2003); see also State v. Dodson, 110 Wn. App. 112, 121, 39 P.3d 324,
330 (2002) (holding that police officer merely corrected clerical error in
changing warrant to specify a search for methamphetamine instead of
marijuana immediately before executing the warrant where court had
determined probable cause to search based on affidavit alleging metham-
phetamine production and that no prejudice was incurred as a result of
the change).
3.4(b) Particular Searches: Places
In urban areas, places are usually identified by a street address. The
address is unnecessary, however, if other facts make it clear that a par-
ticular place is intended. State v. Trasvina, 16 Wn. App. 519, 522-23,
557 P.2d 368, 370 (1976) (finding warrant describing premises as two-
story, white-frame house located directly behind particular address suffi-
cient when no evidence presented that more than one house met descrip-
tion or that premises failed to conform to description except for incorrect
address); see also State v. Chisholm, 7 Wn. App. 279, 283, 499 P.2d 81,
84 (1972) (holding that warrant that failed to specify street location was
sufficiently clear when officers could identify premises with reasonable
certainty and when reason for failure to specify street was included in
affidavit for warrant). Rural areas may be described by a legal descrip-
tion of the property. See Cohen, 19 Wn. App. at 603-04.
When a warrant contains errors, the burden is on the party challeng-
ing the warrant to show that errors could have resulted in a search of the
wrong premises. Fisher, 96 Wn.2d at 967; see also Smith, 39 Wn. App.
at 649 (upholding search where incorrect town was identified in warrant
because defendant made no showing that a similar address existed that
could have been mistakenly searched or even that a street of the same
name existed in the wrongly identified town). The test is not whether an
officer could hypothetically or theoretically search the wrong premises,
but whether, under the circumstances presented, an officer could rea-
sonably determine the correct premises to be searched. Bohan, 72 Wn.
App. at 339. If an officer can so determine, the warrant will be valid. Id.
Generally, unless there is probable cause to search all living units of
a multiple-occupancy building, the description must single out a particu-
lar subunit. People v. Avery, 173 Colo. 315, 319, 478 P.2d 310 (1970)
(en banc). But if the building looks like a single occupancy structure
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from the outside and the officers have no reason to know that it is a mul-
tiple-unit structure, the warrant is not defective for failing to specify a
subunit. Chisholm, 7 Wn. App. at 282-83.
Another exception, the "community living unit" rule, will generally
apply when several people occupy the entire premises in common, but
have separate bedrooms. Under the community living unit rule, a single
warrant describing the entire premises is valid and justifies a search of
the entire premises. State v. Alexander, 41 Wn. App. 152, 156, 704 P.2d
618, 620-21 (1985).
Additional exceptions to the particularity rule are outlined in United
States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000, 1009 (9th Cir. 1983). A warrant may
authorize a search of an entire street address while reciting probable
cause as to only a portion of the premises if(1) the premises are occupied
in common rather than individually; (2) a multi-unit building is used as a
single entity; (3) the defendant is in control of the whole premises; or (4)
the entire premises is suspect. Id. at 1008; see also 2 LaFave, supra, §
4.5(b), at 579-87.
A warrant authorizing the search of an apartment may also include
the search of a padlocked locker located in a storage room next to the
defendant's apartment. State v. Llamas- Villa, 67 Wn. App. 448, 453, 836
P.2d 239, 242 (1992). The Llamas-Villa court concluded that because the
storage locker did not constitute a separate building and was not inten-
tionally excluded from the warrant, the officers did not exceed the scope
of the warrant when they searched the locker. Id. at 452-53. However, in
another situation, the officers' search of "outbuildings" exceeded the
scope of a search warrant that authorized the search of a residence and
the attached carport, but did not authorize the search of "outbuildings,"
which included a barn and a garage. State v. Kelley, 52 Wn. App. 581,
586, 762 P.2d 20, 23-24 (1988). Probable cause to search a house does
not provide probable cause to search outbuildings when the outbuildings
are under the control of other persons. State v. Gebaroff, 87 Wn. App.
11, 16-17, 939 P.2d 706, 709-10 (1997).
Under a search warrant for a premises, the personal effects of the
owner may be searched so long as they are likely repositories for items
named in the warrant. State v. Worth, 37 Wn. App. 889, 892, 683 P.2d
622, 624 (1984). Such personal effects include articles of clothing left on
the floor, even though the clothing does not belong to the owner or resi-
dent of the premises. State v. Hill, 123 Wn.2d 641, 647, 870 P.2d 313,
316 (1994) (en banc).
Although search warrants for vehicles are uncommon because of
the many exceptions allowing warrantless searches, see infra § 5.21,
such warrants are governed by the same principles discussed above. See
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Cohen, 19 Wn. App. at 604; 2 LaFave, supra, § 4.5(d), at 592. A warrant
issued to search a defendant's premises includes the defendant's auto-
mobile if it is located on the premises. State v. Huff, 33 Wn. App. 304,
309-10, 654 P.2d 1211, 1214 (1982) (reasoning that the automobile was
defendant's personal property and thus subject to a search under the war-
rant). However, a warrant to search a house does not include a search of
a vehicle that is not within the curtilage-the area contiguous to the oc-
cupant's home. State v. Graham, 78 Wn. App. 44, 51-52, 896 P.2d 704,
710 (1995). Additionally, when the automobile is neither owned nor un-
der the control of the defendant, such warrantless searches violate the
particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Rivera, 76 Wn.
App. at 525-26; see also 2 LaFave, supra, § 4.10(c), at 750-52.
3.4(c) Particular Searches: Persons
Search warrants may be issued for persons, as well as for places, if
there is probable cause to believe that a specific individual has evidence
on his or her person. Wash. CrR 2.3(c); State v. Rollie M., 41 Wn. App.
55, 58-59, 701 P.2d 1123, 1124-25 (1985). When a search warrant is
issued for a person, the general rule requiring particularity applies. State
v. Carter, 79 Wn. App. 154, 161, 901 P.2d 335, 339 (1995) (acknowl-
edging contrary authority in other states but assuming without deciding
that "all persons present" warrants may pass muster if facts underlying
warrant support necessary nexus between all persons present, the place,
and the criminal activity). State v. Martinez, 51 Wn. App. 397, 399-400,
753 P.2d 1011, 1012-13 (1988) (holding that a warrant is sufficient if it
provides a detailed description of the person to be searched, including the
person's place of residence); State v. Douglas S., 42 Wn. App. 138, 140,
709 P.2d 817, 818 (1985) (holding that a warrant is insufficient if it does
not have a description of the persons to be searched); Rollie M, 41 Wn.
App. at 58-59 (finding insufficient a warrant that authorized search of a
person found in general vicinity of a specified place); see also 2 LaFave,
supra, § 4.5(e), at 596-603. Additionally, if officers have a warrant to
search a person, they may conduct a strip search of the defendant to pro-
cure evidence if such search is conducted in a reasonable manner and
place as prescribed by statute. State v. Colin, 61 Wn. App. 111, 114-15,
809 P.2d 228, 230 (1991); see State v. Hampton, 114 Wn. App. 486,
494-95, 60 P.3d 95, 99 (2002) (holding that strip search pursuant to war-
rant was conducted in a reasonably private place, without unnecessary
touching, by persons of the defendant's gender where defendant was a
male, all searching officers were male, and search was conducted in a
police van with tinted windows).
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For a discussion of when a premises search warrant authorizes the
search of persons not named in the warrant, see infra § 3.8(a). Generally,
when a premises search warrant is executed, police may conduct a war-
rantless search of a person only if they have individualized probable
cause to search that person. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100
S. Ct. 338, 342, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 245 (1979); Rivera, 76 Wn. App. at
524; see also infra § 5.1. Nonetheless, a warrant authorizing the search
of all persons present at a location to be searched may be upheld if the
warrant establishes a nexus between all persons present, the place, and
the criminal activity. See Carter, 79 Wn. App. at 161 (assuming without
deciding that such warrants may pass muster).
3.5 PARTICULAR DESCRIPTION OF THINGS TO BE SEIZED
Because the facts in each case differ greatly, the fact patterns of
prior cases generally are not referred to when determining whether a
warrant describes the things to be seized with sufficient particularity. See
State v. Helmka, 86 Wn.2d 91, 93, 542 P.2d 115, 117 (1975) (en banc).
Instead, courts look to the purposes of the "particular description" re-
quirement to: (1) prevent general exploratory searches; (2) protect
against "seizure of objects on the mistaken assumption that they fall
within" the warrant; and (3) ensure that probable cause is present. State
v. Perrone, 119 Wn.2d 538, 545, 834 P.2d 611, 614-15 (1992) (en banc).
See also Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196, 48 S. Ct. 74, 76, 72
L. Ed. 231, 237 (1927); State v. Stenson, 132 Wn.2d 668, 691-92, 940
P.2d 1239, 1252 (1997) (en banc). The degree of specificity required de-
pends on the circumstances and the type of items involved. State v. Ho-
sier, 124 Wn. App. 696, 711-12, 103 P.3d 217, 224 (2004). A descrip-
tion need not be detailed and is valid if it is "as specific as the circum-
stances and the nature of the activity, or crime, under investigation per-
mits." Stenson, 132 Wn.2d at 692. The warrant must be definite enough
to allow the searching officer to identify the objects sought with reason-
able certainty. State v. Nordlund, 113 Wn. App. 171, 180, 53 P.3d 520,
524 (2002). A search warrant must delineate an officer's actions so that
the reviewing court is able to determine that the search was based on
probable cause and particular descriptions. United States v. Gomez-Soto,
723 F.2d 649, 653 (9th Cir. 1984). See State v. Chambers, 88 Wn. App.
640, 644-46, 945 P.2d 1172, 1175-76 (1997) (observing that a lesser
degree of precision may be satisfactory where the warrant authorizes a
search for contraband or inherently illicit property, and holding warrant
authorizing seizure of "any and all controlled substances" adequate for
search for marijuana); Hosier, 124 Wn. App. at 714 (holding that under-
wear was "writing material" under search warrant where defendant had,
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in the past, written explicit notes on underwear); State v. Weaver, 38 Wn.
App. 17, 22, 683 P.2d 1136, 1139 (1984) (holding that although card-
board box bearing defendant's name would not generally be considered
"paper," police could seize box because the obvious purpose of the war-
rant was seizure not only of controlled substances, but also of evidence
enabling state to demonstrate defendant's dominion and control over the
premises); see also Stenson, 132 Wn.2d at 693-94 (holding that a war-
rant was sufficiently particularized because it contained language that
limited items to be seized to business, financial, and personal records that
indicated a relationship between the parties involved); State v. Reid, 38
Wn. App. 203, 212, 687 P.2d 861, 867 (1984) ("[T]he phrase 'any other
evidence of homicide' specifically limited the warrant to the crime under
investigation [and] specific items listed, such as a shotgun and shotgun
shells[,] provided guidelines for the officers conducting the search.");
State v. Lingo, 32 Wn. App. 638, 641, 649 P.2d 130, 132 (1982) (finding
warrant not constitutionally defective when items to be seized are lim-
ited). But see Weaver, 38 Wn. App. at 24 (Ringold, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that because the box with defendant's name was not seized to show
dominion and control, but solely to carry contraband that had been un-
covered during the warrant search, majority's "dominion and control"
argument is merely a post hoc attempt to justify seizure, and cocaine
later found in the box should have been suppressed). See generally 2
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.6 (a)-(f) (4th ed. 2004).
3.5(a) General Rules
A few general principles can be gleaned from the cases to indicate
when a warrant is sufficiently definite to allow the executing officer to
identify the property with reasonable certainty:
(1) More ambiguity is tolerated when the police have acquired the
most complete description that could reasonably be expected. See State v.
Clark, 143 Wn.2d 731, 754, 24 P.3d 1006, 1017 (2001) (en banc); State
v. Withers, 8 Wn. App. 123, 127, 504 P.2d 1151, 1154 (1972).
(2) A more general description will suffice when the precise iden-
tity of items sought cannot be determined at the time the warrant is is-
sued and probable cause is shown. See Perrone, 119 Wn.2d at 547.
However, in such instances, "the search warrant must [also] be circum-
scribed by reference to the crime under investigation." State v. Riley, 121
Wn.2d 22, 29, 846 P.2d 1365, 1369 (1993) (en banc) (holding that a war-
rant functions "not only to limit the executing officer's discretion, but to
inform the person subject to the search what items the officer may
seize").
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(3) A less precise description is adequate for controlled substances.
See State v. Cowles, 14 Wn. App. 14, 19, 538 P.2d 840, 844 (1975)
(holding that when an affidavit states that narcotics and, specifically,
marijuana were observed, a search warrant authorizing seizure of "con-
trolled substances" is "reasonable and practical under the circumstances
and thus satisfie[s] the constitutional requirement of 'particularity"').
(4) Failure to provide all available descriptive facts is not fatal
when the omitted facts could not have assisted the officer in a more cir-
cumscribed search. See State v. Salinas, 18 Wn. App. 455, 461, 569 P.2d
75, 78 (1977).
(5) An error is not fatal if the officer was able to determine what
was intended from the other facts provided in the warrant. State v.
Cohen, 19 Wn. App. 600, 604, 576 P.2d 933, 936 (1978).
(6) Greater care is required for documents than for physical objects
because of the potential for intrusion into personal privacy. See Stenson,
132 Wn.2d at 692.
(7) Greater care and particularity is required when property sought
is "inherently innocuous" as opposed to property that is "inherently ille-
gal." See State v. Olson, 32 Wn. App. 555, 557-58, 648 P.2d 476, 478
(1982).
3.5(b) Circumstances Requiring Greater Scrutiny
Search warrants for documents and for telephone conversations re-
quire greater scrutiny because of the potential for intrusion into personal
privacy. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.l1, 96 S. Ct. 2737,
2749 n.l1, 49 L. Ed. 2d 627, 643 n.Il (1976). At the same time, the
United States Supreme Court has upheld a search warrant that listed spe-
cific documents pertaining to a particular crime but then added the catch-
all phrase "together with other fruits, instrumentalities, and evidence of
crime." Id. at 479, 96 S. Ct. at 2748, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 642. In Andresen,
the search was constitutional because the catch-all phrase was to be read
as authorizing a search only for evidence relating to the defined crime.
Id. at 480-82, 96 S. Ct. at 274849, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 642-43; see also
State v. Legas, 20 Wn. App. 535, 541, 581 P.2d 172, 175 (1978) (citing
Andresen as authority for the proposition that each item seized need not
have been specified in the warrant so long as the item is related to the
crime charged); cf Reid, 38 Wn. App. 203, 212, 687 P.2d 861, 867
(1984) (holding that a search warrant sufficiently limited officer's discre-
tion when the warrant described the items to be seized, including "any
other evidence of the homicide"). But see 2 LaFave, supra, § 4.6(d), at
633-34 (suggesting that Andresen should not be read as approval for
loose descriptions because the Supreme Court was influenced by the fact
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that the description was as specific as possible). When a search is for
particular contents of documents, the invasion of privacy can be mini-
mized by impounding the documents and then imposing conditions on a
further search. See id. at 636 n.127.
The particularity requirement is afforded its most exacting en-
forcement when the items to be seized implicate First Amendment rights,
including warrants for books, pictures, films, or recordings. See Zurcher
v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564, 98 S. Ct. 1970, 1981, 56 L. Ed. 2d
525, 541 (1978); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485, 85 S. Ct. 506,
511-12, 13 L. Ed. 2d 431, 437 (1965); Perrone, 119 Wn.2d at 547 (hold-
ing that allegedly obscene publications and films implicate First
Amendment protections). In addition, the officers executing the search
warrant are constitutionally prohibited from using their own discretion to
determine whether materials are unlawful. Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York,
442 U.S. 319, 325, 99 S. Ct. 2319, 2324, 60 L. Ed. 2d 920, 927-28
(1979). The need to particularize in the warrant the specific papers
sought does not apply, however, to papers that merely evidence owner-
ship or control over premises. Legas, 20 Wn. App. at 540-41.
Circumstances indicating that an individual has taken precautions to
ensure privacy may cause greater court scrutiny. See, e.g., State v. But-
terworth, 48 Wn. App. 152, 156, 737 P.2d 1297, 1299-1300 (1987). In
Butterworth, the police located the defendant's residence by requesting
his address from the telephone company. Id. at 152. The court noted that
the listing was unpublished, indicating that the defendant specifically
requested privacy regarding his address and phone number. Id. Because
the defendant had taken precautions regarding his privacy, the police
were required to obtain a warrant or subpoena prior to seizing informa-
tion. Id. at 157. The holding in Butterworth, however, has not been ex-
tended to protect addresses located on the outside of envelopes and
postal packages. See State v. Stanphill, 53 Wn. App. 623, 627, 769 P.2d
861, 863 (1989); see also State v. Martin, 106 Wn. App. 850, 857, 25
P.3d 488, 492 (2001) (holding that no warrant was required for police to
search Department of Licensing records to obtain information about reg-
istered owners of vehicles).
3.6 EXECUTION OF THE WARRANT: TIME OF EXECUTION
Washington is one of several states whose court rules require war-
rants to be executed within a certain time period. The warrant "shall
command the officer to search, within a specific period of time not to
exceed 10 days." Wash. CrR 2.3(c). See RCW 69.50.509 (three-day limit
for return of a search warrant for controlled substances); see also State v.
Thomas, 121 Wn.2d 504, 513, 851 P.2d 673, 678 (1993) (en banc) (hold-
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ing that search warrant for controlled substances under RCW 69.50.509
must be executed within 10 days and returned within three); State v. Wal-
laway, 72 Wn. App. 407, 415, 865 P.2d 531, 535-36 (1994) (applying
the Thomas rationale in upholding the timeliness of a search warrant). A
delay in execution may render a warrant invalid because it may mean
that probable cause no longer exists at the time the warrant is executed.
See State v. Higby, 26 Wn. App. 457, 460, 613 P.2d 1192, 1194 (1980);
see 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.7(a), at 645-50 (4th ed.
2004).
Unlike other states, Washington does not restrict the execution of
warrants to daytime hours. See Wash. CrR 2.3(c) (providing that a war-
rant may be served at any time of day); see also State v. Smith, 15 Wn.
App. 716, 719-20, 552 P.2d 1059, 1062 (1976) (nighttime search is not
unreasonable). The United States Supreme Court has not decided
whether the Fourth Amendment requires additional justification for
nighttime search warrants. But see Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S.
430, 460, 94 S. Ct. 1780, 1795, 40 L. Ed. 2d 250, 270 (1974) (Douglas,
J., dissenting) ("The purpose of the restriction upon nighttime searches
was to limit such intrusions to those instances where there is 'some justi-
fication for it."'); see also 2 LaFave, supra, § 4.7(b), at 655 (submitting
that the true test of the constitutionality of a nighttime search depends on
whether it was necessary to make the search at that time).
A search warrant may be executed even when the occupants are not
present. See, e.g., United States v. Gervato, 474 F.2d 40, 44 (3d Cir.
1973) (holding that presence of occupant while search warrant is being
executed is neither a common law nor a constitutional requirement); see
also State v. Wraspir, 20 Wn. App. 626, 628, 581 P.2d 182, 184 (1978);
2 LaFave, supra, § 4.7(c), at 656-60.
3.7 ENTRY WITHOUT NOTICE OR BY FORCE:
"KNOCK AND ANNOUNCE" REQUIREMENT
Absent exigent circumstances, officers executing a warrant must
give notice of their authority and purpose prior to entering the private
premises. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 37-40, 83 S. Ct. 1623,
1632-33, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726, 740-42 (1963). This "knock and announce"
or "knock and wait" requirement applies to the execution of both arrest
and search warrants. Id.; State v. Alldredge, 73 Wn. App. 171, 178, 868
P.2d 183, 187 (1994). The United States Supreme Court has held that a
"no-knock" entry is permissible where the police have a reasonable sus-
picion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular
circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or would inhibit the effec-
tive investigation of the crime by allowing the destruction of evidence.
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Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 1421, 137 L.
Ed. 2d 615, 624 (1997); see also United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65,
70-73, 118 S. Ct. 991, 997-98, 140 L. Ed. 2d 191, 199-200 (1998)
(holding that the Richards standard above does not depend on whether
property is destroyed as a result of the "no-knock" entry); United States
v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 38, 124 S. Ct. 521, 526, 157 L. Ed. 2d 343, 353
(2003) (holding that although circumstances justifying forcible entry may
not exist prior to knock and announce, exigency involving possible de-
struction of evidence may develop following, and result from, the act of
knocking and announcing, justifying a forcible entry after only a brief
wait of 15 to 20 seconds). But see Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927,
932-34, 115 S. Ct. 1914, 1917-18, 131 L. Ed. 2d 976, 981-82 (1995)
(noting that individuals' common law interest in being given an opportu-
nity to comply with the law and to avoid the destruction of property as-
sociated with a "no-knock" entry are not inconsequential). See infra §§
5.16-.20 for a discussion of exigent circumstances.
Washington is one of many states that has codified the knock and
announce requirement. See, e.g., Idaho Code § 19-4409; Mich. Comp.
Laws. Ann. § 780.656. Washington law provides that "[t]o make an ar-
rest in criminal actions, the officer may break open any outer or inner
door, or windows of a dwelling house or other building, or any other en-
closure, if, after notice of his office and purpose, he be refused admit-
tance." RCW 10.31.040. Although the statute expressly refers to arrests,
it applies to the execution of search warrants as well. State v. Young, 76
Wn.2d 212, 217, 455 P.2d 595, 598 (1969); State v. Shelly, 58 Wn. App.
908, 910, 795 P.2d 187, 188 (1990).
The purposes of the knock and announce rule are: (1) to reduce the
potential for violence; (2) to prevent the physical destruction of property;
and (3) to protect privacy. See United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488
F.2d 4, 9 (9th Cir. 1973); State v. Coyle, 95 Wn.2d 1, 5, 621 P.2d 1256,
1258 (1980) (en banc); State v. Garcia-Hernandez, 67 Wn. App. 492,
496, 837 P.2d 624, 627 (1992). Strict compliance with the knock and
announce rule is required unless the State can demonstrate either exigent
circumstances or futility of compliance. Coyle, 95 Wn.2d at 9-10. But
see State v. Richards, 136 Wn.2d 361, 374, 962 P.2d 118, 125 (1998) (en
banc) (approving court of appeal's conclusion that the "knock and wait"
rule is a flexible rule that gives way when police officers have a reason-
able belief that strict compliance would be futile); State v. Reid, 38 Wn.
App. 203, 210, 687 P.2d 861, 867 (1984) (holding that entry is in con-
formity with the knock and announce statute when compliance is sub-
stantial).
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An officer's actions are judged by a standard of reasonableness, de-
termined both by the purposes supporting the knock and announce rule
and by the particular facts and circumstances of the individual case. See,
e.g., Ker, 374 U.S. at 33, 83 S. Ct. at 1629-30, 10 L. Ed. 2d at 737;
Alldredge, 73 Wn. App. at 176-77. See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and
Seizure § 4.8(a), at 662-64 (4th ed. 2004).
3.7(a) Types of Entry Requiring Notice
The phrase "break open" in the Washington knock and announce
statute refers to all nonconsensual entries, not simply to those involving
forcible breaking. See Coyle, 95 Wn.2d at 5-6 (holding that knock and
wait statute was violated when officers grabbed occupant who had
opened door just as police were about to knock and announce them-
selves; officers then entered through open door without alerting other
occupants); State v. Miller, 7 Wn. App. 414, 419, 499 P.2d 241, 244-45
(1972) (holding that execution of search warrant was unlawful when po-
lice entered through partially opened door without knocking or announc-
ing their purpose). A consensual entry, however, is not "breaking open."
State v. Hartnell, 15 Wn. App. 410, 418, 550 P.2d 63, 69 (1976) (finding
that because defendant's wife invited unidentified officer into house, en-
try was consensual and announcement of purpose was not required).
Notice is required for entry by use of a pass key. See Ker, 374 U.S.
at 38-41, 83 S. Ct. at 1632-34, 10 L. Ed. 2d at 740-42. Notice is also
required for entry through a closed but unlocked door. Miller, 7 Wn.
App. at 416. Although courts in other jurisdictions are divided on the
question of whether passage through an open door requires notice, State
v. Nunez, 754 A.2d 581, 584-85 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000), Wash-
ington courts require notice in such situations, see Miller, 7 Wn. App. at
416 (finding that Fourth Amendment and RCW 10.31.040 prohibit an
officer executing a search warrant from entering a house without provid-
ing notice of office and purpose, even though door through which officer
entered was open far enough to permit passage); see also State v. Talley,
14 Wn. App. 484, 490-91, 543 P.2d 348, 352-53 (1975) (holding that
officer entering dwelling must give notice of his office and purpose even
though door to apartment was partially open). However, an officer's fail-
ure to knock and announce himself before entering a fenced backyard
through an unlocked gate does not violate RCW 10.31.040 when the of-
ficer can observe that the backyard is unoccupied, and can therefore es-
tablish that there is little risk of violating the purposes of the rule. State v.
Schimpf, 82 Wn. App. 61, 65, 914 P.2d 1206, 1208 (1996).
The Washington Supreme Court has held that when consent to enter
is obtained by deception, it is still effective consent. State v. Myers, 102
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Wn.2d 548, 552-53, 689 P.2d 38, 41-42 (1984) (en banc), modified on
other grounds by State v. Lively, 130 Wn.2d 1, 19-21, 921 P.2d 1035,
1045 (1996). Thus, an officer who deceives a suspect into allowing him
or her to enter need not announce his office and purpose. In Myers, the
police had been aware that the doors and windows to the defendant's
house were covered by iron bars. Id. at 549. They had also been told by
an informant that the defendant kept a handgun within reach whenever
he opened the door. Id. The police prepared a fictitious warrant for the
defendant's arrest for a traffic offense, knowing that the defendant had
no outstanding traffic violations. Id. at 550. Upon being permitted to en-
ter his house to execute the arrest warrant, the police executed the search
warrant. Id. The court held that even though the officers failed to an-
nounce their office and purpose, the occupant of the house had granted
"valid permission" for them to enter. -d. at 554; see also Coyle, 95
Wn.2d at 5.
Courts have reasoned that an occupant's right to privacy is not in-
fringed by the fact that permission to enter was obtained by ruse, because
the occupant may not deny entry to police who possess a valid search
warrant. Myers, 102 Wn.2d at 560 (Dimmick, J., concurring in result)
(arguing that execution of search warrants requires case-by-case evalua-
tion of tactics used to reduce violence and to prevent destruction of prop-
erty, and that prohibiting use of a ruse may result in police having to ap-
proach houses massively armed and with weapons drawn or having to
destroy building entrances).
Entry by ruse, subterfuge, or deception is not a violation of the
knock and announce statute because no "breaking" occurs within the
terms of the statute. State v. Williamson, 42 Wn. App. 208, 211, 710 P.2d
205, 207 (1985). Such an entry is approved because the interests underly-
ing the statute are well served by an entry gained with permission of the
occupant. Id.; see also State v. Hashman, 46 Wn. App. 211, 216, 729
P.2d 651, 655 (1986) (holding that, where officer used ruse to gain entry
in order to obtain probable cause to support a search warrant, police may
use ruse to gain entry when they have justifiable and reasonable basis to
suspect criminal activity in a residence).
Washington Courts of Appeal cases involving entry by deception
include State v. Ellis, 21 Wn. App. 123, 129, 584 P.2d 428, 432 (1978)
(holding that when officer was unable to gain entry through use of a false
name, subsequent forcible entry absent exigent circumstances was
unlawful and not in compliance with the knock and wait statute); State v.
Huckaby, 15 Wn. App. 280, 290, 549 P.2d 35, 41-42 (1976) (finding
knock and announce statute inapplicable when undercover officers
gained entry into suspect's home with suspect's consent and for apparent
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purpose of drug transaction); cf Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206,
209-10, 87 S. Ct. 424, 426-27, 17 L. Ed. 2d 312, 315-16 (1966) (finding
entry lawful when undercover officer telephoned suspect and misrepre-
sented his identity in order to gain invitation into suspect's home). See
generally William D. Bremer, Annotation, What Constitutes Compliance
with Knock-and-Announce Rule in Search of Private Premises-State
Cases, 85 A.L.R.5th 1 (2001). The Washington knock and announce
statute requires notice prior to entry through inner as well as outer doors.
RCW 10.31.040. But see 2 LaFave, supra, § 4.8(c), at 678 (federal rule
does not require separate notice for different rooms in one house).
3.7(b) Compliance with Requirements
The police must identify themselves as police officers and indicate
to the person in apparent control of the premises that they are present to
execute a warrant. State v. Ellis, 21 Wn. App. 123, 129, 584 P.2d 428,
432 (1978). It is not sufficient to make this announcement simultane-
ously with a forcible entry. Id.; State v. Lowrie, 12 Wn. App. 155, 157,
528 P.2d 1010, 1011-12 (1974) ("Announcing your identity as you kick
in the door is not compliance with the general [knock and wait] rule.").
Police are not required, however, to give a detailed or completely accu-
rate description of their purpose, as long as they comply with the statute.
See Myers, 102 Wn.2d at 555 (holding that use by police of fictitious
arrest warrant to gain entry into defendant's house in order to execute a
valid search warrant did not violate knock and announce requirements
because officers announced identity and stated that purpose was to exe-
cute a warrant); Reid, 38 Wn. App. at 210-11 (holding that police sub-
stantially complied with knock and announce rule despite the fact that
officers announced their presence and purpose only after entering apart-
ment because officers were uncertain as to whether they were entering a
single apartment or a common hallway and because they continued to
announce their presence and purpose as they moved through the apart-
ment, accomplishing the purposes of the knock and announce rule).
In general, officers, after giving notice, must allow the occupants an
opportunity to "refuse admittance" before entering. Garcia-Hernandez,
67 Wn. App. at 495. However, officers need not wait until occupants
affirmatively deny their entry. Richards, 136 Wn.2d at 374 (holding that
police officers need not wait for occupant to expressly grant or deny en-
try where officers act reasonably and waiting would not achieve any pur-
pose of the "knock and wait" rule); State v. Jones, 15 Wn. App. 165, 167,
547 P.2d 906, 908 (1976) (finding officers' entry after 10-second wait
reasonable considering the nighttime hour and the fact that defendant and
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his family were in bed). The holding in Jones is questioned by Wayne R.
LaFave in 2 LaFave, supra, § 4.8(c), at 674-76 n.7 1.
Denial of admittance may be implied from the occupant's lack of
response. See State v. Schmidt, 48 Wn. App. 639, 644-45, 740 P.2d 351,
355 (1987). The length of time that officers must wait before using force
to enter a residence depends on the circumstances of each case. Id. at
644. However, the waiting period ends when the purposes of the knock
and announce rule have been fulfilled. See Richards, 136 Wn.2d at 374
(holding that knock and wait rule was not violated where officers imme-
diately entered apartment after announcing their identity and purpose and
were visible through sliding screen door, because officers acted reasona-
bly and waiting would have served none of the purposes of the knock
and wait rule); Alldredge, 73 Wn. App. at 177 (holding that the waiting
period is over once "the door of the premises is open, attended by an oc-
cupant, and the police have announced their identity and purpose while
face-to-face with the occupant").
In executing a search warrant, police officers must act reasonably.
See generally Myers, 102 Wn.2d at 549-57. Whether an officer acted
reasonably is "a factual determination to be made primarily by the trial
court and depends on the circumstances of each case." Garcia-
Hernandez, 67 Wn. App. at 496 (finding police acted reasonably when
they identified themselves and their purpose before entering without de-
fendant's consent and yelled "police" before entering defendant's bed-
room); State v. Berlin, 46 Wn. App. 587, 593-94, 731 P.2d 548, 552
(1987) (holding that when defendant's wife answered the officer's knock
but failed to open the door after a 30-second wait, officers were justified
in opening the door after the wait, entering, and restating their identity
and purpose; the fact that the police had been told that the defendant had
weapons and a history of violence was not enough to waive compliance
with the knock and announce rule, but did "bear upon the reasonableness
of the length of time that the police waited after announcing them-
selves"); Schmidt, 48 Wn. App. at 646 (holding that when officers iden-
tify themselves and state that they have a search warrant, no express de-
mand to enter is necessary, and that officers' delay of three seconds be-
tween the time they knocked and announced and forcibly entered was
reasonable because occupants' privacy interest was minimal by virtue of
existence of search warrant, there was the possibility that occupants had
been alerted to police presence by barking dogs, suspect had a history of
gun possession, assault, and resisting arrest, smell of methamphetamine
lab alerted officers to possible risk of explosion, and place to be searched
was very small shed, meaning knock could have been quickly answered);
State v. Woodall, 32 Wn. App. 407, 411, 647 P.2d 1051, 1054 (1982)
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(holding that "in light of the information concerning the number of peo-
ple at the party, danger of violence, the concern for destruction of the
evidence, and the deputy's testimony that someone inside the clubhouse
saw [the officers] long before they reached the door," a three or four-
second wait after the officers announced their identity and purpose made
the entry reasonable); State v. Haggerty, 20 Wn. App. 335, 337-38, 579
P.2d 1031, 1033 (1978) (finding that when officers knocked on door and
announced office and purpose, and when door opened after 30-second
wait, officers were justified in believing door was opened in response to
announcement and did not need to repeat office and purpose); Lowrie, 12
Wn. App. at 157 (holding that "[flailure to answer a knock at the door
within 15 seconds and then merely walking away from door is [an] insuf-
ficient" refusal when officers have not announced their identity and pur-
pose nor explicitly demanded entry, even if occupant might have recog-
nized one of the officers).
Additionally, circumstances must reasonably indicate that the occu-
pant has consented to the officer's entry. See State v. Sturgeon, 46 Wn.
App. 181, 183, 730 P.2d 93, 94 (1986) (holding that the knock and an-
nounce statute was violated when the police knocked, the defendant
shouted "yeah," and the police entered the apartment). Washington
courts have also rejected the contention that officers' failure to wait long
enough to permit the occupants a reasonable opportunity to grant or deny
admission violates the knock and announce rule. See State v. Lehman, 40
Wn. App. 400, 404, 698 P.2d 606, 609 (1985). In Lehman, the plain-
clothes police officers knocked and a defendant opened the door ap-
proximately 12 inches. The officers displayed their badges and advised
the defendant that they had a warrant to search the house. Id. at 401. One
officer looked through the open door and saw two men sitting in the liv-
ing room. Id. at 401-02. Without waiting for the defendant to grant or
deny permission to enter, the officers entered the house and conducted
the search. Id. The Lehman court distinguished the case from Coyle by
noting that, unlike Coyle, there had been an announcement by the police.
Id. at 404. It was not necessary that all occupants be aware of the an-
nouncement; hence, the court found sufficient compliance with the knock
and announce statute. Id. at 405.
The announcement of office and purpose may be made to the per-
son answering the door even when that person is not in possession of the
premises. See State v. Sainz, 23 Wn. App. 532, 537 n.3, 596 P.2d 1090,
1094 n.3 (1979).
Unnecessary roughness in executing a warrant "does not rise to
constitutional magnitude . . . or negate prior compliance with RCW
10.31.040." Id. at 538-39.
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The fact that an undercover agent is present who could legally seize
the evidence does not excuse other officers from knocking and waiting.
See State v. Dugger, 12 Wn. App. 74, 77, 528 P.2d 274, 276 (1974).
3.7(c) Exceptions
Under the "useless gesture" exception, compliance with the knock
and announce rule is excused if the authority and purpose of the police
are already known to those within the premises. See Ker, 374 U.S. at 55,
83 S. Ct. at 1640, 10 L. Ed. 2d at 750-51 (Brennan, J., dissenting in
part); Coyle, 95 Wn.2d at 11; State v. Shelly, 58 Wn. App. 908, 911, 795
P.2d 187, 188 (1990). Washington has required that officers be "virtually
certain" that occupants of a dwelling are aware of the officers' presence.
Coyle, 95 Wn.2d at 11. See generally 2 LaFave, supra, § 4.8(f), at 693.
Once the defendant has opened the door and the police officers
have identified themselves and their purpose, any grant or denial of en-
trance by the defendant has been held to be a useless gesture. See Shelly,
58 Wn. App. at 911 (holding strict compliance with the waiting period to
be a useless gesture when the police, armed with a valid search warrant,
could enter the premises regardless of whether defendant granted or de-
nied them permission); see also Lehman, 40 Wn. App. at 404.
The useless gesture exception has also been applied by implication
to justify a police officer's forcible entry when the officer identified him-
self, but was unable to state his purpose before the suspect tried to close
the door. State v. Neff, 10 Wn. App. 713, 717, 519 P.2d 1328, 1330
(1974). Closing a door on an officer not in uniform, under ambiguous
circumstances, will not excuse the officer from complying with the
knock and announce rule. State v. Ellis, 21 Wn. App. 123, 127, 584 P.2d
428, 431 (1978); see also Coyle, 95 Wn.2d at 6.
Police need not comply with the knock and announce requirement,
but may instead enter immediately and with force when exigent circum-
stances are present. Ker, 374 U.S. at 37-41, 83 S. Ct. at 1632-34, 10 L.
Ed. 2d at 740-42; State v. Young, 76 Wn.2d 212, 216, 455 P.2d 595, 598
(1969). A police officer's reasonable belief that the items identified in
the search warrant will be destroyed or removed constitutes one type of
exigent circumstance. The fact that the items could easily be destroyed is
insufficient. The police must possess specific information indicating that
the items are in actual imminent danger of destruction or removal. See
Young, 76 Wn.2d at 215-16 (holding that belief of exigent circumstances
cannot be based on suspicion or ambiguous acts); Coleman v. Reilly, 8
Wn. App. 684, 687, 508 P.2d 1035, 1038 (1973) (holding that "there
must be more than mere suspicion on behalf of the police officers that
evidence will be destroyed before [the police] are justified in making an
2005]
Seattle University Law Review
unannounced entry."); see also State v. Harris, 12 Wn. App. 481, 492-
94, 530 P.2d 646, 653-54 (1975) (finding police justified in not comply-
ing strictly with knock and announce requirements when they had reli-
able information that suspect kept heroin in condoms that he would swal-
low if confronted by police).
Washington has rejected the blanket rule, favored by some courts,
that permits an unannounced entry when the warrant is for easily dis-
posed of items, such as drugs. State v. Jeter, 30 Wn. App. 360, 362, 634
P.2d 312, 314 (1981); see also State v. Edwards, 20 Wn. App. 648, 652,
581 P.2d 154, 157 (1978). Specific factual situations are discussed in
Dugger, 12 Wn. App. at 81-82. See generally 2 LaFave, supra, § 4.8(d).
A police officer's reasonable belief that announcing his or her of-
fice and purpose would jeopardize police or public safety is a second
type of exigent circumstance. See Reid, 38 Wn. App. at 210; State v.
Carson, 21 Wn. App. 318, 321-22, 584 P.2d 990, 991-92 (1978). A
mere good faith concern for safety, however, is not sufficient. Police
must know from prior information or from direct observation that the
suspect both keeps weapons and has a propensity to use them. Jeter, 30
Wn. App. at 363 (finding no exigent circumstances existed when officer
had prior knowledge of defendant's possession of gun but not of any
propensity for defendant to use it to resist arrest); see also State v. Allyn,
40 Wn. App. 27, 31, 696 P.2d 45, 48 (1985) (holding that police were
justified in executing a search warrant without complying with the knock
and announce rule when they knew from undercover agent that the de-
fendant had several firearms in his dwelling and a strong propensity to
use them); Dugger, 12 Wn. App. at 83 (holding that good faith concern
for officer safety is not sufficient to excuse compliance with knock and
announce rule, and that "some credible evidence, such as knowledge that
the occupants might possess weapons and be predisposed to respond vio-
lently, is required to support a good faith claim of concern for safety");
People v. Dumas, 9 Cal. 3d 871, 879, 512 P.2d 1208, 109 Cal. Rptr. 304
(1973) (finding that information that defendant habitually answered door
armed with firearm constituted exigent circumstances); 2 LaFave, supra,
§ 4.8(e), at 686-91.
For a discussion of exigent circumstances justifying the absence of
a warrant, see infra §§ 5.16-.20.
Finally, law enforcement officers need not comply with the notice
requirements when covert entry of the premises is the only way to effec-
tively execute the warrant. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 247-48,
99 S. Ct. 1682, 1688-89, 60 L. Ed. 2d 177, 186-87 (1979) (finding cov-
ert entry onto premises to install listening device authorized by warrant
was constitutional, even where entry was not specifically authorized by
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warrant); Myers, 102 Wn.2d at 553-54 (finding that police were justified
in using ruse to gain entry when informant had stated that defendant usu-
ally had handgun within reach when answering door, and all doors and
windows were covered by bars).
3.8 SEARCH AND DETENTION OF PERSONS ON
PREMISES BEING SEARCHED
3.8(a) Search of Persons on Premises Being Searched
Generally, a premises search warrant justifies a search of personal
effects of the owner found therein [that] "are plausible repositories for
the objects named in the warrant." State v. Hill, 123 Wn.2d 641, 643, 870
P.2d 313, 314 (1994); see also id. at 647 (holding that the search of
sweatpants found on the floor does not constitute an impermissible
search of defendant's person, thus overruling State v. Lee, 68 Wn. App.
253, 842 P.2d 515 (1992)); State v. Worth, 37 Wn. App. 889, 892, 683
P.2d 622, 624 (1984).
A premises search warrant or a warrant to search the person and
premises of one occupant does not authorize a search of other occupants
or visitors who happen to be on the premises while the search is taking
place, nor does it automatically justify a search of personal effects be-
longing to such other occupants or visitors. See State v. Galbert, 70 Wn.
App. 721, 727, 855 P.2d 310, 314 (1993) (rejecting "mere presence" of
contraband as a justification to search persons who are merely located at
the search scene); State v. Douglas S., 42 Wn. App. 138, 140-42, 709
P.2d 817, 818-19 (1985) (finding frisk of a juvenile entering the resi-
dence not justified when there were no grounds to believe that the juve-
nile had dominion and control over the objects specified in the warrant
and the father had admitted that the marijuana plants found on the prem-
ises were his); see also 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure §
4.9(b)-(c), at 704-06 (4th ed. 2004).
In Washington, a guest in a home has automatic standing to chal-
lenge a defective search warrant for the premises where (1) the individ-
ual was legitimately on the premises where the search occurred, (2) the
state intends to use the fruits of the search against the individual, and (3)
the individual did not stipulate to facts that establish a lack of a reason-
able expectation of privacy as to the premises searched or the items
seized. State v. Magneson, 107 Wn. App. 221, 225, 26 P.3d 986, 988
(2001) (citing State v. Williams, 142 Wn.2d 17, 22, 11 P.3d 714, 717
(2000) (en banc), as dicta supporting the continuing validity of automatic
standing in Washington despite abandonment of doctrine at federal
level).
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Although some states have approved the use of warrants authoriz-
ing "search of all persons present," those states limit such use to situa-
tions where the evidence tendered to the issuing "magistrate supports the
conclusion that it is probable [that] anyone in the described place when
the warrant is executed is involved in the criminal activity in such a way
as to have evidence [of the criminal activity] on his person." 2 LaFave,
supra, § 4.5(e), at 601. Washington courts, however, have held that such
a rule fails to establish a sufficient nexus between the persons present
and the criminal activity: "[I]ndividualized probable cause is a prerequi-
site to an evidence search of any person on the premises." State v.
Rivera, 76 Wn. App. 519, 524, 888 P.2d 740, 743 (1995) (citing Ybarra
v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S. Ct. 338, 342, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 245
(1979)). But see State v. Carter, 79 Wn. App. 154, 160-61, 901 P.2d
335, 339 (1995) (acknowledging Rivera and contrary authority in other
states but assuming without deciding that "all persons present" warrants
may pass muster if the facts underlying warrant support necessary nexus
between all persons present, the place, and the criminal activity).
There are several circumstances, however, in which persons on the
premises may be searched. First, a warrant may describe a person to be
searched. See supra § 3.4(c). Because warrants are to be interpreted with
common sense, a warrant stating that there is probable cause to believe
evidence is concealed on a person allows a search of that person even
though the command portion of the warrant mentions only "places and
premises." State v. Williams, 90 Wn.2d 245, 246, 580 P.2d 635, 635
(1978). Second, a search may be conducted incident to arrest. State v.
Cottrell, 86 Wn.2d 130, 133, 542 P.2d 771, 773 (1975) (en banc); see
also infra § 5.1. In Cottrell, the warrant authorized a search of the defen-
dant's residence or "person ... if found thereon." 86 Wn.2d at 131. The
court upheld the search of the defendant's person once the officer had
probable cause to place the defendant under control because the defen-
dant exited a car parked in front of the residence. Id.
When the warrant itself gives no express or implied authorization to
search persons on the premises, and the police do not have probable
cause to arrest them, officers may nevertheless search such persons in
two situations. First, a person not named in the warrant but present on the
premises may be searched if the police "have reasonable cause to believe
[that the person] has the articles for which the search is instituted upon
his person." State v. Halverson, 21 Wn. App. 35, 38, 584 P.2d 408, 410
(1978) (citations omitted). "Reasonable cause" requires that the person
engage in some type of suspicious activity. Id. Thus, in the execution of a
search warrant for narcotics, police were justified in searching an occu-
pant's fists when at the time of the officer's entry the occupant was ob-
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served kneeling in front of a weighing scale and then rising with his fists
clenched. Id. at 36-37. Police were not justified in searching an occu-
pant's purse, however, when the occupant gave no evidence of suspi-
cious behavior. Worth, 37 Wn. App. at 893; cf Carter, 79 Wn. App. at
162 (finding no probable cause to search defendant during a valid prem-
ises search when defendant was asleep and officers testified that they did
not believe defendant was armed and dangerous). See generally 2 La-
Fave, supra, § 4.9(c).
Courts are divided as to whether persons who enter a place being
searched may legally be searched without a warrant if they have no op-
portunity to conceal any named items. See 2 LaFave, supra, § 4.9(c), at
707-08. In these situations, the scope of the search of a bystander is lim-
ited to that necessary for detecting the items sought. Id. Thus, police may
not search a person if the search warrant is for a television set. Id. at 632
n.30.
Second, police may conduct a limited search for weapons to protect
themselves during the execution of the warrant. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illi-
nois, 444 U.S. 85, 93, 100 S. Ct. 338, 343, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 247 (1979);
Worth, 37 Wn. App. at 893; Halverson, 21 Wn. App. at 38; State v. Gal-
loway, 14 Wn. App. 200, 202, 540 P.2d 444, 446 (1975). The police
must, however, have a reasonable suspicion that the person searched is
armed. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 92-94, 100 S. Ct. at 343, 62 L. Ed. 2d at
246-47; see also State v. Lennon, 94 Wn. App. 573, 580-81, 976 P.2d
121, 125 (1999) (holding that a frisk of a person who arrives on the scene
of a search must be justified by specific and articulable facts that create
an objective, reasonable belief that the suspect is armed and dangerous
and may not be based on a generalized suspicion that people present dur-
ing narcotic searches are often armed). Moreover, the search must be
limited to ascertaining whether the individual is armed. State v. Allen, 93
Wn.2d 170, 172, 606 P.2d 1235, 1236 (1980) (en banc) (holding that an
officer conducting a pat-down of an individual who knocked on the door
of a residence being searched may not examine the contents of a wallet
found on the individual "after satisfying himself that the 'bulge' [wallet]
was not a weapon"); cf Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868,
1884-85, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 911 (1968) (holding that police may conduct
limited weapons search to protect themselves during lawful investigatory
stop). Slightly different considerations may control in search situations,
as opposed to Terry stops, because the encounter in the search situation
is more lengthy than that in a Terry stop. See 2 LaFave, supra, § 4.9(d),
at 714-15.
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3.8(b) Detention of Persons on Premises Being Searched
A valid search warrant "implicitly carries with it the limited author-
ity to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is con-
ducted." Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 101 S. Ct. 2587,
2595, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340, 351 (1981) (footnotes omitted). The authority to
detain exists even if the occupant is initially found outside the home.
State v. Flores-Moreno, 72 Wn. App. 733, 739, 866 P.2d 648, 652
(1994).
A brief detention is permissible even when the police do not have
probable cause to believe that the objects of the search are on the person
detained. Summers, 452 U.S. at 705, 101 S. Ct. at 2595, 69 L. Ed. 2d at
351. In addition, the police may ascertain whether any individual arriving
on the scene might interfere with the search and may determine what
business, if any, the individual has at the premises. Galloway, 14 Wn.
App. at 201 (citing State v. Howard, 7 Wn. App. 668, 502 P.2d 1043
(1972)). Such a limited stop, however, is not a license to detain and frisk
all persons approaching within 100 feet of the location of the search.
State v. Melin, 27 Wn. App. 589, 592, 618 P.2d 1324, 1325 (1980).
3.9 PERMISSIBLE SCOPE AND INTENSITY OF SEARCH
Assuming that a search warrant describes the area and items with
the requisite particularity, the remaining question is the permissible
scope and intensity of the search. "As a general rule search warrants
must be strictly construed and their execution must be within the speci-
ficity of the warrant." State v. Cottrell, 12 Wn. App. 640, 643, 532 P.2d
644, 646 (1975); see also Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 611, 119 S. Ct.
1692, 1697-98, 143 L. Ed. 2d 818, 828 (1999) (noting that the Fourth
Amendment at least requires that police actions within a home be related
to the objectives of the authorized intrusion and holding that home
owner's Fourth Amendment rights were infringed when police allowed
media reporters to accompany them into the home for purposes unrelated
to the search).
Just how intense a search may be is governed by the nature of the
items to be seized. Generally, a premises search warrant "justifies a
search of personal effects of the owner found therein [that] are plausible
repositories for the objects specified in the warrant." State v. Worth, 37
Wn. App. 889, 892, 683 P.2d 662, 624 (1984) (citing State v. White, 13
Wn. App. 949, 538 P.2d 860 (1975)); see also State v. Anderson, 41 Wn.
App. 85, 96, 702 P.2d 481, 490 (1985) (holding that a warrant to search
for clothing used in a robbery extended to the entire residence where
clothing might be found, including the inside of a garbage-can-sized
commercial vacuum cleaner). Similarly, a valid search warrant for a de-
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fendant's home, trailer, and vehicles is sufficient to obtain a blood test.
State v. Kalakosky, 121 Wn.2d 525, 532, 852 P.2d 1064, 1068 (1993).
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that officers
searching for documents must, out of necessity, examine documents not
specifically listed in the warrant. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463,
482 n.ll, 96 S. Ct. 2737, 2749 n.ll, 49 L. Ed. 2d 627, 643 n.ll (1976).
In the course of such a search, officers may also seize evidence found
that is not specifically described in the warrant if"it will aid in a particu-
lar apprehension or conviction, or [if it] has a sufficient nexus with the
crime under investigation." State v. Stenson, 132 Wn.2d 668, 695, 940
P.2d 1239, 1254 (1997) (en banc) (finding that officers did not exceed
the scope of the search warrant when they examined and seized docu-
ments not specifically listed in the warrant).
Once the purpose of the warrant has been carried out, the authority
to search ends. See State v. Legas, 20 Wn. App. 535, 541, 581 P.2d 172,
176 (1978) (holding that a warrant permitting a search in a bedroom for
papers linking defendant to the premises did not justify a search of a
small box after such papers had been discovered).
3.9(a) Area
A search may extend to the entire area covered by the warrant's de-
scription. See generally Cottrell, 12 Wn. App. at 644. However, police
"must execute a search warrant strictly within the bounds set by the war-
rant." State v. Kelley, 52 Wn. App. 581, 585, 762 P.2d 20, 22 (1988). A
warrant that authorizes the search of a house but does not mention out-
buildings does not include a search of outbuildings not under defendant's
control, and vice versa. Id. at 585-86 (suppressing evidence located in a
barn and garage that were not specified in the warrant); see also State v.
Gebaroff, 87 Wn. App. 11, 16, 939 P.2d 706, 709 (1997) (holding that
although judges looking for probable cause in an affidavit may draw rea-
sonable inferences regarding where evidence may be located, affidavit
and warrant application describing drug buy at a mobile home did not
give rise to probable cause to search travel trailer located on same prop-
erty but not under suspect's control). Generally, where it is reasonable
for an officer to believe that a storage area is appurtenant to the area cov-
ered by a valid search warrant, the officers may search the storage area.
See State v. Boyer, 124 Wn. App. 593, 602, 102 P.3d 833, 838 (2004). A
search of a padlocked locker and a storage room that did not comprise a
separate building does not exceed the scope of a warrant to search the
premises. State v. Llamas-Villa, 67 Wn. App. 448,452-53, 836 P.2d 239,
241-42 (1992).
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Police may enter areas not explicitly named in the warrant when
such entry is necessary to execute the warrant. See, e.g., Dalia v. United
States, 441 U.S. 238, 257, 99 S. Ct. 1682, 1693, 60 L. Ed. 2d 177, 193
(1979) (holding that a warrant explicitly authorizing planting of hidden
microphone implicitly authorized covert entry onto premises). Addition-
ally, officers may search for items thrown outside of the premises if such
action was provoked by the knowledge of police presence at the prem-
ises. State v. Dearinger, 73 Wn.2d 563, 567, 439 P.2d 971, 973 (1968)
(finding that officers acted within ambit of warrant in seizing a sack and
its contents thrown by occupant into the adjoining yard during the
search).
It has been suggested that police may enter adjacent areas if they
reasonably fear for their safety. See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Sei-
zure § 4.10(a), at 738-39 (4th ed. 2004). However, whether Washington
courts will so hold remains unclear. In Boyer, a Washington court of ap-
peals noted that no Washington court had addressed the issue of a protec-
tive sweep incident to the execution of a search warrant. 124 Wn. App. at
602. The court held that given the weight of authority specifically limit-
ing protective sweeps to arrests and execution of arrest warrants, the trial
court erred as a matter of law in concluding that a warrantless search of
an area not covered by the search warrant in officers' possession was
justified as a protective sweep. Id. Although the court's holding may be
interpreted as prohibiting warrantless protective sweeps incident to the
execution of a search warrant, the Boyer court's holding seemed to rest,
at least in part, on the fact that the "officers articulated no specific facts
that would support a prudent officer's belief that the area harbored a
dangerous person." Id.
3.9(b) Personal Effects
Personal effects found on the premises and belonging to the occu-
pant may be searched if the effects can reasonably be expected to contain
the described items. See, e.g., State v. Hill, 123 Wn.2d 641, 643, 870
P.2d 313, 314 (1994); Worth, 37 Wn. App. at 892. Ordinarily, however,
the police may not search effects that they know belong to other occu-
pants. See Worth, 37 Wn. App. at 893. But see State v. Jackson, 107 Wn.
App. 646, 649, 27 P.3d 689, 690 (2001) (holding that police properly
searched a jacket where there was confusion over whether it was owned
by lawfully arrested driver or non-arrested passenger). Even when a war-
rant authorizes a search of the entire premises, it does not justify the
search of another person residing on the premises who was not men-
tioned in the affidavit; nor does it justify a search of a purse belonging to
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another person if she was holding the purse or in proximity to it. Worth,
37 Wn. App. at 893.
In Worth, the court rejected a distinction between personal effects
worn on or held by the person and those effects nearby the person at the
time of the search: "A narrow focus on whether a person is holding or
wearing a personal item would tend to undercut the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment and leave vulnerable readily recognizable effects, such as
[a] purse, which an individual has under [her] control and seeks to pre-
serve as private." Id.; cf State v. Scott, 21 Wn. App. 113, 117, 584 P.2d
423, 425 (1978) (holding that a warrant authorizing search of "spa" busi-
ness records to uncover evidence of prostitution did not permit search of
employees' purses for customers' names); 2 LaFave, supra, § 4.10(b), at
747-48 (suggesting that the proper test in a case involving visitors is
whether police have a reasonable belief that the items described would
be concealed in the visitor's belongings). One court has attempted to
avoid this problem by holding that one has no privacy interest in items
left at another's house. State v. Biggs, 16 Wn. App. 221, 224-25, 556
P.2d 247, 249 (1976) (holding that visitor who departed without his
jacket no longer had expectation of privacy regarding the jacket and thus
jacket could be searched).
An individual has no privacy interest in abandoned personal prop-
erty. See State v. Reynolds, 144 Wn.2d 282, 287, 27 P.3d 200, 203
(2001) (en banc). In Reynolds, police arrested the driver of a vehicle in
which the defendant was a passenger. Id. at 284-85. The arresting offi-
cer, having previously noticed a coat on the floor of the vehicle, discov-
ered the same coat pushed under the front passenger tire of the car upon
returning to the vehicle to speak with the defendant. Id. Upon question-
ing, Reynolds denied ownership of the coat and denied placing it under
the vehicle. Id. The Reynolds court deemed the coat abandoned property
and held that authorities needed neither a warrant nor probable cause to
retrieve and search abandoned property. Id. at 287-88. However, absent
a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement, a search of aban-
doned property will not be upheld where a defendant can show both
unlawful police conduct and a causal nexus between that unlawful con-
duct and the abandonment of the property. See State v. Richenbach, 153
Wn.2d 126, 136-37, 101 P.3d 80, 87 (2004) (en banc) (holding that
abandonment occurs when circumstances show that an individual has
voluntarily relinquished a reasonable expectation of privacy by discard-
ing property but that a reasonable expectation of privacy is not voluntar-
ily relinquished when property is abandoned as a result of an illegal
search or seizure).
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Despite the Supreme Court's holding that there is no expectation of
privacy in garbage left beyond the curtilage of a home, Washington has
recognized a privacy right in one's garbage, requiring a warrant to search
such refuse. Compare California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41, 108
S. Ct. 1625, 1628-29, 100 L. Ed. 2d 30, 36-37 (1988), with State v.
Boland, 115 Wn.2d 571, 576-77, 800 P.2d 1112, 1115 (1990) (en banc)
(rejecting Greenwood on state law grounds). But see State v. Hepton, 113
Wn. App. 673, 679, 54 P.3d 233, 237 (2002) (holding no reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in garbage bags left in front of neighboring aban-
doned house). See also supra § 1.3(g).
3.9(c) Vehicles
Police who have authority to search a residence for illegal drugs
also have authority to search vehicles that are under the control of the
defendant and that are located on the premises to be searched. State v.
Claflin, 38 Wn. App. 847, 853, 690 P.2d 1186, 1191 (1984). But see 2
LaFave, supra, § 4.10(b), at 749-50. However, police have no authority
to search vehicles that are not within the curtilage of the home. See, e.g.,
State v. Graham, 78 Wn. App. 44, 51-52, 896 P.2d 704, 709-10 (1995)
(holding that a truck parked next to, and slightly in, a public street where
there was no fence or other barrier between the occupant's yard and the
street is not within the curtilage of the house); State v. Pourtes, 49 Wn.
App. 579, 581, 744 P.2d 644, 645 (1987) (holding that the street and the
shoulder of the roadway were not within the curtilage of a residence);
State v. Niedergang, 43 Wn. App. 656, 662, 719 P.2d 576, 579 (1986)
(holding that a vehicle is not within the curtilage of a house when it is
parked in a space that lawfully could be used by anyone coming to the
adjoining house on legitimate business). A trailer that is used as a resi-
dence is treated as a residential outbuilding rather than as a vehicle. Ge-
baroff, 87 Wn. App. at 16.
3.10 SEIZURE OF UNNAMED ITEMS: REQUIREMENTS IN GENERAL
Items not listed in the search warrant may be seized when the sei-
zure falls within one of the general exceptions to the warrant require-
ment. See, e.g., State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61, 70, 917 P.2d 563,
568 (1996) (en banc) (search incident to arrest); State v. Rose, 128
Wn.2d 388, 392, 909 P.2d 280, 283 (1996) (en banc) (open view); State
v. Myers, 117 Wn.2d 332, 346, 815 P.2d 761, 769 (1991) (en banc) (plain
view). For a discussion of search incident to arrest see infra § 5.1. See
generally infra ch. 5.
The plain view doctrine is an exception to the warrant requirement
that applies after police lawfully invade an area where there is a reason-
[Vol. 28:467
Washington Search & Seizure
able expectation of privacy. Myers, 117 Wn.2d at 345-46. The plain
view doctrine requires that the officers (1) have prior justification for the
intrusion, and (2) immediately recognize they have found contraband. Id.
Traditionally, inadvertent discovery was a third requirement. State v.
Hoggart, 108 Wn. App. 257, 271 n.32, 30 P.3d 488, 495 (2001). Inadver-
tent discovery is no longer required under the Fourth Amendment, see
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 140, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2309-10, 110
L. Ed. 2d 112, 125 (1990), and has never been explicitly required under
Article I, Section 7 of the Washington Constitution. State v. Goodin, 67
Wn. App. 623, 627-28, 838 P.2d 135, 138 (1992).
Under the plain view doctrine, officers have justification for seizing
contraband not specified in the warrant if it is found during the course of
a valid search and is within the scope of a valid warrant. Goodin, 67 Wn.
App. at 627; see also State v. Wright, 61 Wn. App. 819, 827, 810 P.2d
935, 939 (1991) (holding that a handgun discovered at the crime scene
was within the plain view exception). However, officers do not have jus-
tification under the plain view doctrine for seizing contraband discovered
during a general exploratory search after they have found what they
sought under the warrant. State v. Legas, 20 Wn. App. 535, 542, 581
P.2d 172, 176 (1978) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 466, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2038, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 583 (1971)) ("Plain
view doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search
from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges.").
The open view doctrine differs from the plain view doctrine in that
the open view doctrine applies when officers discover contraband from a
nonintrusive vantage point. State v. Dykstra, 84 Wn. App. 186, 191-92,
926 P.2d 929, 932 (1996). For example, a residential front porch may be
considered a nonintrusive vantage point if it has a "natural access route
to the residence and is impliedly open to the public." Rose, 128 Wn.2d at
391-92; see also Myers, 117 Wn.2d at 345 (holding that contraband was
in open view when police officers approached home in daylight by direct
access and spoke with occupant from porch and did not "spy" or act se-
cretively); State v. Seagull, 95 Wn.2d 898, 905, 632 P.2d 44, 48-49
(1981) (en bane) (holding that slight deviation from the most direct route
was not unreasonable intrusion on occupant's privacy). However, offi-
cers violate the open view exception when they intrude on the defen-
dant's reasonable expectation of privacy. State v. Daugherty, 94 Wn.2d
263, 266-67, 616 P.2d 649, 651 (1980) (en bane) (finding that a violation
occurred when officer questioned a suspect outside the residence and a
second officer walked around a vehicle in the driveway to look into an
obscure garage at the back of the lot).
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3.11 DELIVERING WARRANT AND INVENTORY: REQUIREMENTS FOR
EXECUTION OF WARRANTS
Statutes or court rules may impose requirements on the execution of
warrants beyond those mandated by the federal constitution. Washington
court rules provide:
The peace officer taking property under the warrant shall give to
the person from whom or from whose premises the property is
taken a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken.
If no such person is present, the officer may post a copy of the
search warrant and receipt. The return shall be made promptly
and shall be accompanied by a written inventory of any property
taken. The inventory shall be made in the presence of the person
from whose possession or premises the property is taken, or in
the presence of a least one person other than the officer. The
court shall upon request deliver a copy of the inventory to the
person from whom or from whose premises the property was
taken and to the applicant for the warrant.
Wash. CrR 2.3(d).
Although the rule requires that officers conducting a search provide
a resident with a copy of the warrant prior to commencing the search,
procedural noncompliance does not compel invalidation of an otherwise
sufficient warrant or suppression of the fruits of the search absent a
showing of prejudice. State v. Aase, 121 Wn. App. 558, 567, 89 P.3d
721, 726 (2004) (holding that several minute delay in provision of war-
rant to defendant resident did not require suppression under either federal
or state constitution or Wash. CrR 2.3(d)). The requirement that an in-
ventory be made in the presence of another person is designed to prevent
error in the inventory and is satisfied by the presence of another police
officer. State v. Wraspir, 20 Wn. App. 626, 628, 581 P.2d 182, 184
(1978).
Washington follows the majority rule that defects relating to the re-
turn of a search warrant are ministerial and do not compel invalidation of
the warrant, absent a showing of prejudice. State v. Smith, 15 Wn. App.
716, 719, 552 P.2d 1059, 1062 (1976). But see 2 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 4.12(c), at 819 (4th ed. 2004) (suggesting that if no
return was made, the search should be unconstitutional).
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3.12 CHALLENGING THE CONTENT OF AN AFFIDAVIT
3.12(a) Informant's Identity
Although a defendant is generally entitled to examine an affidavit
in order to challenge whether the warrant was issued on probable cause,
the court may excise portions of the affidavit that identify a confidential
or unnamed informant to protect the State's interest in maintaining the
confidentiality of such informants. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154,
171, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 2684, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667, 682 (1978); State v. Mathi-
esen, 27 Wn. App. 257, 260, 616 P.2d 1255, 1257 (1980); see Wash. CrR
4.7(f)(2) (State's insistence on an informant's secrecy is based on the
"informant's privilege," recognized by both statute and court rule); see
also RCW 5.60.060(5) ("A public officer shall not be examined as a wit-
ness as to communications made . . . in official confidence, when the
public interest would suffer by disclosure."). When the information is
secret, however, the defendant lacks access to the very information he or
she needs to challenge the veracity of an affidavit. State v. Casal, 103
Wn.2d 812, 818, 699 P.2d 1234, 1238 (1985) (en banc). Thus, "funda-
mental fairness" may require the disclosure of an informant's identity
when the informant's potential testimony at trial would be relevant to the
determination of the defendant's innocence. See Casal, 103 Wn.2d at
815-16 (citing Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 61, 77 S. Ct. 623,
628, 1 L. Ed. 2d 639, 645 (1957)). A defendant under these circum-
stances is entitled to an in camera hearing on the truthfulness of the in-
formant's information if the defendant "casts a reasonable doubt on the
veracity of material representations made by the affiant." State v. White,
50 Wn. App. 858, 865, 751 P.2d 1202, 1206 (1988) (quoting Casal, 103
Wn.2d at 820). All the defendant must show is a "minimal showing of
inconsistency." White, 50 Wn. App. at 865 (quoting United States v.
Brian, 507 F. Supp. 761, 766 (D. R.I. 1981)). Even so, "a Casal hearing
is required only whe[n] a search warrant affidavit contains no other inde-
pendent basis for establishing probable cause." White, 50 Wn. App. at
865 n.4.
When the defendant presents evidence that casts doubt on the ve-
racity of representations in the officer's affidavit and the officer has re-
lated information provided by a secret informant, the court, in its discre-
tion, may order an in camera hearing to examine the informant. Casal,
103 Wn.2d at 820-21. If the informant verifies the affiant's story and the
judge is convinced that probable cause existed, the informant's identity is
not to be disclosed. Id. at 822. But if the judge finds a substantial show-
ing of falsehood, an open evidentiary hearing is required. Id.
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3.12(b) Misrepresentations and Omissions in Affidavit
A defendant may challenge the validity of a warrant based on a
misrepresentation of fact in the supporting affidavit. Franks, 438 U.S. at
155-56, 98 S. Ct. at 2676, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 672. The defendant must first
make a substantial showing that a false statement in the affidavit (1) was
either made knowingly and intentionally or in reckless disregard for the
truth, and (2) was necessary or material to the finding of probable cause.
Id. at 155-56, 98 S. Ct. at 2676, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 668-69; State v. Garri-
son, 118 Wn.2d 870, 872, 827 P.2d 1388, 1389-90 (1992) (per curiam).
The Franks test also applies to allegations of material omissions. State v.
Cord, 103 Wn.2d 361, 367, 693 P.2d 81, 85 (1985) (en banc). The sub-
stantial showing must be based on specific facts and offers of proof
rather than on conclusory assertions. Garrison, 118 Wn.2d at 872. "'Al-
legations of negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient."' State v.
Seagull, 95 Wn.2d 898, 908, 632 P.2d 44, 50 (1981) (quoting Franks,
438 U.S. at 171, 98 S. Ct. at 2684, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 682); State v. Olson,
74 Wn. App. 126, 131-32, 872 P.2d 64, 68 (1994); State v. Taylor, 74
Wn. App. 111, 116, 872 P.2d 53, 56 (1994).
If the defendant fails to meet these formidable preconditions, the
inquiry ends. State v. Jackson, 111 Wn. App. 660, 677, 46 P.3d 257,
266-67 (2002). But if the defendant is successful in proving the truth of
his allegations and the false statements or omitted material is relevant to
the establishment of probable cause, the affidavit must be examined.
Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72, 98 S. Ct. at 2684-85, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 682;
Garrison, 118 Wn.2d at 873. Once false statements are deleted or the
omissions are inserted into the affidavit, the defendant's motion to sup-
press fails and no hearing is required if the affidavit then supports a find-
ing of probable cause. Garrison, 118 Wn.2d at 873. However, if the
modified affidavit is insufficient to support a finding of probable cause,
the defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing under the Fourth
Amendment. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72, 98 S. Ct. at 2684-85, 57 L.
Ed. 2d at 682; Garrison, 118 Wn.2d at 873.
3.13 SPECIAL SITUATIONS
3.13(a) First Amendment Limitations
The Fourth Amendment requirement of particularity in the descrip-
tion of items to be seized is afforded its most scrupulous enforcement
when the items implicate First Amendment rights, such as in the case of
literature, pictures, films, and recordings. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S.
476, 485, 85 S. Ct. 506, 511, 13 L. Ed. 2d 431, 437 (1965); State v. Per-
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rone, 119 Wn.2d 538, 547-48, 834 P.2d 611, 616 (1992). Furthermore,
"the constitutional requirement that warrants must particularly describe
the 'things to be seized' is to be accorded the most scrupulous exactitude
when the 'things' are books, and the basis for their seizure is the ideas
[that] they contain." Stanford, 379 U.S. at 485, 85 S. Ct. at 511-12, 13 L.
Ed. 2d at 437; State v. J-R Distrib., Inc., 111 Wn.2d 764, 774, 765 P.2d
281, 286 (1988) (en banc). When the First Amendment is involved, noth-
ing should be left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.
Stanford, 379 U.S. at 485, 85 S. Ct. at 512, 13 L. Ed. 2d at 437.
Thus, a warrant that commands the executing officer to seize
"books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures,
recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist
Party of Texas," fails the scrupulous exactitude requirement of the
Fourth Amendment. Stanford, 379 U.S. at 478, 85 S. Ct. at 508, 13 L.
Ed. 2d at 433 (holding that a general search for objectionable publica-
tions was constitutionally intolerable).
However, the scrupulous exactitude standard has not been extended
to all searches and seizures involving the First Amendment. State v. Wal-
ter, 66 Wn. App. 862, 869, 833 P.2d 440, 444 (1992) (per curiam) (de-
termining that greater scrutiny was not required merely because photo-
graphs were involved); see also New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S.
868, 875, 106 S. Ct. 1610, 1615, 89 L. Ed. 2d 871, 880 (1986) (rejecting
contention that more than warrant was required to seize photographs
from newspaper office); Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 490, 93 S. Ct.
2789, 2793, 37 L. Ed. 2d 745, 752-53 (1973) (holding that the First
Amendment does not require a hearing prior to seizure of a film so long
as the seizure does not prevent the film from being exhibited).
The scrupulous exactitude standard is typically triggered when the
warrant commands the seizure of allegedly obscene material. See Per-
rone, 119 Wn.2d at 553; see also Furfaro v. Seattle, 97 Wn. App. 537,
984 P.2d 1055 (1999) (holding that, because topless entertainment is en-
titled to some degree of constitutional protection under the First
Amendment, the determination of probable cause to arrest stage dancers
is like the determination of probable cause to seize books and films, thus
calling for sensitive discernment and a warrant prior to arresting such
entertainers under non-exigent circumstances); see also 2 Wayne R. La-
Fave, Search and Seizure § 4.6(e), at 638-41 (4th ed. 2004). Clearly, a
warrant authorizing the seizure of material that the executing officer
deems to be "child pornography" provides the executing officer broad
discretion and therefore violates the Fourth Amendment and the scrupu-
lous exactitude standard. Perrone, 119 Wn.2d at 553. "Rather, what is
required is a description of these materials by title or similar identifying
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characteristic, or by a specific statement as to the type of contents [that]
would render the materials presumptively obscene." 2 LaFave, supra, §
4.6(e), at 640.
3.13(b) Intrusions into the Body
In 1952, the United States Supreme Court considered whether a
physical intrusion into a person's body violates due process and deter-
mined that due process is violated if the intrusion "shocks the con-
science." Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 72 S. Ct. 205, 209, 96
L. Ed. 183, 190 (1952) (concluding that stomach pumping without a war-
rant to obtain evidence violated due process). Subsequent to Rochin,
however, the Supreme Court reversed itself, and applied the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule to the states. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 657, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1692, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 1091 (1961). Conse-
quently, the Court has not relied on the Rochin "shocks the conscience"
standard exclusively but has instead applied a Fourth Amendment rea-
sonableness analysis in cases like Rochin that involve highly intrusive
searches and seizures. See generally United States v. Montoya de Her-
nandez, 473 U.S. 531, 105 S. Ct. 3304, 87 L. Ed. 2d 381 (1985); Winston
v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 105 S. Ct. 1611, 84 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1985); Schmer-
ber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 766-72, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1833-36, 16 L.
Ed. 2d 908, 917-20 (1966). Thus, for example, "[a] compelled surgical
intrusion into an individual's body for evidence implicates expectations
of privacy and security of such magnitude that the intrusion may be 'un-
reasonable' even if likely to produce evidence of a crime." Winston, 470
U.S. at 759, 105 S. Ct. at 1616, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 668. But see Schmerber,
384 U.S. at 770-72, 86 S. Ct. at 1835-36, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 916-20 (hold-
ing that blood alcohol content may be obtained under certain circum-
stances). An intrusion that is reasonable is one in which (1) there is a
clear indication, rather than a mere chance, that the intrusion will pro-
duce the desired evidence; (2) the intrusive procedure is reasonably
suited to obtaining the evidence, as for example, a blood test used for
determining blood alcohol levels; and (3) the intrusive procedure is per-
formed in a reasonable manner, as, for example, a blood test performed
by medical personnel rather than by officers at the station house. 2 La-
Fave, supra, § 4.1(e), at 458-59.
Thus, for example, taking a blood sample from a defendant charged
with negligent homicide is valid when the police have probable cause to
believe that evidence of intoxication will be found and that the test used
to measure blood alcohol content is reasonable and performed in a rea-
sonable manner. See RCW 46.20.308(3); State v. Curran, 116 Wn.2d
174, 185, 804 P.2d 558, 564 (1991) (en banc); see also State v. Kala-
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kosky, 121 Wn.2d 525, 532, 852 P.2d 1064, 1068 (1993) (en banc) (hold-
ing that valid search warrant based on probable cause is constitutionally
sufficient to obtain blood sample from suspect); State v. Komoto, 40 Wn.
App. 200, 208, 697 P.2d 1025, 1031 (1985) (holding that probable cause
is established if person appears intoxicated and intoxication is an element
of the crime for which the suspect is arrested).
Washington has also upheld mandatory blood testing in cases of pu-
tative fathers, see State v. Meacham, 93 Wn.2d 735, 739, 612 P.2d 795,
798 (1980) (en banc), and has upheld mandatory HIV and DNA testing
of convicted sexual offenders. See Kalakosky, 121 Wn.2d at 536 (holding
that mandatory HIV testing of sexual offenders presents a minimal
Fourth Amendment intrusion for which the State's reasons are compel-
ling). See also State v. Olivas, 122 Wn.2d 73, 93, 856 P.2d 1076, 1086
(1993) (en banc) (holding that statute requiring mandatory DNA testing
of convicted sexual offenders in order to establish DNA databank is con-
stitutionally permissible).
More intrusive procedures may be permitted in special environ-
ments such as prisons and jails. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 560,
99 S. Ct. 1861, 1885, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447, 482 (1979) (finding full body
cavity searches of prison inmates following contact visits not unreason-
able, even when searches are routine and not based on probable cause);
State v. Harris, 66 Wn. App. 636, 642, 833 P.2d 402, 405 (1992) (find-
ing exigent circumstances justified strip search of juvenile before place-
ment in holding cell when police had prior experience with gang mem-
bers taping razor blades to their skin). Similar intrusive procedures may
be allowed at borders. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537, 105
S. Ct. at 3308, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 388-89 (1985) (holding that suspect fitting
profile for alimentary canal drug smuggler may be subjected to rectal
cavity search when search warrant was based on profile and suspect's
unwillingness to eat, drink, or defecate during sixteen-hour confine-
ment). See generally infra §§ 6.2 (prisons), 6.3 (borders).
The Washington Constitution affords no greater protection to an ar-
restee for warrantless body strip searches than does the federal constitu-
tion. State v. Audley, 77 Wn. App. 897, 907, 894 P.2d 1359, 1364 (1995)
(finding warrantless strip search of arrestee in local detention center rea-
sonable when security needs of local jail outweighed privacy interest of
arrestee).
Other factors considered include whether the search is necessary for
a fair determination of the charges and whether opportunities for an ad-
versary hearing and interlocutory appellate review are available. See
Winston, 470 U.S. at 762, 105 S. Ct. at 1617-18, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 670
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(holding that the community's interest in determining the guilt or inno-
cence of a party is a balancing measure).
3.13(c) Warrants Directed at Nonsuspects
In 1978, the United States Supreme Court held that the Fourth
Amendment provides the same special protections against search and
seizure for the possessor of evidence who is not the suspect of a crime.
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 559-60, 98 S. Ct. 1970, 1978,
56 L. Ed. 2d 525, 537-38 (1978) (holding that probable cause to issue a
valid search warrant merely requires that officers demonstrate that the
fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of a crime be located on the prem-
ises to be searched). Critics have argued that a search warrant of a third
party is per se unreasonable and that a subpoena duces tecum can ade-
quately protect law enforcement interests. See Note, The Reasonableness
of Warranted Searches ofNonsuspect Third Parties, 44 Alb. L. Rev. 212,
232-35 (1979) (criticizing Zurcher for failing to adopt a less drastic al-
ternative or less intrusive practice test in Fourth Amendment cases).
In response to Zurcher, Congress enacted the Privacy Protection
Act of 1980 ("PPA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa-2000aa-12 (1994). See S.
Rep. No. 96-874, at 4 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3950,
3950. The PPA prohibits the government from searching or seizing any
work product material "possessed by a person reasonably believed to
have a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broad-
cast, or other similar form of public communication" without first issuing
a subpoena duces tecum. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a). The PPA "affords the
press and certain other persons not suspected of committing a crime with
protections not provided currently by the Fourth Amendment." S. Rep.
No. 96-874, at 4. Such protections of nonsuspects, however, has not been
extended outside the media. See United States v. Humphreys, 982 F.2d
254, 258 (8th Cir. 1992) (upholding a warrant to search an attorney's
office on probable cause that attorney was evading taxes); O'Connor v.
Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 1979) (en banc) (finding that the
protections of client confidentiality, attorney-client privilege, attorney
work product, and a criminal defendant's constitutional right to counsel
cannot keep enforcement officers from rummaging through documents in
search of items to be seized when such officers possess a warrant to
search an attorney's office). See generally 2 LaFave, supra, § 4.1(f)-(h).
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CHAPTER 4:
SEIZURE OF THE PERSON: ARRESTS AND STOP-AND-FRISKS
4.0 SEIZURE: INTRODUCTION
This chapter covers principles that are unique to seizure of the per-
son. Related issues are discussed supra ch. 2 (probable cause); supra §
3.7 (knock and announce); and infra § 5.1 (search incident to arrest).
Under the Fourth Amendment, a seizure occurs when an officer, by
physical force or by show of authority, restrains an individual's freedom
of movement. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553, 100
S. Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 509 (1980). Restraint amounting to
a seizure occurs when a reasonable person would not feel free to leave
the area. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1877, 20 L.
Ed. 2d 889, 903 (1968). This objective test considers the coercive effect
of the officer's conduct in the particular situation to determine the im-
pression conveyed to a reasonable person in a similar situation. See
Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573, 108 S. Ct. 1975, 1979, 100
L. Ed. 2d 565, 572 (1988).
In slight contrast to the Fourth Amendment, the Washington Con-
stitution has generally been interpreted as providing greater protection of
individual privacy interests. See State v. Young, 135 Wn.2d 510, 957
P.2d 681 (1998) (en banc). Under Article I, Section 7, a seizure occurs
when a reasonable person, under the totality of the circumstances, would
not feel free to either (1) leave or (2) decline the officer's requests, due to
an officer's use of force or display of authority. State v. Rankin, 151
Wn.2d 689, 695, 92 P.3d 202, 205 (2004) (en banc); State v. O'Neill, 148
Wn.2d 564, 574, 62 P.3d 489, 495 (2003) (en banc). Whether a reason-
able person would feel free to leave is not based on the defendant's be-
havior; rather, it is determined by objectively looking at the law en-
forcement officer's actions. Rankin, 151 Wn.2d at 695; O'Neill, 148
Wn.2d at 574 (citing State v. Young, 135 Wn.2d 498, 501, 957 P.2d 681,
682 (1998) (en banc)); see also State v. Hansen, 99 Wn. App. 575, 576,
994 P.2d 855, 856 (2000) (per curiam) (holding that handing defendant's
identification from one officer to another for the purpose of identification
does not amount to a seizure under the Fourth Amendment).
Specifically, a determination of whether a reasonable person would
feel free to leave is based on the officer's coercive conduct. See O'Neill,
148 Wn.2d at 574; see also State v. Knox, 86 Wn. App. 831, 839, 939
P.2d 710, 714 (1997). Coercive conduct is established by a series of acts,
rather than a single act, that conveys a seizure. See State v. Soto-Garcia,
68 Wn. App. 20, 25, 841 P.2d 1271, 1273 (1992) (finding that when offi-
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cer asked defendant both whether he had drugs on his person and
whether the officer could search him, the situation was of such a nature
as to prevent a reasonable person from feeling free to leave); cf State v.
Toney, 60 Wn. App. 804, 807-08, 810 P.2d 929, 931 (1991) (finding that
no seizure occurred because there was no evidence that the officer drove
aggressively or intentionally singled defendant out). In deciding whether
an individual has been seized, the relevant question is whether, under the
circumstances, police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable
person that he was not free to leave. State v. Avila-Avina, 99 Wn. App. 9,
14, 991 P.2d 720, 724 (2000) (finding that seizure occurred when defen-
dant voluntarily entered police car, which could not be opened from in-
side, and a police officer was either in the car or nearby at all times).
4.1 ARREST
Although a seizure restrains an individual's freedom of movement,
not all seizures amount to arrests. See State v. Lyons, 85 Wn. App. 268,
270, 932 P.2d 188, 189 (1997) (finding that investigative detention was
not transformed into an arrest when the investigating officer physically
restrained a suspect and stated that he was under arrest). For instance, a
seizure, but not necessarily an arrest, has taken place when a police offi-
cer asks an individual to step out of his or her car during a stop. See State
v. O'Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 581-82, 589, 62 P.3d 489, 499, 503 (2003)
(en banc) (finding that a police officer who shined a spotlight into a
parked car and asked the driver for identification did not seize defendant
until the officer asked him to exit the car because at that point a reason-
able person in defendant's shoes would not believe himself free to leave).
Thus, the relevant inquiry to determine whether a person is in custody is
whether a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have thought
he or she was in custody. See State v. Radka, 120 Wn. App. 43, 50, 83
P.3d 1038, 1041 (2004) (finding that no arrest occurred when suspect
was told he was under arrest and placed in back of patrol car, because
officer did not frisk or handcuff the suspect and officer allowed suspect
to make calls on his cell phone from the back of the police car); see also
State v. Rivard, 131 Wn.2d 63, 75, 929 P.2d 413, 419 (1997) (en banc)
(finding that no arrest occurred because defendant was not physically
apprehended, restrained, handcuffed, placed in a police vehicle, or ap-
proached by officers who had weapons drawn).
It is no defense to a criminal prosecution that a defendant was ille-
gally arrested. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444, 7 S. Ct. 225, 229, 30 L.
Ed. 421, 424 (1886); State v. Waters, 93 Wn. App. 969, 976, 971 P.2d
538, 542 (1999). However, the legality of the arrest affects the legality of
the searches and confessions taking place subsequent to the arrest, as
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well as the admissibility of evidence derived from the arrest. See gener-
ally infra ch. 7.
4.2 ARRESTS WITHOUT WARRANTS: PUBLIC VERSUS HOME ARRESTS
Arrests are not subject to the same strict warrant requirements as
searches, and an officer may make a warrantless felony arrest in a public
place even though he or she had time to obtain a warrant. See United
States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 422-23, 96 S. Ct. 820, 827-28, 46 L. Ed.
2d 598, 608-09 (1976); United States v. Gooch, 6 F.3d 673, 677 (9th Cir.
1993). Nonetheless, such arrests must still be supported by probable
cause. 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.1(b), 14-16 (4th ed.
2004). Probable cause is essentially defined as a reasonable belief of
guilt particularized to the person to be searched or seized. Maryland v.
Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371, 124 S. Ct. 795, 800, 157 L. Ed. 2d 769, 775
(2003). Probable cause, however, is not subject to calculation by formula
or by mathematical certainty. See State v. Morgan, 78 Wn. App. 208,
212, 896 P.2d 731, 733 (1995). Thus, a defendant is entitled to a prompt
judicial determination of probable cause. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103, 126, 95 S. Ct. 854, 869, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54, 72 (1975); see also infra §
4.5(c).
Although police may make a warrantless arrest in a public area, in
the absence of exigent circumstances they may not make a warrantless
arrest after a nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home. Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1381-82, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639,
652-53 (1980). Exigent circumstances exist when the time required to
obtain a warrant would result in the suspect's escape, injury to either the
officers or the public, or the destruction of evidence. See Gooch, 6 F.3d
at 679; State v. White, 129 Wn.2d 105, 112-13, 915 P.2d 1099, 1103
(1996) (en banc). Fact patterns constituting exigent circumstances are
described in detail, infra §§ 5.16-.20. See generally William C. Donnino
& Anthony J. Girese, Exigent Circumstances for a Warrantless Home
Arrest, 45 Alb. L. Rev. 90 (1980). The Payton prohibition on a war-
rantless, nonconsensual entry of a suspect's home has been applied to
several Washington cases, including White, 129 Wn.2d at 109 (declining
to extend Payton beyond the protection of the home), and State v. Grif-
fith, 61 Wn. App. 35, 41, 808 P.2d 1171, 1174 (1991) (finding war-
rantless arrest at suspect's home lawful due to exigent circumstances).
In Washington, the arrest of a suspect who is standing in the door-
way of his or her home is treated the same as an arrest in the home. See
State v. Solberg, 122 Wn.2d 688, 697, 861 P.2d 460, 465 (1993) (citing
State v. Holeman, 103 Wn.2d 426, 429, 693 P.2d 89, 91 (1985)). As
such, for Fourth Amendment purposes the location of the suspect, and
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not the location of the officer, is material to the issue of whether an arrest
occurs in the home. See Holeman, 103 Wn.2d at 429. Thus, an officer is
prohibited from arresting a suspect standing in the doorway of the home
without a warrant unless exigent circumstances exist. See Solberg, 122
Wn.2d at 697. However, an arrest of a suspect who is on a front porch, as
opposed to in the doorway, is considered a public arrest. See id. at 698
(stating that the "conclusion that a warrantless arrest on a porch is an il-
legal arrest conflicts with authority from other Washington decisions,
other jurisdictions, and scholarly comment").
Under the Fourth Amendment, police who make a warrantless ar-
rest outside an arrestee's home may then accompany the arrestee into his
or her home even if the arrestee, with the officer's consent, enters the
home for the purpose of obtaining identification. See Washington v.
Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 6-7, 102 S. Ct. 812, 817, 70 L. Ed. 2d 778, 785-
86 (1982) (finding risk of danger to officer and possibility of confeder-
ates' escape justified police officer's act of accompanying arrested per-
son into dwelling, and holding that police need no affirmative indication
of likelihood of danger or escape).
Washington, however, has rejected the bright-line rule that an offi-
cer may, in all circumstances, accompany an arrestee into the arrestee's
home. See State v. Chrisman, 100 Wn.2d 814, 820-21, 676 P.2d 419,
423 (1984) (en banc). Under Article I, Section 7, when a person is ar-
rested for a minor violation, the arresting officer may not follow the ar-
restee into his or her home unless the officer can reasonably conclude
that the officer's safety is endangered, that evidence might be destroyed,
or that escape is a strong possibility. See Gooch, 6 F.3d at 679; White,
129 Wn.2d at 112-13 (reiterating factors that constitute exigent circum-
stances). A police officer may accompany an arrestee into his or her resi-
dence without a warrant if the officer knows of specific, articulable facts
that indicate a threat to the officer's safety. State v. Wood, 45 Wn. App.
299, 308-09, 725 P.2d 435, 440 (1986) (finding that sufficient reason
existed to accompany the arrestee into residence for security purposes
when officer was executing an arrest warrant for a felony parole viola-
tion).
An officer may also enter a home without a warrant in response to a
medical emergency. State v. Schroeder, 109 Wn. App. 30, 39 n.6, 32
P.3d 1022, 1026 n.6 (2001). A warrantless search based on the emer-
gency exception is valid only if (1) the officer subjectively believed that
someone likely needed assistance for health or safety reasons; (2) a rea-
sonable person in the same situation would similarly believe that there
was a need for assistance; and (3) there was a reasonable basis to associ-
ate the need for assistance with the place searched. State v. Gibson, 104
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Wn. App. 792, 796-97, 17 P.3d 635, 637-38 (2001) (upholding arrest of
defendant under emergency exception to warrant requirement when offi-
cers called to the house secured the safety of the children but upon fur-
ther search of the house discovered defendant emptying bags of mari-
juana).
4.3 ARRESTS WITHOUT WARRANTS: FELONY VERSUS
MISDEMEANOR ARRESTS
4.3(a) Felony Arrest
This section discusses differences in the warrant requirements for
felony and misdemeanor arrests. For a discussion of custodial arrests for
misdemeanor offenses, see infra § 4.5(d). Under the common law stan-
dard and the Fourth Amendment, an officer's authority to make a war-
rantless arrest in public generally applies to felonies. See United States v.
Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 422-23, 96 S. Ct. 820, 827-28, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598,
608-09 (1976). While some states have placed restrictions on warrantless
felony arrests, Washington has codified the common law rule. RCW
10.31.100.
4.3(b) Misdemeanor Arrest
Under common law, an officer can make a warrantless arrest of a
person who breaches the peace. See Kalmas v. Wagner, 133 Wn.2d 210,
218, 943 P.2d 1369, 1373 (1997) (en banc) (citing Pavish v. Meyers, 129
Wn. 605, 606-07, 225 P. 633, 633-34 (1924)); 3 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 5.1(b), at 16 (4th ed. 2004). However, an officer's
authority to make such an arrest under the common law is not restricted
to offenses involving a breach of the peace. Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 327, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 1543, 149 L. Ed. 2d 549, 560
(2001). Thus, before making a warrantless misdemeanor arrest, an officer
must have probable cause to believe that a misdemeanor is being com-
mitted in his presence. State v. Thompson, 69 Wn. App. 436, 441, 848
P.2d 1317, 1320 (1993). The common law misdemeanor rule has not
been held to be constitutionally required, and many states have enacted
statutes applying the misdemeanor rule to felonies. See Watson, 423 U.S.
at 418-21, 96 S. Ct. at 825-27, 46 L. Ed. 2d at 606-08. Some states that
require warrants for misdemeanors have held that a statutory violation, as
opposed to a constitutional violation, is not grounds for the suppression
of evidence obtained as a result of the arrest. See, e.g., State v. Eubanks,
283 N.C. 556, 559-60, 196 S.E.2d 706, 708-09 (1973).
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Similarly, Washington permits an officer to make a warrantless
misdemeanor arrest when the offense is being committed, or has been
committed, in the officer's presence. RCW 10.31.100; State v. Green,
150 Wn.2d 740, 742, 82 P.3d 239, 240 (2004) (per curiam). However,
the statute sets out several exceptions that permit an officer to make a
warrantless misdemeanor arrest where the offense is not committed in
the officer's presence. RCW 10.31.100. An officer may make a war-
rantless misdemeanor arrest if the offense (1) involves criminal trespass,
physical harm, or the threat of physical harm to persons or property; (2)
is for possession of marijuana, or possession or consumption of alcohol
by a minor; (3) is for violation of a restraining order; (4) is witnessed by
another officer; or (5) is for one of a number of specified traffic offenses.
See id. But compare State ex rel. McDonald v. Whatcom County Dist.
Ct., 92 Wn.2d 35, 38, 593 P.2d 546, 547 (1979) (en banc) (holding that
an officer may not make an arrest at a location other than the accident
scene) with State v. Teuber, 19 Wn. App. 651, 654-55, 577 P.2d 147,
149-50 (1978) (holding that an officer may make lawful misdemeanor
arrest for offense committed four hours earlier when offense involves
physical harm to property).
The "in the presence" requirement of RCW 10.31.100 is satisfied
whenever the officer directly perceives facts permitting a reasonable in-
ference that a misdemeanor is being committed. See City of Snohomish v.
Swoboda, 1 Wn. App. 292, 295, 461 P.2d 546, 548-49 (1969). Questions
arise as to whether the officer must view all the elements of a crime and
as to what types of information may be used to fill in "gaps." Id. (finding
the "in the presence" requirement satisified when, as part of "sting" op-
eration, police officers observed a person, from 150 feet away, handing
an object to another, and holding that even though police could not posi-
tively identify the object, the nature of the operation permitted a reason-
able inference that the object was contraband); see also State v.
Silverman, 48 Wn.2d 198, 202-03, 292 P.2d 868, 870-71 (1956) (finding
the "in the presence" requirement satisfied for possession of obscene pic-
tures with intent to show them when officer entered establishment as
member of public and viewed "peep shows").
Originally, the misdemeanor offense of possessing or consuming
alcohol by a person under 21 years of age, RCW 66.44.270 (1955), was
not considered committed in an officer's presence if the officer did not
witness the person's ingestion of the alcohol. State v. Allen, 63 Wn. App.
623, 625, 821 P.2d 533, 534-35 (1991). However, the Washington Leg-
islature realized that such a requirement was problematic. Thus, in 1987,
the legislature amended RCW 66.44.270 to allow an officer to arrest a
person under the age of 21 for possessing or consuming alcohol if the
[Vol. 28:467
Washington Search & Seizure
officer had probable cause to believe that the person had alcohol or other
drugs in his system. See RCW 10.31.100; see State v. Preston, 66 Wn.
App. 494, 497-98, 832 P.2d 513, 515-16 (1992) (citing State v. Hor-
naday, 105 Wn.2d 120, 713 P.2d 71 (1986)). See generally 3 LaFave,
supra, § 5.1 (c) (discussing what constitutes "in the presence").
4.4 ARRESTS WITH WARRANTS
The principles governing the procurement and execution of search
warrants also apply to arrest warrants. See supra ch. 3; Wash. CrR 2.2;
RCW 10.31.030. Thus, an invalid warrant will not support an arrest. See
Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568-69, 91 S. Ct. 1031, 1037, 28 L.
Ed. 2d 306, 313 (1971); 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure §
5.1 (h), at 64-65 (4th ed. 2004).
A seizure is lawful if an officer has reasonably articulable grounds
to believe that the suspect is the intended arrestee named in the warrant.
State v. Smith, 102 Wn.2d 449, 453-54, 688 P.2d 146, 149 (1984) (en
banc). If doubt arises as to identity, the officer is expected to immedi-
ately take reasonable steps to confirm or deny that the warrant applies to
the person being held. Id. at 454. The initial arrest, however, must be
based on more than the individual's similarity to the general physical
description set forth in the warrant. See Smith, 102 Wn.2d at 454 (apply-
ing the test articulated in Sanders v. United States, 339 A.2d 373, 379
(D.C. Cir. 1975), and finding seizure of"chako sticks" unlawful).
Under statutory law in Washington, a person arrested under the au-
thority of a warrant must first be read the warrant and, if the person
wishes to deposit bail, taken without delay before a judge. RCW
10.31.030; State v. Caldera, 84 Wn. App. 527, 528, 929 P.2d 482, 482
(1997) (per curiam) (finding the search of two defendants who were
searched prior to being read the warrant or taken before a judge to de-
posit bail illegal).
4.5 ARRESTS: MISCELLANEOUS REQUIREMENTS
4.5(a) Use of Force
Under traditional common law, an officer was permitted to use rea-
sonable force to make an arrest, and the officer could use deadly force if
such force reasonably appeared necessary to prevent a suspect's escape
from a felony arrest. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 13-15, 105 S.
Ct. 1694, 1702-03, 85 L. Ed. 2d 1, 10-12 (1985). The common law rule
has been restricted, however, and an arresting officer may use deadly
force only when he or she "has probable cause to believe that the suspect
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poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer
or others." Id. at 11, 105 S. Ct. at 1696-97, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 3 (holding
that police were not permitted to shoot unarmed, fleeing burglary sus-
pect).
In Washington, the amount of force an officer may use is governed
by statute to the extent that the statute is consistent with Garner. See,
e.g., RCW 10.31.050 ("If after notice of the intention to arrest the defen-
dant, he either flee[s] or forcibly resist[s], the officer may use all neces-
sary means to effect the arrest."); RCW 9A. 16.040 (listing specific situa-
tions in which officer is justified in using deadly force).
In a Washington case decided before Garner, the court upheld the
use of a chokehold to prevent destruction of evidence even though the
officers did not fear harm to themselves or to the public. See State v. Ta-
plin, 36 Wn. App. 664, 666, 676 P.2d 504, 506 (1984) (finding that
chokehold used to prevent defendant from swallowing balloons sus-
pected of containing heroin did not violate due process or Fourth
Amendment rights because defendant was capable of breathing when
chokehold was applied); cf infra §§ 5.2(a), 5.18(a). The legislature spe-
cifically limited the use of deadly force under RCW 9A.16.040(1)(c) to
instances in which the officer has "probable cause to believe that the sus-
pect, if not apprehended, poses a threat of serious physical harm to the
officer or ... others." RCW 9A. 16.040(2). The use of deadly force by a
public officer is justified "when necessar[y] ... to overcome actual resis-
tance to the execution of the legal process ... or in the discharge of a
legal duty." RCW 9A.16.040(1)(b). In particular, deadly force is justified
when either a public officer or a person acting under his command and in
the officer's aid assists the officer by:
i) arrest[ing] or apprehend[ing] a person who the officer reasonably
believes has committed, has attempted to commit, is committing, or
is attempting to commit a felony;
ii) prevent[ing] the escape of a person from a federal or state correc-
tional facility or in retak[ing] a person who escapes from such a fa-
cility; or
iii) prevent[ing] the escape of a person from a county or city jail...
if the person has been arrested for, charged with, or convicted of a
felony; or
iv) lawfully suppress[ing] a riot if the actor or another participant is
armed with a deadly weapon.
RCW 9A. 16.040(1)(c).
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In construing a prior statute, the Washington Supreme Court held
that deadly force may be used even when a felony has not in fact oc-
curred so long as the officer reasonably believes that a felony has been
committed. See Reese v. Seattle, 81 Wn.2d 374, 379-80, 503 P.2d 64,
69-70 (1972) (en banc). In Reese, the court stated that "[g]reat caution
must be exercised by an officer in the use of deadly force and it must be
resorted to by an officer only when all other reasonable efforts to appre-
hend a person fleeing from a lawful arrest for a felony have failed." Id. at
382-83 (emphasis in original). In light of Garner and amendments to
RCW 10.31.050, an officer must show probable cause, rather than
merely reasonable cause. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 13-15, 105 S. Ct. at
1702-03, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 10-12; see also RCW 10.31.050.
4.5(b) Significance of Booking and Crime Charged.
Pretextual Arrests
Courts differ as to the significance of a suspect being booked for
one offense yet being formally charged with another. Conflicting consid-
erations underlie the decisions. On the one hand, if the booking and for-
mal charges need not be similar, police can use an arrest as a pretext for
detaining a suspect for questioning about an unrelated crime for which
the police lack probable cause. On the other hand, at the time police first
establish probable cause for one crime, they may not possess sufficient
information to establish probable cause for another. See generally 3
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.1 (e) (4th ed. 2004). In Wash-
ington, the formal charge may differ from the booking charge. See State
v. Teuber, 19 Wn. App. 651, 655-56, 577 P.2d 147, 150 (1978). The
booking charge has no significance after a formal charge has been
lodged, and booking "for investigation" is permissible provided that
probable cause for an arrest on any charge is present. See State v.
Thompson, 58 Wn.2d 598, 606-07, 364 P.2d 527, 532 (1961) (en banc).
When a suspect is arrested for a misdemeanor not committed in the
officer's presence, the arrest is not illegal if the arresting officer has
knowledge of a felony for which the suspect could have been arrested.
See State v. Stebbins, 47 Wn. App. 482, 485, 735 P.2d 1353, 1355
(1987).
4.5(c) Judicial Review
A person arrested without a warrant is entitled to a post-arrest prob-
able cause determination. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114, 95 S. Ct.
854, 863, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54, 65 (1975) ("Once the suspect is in custody...
the reasons that justify dispensing with the magistrate's neutral judgment
evaporate."). A neutral and detached magistrate must make the probable
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cause determination, but the hearing may be ex pane. See id. at 119-23,
95 S. Ct. at 865-68, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 68-7 1.
Courts have not resolved the issue of whether a violation of the
Gerstein rule requires suppression of evidence seized after the arrest. See
3 LaFave, supra, § 5.1 (g), at 62-64; see also Williams v. State, 264 Ind.
664, 669-70, 348 N.E.2d 623, 627-28 (1976) (suppressing defendant's
voluntary confession when, following probable cause arrest, defendant
was held for eight days without judicial determination of probable cause
and confession was made during that detention).
4.5(d) Custodial Arrests for Minor Offenses
Until the last decade, a question remained as to whether the Fourth
Amendment imposes some limits on the making of arrests, such as the
need for actual custody, aside from the probable cause requirement. 3
LaFave, supra, § 5.1(i), at 77-78. During that time, some lower courts
supported the proposition that an arrest may be "unreasonable" in the
Fourth Amendment sense because of an absence of a need for custody.
Id. In 2001, however, the United States Supreme Court held that "[i]f an
officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed
even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without vio-
lating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender." Atwater v. City of
Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354-55, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 1557, 149 L. Ed. 2d
549, 577 (2001) (upholding the arrest of an individual for failing to se-
cure herself and her children with safety belts).
State law may still provide greater protection to its citizens for mi-
nor offenses than does the Fourth Amendment. For example, the Wash-
ington Court of Appeals has noted Atwater's bright-line rule but stated
that because of the state's additional protection of privacy rights, Wash-
ington courts must draw the line differently than the United States Su-
preme Court. State v. Pulfrey, 120 Wn. App. 270, 283, 86 P.3d 790, 797
(2004), rev. granted, 152 Wn.2d 1021, 101 P.3d 108 (2004). Yet the
court in Pulfrey noted that current Washington Supreme Court jurispru-
dence provided that no additional justification beyond probable cause
need be shown where custodial arrest is authorized by statute. Id.
When civil proceedings, as opposed to criminal proceedings are in-
volved, custodial arrests may be improper. The Washington Supreme
Court has held a statute unconstitutional that authorized the custodial
arrest of any person against whom a paternity complaint is filed. See
State v. Klinker, 85 Wn.2d 509, 524, 537 P.2d 268, 279 (1975) (en banc).
Thus, in the absence of a contrary showing, the usual summons and
complaint procedure for civil cases is deemed adequate for securing the
defendant's presence at trial. See id. at 522. However, criminal cases are
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treated differently because the public interest in restraining the defendant
is greater. See id. at 520.
Under Washington law, "as a matter of public policy . . . custodial
arrest for minor traffic violations is unjustified, unwarranted, and imper-
missible if the defendant signs [a] promise to appear" in court. State v.
Hehman, 90 Wn.2d 45, 47, 578 P.2d 527, 528 (1978) (en banc); see 3
LaFave, supra, § 5.2(g), at 122-23 n.135. In one case, the Washington
Supreme Court held that an officer was prohibited from making a custo-
dial arrest for a minor traffic violation unless the officer had "other rea-
sonable grounds [for the arrest] apart from the minor traffic violation
itself." Hehman, 90 Wn.2d at 50. See also State v. Reichenbach, 153
Wn.2d 126, 135-36, 101 P.3d 80, 87 (2004) (finding arrest of passenger
in informant's vehicle invalid because police lacked a warrant or prob-
able cause, and the scope of the informant's consent to search the vehicle
did not extend to the passenger). In 1979, the Washington Legislature
amended RCW 46.64.015 to clarify when an officer must issue a citation
and when an officer may arrest without a warrant. See State v. Reding,
119 Wn.2d 685, 689, 835 P.2d 1019, 1021 (1992) (en banc). Under the
amended statute, custodial arrests for minor traffic violations are limited
to situations involving specific statutory violations, a defendant's refusal
to sign a promise to appear, and nonresident arrestees. See State v.
Radka, 120 Wn. App. 43, 48, 83 P.3d 1038, 1040 (2004).
Custodial arrests are permissible, however, for non-minor offenses,
such as reckless driving. See Reding, 119 Wn.2d at 688. Furthermore, a
custodial arrest is not inappropriate merely because the offense is traffic-
related. See State v. Carner, 28 Wn. App. 439, 444, 624 P.2d 204, 207
(1981) (finding arrest proper when minor tried to evade police on his
motorcycle); ef RCW 46.64.015 (police may detain suspect who refuses
to sign a promise to appear in court).
A police officer may make a custodial arrest for a traffic violation
when the violation is a crime rather than merely a traffic infraction, or
when the circumstances surrounding the arrest dictate transferring the
violator to another location for completion of the arrest process. See State
v. LaTourette, 49 Wn. App. 119, 125, 741 P.2d 1033, 1036 (1987) (find-
ing that officers' decision to move arrestee to another location to com-
plete arrest for reckless driving was proper when hostile crowd gathered
in parking lot); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 756-64, 104
S. Ct. 2091, 2101-04, 80 L. Ed. 2d 732, 747-52 (1984) (White, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that State acted within its proper police power in deal-
ing with perceived seriousness of drunk driving when it enacted a statute
permitting a warrantless arrest for the misdemeanor); State v. McIntosh,
42 Wn. App. 573, 576, 712 P.2d 319, 321 (1986) (finding arrest justified
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when arrestee for misdemeanor traffic violation had no identification, did
not claim to own the vehicle he was driving, and related a suspicious ac-
count of his activities).
Washington further distinguishes custodial and non-custodial ar-
rests by allowing searches incident to arrest only in the case of a custo-
dial arrest. See State v. Craig, 115 Wn. App. 191, 194-95, 61 P.3d 340,
341-42 (2002) (finding search valid based on custodial nature of arrest);
State v. McKenna, 91 Wn. App. 554, 561-63, 958 P.2d 1017, 1021-23
(1998) (finding search invalid because it was done after suspect had been
released from arrest for a nonviolent misdemeanor).
4.6 STOP-AND-FRISK: INTRODUCTION
Police investigatory stops that fall short of arrests may be based on
proof less than probable cause. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.
Ct. 1868, 1883, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 909 (1968). Although these brief de-
tentions, known as "Terry stops," fall within the scope of the Fourth
Amendment, the public interest in crime detection and the relative nonin-
trusiveness of the stop permit a lower standard of proof. See id. at 20-27,
88 S. Ct. at 1879-83, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 905-09. Thus, the investigatory
stop is tested against the Fourth Amendment's general proscription of
unreasonable searches and seizures rather than the Amendment's prob-
able cause requirement. See id. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1879, 20 L. Ed. 2d at
905.
Regardless whether Article I, Section 7 of the Washington Consti-
tution or Fourth Amendment protection is at issue, for a seizure to be
permissible, an officer must have "specific and articulable facts giving
rise to a reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is, or is about to be,
engaged in criminal activity." Id. at 22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880, 20 L. Ed. 2d at
906. Under the Fourth Amendment, reasonable suspicion is not based on
the officer's subjective belief, but on an objective view of all of the facts.
See id. However, under Article I, Section 7 of the Washington Constitu-
tion, reasonable suspicion requires consideration of the totality of the
circumstances, including the officer's subjective belief. See State v. Lad-
son, 138 Wn.2d 343, 358-59, 979 P.2d 833, 843 (1999) (en banc). See
generally supra § 2.9(b).
Once an officer possesses a reasonable suspicion, he or she may
forcibly stop the suspect, but the stop must be a more limited intrusion
than an arrest. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209, 99 S. Ct.
2248, 2255, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824, 834 (1979). The reasonableness of the of-
ficer's conduct may be determined by the circumstances of the stop, in-
cluding whether the officer was following standard procedures or routine
practices in effecting the stop. State v. Chapin, 75 Wn. App. 460, 468,
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879 P.2d 300, 305 (1994). Further, an investigatory stop will be held
"reasonable" when "the limited violation of individual privacy" is out-
weighed by the public's "interests in crime prevention and detection."
Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 209, 99 S. Ct. at 2255, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 834. Al-
though a balancing test determines the permissible scope of a stop, once
an intrusion is substantial enough to constitute an arrest, probable cause
is necessary regardless of how substantial the public's interest may be.
See id. at 212-16, 99 S. Ct. at 2256-58, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 835-38 (holding
that custodial detention requires probable cause even when charges not
filed and suspect not told that he is under arrest). But cf United States v.
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 105 S. Ct. 3304, 87 L. Ed. 2d 381
(1985) (finding special governmental interest in detaining smugglers at
border justified holding suspect 16 hours based on reasonable suspicion
of transporting contraband); see also infra § 6.3.
Reasonable suspicion justifying an investigatory stop may ripen
into probable cause for arrest if the totality of the circumstances would
lead a reasonably cautious and prudent police officer with the arresting
officer's experience to believe that the suspect had committed a crime.
State v. McIntosh, 42 Wn. App. 579, 583-84, 712 P.2d 323, 326 (1986)
(holding that suspect's inability to give rational account of appearance
and presence in a high burglary area late at night, absence of identifica-
tion, and presence of what appeared to be burglar's tools gave rise to
probable cause to arrest); State v. Crane, 105 Wn. App. 301, 310, 19
P.3d 1100, 1105-06 (2001) (holding that suspect's action of approaching
a house for which police were in the process of obtaining a search war-
rant and suspect's lack of identification did not ripen into probable cause
such that officer could run a warrant check on the suspect). A temporary
seizure of a suspect that falls short of an arrest does not require that the
officer give the suspect a Miranda warning because a Terry stop is not a
custodial interrogation. State v. King, 89 Wn. App. 612, 624-25, 949
P.2d 856, 863 (1998). However, if the officer's suspicion ripens into
probable cause for arrest, a Miranda warning must be given. State v.
Mercer, 45 Wn. App. 769, 777, 727 P.2d 676, 682 (1986); see also State
v. Cameron, 47 Wn. App. 878, 885-86, 737 P.2d 688, 692 (1987); State
v. Marshall, 47 Wn. App. 322, 324-25, 737 P.2d 265, 267 (1987).
Terry stops are permitted both to prevent ongoing or future criminal
activity and to investigate completed crimes. See United States v.
Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 227, 105 S. Ct. 675, 679-80, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604,
611 (1985). For a discussion of the use of the reasonable suspicion stan-
dard in special environments, see infra §§ 6.1 (schools) and 6.3 (bor-
ders). See generally Peter Preiser, Confrontations Initiated by Police on
Less Than Probable Cause, 45 Alb. L. Rev. 57 (1980); 4 Wayne R. La-
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Fave, Search and Seizure §§ 9.3(b) (routine traffic stops), 9.7 (road-
blocks), 9.8 (other brief detentions) (4th ed. 2004).
4.7 SATISFYING THE REASONABLE SUSPICION STANDARD
4.7(a) Factual Basis and Individualized Suspicion
The reasonable suspicion standard requires the officer's belief to be
based on objective facts. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 99 S. Ct.
2637, 2640, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 362 (1979). See also State v. Perea, 85
Wn. App. 339, 341-42, 932 P.2d 1258, 1259-60 (1997); State v. Seitz,
86 Wn. App. 865, 869-70, 941 P.2d 5, 8 (1997). The facts must be both
"specific and articulable"; thus, an "inarticulate hunch" is not sufficient.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889,
906 (1968); State v. Thompson, 93 Wn.2d 838, 842, 613 P.2d 525, 527
(1980); see also Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 6, 105 S. Ct. 308, 311,
83 L. Ed. 2d 165, 171 (1984) (per curiam); United States v. Cortez, 449
U.S. 411, 418, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621, 629 (1981). As a
result of his or her experience, however, an officer may be able to per-
ceive a reasonable suspicion in conduct that an ordinary citizen would
consider to be innocent. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
873, 884-85, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 2582, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607, 618-19 (1975); see
also State v. Rice, 59 Wn. App. 23, 28-29, 795 P.2d 739, 741-42 (1990)
(holding that an officer's experience will be considered when determin-
ing whether suspicion of wrongdoing was justified).
Individualized suspicion is generally required for a Terry stop.
Brown, 443 U.S. at 51, 99 S. Ct. at 2640-44, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 362; State v.
Kennedy, 38 Wn. App. 41, 45-46, 684 P.2d 1326, 1329 (1984); see also
State v. Byrd, 110 Wn. App. 259, 264, 39 P.3d 1010, 1013-14 (2002)
(finding stopping a vehicle solely to determine the validity of the trip
permit invalid); State v. Penfield, 106 Wn. App. 157, 162-63, 22 P.3d
293, 295-96 (2001) (finding that officer who stopped vehicle without
any articulable suspicion of criminal activity on the part of the male
driver could not lawfully ask male driver to identify himself when basis
for stop was license suspension of female who was the vehicle's regis-
tered owner).
There are, however, several exceptions. For example, in some cir-
cumstances a stop may be based on less than individualized suspicion
when "carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limita-
tions on the conduct of individual officers." Brown, 443 U.S. at 51, 99 S.
Ct. at 2640, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 362. Border checkpoints may constitute such
a circumstance. See infra § 6.3. When individualized suspicion is lack-
ing, however, officer discretion must be limited. For example, police of-
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ficers stopping vehicles for driver's license and vehicle registration
checks may not select the vehicles at random, Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 663, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1401, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 673-74 (1979);
see also State v. Thorp, 71 Wn. App. 175, 181-82, 856 P.2d 1123, 1127
(1993) (holding that officers who lack probable cause or a reasonable
suspicion may not randomly stop moving vehicles for questioning). For a
checkpoint program to be upheld, it must be primarily designed to serve
a purpose closely related to the identified problem; a program designed
to uncover ordinary criminal wrongdoing violates the Fourth Amend-
ment. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41-42, 121 S. Ct.
447, 454, 148 L. Ed. 2d 333, 343-44 (2000). For a discussion of stops
not requiring individualized suspicion, see infra §§ 6.3 (stops at or near
borders) and 5.24 (vehicle spot checks).
4. 7(b) Particular Applications: Informants
When stops are based on information provided by informants, the
information does not have to meet the same criteria required for probable
cause. See, e.g., Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147, 92 S. Ct. 1921,
1924, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612, 617 (1972). See generally supra §2.5. The in-
formation must, however, carry some "indicia of reliability." Adams, 407
U.S. at 147, 92 S. Ct. at 1924, 32 L. Ed. 2d at 617 (finding sufficient in-
dicia when the informant was known personally to the officer and had
provided information in the past). For a discussion of cases surrounding
Adams, see generally 4 LaFave, supra, § 9.4. See also United States v.
Butler, 74 F.3d 916, 920-21 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that detailed infor-
mation provided by the informant plus independent observations by the
officers involved were sufficient indicia of reliability to justify stop);
State v. Conner, 58 Wn. App. 90, 95, 791 P.2d 261, 263 (1990) (holding
that a stop based solely on information provided by an informant is im-
permissible absent either (1) circumstances suggesting the informant's
reliability or (2) some corroborative observation suggesting either the
presence of criminal activity or that the information was reliable).
In Washington, police must have some reason to believe that an in-
formant is reliable and possesses "[s]ome underlying factual justification
for the informant's conclusion" that a crime is being committed. State v.
Sieler, 95 Wn.2d 43, 48, 621 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1980) (en banc). One rea-
son for this is that individuals' positions as informants inherently affects
their reliability. See State v. Garcia, 125 Wn.2d 239, 242, 883 P.2d 1369,
1370 (1994) (en banc) (holding that information provided by a citizen
does not require a showing of the same degree of reliability as an infor-
mant because a citizen is not a "professional" informant).
20051
Seattle University Law Review
No reliability may be inferred from an anonymous informant or
from a named but unknown telephone informant, nor may the basis for
the informant's knowledge be inferred from conclusory allegations. Id.
Conclusory allegations may be sufficient, however, when independent
police observations corroborate the presence of criminal activity or the
reliability of the manner in which the information was obtained. See id.;
see also State v. Lesnick, 84 Wn.2d 940, 944, 530 P.2d 243, 246 (1975)
(en banc); State v. Kennedy, 38 Wn. App. 41, 45-46, 684 P.2d 1326,
1329 (1984); State v. Sykes, 27 Wn. App. 111, 115-16, 615 P.2d 1345,
1347-48 (1980); State v. McCord, 19 Wn. App. 250, 254-55, 576 P.2d
892, 895 (1978).
An informant's tip may be sufficiently reliable to support a stop
even when it would not support an arrest. See, e.g., State v. Moreno, 21
Wn. App. 430, 436-37, 585 P.2d 481, 485 (1978) (finding cause to stop,
but not to arrest, when defendant arrived on flight specified by anony-
mous informant); State v. Chatmon, 9 Wn. App. 741, 748-49, 515 P.2d
530, 535 (1973) (finding a subsequent search invalid, not for officer's
failure to 1) establish an anonymous informant's reliability; 2) obtain a
description of the informant; or 3) failing to learn the informant's pur-
pose for being at scene of crime and reason for wanting to remain
anonymous, but rather because circumstances did not indicate probable
cause).
Police may also make a Terry stop on the basis of information pro-
vided by other divisions or agencies. See United States v. Hensley, 469
U.S. 221, 230, 105 S. Ct. 675, 681, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604, 613 (1985); see
also Butler, 74 F.3d at 921 (noting probable cause may be demonstrated
through the collective knowledge of the officers involved in an investiga-
tion). Furthermore, the "fellow officer" rule justifies an arrest on the ba-
sis of a police bulletin, such as a hot sheet, as long as the issuing agency
has sufficient information for probable cause. See Whiteley v. Warden,
Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 568, 91 S. Ct. 1031, 1037, 28
L. Ed. 2d 306, 313 (1971). The collective knowledge of law enforcement
agencies that gives rise to a dispatch will be imputed to officers who act
on it. State v. O'Cain, 108 Wn. App. 542, 544-45, 31 P.3d 733, 734
(2001). However, if the seizure is later challenged in court, the State
must prove that the dispatch was based on a sufficient factual foundation
to justify the stop at issue. Id. Consequently, if the issuing agency lacks
probable cause, so does the arresting officer. State v. Mance, 82 Wn.
App. 539, 542, 918 P.2d 527, 529 (1996). Further, an investigatory stop
may be based on information provided by other police agencies regard-
ing a completed crime so long as the length and the intrusiveness of the
detention do not exceed that which would have been effected by the po-
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lice agency providing the information. State v. Dorsey, 40 Wn. App. 459,
470, 698 P.2d 1109, 1115-16 (1985).
Some surrounding circumstances decrease the required level of re-
liability, however. For example, the Washington Supreme Court has sug-
gested that when the tip involves a serious crime, less reliability is re-
quired for a stop than is required in other circumstances. Sieler, 95
Wn.2d at 50; Lesnick, 84 Wn.2d at 944-45. See 4 LaFave, supra, §
9.5(h), at 591-94, for a discussion of State v. Lesnick. Another factor that
bears on the reasonableness of a police officer's temporary investigatory
detention of the suspect is potential danger. State v. Franklin, 41 Wn.
App. 409, 413, 704 P.2d 666, 669 (1985) (finding an investigatory stop
justified when an anonymous informant observed a person displaying a
gun in a public restroom and a police officer verified the informant's re-
port of the person's attire and location). The need for immediate police
action may outweigh concerns about the reliability of an unknown in-
formant. Id.
4.7(c) Particular Applications: Nature of the Offense
Terry stops have been upheld for offenses ranging from aggravated
robbery, United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 105 S. Ct. 675, 83 L.
Ed. 2d 604 (1985), to possession of narcotics, Adams v. Williams, 407
U.S. 143, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1972). A non-traffic, civil
infraction is insufficient to justify a Terry stop. State v. Duncan, 146
Wn.2d 166, 175, 43 P.3d 513, 517 (2002) (en banc) (declining to extend
Terry to general, nontraffic civil infractions). For arguments that Terry
stops should be limited to investigations of serious offenses, see Adams,
407 U.S. at 151-53, 92 S. Ct. at 1926-27, 32 L. Ed. 2d at 619-21 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). See generally 4 LaFave, supra, § 9.2(c); cf State v.
Moreno, 21 Wn. App. at 434 (characterizing possession of narcotics as a
"serious" offense).
4.7(d) Examples of Satisfying or Failing to Satisfy the
Reasonable Suspicion Standard
The mere fact that a suspect is in a high crime area will not justify a
stop. Brown, 443 U.S. at 52, 99 S. Ct. at 2641, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 362-63;
see also State v. Barber, 118 Wn.2d 335, 346, 823 P.2d 1068, 1075
(1992) (en banc) (holding that a person of a specific race being "out of
place" in a particular geographic area can never amount to a reasonable
suspicion); State v. Seitz, 86 Wn. App. 865, 867-70, 941 P.2d 5, 7-8
(1997) (holding that officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop where
officers saw occupants of a car speaking to a man on the sidewalk but did
not observe drugs, money, or anything else change hands); State v. Soto-
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Garcia, 68 Wn. App. 20, 25, 841 P.2d 1271, 1274 (1992) (stating that
merely walking in the street in a known drug area late at night does not
suggest that someone has committed a crime).
A person who simply acts suspiciously is not the proper subject of a
stop in the absence of other circumstances. Brown, 443 U.S. at 51, 99 S.
Ct. at 2639, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 360 (finding that police inappropriately
stopped a person who was seen walking away from another person in an
alley known for a high incidence of drug traffic); State v. Walker, 66 Wn.
App. 622, 629, 834 P.2d 41, 45 (1992) (finding that an officer investigat-
ing a report of suspicious behavior in a neighborhood inappropriately
stopped a man who appeared startled when he saw the officer and turned
onto another street to avoid him). Similarly, officers may not stop an in-
dividual merely because the individual is in proximity to others who are
suspected of criminal activity. State v. Thompson, 93 Wn.2d 838, 841,
613 P.2d 525, 527 (1980). See supra § 4.7(b). But cf Michigan v. Sum-
mers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 101 S. Ct. 2587, 2595-96, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340,
351 (1981) (holding that a valid search warrant for residence allows de-
tention of occupants during search). See generally 2 LaFave, supra, §
4.9(d).
Washington case law continues to support an officer's use of a
Terry stop. See State v. Jones, 117 Wn. App. 721, 728, 72 P.3d 1110,
1113 (2003), rev. denied, 151 Wn.2d 1006, 87 P.3d 1184 (2004) (holding
that officer's observation of suspect in area known for narcotics crouch-
ing down in a comer picking up small pieces of an item consistent with
the appearance of crack cocaine and who quickly began to leave the area
upon noticing the presence of the officer was sufficient for investigatory
stop); State v. Garcia, 125 Wn.2d 239, 242, 883 P.2d 1369, 1370 (1994)
(per curiam) (finding that information given to police, combined with an
officer's experience in narcotics and knowledge of location as high crime
area justified investigative restraint); State v. Little, 116 Wn.2d 488, 497-
98, 806 P.2d 749, 753-54 (1991) (en banc) (finding sufficient suspicion
to conduct a Terry stop where officers were generally familiar with resi-
dents of a complex, did not recognize suspects, and defendant subse-
quently fled from the officers); State v. Young, 86 Wn. App. 194, 201,
935 P.2d 1372, 1375 (1997) (finding that suspect's dropping a soda can
when illuminated by an officer's spotlight in an area known for drug ac-
tivity supported an investigatory stop); State v. Alcantara, 79 Wn. App.
362, 366-67, 901 P.2d 1087, 1089 (1995) (holding that to permit a war-
rantless search would impermissibly blur the distinction between a Terry
stop and those cases where the evidence provides probable cause for ar-
rest); State v. Rodriguez-Torres, 77 Wn. App. 687, 693, 893 P.2d 650,
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652 (1995) (reasoning that the Terry rationale for limited searches for
potential weapons was based on concern for officer safety).
Other Washington decisions upholding Terry stops include: State v.
Thorn, 129 Wn.2d 347, 354, 917 P.2d 108, 112 (1996) (en banc); State v.
Pressley, 64 Wn. App. 591, 597, 825 P.2d 749, 752 (1992) (finding the
manner in which the defendant reacted to the officers' presence consis-
tent with behavior suggesting a drug buy); State v. Rice, 59 Wn. App. 23,
28, 795 P.2d 739, 742 (1990) (finding that the firing of shots indicated
the presence of firearms and probable illegal conduct).
4.8 DIMENSIONS OF A PERMISSIBLE STOP
4.8(a) Time, Place, and Method
An investigatory stop may be based on less than probable cause
when the intrusion on individual freedom is relatively minor. Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884-85, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 911
(1968). When an investigatory stop becomes as intrusive as an arrest, the
stop is considered an arrest and requires probable cause. Dunaway v.
New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 2258, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824,
838 (1979).
A valid stop must be limited as to length, movement of the suspect,
and investigative techniques employed. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,
500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 238 (1983); see also State
v. Mitchell, 80 Wn. App. 143, 145-46, 906 P.2d 1013, 1015 (1995); State
v. Fowler, 76 Wn. App. 168, 172-73, 883 P.2d 338, 340 (1994) (holding
that an officer exceeded the scope of a permissible stop when he re-
moved a cigarette pack containing LSD from the suspect's pocket know-
ing that it was not a weapon). See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search
and Seizure § 9.2(f) (4th ed. 2004). Generally, the level of suspicion re-
quired for an investigative stop of a pedestrian is the same as that re-
quired for an investigative stop of a vehicle. See State v. Kennedy, 107
Wn.2d 1, 6, 726 P.2d 445, 448 (1986) (en banc).
The United States Supreme Court has declined to set an absolute
limit on the permissible duration of a Terry stop in terms of minutes or
hours. The duration of a stop is evaluated in terms of whether "the police
diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or
dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to
detain the [suspect]." United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.
Ct. 1568, 1575, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605, 616 (1985); see Royer, 460 U.S. at
500, 103 S. Ct. at 1325, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 238 (noting that a stop may "last
no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop"); cf
State v. Cunningham, 116 Wn. App. 219, 228-29, 65 P.3d 325, 329
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(2003) (finding a 45-minute wait with suspect in handcuffs to be a per-
missible Terry stop and not a formal arrest because officer's questions
related only to the identification of the suspect and suspect's actions
caused the lengthy delay).
Detaining a suspect to preserve the "status quo" while police inves-
tigate suspicious circumstances justifying an investigatory stop may not
exceed the scope of a Terry stop. See State v. Miller, 91 Wn. App. 181,
184, 955 P.2d 810, 812 (1998) (holding that officer was properly seeking
to maintain status quo by waiting to see if violence would erupt between
two suspects); State v. Perea, 85 Wn. App. 339, 342, 932 P.2d 1258,
1259-60 (1997) (holding that officers may temporarily detain a suspect
pending results of a police radio check); State v. Moon, 45 Wn. App.
692, 695, 726 P.2d 1263, 1265 (1986) (finding a proper Terry stop where
an officer detained a suspect in a room approximately 20 minutes while
the robbery victim was brought to the room for identification and suspect
was not searched or otherwise restrained in the interim). The means of
investigation need not be the least intrusive available, provided the police
do not act unreasonably "in failing to recognize or to pursue" a less in-
trusive alternative. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 687, 105 S. Ct. at 1576, 84 L. Ed.
2d at 616. For example, a Washington court has held that an officer did
not use the least intrusive means reasonably available to confirm or dis-
pel his suspicion that a house was being burglarized when he ordered
three juveniles out of the house at gunpoint. State v. Johnston, 38 Wn.
App. 793, 798-99, 690 P.2d 591, 594 (1984).
The investigative methods employed in a Terry stop must be less
intrusive than those employed in arrests in every respect, not merely du-
ration. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 210-11, 99 S. Ct. at 2255-56, 60 L. Ed. 2d
at 834-35. But cf Illinois v. Caballes, _ U.S. __, 125 S. Ct. 834, _
L. Ed. _ (2005) (holding that the arrival of a second officer with a po-
lice dog during a routine traffic stop did not violate motorist's Fourth
Amendment rights when the dog was allowed to sniff the exterior of the
vehicle while original officer was writing up a warning citation). For ex-
ample, police may not transport a nonconsenting suspect in a patrol car
to the police station and subject the suspect to custodial interrogation
based only on a reasonable suspicion. See Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 212, 99
S. Ct. at 2256, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 836; see also Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S.
811, 816-18, 105 S. Ct. 1643, 1647, 84 L. Ed. 2d 705, 710-11 (1985)
(holding that police may not transport a suspect to the police station for
fingerprinting absent probable cause, but may take fingerprints while
stopping and questioning suspect on basis of reasonable suspicion);
Royer, 460 U.S. at 496, 103 S. Ct. at 1323, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 235 (finding
that seizing a suspect's luggage at an airport and directing the suspect to
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a room for interrogation constituted an arrest); State v. Gonzales, 46 Wn.
App. 388, 396, 731 P.2d 1101, 1107 (1986) (noting that handcuffing and
transporting a suspect to a police station before probable cause to arrest
arises, that is, before knowledge that a crime has been committed, may
constitute an illegal arrest under the Fourth Amendment and Article 1,
Section 7). A radio call summoning the investigating officers to an ap-
parently unrelated crime scene, however, may give rise to a reasonable
suspicion sufficient to justify the officers transporting the suspect with
them. See State v. Sweet, 44 Wn. App. 226, 232-33, 721 P.2d 560, 564
(1986); cf State v. Byers, 85 Wn.2d 783, 787-88, 539 P.2d 833, 836
(1975) (discussing transportation to crime scene).
Transporting a suspect a short distance to obtain identification is
within the permissible scope of a Terry stop when the police have
knowledge of a reported crime, but the search may not be proper when
there is only an observation of suspicious conduct. See State v. Wheeler,
108 Wn.2d 230, 237, 737 P.2d 1005, 1008 (1987) (en banc); State v.
Hoffpauir, 44 Wn. App. 195, 198-99, 722 P.2d 113, 115-16 (1986)
(finding suspect voluntarily consented to transportation to the crime
scene for identification purposes); see also Sweet, 44 Wn. App. at 232-
33 (finding that a suspect's demonstrated propensity to flee justified his
being placed in patrol car and transported to an apparently unrelated
crime scene).
Other Washington cases involving Terry stops include the follow-
ing: United States v. Salas, 879 F.2d 530, 535 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating
that it would be reasonable for an officer to assume that a narcotics
dealer could be armed and dangerous if he had recently used cocaine);
State v. Collins, 121 Wn.2d 168, 173-74, 847 P.2d 919, 922 (1993) (en
banc) (holding that a Terry stop was justified where darkness prevented
the officer from seeing clearly and the defendant had previously been
arrested on an outstanding felony warrant); State v. Glover, 116 Wn.2d
509, 514, 806 P.2d 760, 762 (1991) (en banc) (finding that under the to-
tality of circumstances presented to the officer, including the officer's
experience, the location, and the suspect's conduct, sufficient reasonable
suspicion existed to justify an investigatory stop); State v. Randall, 73
Wn. App. 225, 230-31, 868 P.2d 207, 210 (1994) (holding that the offi-
cer had a reasonable suspicion justifying a stop when he observed two
males fitting the description of robbery suspects standing in a park six
blocks from the site of the robbery); State v. Biegel, 57 Wn. App. 192,
195, 787 P.2d 577, 578 (1990) (stating that although an officer was justi-
fied in making a Terry stop where the officer suspected the defendant
was engaged in a drug buy, the officer lacked probable cause to arrest
without more justification).
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4.8(b) Detention of Persons in Proximity to Suspect
The Washington Supreme Court has held that under the Fourth
Amendment the mere fact of an individual's proximity to one independ-
ently suspected of criminal activity is insufficient to justify a stop. State
v. Thompson, 93 Wn.2d 838, 841-42, 613 P.2d 525, 527-28 (1980)
(holding that a stop based on driver's parking violation does not reasona-
bly provide grounds to require identification of passengers absent an in-
dependent cause to question passengers). See also State v. Chelly, 94
Wn. App. 254, 260, 970 P.2d 376, 379 (1999) (finding the fact that pas-
senger was not wearing a safety belt provided an officer with the author-
ity to detain him for a reasonable period of time in order to identify him);
cf State v. Serrano, 14 Wn. App. 462, 466-68, 544 P.2d 101, 104-05
(1975). See generally 4 LaFave, supra, § 9.2(b).
4.8(c) Detention Related to Traffic Infractions
Pretextual traffic infraction stops made for the purpose of conduct-
ing warrantless investigations of matters unrelated to a person's driving
violate Article I, Section 7 of the Washington Constitution. State v.
Myers, 117 Wn. App. 93, 96, 69 P.3d 367, 369 (2003), rev. denied, 150
Wn.2d 1027, 82 P.2d 242 (2004) (citing State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343,
353, 979 P.2d 833, 839 (1999) (en banc) (declining to follow federal law
holding pretextual traffic stops not in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment)). "The reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic infraction has
occurred which justifies an exception to the [search] warrant requirement
for an ordinary traffic stop does not justify a stop for criminal investiga-
tion." Myers, 117 Wn. App. at 98 (citing Ladson, 138 Wn.2d at 349). "A
stop for a traffic infraction can be extended only when an officer has ar-
ticulable facts from which the officer 'could reasonably suspect criminal
activity."' State v. Lemus, 103 Wn. App. 94, 101, 11 P.3d 326, 330
(2000) (citing State v. Tijerina, 61 Wn. App. 554, 629, 811 P.2d 241, 243
(1991); quoting State v. Gonzales, 46 Wn. App. 388, 394, 731 P.2d 1101,
1105 (1986)). If the initial traffic stop is unlawful, any evidence obtained
from it will be inadmissible as fruit from a poisonous tree. State v.
Brown, 119 Wn. App. 473, 475-76, 81 P.3d 916, 917 (2003) (citing State
v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 4, 726 P.2d 445, 447 (1986)). See generally
infra § 5.27(c) (concerning enforcement of traffic regulations).
When determining if a particular traffic stop is pretextual, the court
should consider the totality of the circumstances, including both the sub-
jective intent of the officer and the objective reasonableness of the offi-
cer's behavior. State v. Hoang, 101 Wn. App. 732, 742-43, 6 P.3d 602,
607 (2000) (citing State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 359, 979 P.2d 833,
843 (1999)) (holding that a stop was not pretextual because the officer
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was acting within his normal traffic control duties); State v. DeSantiago,
97 Wn. App. 446, 448, 983 P.2d 1173, 1174 (1999) (finding a stop pre-
textual because officer subjectively believed suspect had just bought or
sold drugs and officer deliberately followed suspect for 10 blocks look-
ing for a reason to pull suspect over).
4.9 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON COMPELLED RESPONSES TO
INVESTIGATORY QUESTIONS
Fourth Amendment guarantees prohibit an officer from forcibly
stopping an individual in the absence of at least a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 2641,
61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 362-63 (1979). However, even when a police officer
possesses a reasonable suspicion and forcibly detains and questions the
suspect, the officer may not compel the suspect to answer. Davis v. Mis-
sissippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 n.6, 89 S. Ct. 1394, 1397 n.6, 22 L. Ed. 2d
676, 681 n.6 (1969); State v. White, 97 Wn.2d 92, 105-06, 640 P.2d
1061, 1068-69 (1982) (en banc). Furthermore, a suspect's refusal to an-
swer an investigating officer's questions cannot provide the basis for an
arrest. See White, 97 Wn. App. at 106.
A number of states, including Washington, have enacted stop-and-
identify statutes or other legislation designed in part to facilitate police
investigation of ongoing or imminent crimes. See, e.g., id. at 95; see also
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 103 S. Ct. 1855, 75 L. Ed. 2d 903
(1983) (addressing a California statute requiring loiterers to identify
themselves to peace officers when requested). Some of these statutes
have been struck down as unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g., Kolender,
461 U.S. at 361, 103 S. Ct. at 1860, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 911; White, 97
Wn.2d at 98-101. These statutes can be challenged on a number of
grounds, including the implication of (1) the First Amendment right of
free speech; (2) the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination; (3)
the Fourteenth Amendment right of due process; and (4) the Fourth
Amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. White, 97
Wn.2d at 97 nn. 1, 2. Thus, a Terry stop that survives a Fourth Amend-
ment challenge may collapse under a challenge brought under another
amendment.
4.10 GROUNDS FOR INITIATING A FRISK
An officer conducting a Terry stop may conduct a limited search
for weapons in order to protect himself or herself or persons nearby from
physical harm. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884, 20 L.
Ed. 2d 889, 911 (1968); State v. Alcantara, 79 Wn. App. 362, 366, 901
P.2d 1087, 1089 (1995). Even such a limited intrusion, however, is a
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"search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Terry, 392 U.S.
at 29, 88 S. Ct. at 1884, 30 L. Ed. 2d at 910.
The prerequisites to a pat-down for weapons are that the officer is
legitimately in the presence of the party to be frisked and has grounds for
a forcible stop. See id. at 32-33, 88 S. Ct. at 1885-86, 20 L. Ed. 2d at
912-13 (Harlan, J., concurring). A frisk may then be undertaken if the
officer reasonably believes that the suspect "may be armed and presently
dangerous" to the officer or others and if nothing in the course of an ini-
tial investigation dispels that fear. Id. at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884, 20 L. Ed.
2d at 911. A frisk may not be used as a pretext to search for incriminat-
ing evidence when the officer has no reasonable grounds to believe that
the suspect is armed. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64, 88 S. Ct.
1889, 1903, 20 L. Ed. 2d 917, 935 (1968).
Lower federal courts have read Terry to mean that for certain
crimes in which the offender is likely to be armed, the right to conduct a
protective search is "automatic"; for other crimes, such as possession of
marijuana, additional circumstances must be present. See 4 Wayne R.
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.6(a), at 625-28 (4th ed. 2004).
Washington requires the following for a valid frisk: (1) the initial
stop is legitimate; (2) there is a reasonable safety concern justifying a
protective frisk for weapons; and (3) the scope of the frisk is limited to
the protective purposes. State v. Lennon, 94 Wn. App. 573, 580, 976 P.2d
121, 125 (1999) (citing State v. Collins, 121 Wn.2d 168, 173, 847 P.2d
919, 922 (1993)); see State v. Smith, 102 Wn.2d 449, 452-53, 688 P.2d
146, 148 (1984) (en banc) (noting that the fact a detention occurs in a
high crime area is not in itself sufficient to justify a search); State v.
Harper, 33 Wn. App. 507, 511, 655 P.2d 1199, 1201 (1982) (holding
that an officer must have a "sufficient basis" to believe that an individual
is armed in order to conduct a self-protective search). Thus, police may
not take intrusive protective measures when they cannot articulate a rea-
son for believing that a suspect is dangerous other than that the suspect
was seen leaving in his car from the scene of a possible burglary. State v.
Williams, 102 Wn.2d 733, 740-41, 689 P.2d 1065, 1069-70 (1984) (en
banc).
An overt, threatening gesture is not a condition precedent to a sei-
zure. State v. Perez, 41 Wn. App. 481, 484-86, 704 P.2d 625, 628-29
(1985) (finding that an officer's observation of a gun on the floor of sus-
pect's car, the driver's bloodshot eyes, and the smell of alcohol consti-
tuted reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect was armed and might
gain access to the weapon). Frisks have been permitted in a variety of
situations. For example, in State v. Guzman-Cuellar, 47 Wn. App. 326,
332, 734 P.2d 966, 970 (1987), an officer was justified in initiating a
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frisk where the suspect matched the description of a murder suspect. See
also State v. Laskowski, 88 Wn. App. 858, 860-61 950 P.2d 950, 952
(1997) (finding a pat-down search of a suspect's backpack reasonable
when another suspect was found with a live shotgun cartridge); State v.
Sweet, 44 Wn. App. 226, 235-36, 721 P.2d 560, 565-66 (1986) (finding
a justified reasonable suspicion that suspect was armed and dangerous
where suspect fled from a high crime area when he saw officers and
dropped a ski mask when apprehended); State v. Harvey, 41 Wn. App.
870, 875, 707 P.2d 146, 149 (1985) (holding that an officer was justified
in making a protective search of a burglary suspect on the grounds that it
is well-known that burglars often carry weapons); State v. Galloway, 14
Wn. App. 200, 201-02, 540 P.2d 444, 446 (1975) (allowing frisk where
defendant entered an apartment during execution of a search warrant and
suspiciously kept his hand in his overcoat pocket during police question-
ing); State v. Howard, 7 Wn. App. 668, 673-74, 502 P.2d 1043, 1046-47
(1972) (allowing frisk where defendant parked a car near a residence be-
ing searched, and officer had prior knowledge that defendant carried a
concealed knife); State v. Brooks, 3 Wn. App. 769, 774-75, 479 P.2d
544, 548 (1970) (allowing frisk where defendant matched the description
of a suspect who had fired shots at other officers moments before the
stop).
Under certain circumstances, a search may be conducted pursuant
to a Terry stop even in the absence of grounds for believing that the sus-
pect is armed and dangerous. For example, a police officer may seize
property from a suspect if the suspect's actions give rise to a reasonable
suspicion that evidence of a crime is in danger of being destroyed or lost.
State v. Dorsey, 40 Wn. App. 459, 472, 698 P.2d 1109, 1116 (1985) (de-
ciding case in which an officer detaining a suspect for questioning about
credit card theft observed the suspect shaking his coat so as to apparently
dislodge an envelope from the coat pocket that could have contained
credit cards). A pat-down search may also be reasonable when police are
performing their "community caretaking" function. See State v. Acrey,
148 Wn.2d 738, 751, 64 P.3d 594, 601 (2003) (en banc) (holding com-
munity caretaking function exception to warrant requirement permitted
officers to detain 12-year-old minor found on city street after midnight in
area with no residences or open businesses while officers contacted mi-
nor's parent). But cf State v. Kinzy, 141 Wn.2d 373, 391-92, 5 P.3d 668,
678-79 (2000) (en banc) (holding community caretaking exception to
warrant requirement did not permit officers to detain a 16-year-old minor
whom officers perceived to be between 11 and 13 years of age and found
after 10 p.m. on a school night in a known drug-trafficking area associat-
ing with persons known to be involved with narcotics).
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4. 10(a) Scope of a Permissible Frisk
A frisk must be justified not only in its inception, but also in its
scope. State v. Hudson, 124 Wn.2d 107, 112, 874 P.2d 160, 163 (1994)
(en banc). The scope of a valid frisk is strictly limited to what is neces-
sary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the offi-
cer or others nearby. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884,
20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 911 (1968); see also State v. Alcantara, 79 Wn. App.
362, 366, 901 P.2d 1087, 1089 (1995) (holding that a search exceeded
the scope of Terry stop because the officer gave no indication that the
search was based on concerns for officer's safety); cf infra §5.1 (dis-
cussing search incident to arrest). Pat-down searches are permitted if the
police officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a suspect is armed
and currently dangerous. State v. Broadnax, 98 Wn.2d 289, 296, 654
P.2d 96, 101 (1982) (en banc); State v. Hobart, 94 Wn.2d 437, 441, 617
P.2d 429, 431 (1980) (en banc). See also State v. Samsel, 39 Wn. App.
564, 573, 694 P.2d 670, 676 (1985) (holding that a frisk was reasonable
when officers stopped suspects seen entering a taxicab in close spatial
and temporal proximity to a robbery, the suspects matched the victim's
description of the robbers, and, after stopping the taxicab, officers ob-
served marijuana and a gun holster on the floor of the passenger com-
partment). A frisk need not conform to the conventional pat-down. See
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147-49, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 1923-24, 32
L. Ed. 2d 612, 617-18 (1972) (finding an officer was justified in reach-
ing through a window and removing a revolver from the suspect's waist-
band when, after the officer had received information that a narcotics
suspect was seated in a nearby car and carried a gun in his waistband, the
first suspect refused to comply with the officer's request to step out of
the car); see also 4 LaFave, supra, § 9.5(b), at 655; supra § 4.7(c)-(d).
A Washington court has upheld an officer's grab at a suspect's
hand when the suspect furtively withdrew his hand from his pocket and
thrust it behind his back. State v. Serrano, 14 Wn. App. 462, 469, 544
P.2d 101, 106 (1975). Although the court reasoned that the officer's re-
flexive action was not actually a search, the Terry principle that officers
may act to protect themselves also justified the interference. Id.
While the scope of the search should be sufficient to assure the of-
ficer's safety, it should be strictly limited to the purpose for which it is
permitted. State v. Franklin, 41 Wn. App. 409, 414, 704 P.2d 666, 670
(1985) (finding that a search of a suspect's tote bag was allowed when
(1) an officer was informed that the suspect had a gun, (2) the officer
immediately confronted the suspect, and (3) the suspect admitted that a
weapon was in the tote bag). When in the course of a frisk an officer
feels what may be a weapon, the officer may only take such action as is
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necessary to examine the object. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884-
85, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 911. Once police ascertain that no weapon is in-
volved, their authority to conduct even a limited search ends. Hudson,
124 Wn.2d. at 113; see also Hobart, 94 Wn.2d at 446. See generally 4
LaFave, supra, § 9.6(c).
4. 1 0(b) Frisks of Persons in Proximity to Suspect
Police may not frisk persons present on the premises of a place be-
ing lawfully searched absent a reasonable suspicion that such persons are
armed. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 94, 100 S. Ct. 338, 343, 62 L.
Ed. 2d 238, 247 (1979); supra § 3.8(a). Similarly, police may not take
protective measures such as searching the purse of a vehicle's passenger
when the driver is stopped on the basis of a traffic violation absent a rea-
sonable suspicion that the passenger is involved in criminal conduct.
State v. Larson, 93 Wn.2d 638, 641-42, 611 P.2d 771, 773-75 (1980)
(en banc). See also State v. Parker, 139 Wn.2d 486, 987 P.2d 73 (1999)
(en banc). When an officer makes a lawful investigative stop and has
objective reasons for believing that there may be a weapon in the vehicle,
the officer may make a limited search of the passenger compartment for
weapons within the area of control of the suspect and of any other pas-
senger in the vehicle. State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 12, 726 P.2d 445,
451 (1986) (en banc). A passenger frisk is justified only when the officer
is able to identify specific, articulable facts giving rise to an objectively
reasonable belief that the passenger may be armed and dangerous. State
v. Horrace, 144 Wn.2d 386, 399-400, 28 P.3d 753, 760 (2001) (en
banc); State v. McIntosh, 42 Wn. App. 579, 582-83, 712 P.2d 323, 325
(1986) (upholding frisk where investigating officer noticed the driver
was armed with a knife and saw a weapon-like object under front seat of
car); see also State v. Coahran, 27 Wn. App. 664, 620 P.2d 116 (1980)
(holding that a protective frisk of a passenger is permitted when the
driver is lawfully stopped for reasons pertaining to handgun possession
and threats of violence). One commentator suggests that the appropriate
inquiry is whether the officer is under a reasonable apprehension of dan-
ger-a determination that depends on the nature of the crime, the time
and place of the arrest, the number of officers and suspects, and whether
the companion has made any threatening movements. See 4 LaFave, su-
pra, § 9.5(a), at 636-37.
4. 10(c) Protective Measures Other Than Frisks
An officer may take self-protective measures other than a frisk. For
instance, a police officer may order a driver who has been validly
stopped to get out of his or her car, regardless of whether the driver is
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suspected of being armed or dangerous or whether the offense under in-
vestigation is a serious one. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111,
98 S. Ct. 330, 333, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331, 337 (1977) (noting that intrusion is
de minimis while risks confronting an officer are substantial). See also
State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 12, 726 P.2d 445, 451 (1986) (en banc).
The Supreme Court later extended the Mimms rule to passengers of law-
fully stopped vehicles. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S. Ct.
882, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1997). The Washington Supreme Court, however,
declined to extend Mimms to passengers of the vehicle under Article I,
Section 7 unless the officer has an objective reason based on safety con-
cerns. State v. Mendez, 137 Wn.2d 208, 220, 970 P.2d 722, 728 (1999)
(en banc). See 4 LaFave, supra, § 9.6(a), at 646 n.155.
4. 1 0(d) Search ofArea: Measures Beyond Frisks
Officers may extend a Terry search for weapons to the passenger
compartment of a detained person's vehicle when the police have a rea-
sonable belief that the suspect is both dangerous and has easy access to a
weapon in the vehicle. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-50, 103
S. Ct. 3469, 3481, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201, 1220 (1983). See also State v.
Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 12, 726 P.2d 445, 451 (1986) (en banc) (uphold-
ing frisk where officer observed the suspect leaning forward as though to
place something under seat while stopping suspect's vehicle for investi-
gation of possible drug buy); State v. McIntosh, 42 Wn. App. 579, 582-
84, 712 P.2d 323, 325 (1986) (finding a search appropriate when the
driver of a vehicle was armed with a knife and a weapon-like object visi-
bly protruded from under passenger seat); Perez, 41 Wn. App. at 486
(finding seizure of rifle reasonable when officer had reason to believe
suspect was armed because officer could see from outside of the vehicle
a piece of wood and what appeared to be a gun barrel covered by a jacket
inside of the vehicle). A police officer may search a container carried by
a suspect who is detained for questioning if the officer reasonably be-
lieves that the suspect possesses a weapon and the suspect has told the
officer that a weapon is in the container. See Franklin, 41 Wn. App. at
415 (suspect carried a backpack). For a discussion of whether an officer
may search items carried by a suspect, see generally 4 LaFave, supra, §
9.5(e).
However, police cannot search a car without a warrant incident to
the arrest of a recent occupant unless the arrestee had ready access to the
passenger compartment at the time of arrest. State v. Rathbun, 124 Wn.
App. 372, 378, 101 P.3d 119 (2004) (holding that suspect was not in
"immediate control" of the vehicle at the time of arrest when suspect had
run 40 to 60 feet away from the vehicle); State v. Johnston, 107 Wn.
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App. 280, 288, 28 P.3d 775, 779 (2001) (holding search illegal when two
defendants were outside of the vehicle and two police officers were be-
tween the defendants and the car because defendants did not have "im-
mediate control" of the passenger compartment); cf State v. Bradley, 105
Wn. App. 30, 38, 18 P.3d 602, 607 (2001) (holding officers may search
vehicle for weapons or destructible evidence if the vehicle was in the
"immediate control" of the defendant just prior to the arrest).

Washington Search & Seizure
CHAPTER 5:
WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES:
THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
5.0 INTRODUCTION
"[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable ... subject only
to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576,
585 (1967) (footnotes omitted); State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 171, 43
P.3d 513, 515 (2002); see also Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366,
371-72, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2135, 124 L. Ed. 2d 334, 343-44 (1993); Coo-
lidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2032, 29
L. Ed. 2d 564, 576 (1971).
The following sections examine the various exceptions to the war-
rant requirement, which, according to the United States Supreme Court,
are to be "jealously and carefully drawn." Florida v. White, 526 U.S.
559, 568, 119 S. Ct. 1555, 1561, 143 L. Ed. 2d 748, 756 (1999); State v.
Reichenbach, 153 Wn.2d 126, 131, 101 P.3d 80, 84 (2004) (en banc).
The burden of proof is on the State to show that a warrantless search or
seizure falls within one of the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment war-
rant requirement. State v. Acrey, 148 Wn.2d 738, 746, 64 P.3d 594, 598
(2003). In addition, even when a search or seizure falls within one of the
exceptions to the warrant requirement, the search or seizure may be inva-
lid if it infringes upon other rights. See, e.g., United States v. Sherwin,
572 F.2d 196, 200 (9th Cir. 1977) (plain view seizure of photographs of
sexual activity invalid; the officers' determination that photographs were
obscene violated the First Amendment).
5.1 SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST
Police may conduct a warrantless search and seizure incident to a
lawful arrest. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63, 89 S. Ct.
2034, 2039-40, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685, 693-94 (1969). As the Court explained
in Chimel:
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to
search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the
latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.
Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be endangered, and the
arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the
arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the ar-
restee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.
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And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a
weapon or evidentiary item must, of course, be governed by a like
rule .... There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the
arrestee's person and the area "within his immediate control"-
construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might
gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.
There is no comparable justification, however, for routinely search-
ing any room other than that in which an arrest occurs--or, for that
matter, for searching through all the desk drawers or other closed or
concealed areas in that room itself. Such searches, in the absence of
well-recognized exceptions, may be made only under the authority
of a search warrant.
Id.
The "search incident to arrest" exception to the warrant requirement
applies only when (1) there was a valid arrest and (2) the search incident
to the arrest was "restricted in time and place in relation to the arrestee
and the arrest," as opposed to being "a wide-ranging exploratory, rum-
maging, ransacking" search. State v. Smith, 88 Wn.2d 127, 135, 559 P.2d
970, 974 (1977).
As the following sections demonstrate, Washington's search inci-
dent to arrest exception to the warrant requirement, although similar to
the federal exception, is subject to a different analysis under the Wash-
ington Constitution than the analysis required under the Fourth Amend-
ment.
5.1 (a) Lawful Arrest
The criteria for a lawful arrest are discussed in Chapter 4, supra. If
the arrest is invalid, then the search incident to the arrest is invalid as
well. State v. Hehman, 90 Wn.2d 45, 50, 578 P.2d 527, 529 (1978); State
v. Terrazas, 71 Wn. App. 873, 878, 863 P.2d 75, 78-79 (1993). If an ar-
rest is lawful, then a search incident to that arrest is permissible. State v.
Pulfrey, 120 Wn. App. 270, 274, 86 P.3d 790, 793 (2004), review
granted, 152 Wn.2d 1021, 101 P.3d 108 (2004); State v. Johnson, 77
Wn. App. 441, 443, 892 P.2d 106, 108 (1995); see also State v. White,
129 Wn.2d 105, 112, 915 P.2d 1099, 1102-03 (1996) (a warrantless
search is not presumed to be invalid under the Fourth Amendment if it is
made incident to a lawful arrest); State v. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144, 164,
720 P.2d 436, 447 (1986). Even when an arrest is valid, however, a
search is not properly "incident" to the arrest if the arrest is merely a pre-
text for conducting a search to obtain evidence of a different offense.
State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 353, 979 P.2d 833, 839 (1999)) (declin-
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ing to follow federal law holding pretextual traffic stops as not violating
the Fourth Amendment); State v. Johnson, 71 Wn.2d 239, 242-43, 427
P.2d 705, 707 (1967); cf State v. Carner, 28 Wn. App. 439, 445, 624
P.2d 204, 208 (1981) (holding that a second body search was invalid
when made after the decision to release the defendant and in retaliation
for his remarks, even when the arrest and initial search were valid). See
infra § 5.4(a) for discussion of the need for the search to be contempora-
neous with the arrest.
Property seized incident to a lawful arrest may be used to prosecute
the arrested person for a crime other than the one for which the person
was initially arrested so long as the initial arrest was not merely a pretext
to conduct a search for evidence of some other offense. State v. Smith,
119 Wn.2d 675, 681, 835 P.2d 1025, 1029 (1992) (finding that, after a
lawful arrest for consuming liquor in public, drug paraphernalia was ad-
missible when found in the defendant's fanny pack during the search); cf
State v. Cormier, 100 Wn. App. 457, 463, 997 P.2d 950, 954 (2000) (ab-
sent self-defense, evidence from a search of the defendant was admissi-
ble after the defendant's lawful arrest for assaulting an officer, even
though the defendant assaulted the officer after being illegally stopped);
see also State v. Gammon, 61 Wn. App. 858, 863, 812 P.2d 885, 888
(1991); State v. LaTourette, 49 Wn. App. 119, 127-29, 741 P.2d 1033,
1037-38 (1987); State v. White, 44 Wn. App. 276, 278, 722 P.2d 118,
119 (1986).
The search incident to arrest exception requires a custodial arrest.
See Hehman, 90 Wn.2d at 50. In Washington, custodial arrest for minor
traffic violations is generally not permitted. See RCW 46.64.015; State v.
Reding, 119 Wn.2d 685, 689-90, 835 P.2d 1019, 1021-22 (1992). With
limited exceptions, officers are required to cite and release motorists
stopped for minor traffic offenses if the motorist gives a signed promise
to appear in court. See RCW 46.64.015; Reding, 119 Wn.2d at 689-90.
Moreover, officers explicitly lack authority to arrest after witnessing only
a minor traffic infraction. RCW 46.63.020. Thus, a search is generally
unlawful if it is incident to a stop for a minor traffic violation. See Ter-
razas, 71 Wn. App. at 875.
Police officers are authorized to make a custodial arrest for a traffic
violation if: (1) the motorist refuses to sign a written promise to appear in
court; (2) the violation is one of the "nonminor" traffic violations spe-
cifically designated in RCW 10.31.100; or (3) the motorist is a nonresi-
dent arrestee. See RCW 46.64.015(1)-(3). Absent one of these condi-
tions, police need other reasonable grounds to arrest and conduct a valid
search incident to arrest if a motorist is stopped for a "minor" traffic vio-
lation. See Reding, 119 Wn.2d at 691-92 (upholding custodial arrest for
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the nonminor offense of reckless driving); Terrazas, 71 Wn. App. at
875-78 (an officer may arrest a defendant for driving without a valid
driver's license only if facts suggest the defendant will not appear in
court if cited and released). But see State v. Barker, 143 Wn.2d 915, 922,
25 P.3d 423, 426 (2001) (out-of-state trooper lacked statutory or com-
mon-law authority to arrest DUI suspect near state line in Washington,
and existence of probable cause did not render the stop constitutionally
valid).
5.1 (b) "Immediate Control"
In determining whether the area searched or the object seized was
within the "immediate control" of the defendant under the Fourth
Amendment, courts have recognized that "there can be no hard and fast
rule." People v. Williams, 57 Ill. 2d 239, 246, 311 N.E.2d 681 (1974).
Factors that have been considered include the following: (1) whether the
arrestee was physically restrained; (2) the position of the officer in rela-
tion to the defendant and the place searched; (3) the difficulty of gaining
access into the container or enclosure searched; and (4) the number of
officers present as compared with the number of arrestees or other per-
sons. See 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 6.3(c), at 355-57
(4th ed. 2004); see also id. § 7.1(b), at 505-07. For the purposes of a
search incident to an arrest, an object or container is considered to be
within the control of an arrestee if the object was within the arrestee's
reach immediately prior to arrest or at the moment of arrest. Smith, 119
Wn.2d at 681-82 (upholding search of a fanny pack that was within one
or two steps of the defendant at the time of the arrest); see also United
States v. Turner, 926 F.2d 883, 888 (9th Cir. 1991) (plastic baggies under
arrestee's pillow were within immediate control of arrestee who was on
the bed when he was arrested); United States v. Andersson, 813 F.2d
1450, 1455 (9th Cir. 1987) (closed suitcase on the bed next to arrestee
searchable incident to arrest).
Under the Fourth Amendment, and in certain limited situations,
some courts have permitted police to extend a search incident to an arrest
in the home into an area that is beyond the arrestee's immediate control.
If the police permit an arrestee to move into other rooms to gather cloth-
ing, for example, the police may accompany the arrestee and search the
rooms and any areas, such as closets or bureau drawers, where the ar-
restee has been. See 3 LaFave, supra, § 6.4(a), at 363-65. Courts have
also permitted police to search premises to determine whether accom-
plices who could aid the arrestee are present, see id. § 6.4(b), at 370, and
to conduct a protective sweep of the premises when the officers fear that
third parties may offer resistance, id. § 6.4(c), at 373-75. See Maryland
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v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 333-36, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 1098-99, 108 L. Ed. 2d
276, 288 (1990).
Article I, Section 7 of the Washington Constitution places greater
restraints on police than the Fourth Amendment does when an arrestee is
in her home. Entry into rooms beyond the immediate control of the sus-
pect requires that police have a reasonable fear for their safety or a belief
that the arrestee is about to destroy evidence or escape. State v. Chris-
man, 100 Wn.2d 814, 815, 821, 676 P.2d 419, 421, 423 (1984) (holding
on remand that, although the United States Supreme Court held that a
warrantless entry into and search of the dormitory room of two college
students did not violate the Fourth Amendment, Washington v. Chris-
man, 455 U.S. 1, 7, 102 S. Ct. 812, 817, 70 L. Ed. 2d 778, 785 (1982),
the entry and search did violate Article 1, Section 7 of the Washington
Constitution); see also State v. Boyer, _ Wn. App. _, _, 102 P.3d
833, 838 (2004) (protective sweep of basement rooms that belonged to
an upstairs apartment not justified when search was done incident to exe-
cution of a search warrant for a basement apartment); cf State v. McKin-
ney, 49 Wn. App. 850, 857, 746 P.2d 835, 839 (1987) (finding a war-
rantless entry into a home justified by the risk that the suspect identified
in a search warrant might escape); cf 3 LaFave, supra, § 6.3(c), at 358,
6.4(a)-(c), at 363-87, 7. 1(b), at 507.
For a discussion of automobile searches incident to arrest, see infra
§ 5.2(b).
5.2 IMMEDIATE CONTROL OR PERMISSIBLE SCOPE:
PARTICULAR APPLICATIONS
5.2(a) The Defendant
Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may search an arrestee
who has been taken into custody even when the officer does not believe
that the arrestee is armed or in possession of evidence of the crime for
which the suspect was arrested. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,
235, 94 S. Ct. 467, 477, 38 L. Ed. 2d 427, 440-41 (1973). The lawful
arrest establishes the authority to search the arrestee; the arresting officer
need not have a subjective fear that an arrestee is armed or will destroy
evidence. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 263-64, 94 S. Ct. 488,
491, 38 L. Ed. 2d 456, 460 (1973). The rule applies even when the cus-
todial arrest follows a stop for a minor traffic violation, unless such an
arrest would be illegal. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235, 94 S. Ct. at 477, 38 L.
Ed. 2d at 440-41; see State v. Reding, 119 Wn.2d 685, 691-92, 835 P.2d
1019, 1022-23 (1992); cf Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 118-19, 119
S. Ct. 484, 488, 142 L. Ed. 2d 492, 499 (1998) (declining to extend Rob-
20051
Seattle University Law Review
inson's search incident to arrest rule when officer only gave a citation for
speeding and did not arrest).
Under Article I, Section 7 of the Washington Constitution, an ar-
restee's diminished expectation of privacy permits an officer to search an
arrestee's clothing, including small containers found on the arrestee.
State v. Smith, 119 Wn.2d 675, 681-82, 835 P.2d 1025, 1029 (1992)
(upholding search of fanny pack following lawful arrest); State v. Gam-
mon, 61 Wn. App. 858, 864, 812 P.2d 885, 888 (1991) (upholding search
of prescription pill bottle found on defendant following lawful arrest);
State v. White, 44 Wn. App. 276, 278, 722 P.2d 118, 119-20 (1986) (up-
holding police examination of cosmetic case found in arrestee's coat
pocket). In addition, an arrestee does not have to be in actual physical
possession of a container at the time of the search, so long as the con-
tainer is within the arrestee's reach. Smith, 119 Wn.2d at 681; Gammon,
61 Wn. App. at 863-64. A greater expectation of privacy is extended to
possessions that are not closely related to the person's clothing, such as
"purses, briefcases[,] or luggage," and some additional reason must be
present to justify the search of those items. White, 44 Wn. App. at 279;
see also State v. Kealey, 80 Wn. App. 162, 170, 907 P.2d 319, 324
(1995) (stating that "a purse is inevitably associated with an expectation
of privacy"). For a discussion of the search of purses in conjunction with
automobile searches, see infra § 5.2(b).
Evidence seized pursuant to the search of an arrestee's person does
not need to relate to the crime for which the defendant was arrested, nor
must the grounds for the initial search encompass the evidence seized.
See Smith, 119 Wn.2d at 681 (allowing admission of drug paraphernalia
found in a fanny pack during a search subsequent to a lawful arrest for
consuming liquor in public); see also Gammon, 61 Wn. App. at 863;
State v. LaTourette, 49 Wn. App 119, 127-28, 741 P.2d 1033, 1037-38
(1987); White, 44 Wn. App. at 278.
An intrusion into a suspect's body, such as by drawing blood sam-
ples, is a search and seizure under Article I, Section 7 and the Fourth
Amendment and therefore is not justifiable under the search incident to
arrest exception to the warrant requirement. Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 767, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1834, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908, 917 (1966); State
v. Dunivin, 65 Wn. App. 501, 507, 828 P.2d 1150, 1154 (1992). How-
ever, such intrusions may be justified by the exigent circumstances ex-
ception. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71, 86 S. Ct. at 1835-36, 16 L. Ed.
2d at 919-20; see generally infra § 5.18(a) and supra § 3.13(b); 3 Wayne
R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.3(c), at 171-72 (4th ed. 2004). In
Washington, bodily intrusions are authorized by statute in order to allow
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police to take blood tests of motorists arrested for certain serious traffic
violations. RCW 46.20.308(3).
Less intrusive physical measures are permissible, such as a choke-
hold intended to prevent a suspect from swallowing apparent contraband.
See State v. Taplin, 36 Wn. App. 664, 666-67, 676 P.2d 504, 506 (1984);
State v. Williams, 16 Wn. App. 868, 871-72, 560 P.2d 1160, 1163
(1977). Officers attempting to prevent a suspect from swallowing evi-
dence may not, however, prevent the suspect from breathing or obstruct
the suspect's blood supply to the head, although they may pinch his
mouth shut. Williams, 16 Wn. App. at 872. More aggressive conduct,
such as jumping on the suspect, is likely to violate due process rights. Id.
at 870; see Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 72 S. Ct. 205, 209-
11, 96 L. Ed. 183, 190 (1952); see generally 3 LaFave, supra, § 5.2(i).
For a brief discussion of post-detention body searches, see infra § 6.2(d).
5.2(b) Vehicles and Containers
Under both Article 1, Section 7 and the Fourth Amendment, police
may search the passenger compartment of an automobile as a search in-
cidental to the arrest of an occupant. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,
460-62, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2864-65, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768, 775-76 (1981);
State v. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144, 152, 720 P.2d 436, 441 (1986); see also
State v. Vrieling, 144 Wn.2d 489, 496, 28 P.3d 762, 766 (2001) (search
of the inside rear of pulled-over motor home valid when incidental to
arrest of its driver); State v. Hill, 68 Wn. App. 300, 308, 842 P.2d 996,
1000 (1993) (search of passenger compartment incidental to arrest of
passenger was valid). Known as the Belton rule, the passenger compart-
ment is considered within the arrestee's immediate control under the
Fourth Amendment, even after the arrestee has been placed in police cus-
tody. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460, 101 S. Ct. at 2864, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 774; see
also Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, _, 124 S. Ct. 2127,
2132, 158 L. Ed. 2d 905, 915 (2004) (holding that the Belton rule is not
confined to situations in which the police initiate contact with the occu-
pant of a vehicle while that person is in the vehicle; the rule also reaches
persons who were recent occupants).
Under Article I, Section 7, a passenger compartment search inci-
dental to arrest must take place "immediately subsequent" to the sus-
pect's arrest and placement in the police car. State v. Fladebo, 113
Wn.2d 388, 395-97, 779 P.2d 707, 712 (1989); Stroud, 106 Wn.2d at
152; State v. Cass, 62 Wn. App. 793, 795-97, 816 P.2d 57, 58-59
(1991); see generally State v. Rankin, 151 Wn.2d 689, 697, 92 P.3d 202,
206 (2004) (explaining that, under Article I, Section 7, "a mere request
for identification from a passenger in an automobile for investigatory
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purposes constitutes a seizure unless there is a reasonable basis for the
inquiry"). When a subject has stepped out of a vehicle during a lawful
investigative stop, the officer may make a limited search of the passenger
compartment for weapons within the area of the suspect's control and
within the control of any other passenger in the vehicle if the police offi-
cer has objective reasons for believing that there may be a weapon in the
vehicle. State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 12-13, 726 P.2d 445, 451-52
(1986) (finding that a limited search was justified after an officer saw the
defendant lean forward as if putting something under the seat); State v.
Larson, 88 Wn. App. 849, 850-51, 857, 946 P.2d 1212, 1214, 1216
(1997) (concern for officer safety supported a limited search of a driver's
vehicle when an officer previously saw furtive movements by the driver,
and the driver would have to return to his truck in order to obtain regis-
tration).
Even when officers initially have an objective reason to be con-
cerned for their safety, events during the course of an investigation may
negate an objectively reasonable belief that the suspect is armed and
dangerous. State v. Glossbrener, 146 Wn.2d 670, 684, 49 P.3d 128, 135
(2002). In Glossbrener, an officer pulled over a vehicle because of a bro-
ken headlight and noticed the driver reach down toward the passenger
side of the car for several seconds before coming to a complete stop. Id.
at 673. When the officer approached the lone driver, the officer smelled
alcohol and noticed the driver's bloodshot eyes. Id. When asked if he had
been hiding any weapons, the driver said he had reached over to hide an
alcohol container. Id. The officer then told the driver to stay in the car
while the officer checked for warrants. Id. at 674. After finding no war-
rants, the officer conducted a sobriety test and a pat-down that revealed
no weapons. Id. The court noted that it was not until the officer had com-
pleted his investigation and determined that the driver was not legally
intoxicated that he decided to call for backup in order to search the vehi-
cle's passenger area where he had seen the driver reach. Id. at 682. The
court held that, under the circumstances of the officer's own investiga-
tion, he did not have an objectively reasonable belief that he was in dan-
ger. Id. The court distinguished other cases where officers conducted the
searches "at the first opportunity after the officer observed the furtive
movement." Id. at 683 (discussing State v. Horrace, 144 Wn.2d 386,
388, 28 P.3d 753, 754 (2001); State v. Watkins, 76 Wn. App. 726, 728,
887 P.2d 492, 493 (1995); State v. Wilkinson, 56 Wn. App. 812, 813, 785
P.2d 1139, 1140 (1990); cf State v. Jones, 146 Wn.2d 328, 338, 45 P.3d
1062, 1067 (2002).
The justification for a warrantless search incident to an arrest is lost
if the defendant is removed from the scene. State v. Boyce, 52 Wn. App.
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274, 277-78, 758 P.2d 1017, 1018-19 (1988). When a suspect is arrested
outside of the vehicle, "the proper inquiry is whether the vehicle was
within the arrestee's immediate control 'at the time the police initiate an
arrest'-not whether the arrestee had control over the vehicle at some
point prior to his or her arrest." State v. Rathbun, 124 Wn. App. 372,
378, 101 P.3d 119, 121 (2004). In Rathbun, police initially saw the sus-
pect standing beside the open doors of his truck, but by the time they ini-
tiated the arrest, the suspect had run about 40 to 60 feet away from the
truck and jumped over a fence. Id. Holding that a search of the defen-
dant's truck incident to his arrest was illegal, the court reasoned that the
suspect did not have the opportunity to destroy evidence or obtain a
weapon from within the truck when he was at least 40 feet away and the
warrant for the suspect's arrest had no connection to his truck. Id.; see
also State v. Johnston, 107 Wn. App. 280, 288, 28 P.3d 775, 779 (2001)
(invalid vehicle search where defendants, whom witnesses reported see-
ing in the car earlier during an armed robbery, walked past a police offi-
cer standing near the car before being arrested "in the immediate vicin-
ity"); State v. Wheless, 103 Wn. App. 749, 755-56, 14 P.3d 184, 188
(2000) (search not properly incident to arrest because of a lack of physi-
cal proximity between tavern bathroom, where arrest took place, and tav-
ern parking lot, where search took place).
Under the Fourth Amendment, any containers in the passenger
compartment may be searched, whether the containers are locked or
unlocked. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460-61, 101 S. Ct. at 2864, 69 L. Ed. 2d at
768; cf Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419,424, 124 S. Ct. 885, 889, 157 L.
Ed. 2d 843, 851 (2004) ("The Fourth Amendment does not treat a motor-
ist's car as his castle."); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303, 119
S. Ct. 1297, 1302, 143 L. Ed. 2d 408, 416 (1999) (explaining that, under
the Fourth Amendment, both passengers and drivers possess a reduced
expectation of privacy while in automobiles).
Under Article I, Section 7, the search may not include any locked
containers, including a locked glove compartment. Vrieling, 144 Wn.2d
at 492 n. 1 (explaining how Fladebo, 113 Wn.2d 388, resolved, by agree-
ing with the lead, non-majority opinion in Stroud, 106 Wn.2d at 144, the
question of whether locked containers may be searched); Stroud, 106
Wn.2d at 152. The lawful scope extends to "all space reachable without
exiting the vehicle," including the "zipped, 'unlocked' cushion" contain-
ing a gun in the back of a motor home accessible to the occupants when
the motor home was on the road. Vrieling, 144 Wn.2d at 496 (noting that
a different question may be presented when a motor home serves as a
fixed residence); see also State v. Johnson, 77 Wn. App. 441, 444-45,
892 P.2d 106, 108 (1995) (citing 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Sei-
2005]
Seattle University Law Review
zure § 7.1(c), at 16 (1987) (sleeper compartment of a tractor-trailer rig
considered part of passenger compartment); State v. Kypreos, 115 Wn.
App. 207, 216, 61 P.3d 352, 357 (2002) (a fifth-wheel trailer located on
private property unattached to a motorized vehicle is not subject to the
automobile exception); State v. Davis, 79 Wn. App. 355, 360-62, 901
P.2d 1094, 1097-98 (1995).
At a minimum, the "personal effects of a passenger, such as a
purse[,] jacket, or container, known to the officers to belong to the pas-
senger, may not be searched incident to the arrest of the driver if not in
the 'immediate control' of the driver." Vrieling, 144 Wn.2d at 494, n.2
(explaining State v. Parker, 139 Wn.2d 486, 987 P.2d 73 (1999) (en
banc), by analyzing the lead opinion together with the narrowing concur-
ring-dissenting opinion, where none of the analytical approaches gar-
nered a majority vote); Jones, 146 Wn.2d at 338. But see State v. Jack-
son, 107 Wn. App. 646, 650, 27 P.3d 689, 691 (2001) (holding that po-
lice may lawfully assume that items of confused ownership are lawfully
subject to inspection where driver and passenger both claimed ownership
of jacket in car).
Police may legally retrieve and search voluntarily abandoned prop-
erty. State v. Reynolds, 144 Wn.2d 282, 287, 27 P.3d 200, 204 (2001).
However, they may not seize property found in a location where a third
party gave consent to search if police caused that property to be aban-
doned via an unlawful seizure of the property's owner. State v. Reichen-
bach, 153 Wn.2d 126, 136, 101 P.3d 80, 87 (2004) (en banc). Note that
the valid arrest of a driver does not justify the warrantless search of a
passenger's purse where the purse is on the passenger's person and the
passenger is outside the vehicle, unless police have some articulable sus-
picion that criminal conduct has occurred or is about to occur. State v.
Seitz, 86 Wn. App. 865, 869, 941 P.2d 5, 8 (1997). Similarly, the valid
arrest of a passenger does not justify the warrantless search of the
driver's purse left in the car when police direct the driver to exit the car
without her purse, although they did not believe she presented any dan-
ger. State v. Nelson, 89 Wn. App. 179, 183, 948 P.2d 1314, 1316 (1997).
The locked trunk of an automobile that is inaccessible from the in-
terior of the car is not considered part of the passenger compartment;
therefore, a search warrant is required to conduct a lawful search of the
locked trunk. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 n.4, 101 S. Ct. at 2684 n.4, 69
L. Ed. 2d at 775 n.4 (stating that the "interior of the passenger compart-
ment . . . does not encompass the trunk"); Davis, 79 Wn. App. at 361.
Federal courts have interpreted "passenger compartment" to encompass
the hatch area of a hatchback automobile. See, e.g., United States v.
Doward, 41 F.3d 789, 793 (1st Cir. 1994). The engine compartment is
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not considered to be part of the passenger compartment and cannot be
searched without a warrant under the search incident to arrest exception.
State v. Mitzlaff, 80 Wn. App. 184, 188, 907 P.2d 328, 330 (1995).
When police have probable cause to believe that an automobile
contains contraband or evidence, they may have authority to search the
vehicle without a warrant pursuant to one of the other exceptions to the
warrant requirement, whether or not they have probable cause to arrest
the vehicle's occupants. See generally infra §§ 5.21-.23. Under the
Fourth Amendment, the police may search any container located within
an automobile if they have probable cause to believe that the container
itself holds contraband, even if they lack probable cause to search the
vehicle as a whole. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 573, 111 S. Ct.
1982, 1988, 114 L. Ed. 2d 619, 630 (1991). In order to provide the nec-
essary added protection guaranteed by Article I, Section 7, however, the
court will require "virtual certainty that the container, in the circum-
stances viewed, holds contraband, as if transparent." State v. Courcy, 48
Wn. App. 326, 332, 739 P.2d 98, 102 (1987) (during a lawful Terry stop,
see supra § 2.9(b), an officer viewed a precisely folded paper "bindle,"
commonly used to package cocaine, in the suspect's identification folder;
the officer was justified in seizing the bindle and opening it). However,
an automobile occupant does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy
in property viewed through a vehicle window and such objects may fall
within the "open view" or "plain view" warrant exceptions. State v.
Ozuna, 80 Wn. App. 684, 689-90, 911 P.2d 395, 399 (1996); State v.
Gonzales, 46 Wn. App. 388, 397, 731 P.2d 1101, 1107 (1986).
5.3 PRE-ARREST SEARCH
If a warrantless search is closely related in time and place to a law-
ful arrest, the search may be considered incidental to the arrest and valid
as long as probable cause to arrest exists at the time of the search, even if
the search occurs before the arrest. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98,
111, 100 S. Ct. 2556, 2564, 65 L. Ed. 2d 633, 645-46 (1980); State v.
Smith, 88 Wn.2d 127, 138, 559 P.2d 970, 975 (1977); State v. Harrel, 83
Wn. App. 393, 400, 923 P.2d 698, 702 (1996). If probable cause does not
exist at the time of the search, a search that provides probable cause is
not considered a valid search incidental to the arrest. Smith v. Ohio, 494
U.S. 541, 543, 110 S. Ct. 1288, 1290, 108 L. Ed. 2d 464, 467-68 (1990)
(the warrantless search of the defendant's paper bag could not be justi-
fied as a search incidental to the arrest when the bag contained drug
paraphernalia and the search was followed by the arrest of the defendant
for drug abuse); see generally 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure §
5.5(a) (4th ed. 2004).
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Under limited circumstances, pre-arrest searches are permitted even
when the arrest does not closely follow the search. A search may be con-
sidered incidental to the arrest of a suspect in the following circum-
stances: (1) the police have probable cause; (2) the police believe the
suspect is in the process of destroying highly evanescent evidence; and
(3) the evidence can be preserved by a limited search. Cupp v. Murphy,
412 U.S. 291, 296, 93 S. Ct. 2000, 2004, 36 L. Ed. 2d 900, 906 (1973).
See generally 3 LaFave, supra, § 5.4(b); Smith, 88 Wn.2d at 137-38 (up-
holding an officer's seizure of evidence prior to arrest because of exigent
circumstance of its possible destruction). Pre-arrest searches are Terry
searches, see supra § 2.9(b), and should be subject to the same standard
applied and discussed supra §§ 4.5-.9.
5.4 POST-DETENTION SEARCHES:
SEARCHES INCIDENT TO ARREST AND INVENTORY SEARCHES
5.4(a) Post-Detention Searches Incident to Arrest
The search incident to arrest exception can apply to a search at both
the place of detention as well as the place of arrest. See generally 3
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.3(a) (4th ed. 2004). However,
a significant delay between the arrest and the search will render the
search unreasonable, since the search is no longer contemporaneous with
the arrest. State v. Smith, 119 Wn.2d 675, 683, 835 P.2d 1025, 1030
(1992) (delay of 17 minutes between arrest and search of a fanny pack
was not unreasonable under the circumstances). Whether a delay is suffi-
cient to render a search unreasonable and no longer valid under the
search incident to arrest exception depends on the facts of the individual
case. Id. at 683 n.4; see State v. Boursaw, 94 Wn. App. 629, 635, 976
P.2d 130, 134 (1999) (search reasonable where there was only a 10-
minute delay between arrest and arrival of dog that completed search by
sniffing behind vehicle's ashtray; holding is limited to facts of this case,
and delays caused by a request for assistance might be unreasonable un-
der different circumstances); cf State v. McKenna, 91 Wn. App. 554,
564, 958 P.2d 1017, 1022 (1998) (holding search not reasonably con-
temporaneous to a noncustodial arrest because the arrest ended before
search occurred); State v. Radka, 120 Wn. App. 43, 50, 83 P.3d 1038,
1041 (2004) (search of vehicle not valid as incidental to arrest because
driver's detention was noncustodial as evidenced from the fact that dep-
uty did not frisk driver or place him in handcuffs and deputy allowed him
to make cell telephone calls from back of patrol car, presumably to ar-
range transportation).
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Any post-arrest search is unlawful if probable cause to arrest dissi-
pates by the time the suspect is taken into custody. See State v. Hehman,
90 Wn.2d 45, 50, 578 P.2d 527, 529 (1978) (holding that if the arrest is
invalid, then the search incident to the arrest is invalid); State v. Lemus,
103 Wn. App. 94, 105, 11 P.3d 326, 332 (2000) (invalid search of vehi-
cle when no probable cause existed to arrest driver prior to police per-
forming positive field test of cocaine powder seen in car).
Under the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 7 of the Wash-
ington Constitution, when an arrestee is searched upon booking, officers
may later conduct a warrantless "second look" into the arrestee's belong-
ings. United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 805, 94 S. Ct. 1234, 1238,
39 L. Ed. 2d 771, 777 (1974) (a search of the defendant's personal be-
longings long after the defendant had been searched and placed in a jail
cell was a permissible search incident to an arrest); State v. Cheatam, 150
Wn.2d 626, 642, 81 P.3d 830, 838 (2003) (holding that once police have
conducted a valid inventory search of an inmate's clothing and other ef-
fects at booking and have placed them in storage for safekeeping in ac-
cord with a proper inventory procedure, the inmate has lost any privacy
interest in those items). See 3 LaFave, supra, § 5.3(b), at 159 (explaining
that Edwards requires that a valid "second look" into the arrestee's in-
ventoried belongings meet the following criteria: (1) The object seized
must come into plain view at the time of arrival at the place of detention;
(2) the later investigation must establish that the object has evidentiary
value; and (3) the object must remain in police custody as part of the ar-
restee's inventoried property).
A difficult question arises when a suspect is detained only because
the police have failed to comply with laws allowing release. See gener-
ally 3 LaFave, supra, § 5.3(d). A search conducted after police have de-
cided to release a suspect is improper when there is no probability that
the suspect possesses relevant evidence or weapons. State v. Carner, 28
Wn. App. 439, 445, 624 P.2d 204, 207-08 (1981). Similarly, courts have
not validated a search based on consent from someone who was illegally
detained. State v. Avila-Avina, 99 Wn. App. 9, 14-15, 991 P.2d 720, 724
(2000); State v. O'Day, 91 Wn. App. 244, 253, 955 P.2d 860, 865
(1998).
5.4(b) Post-Detention Inventory Search
Under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 7, police offi-
cers may search containers or packages as part of an inventory of the ar-
restee's possessions prior to storing the items for safekeeping. Illinois v.
Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643-48, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 2608-09, 77 L. Ed. 2d
65, 69-71 (1983); State v. Smith, 76 Wn. App. 9, 16, 882 P.2d 190, 194
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(1994). These "caretaking procedures" are constitutionally permissible
under the Fourth Amendment's standard of "reasonableness." South Da-
kota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369-70, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 3097-98, 49 L.
Ed. 2d 1000, 1005-06 (1976). However, police must have probable cause
to conduct a warrantless search of containers found in vehicles. Wyoming
v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 1300, 143 L. Ed. 2d
408, 415 (1999); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579, 111 S. Ct.
1982, 1991, 114 L. Ed. 2d 619, 634 (1991) (overruling previous holding
in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 53 L. Ed. 2d
538 (1977), that probable cause was not required to conduct a war-
rantless search of containers in vehicles). An inventory search that is "a
ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evi-
dence" is unreasonable. Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4, 110 S. Ct. 1632,
1635, 109 L. Ed. 2d 1, 6 (1990); see also State v. Mireles, 73 Wn. App.
605, 612, 871 P.2d 162, 165-66 (1994). The police have some obligation
to safeguard the container and its contents when they seize it. See
Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 19, 97 S. Ct. at 2487, 53 L. Ed. 2d at 553.
Whether the defendant is arrested in a private or public place is sig-
nificant when determining if police will be able to conduct a warrantless
inventory search. Id. (when a person is arrested in a public place, it is
reasonable for police to take custody of the arrestee's property rather
than to leave the property in the public place while a warrant is ob-
tained). See 3 LaFave, supra, § 5.5(b), at 220-23.
Consistent with the greater protection provided under Article 1, Sec-
tion 7, inventory searches in Washington must be conducted "in good
faith for the purposes of (1) finding, listing, and securing from loss dur-
ing detention property belonging to a detained person; (2) protecting po-
lice from liability due to dishonest claims of theft; and (3) protecting
temporary storage bailees against false charges." Smith, 76 Wn. App. at
16; see also State v. Houser, 95 Wn.2d 143, 154, 622 P.2d 1218, 1225
(1980); State v. Gluck, 83 Wn.2d 424, 428, 518 P.2d 703, 706-07 (1974).
Search of a defendant's purse upon arrival at jail has been upheld under
Article I, Section 7. Smith, 76 Wn. App. at 15-16. But see State v. Smith,
56 Wn. App. 145, 150-52, 783 P.2d 95, 98-99 (1989) (holding that a
booking search of an arrestee's purse was unlawful because she was not
given timely opportunity to post bail, and police apparently were not
concerned that she was carrying weapons); State v. Dugas, 109 Wn. App.
592, 599, 36 P.3d 577, 581 (2001) (concluding that while police could
inventory arrestee's jacket left on a hood of a car at the scene, they could
not search the closed container in the jacket when there was no indication
of dangerous contents; searching for illegal drugs is outside the scope of
a valid inventory search). See generally 3 LaFave, supra, § 5.5(b).
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Under both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 7, the
police may conduct an inventory search of a validly impounded automo-
bile. Containers discovered during the inventory search may be opened
without a warrant. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374-75, 107
S. Ct. 738, 742-43, 93 L. Ed. 2d 739, 747-48 (1987); State v. McFadden,
63 Wn. App. 441, 448, 820 P.2d 53, 56 (1991), overruled on other
grounds by State v. Adel, 136 Wn.2d 629, 640, 965 P.2d 1072, 1077
(1998); see also infra § 5.28.
5.5 SEARCHES CONDUCTED IN GOOD FAITH AND WITHOUT PURPOSE OF
FINDING EVIDENCE: COMMUNITY CARETAKING
AND MEDICAL EMERGENCY
If officers undertake a search in good faith for a reason other than
investigating a crime-for example, when it is necessary for police to aid
or assist, or when making routine checks on health and safety-any evi-
dence they discover may be admissible under the Fourth Amendment.
See State v. Thompson, 151 Wn.2d 793, 802-03, 92 P.3d 228, 232-33
(2004) (concluding that a police officer's entry into defendant's home to
retrieve a guest's jacket was not justified by the community caretaking
function); 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.5(d), at 240 (4th
ed. 2004). A limited invasion of constitutionally protected privacy rights
is allowed for "community caretaking" only if:
(1) the police officer subjectively believed that someone likely
needed assistance for health or safety concerns;
(2) a reasonable person in the same situation would similarly be-
lieve that there was need for assistance; and
(3) there was a reasonable basis to associate the need for assistance
with the place being searched.
Id. (citation omitted).
"Whether an encounter made for noncriminal noninvestigatory pur-
poses is reasonable depends on a balancing of the individual's interest in
freedom from police interference against the public's interest in having
the police perform a 'community caretaking function."' Thompson, 151
Wn.2d at 802 (quoting Kalmas v. Wagner, 133 Wn.2d 210, 216-17, 943
P.2d 1369, 1372 (1997)). Thus, even when police lack probable cause to
believe a crime has been committed, they may conduct a warrantless
search of the premises when the premises contain the following: (1) per-
sons in imminent danger of death or harm; (2) objects likely to bum, ex-
plode, or otherwise cause harm; or (3) information that will disclose the
location of a threatened victim or the existence of such a threat. State v.
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Downey, 53 Wn. App. 543, 545, 768 P.2d 502, 504 (1989); cf State v.
Menz, 75 Wn. App. 351, 353-56, 880 P.2d 48, 49-50 (1994) (police en-
try was justified when in response to a domestic violence call). But see
State v. Schlieker, 115 Wn. App. 264, 272, 62 P.3d 520, 524 (2003) (de-
spite some evidence that supported the community caretaking exception,
officers responding to domestic violence call at house did not meet the
exception when they failed to inquire about the defendants' safety in a
trailer located on the property after the residents of the house told offi-
cers about alleged drug activity in the trailer prior to search). See gener-
ally 3 LaFave, supra, § 5.5(d). The officer's warrantless entry must be
motivated by a need to render assistance and must not be merely a pre-
text for obtaining evidence that would otherwise be unavailable. State v.
Gibson, 104 Wn. App. 792, 799, 17 P.3d 635, 639 (2001); State v. Ange-
los, 86 Wn. App. 253, 255, 936 P.2d 52, 53 (1997); State v. Gocken, 71
Wn. App. 267, 275, 857 P.2d 1074, 1080 (1993). Consequently, the offi-
cer must be able to articulate specific facts and reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom that justify the warrantless entry. State v. Davis, 86 Wn.
App. 414, 420, 937 P.2d 1110, 1114 (1997) (entry was proper when, af-
ter check-out time, the motel occupant did not respond to repeated tele-
phone calls and knocks at the door).
When determining whether police have intruded beyond their scope
of community caretaking in trying to protect children, courts have con-
sidered circumstances beyond the fact that a minor is found out late at
night. See State v. Acrey, 148 Wn.2d 738, 64 P.3d 594 (2003); State v.
Kinzy, 141 Wn.2d 373, 5 P.3d 668 (2000). In Kinzy, police stopped a 16-
year-old girl after seeing her walking on a downtown Seattle sidewalk at
about 10 p.m. on a weeknight with an adult male the officer knew to be
involved with narcotics. Id. at 378. When Kinzy tried to walk away, the
officer physically detained her and a later search revealed cocaine. Id.
The court held that, under the community caretaking exception, police
could approach Kinzy and ask if she needed help, but without articulable
suspicion that she had committed a criminal offense, they could not
physically detain her when she chose to walk away. Id. at 395. In Acrey,
police responded to a citizen's 911 call on a weeknight reporting fight-
ing, and found five young boys, including the 12-year-old Acrey, out
after midnight in an isolated area with no adult supervision. 148 Wn.2d
at 742-43. Police contacted Acrey's mother, who asked police to give
the boy a ride home. Id. at 743. Before transporting the boy in the police
car, police conducted a pat-down frisk for safety purposes and found
drugs. Id. at 743. The court affirmed the appellate court's holding that
there was reason for heightened concern that the boys may be engaging
in conduct that could bring harm to themselves or others, and that the
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police acted reasonably. Id. at 751. The court agreed with how the ap-
peals court distinguished Kinzy:
Acrey was younger than Kinzy, and the hour much later; Acrey was
in an isolated area unaccompanied by an adult; and most important,
the officers had initially detained Acrey to investigate a possible
crime. The fact that a 911 call had been placed raised at least some
degree of concern for Acrey's well-being, regardless of whether
there was any criminal activity .... Perhaps most important, the
fact that Acrey had been legitimately detained in a Terry stop meant
that there was merely a momentary additional intrusion for commu-
nity caretaking purposes.
Id. at 752.
Police may make a warrantless entry into a residence in response to
a report of domestic violence under the emergency exception. Menz, 75
Wn. App. at 353. "Police officers responding to a domestic violence re-
port have a duty to ensure the present and continued safety and well-
being of the occupants" of a residence. State v. Raines, 55 Wn. App. 459,
465, 778 P.2d 538, 542 (1989).
When the medical emergency is a homicide, officers may not only
enter to aid the victim, but they may also make a quick check to see if the
perpetrator or other victims are present. See Flippo v. West Virginia, 528
U.S. 11, 14, 120 S. Ct. 7, 15, 145 L. Ed. 2d 16, 20 (1999) (noting that,
while officers may enter a murder scene to aid victims or to see if the
perpetrator is present, there is no general "murder scene" warrant excep-
tion); Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 21, 105 S. Ct. 409, 411, 83 L.
Ed. 2d 246, 251 (1984) (same); State v. Stevenson, 55 Wn. App. 725,
729-30, 780 P.2d 873, 876 (1989). Thus, any evidence observed in plain
view during the course of legitimate police emergency activities at the
scene may be seized. Id. at 730. Any such search must be brief; a general
exploratory search lasting several hours is not permissible. Thompson,
469 U.S. at 21, 105 S. Ct. at 411, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 251; cf supra § 5.1(b).
In the course of rendering aid, police may conduct a warrantless
search of a victim's personal effects so long as the search is motivated by
a need to render assistance. State v. Loewen, 97 Wn.2d 562, 568, 647
P.2d 489, 493 (1982) (the search of the defendant's tote bag for identifi-
cation was improper when the defendant regained consciousness prior to
the search); see also Chavis v. Wainwright, 488 F.2d 1077, 1078 (5th
Cir. 1973) (police justified in making an inventory search of the defen-
dant's clothing and effects when removed in the hospital during the de-
fendant's treatment and when police were required to keep the clothing
and effects as evidence of possible homicide); United States v. Dunavan,
485 F.2d 201, 203 (6th Cir. 1973) (when taking persons to the hospital,
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police may search their briefcases for the purpose of establishing iden-
tity); cf State v. Dempsey, 88 Wn. App. 918, 922, 947 P.2d 265, 268-69
(1997) (a search associated with emergency civil commitment was justi-
fied under the emergency exception; the scope of the search may extend
to whatever is reasonable to conduct the caretaking function). But see
Loewen, 97 Wn.2d at 568 (necessity must exist at time of search); State
v. Schroeder, 109 Wn. App. 30, 45, 32 P.3d 1022, 1029 (2001) (search-
ing coat pocket for identification where the coat was located in a differ-
ent room from suicide victim was beyond scope of community caretak-
ing function of waiting at the scene for coroner after the grief-stricken
cohabitant of the premises left with police chaplain to go to a friend's
house).
Similarly, police may make a warrantless entry to protect prop-
erty, and in so doing police may seize evidence within their plain view.
State v. Bakke, 44 Wn. App. 830, 839-41, 723 P.2d 534, 538-40 (1986)
(police may make a warrantless entry into a private residence in response
to a reported burglary and may then seize contraband within their plain
view); State v. Campbell, 15 Wn. App. 98, 100, 547 P.2d 295, 297
(1976) (police entry to investigate alleged burglary permissible). Fire-
fighters may enter a house to extinguish a fire and immediately thereafter
conduct a limited warrantless investigation to determine the fire's cause.
Michigan v. Taylor, 436 U.S. 499, 510, 98 S. Ct. 1942, 1950, 56 L. Ed.
2d 486, 499 (1978). Once a fire has been extinguished, however, a war-
rant is required for arson investigators to search the premises to discover
a possible criminal cause of the fire. Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287,
294-95, 104 S. Ct. 641, 647, 78 L. Ed. 2d 477, 484-85 (1984); Taylor,
436 U.S. at 511, 98 S. Ct. at 1951, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 500.
Police officers may enter a private residence without a warrant
when officials of another government agency have validly entered the
residence and have discovered contraband. State v. Bell, 108 Wn.2d 193,
201, 737 P.2d 254, 259 (1987) (a marijuana-growing operation discov-
ered in plain view by firefighters justified a warrantless entry and seizure
by police). Seizure of immediately recognizable contraband by firefight-
ers is valid if it is inadvertently discovered while they are engaged in
their firefighting activities. Id. at 197. Exigent circumstances are not re-
quired to justify such a seizure. Police officers then step into the fire-
fighters' shoes and may subsequently enter a residence without a warrant
and seize the contraband, so long as they do not exceed the scope of the
prior intrusion. Id. at 201; cf State v. Browning, 67 Wn. App. 93, 97, 834
P.2d 84, 86 (1992) (contraband sighted during an unlawful entry by the
building inspector could not be used as the basis for later police entry
under warrant).
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5.6. THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE: DISTINCTION BETWEEN
"PLAIN VIEW" AND "OPEN VIEW"
Courts have used the term "plain view" to describe the following
three types of searches: (1) a search where an officer observes an item
that is exposed to public view in a public place or in a location that is not
constitutionally protected; (2) a search where an officer intrudes into a
constitutionally protected area-either lawfully or unlawfully-and there
observes a clearly exposed object; and (3) a search where an officer,
standing in a nonprotected area, observes an object that is located inside
a constitutionally protected area. State v. O'Herron, 153 N.J. Super. 570,
574, 380 A.2d 728 (1977); 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure §
2.2(a), at 447-48 (4th ed. 2004).
These three situations are distinguished by the nature of the defen-
dant's expectation of privacy in the object. In the first situation, the dis-
covery of an object in a public place or in a location that is not constitu-
tionally protected is not a true search because the defendant has no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in an object that is exposed to the public
view. State v. Rose, 128 Wn.2d 388, 392, 909 P.2d 280, 282-83 (1996).
Generally, "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his
own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S. Ct. 507, 511, 19 L. Ed. 2d
576, 582 (1967). See generally supra §§ 1.1-.3. Thus, this situation is
more accurately referred to as "open view" and not "plain view." State v.
Dykstra, 84 Wn. App. 186, 191 n.4, 926 P.2d 929, 932 n.4 (1996); see
also State v. Carter, 151 Wn.2d 118, 128, 85 P.3d 887, 891 (2004) (hold-
ing that an examination of the interior of a firearm placed in open view
does not constitute a search subject to the warrant requirement).
Likewise, a search does not occur when an object, located in a pro-
tected area, is merely observed from a vantage point in a nonprotected
area. State v. Ross, 141 Wn.2d 304, 312, 4 P.3d 130, 135 (2000) ("An
officer with legitimate business, when acting in the same manner as a
reasonably respectful citizen, is permitted to enter the curtilage areas of a
private residence which are impliedly open, such as access routes to the
house."); Rose, 128 Wn.2d at 392; State v. Seagull, 95 Wn.2d 898, 901,
632 P.2d 44, 46-47 (1981); 1 LaFave, supra, § 2.2(a), at 448-49. But see
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 2046, 150 L.
Ed. 2d 94, 106 (2001) (holding that use of a thermal imaging device,
which is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that
would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion turns
a surveillance into a search and is presumptively unreasonable without a
warrant); State v. Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d 400, 409, 47 P.3d 127, 132
(2002) (noting that, "[a]lthough there is no case directly on point, courts
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have overwhelmingly found that an attempt to block a view through a
window shows a reasonable expectation of privacy"); State v. Young, 123
Wn.2d 173, 186, 867 P.2d 593, 599 (1994) (citing State v. Myrick, 102
Wn.2d 506, 513, 688 P.2d 151, 155 (1984), and holding that "[m]erely
because it is generally known that the technology exists to enable police
to view private activities from an otherwise nonintrusive vantage point, it
does not follow that these activities are without protection").
In Cardenas, for example, police investigating an armed robbery
were directed to a motel where a security guard reported seeing a vehicle
matching the description of the suspects' car. 146 Wn.2d at 403-04.
When the police arrived, other officers were standing next to a car that
did not match the victim's original description, but contained what an
officer believed were some items that matched the description of items
taken. Id. Guests at the motel told police what room the car's occupants
had hurriedly entered. Id. An officer had to drop to bended knees in order
to peer through a three-inch gap "at the foot of closed curtains." Id. at
415 (Alexander, C.J., dissenting). The officer saw two males, who
matched the general description of suspects, leaning over a bed and sort-
ing through papers, including credit cards, and dart to the back of the
room when the officer knocked on the door without announcing "police."
Id. at 404. In a five to four decision, the Washington Supreme Court af-
firmed the conviction without deciding whether the open view doctrine
applied to the officers' observations. Id. at 410. The court reasoned that
exigent circumstances existed even without relying on the officers' ob-
servations through the window, and that their actions were justified by
officer safety concerns. Id. However, the dissent concluded that, without
the observations made through the window, exigent circumstances did
not exist and the search through the window was not lawful because it
was made from an unnatural vantage point. Id. at 414-15 (Alexander,
C.J., dissenting).
Even if observations from a nonprotected vantage point do not con-
stitute a search, privacy rights are implicated when police enter a consti-
tutionally protected area to seize an object. See State v. Dyreson, 104
Wn. App. 703, 713-14, 17 P.3d 668, 673-74 (2001) (holding search in-
valid where detective entered vacant but open shed after renter told de-
tective "to go look in the shed," where "looking into a building is not the
same as crossing its threshold"). In other words:
Seeing something in open view does not ... dispose, ipso facto, of
the problem of crossing constitutionally protected thresholds ....
Light waves cross thresholds with a constitutional impunity not
permitted arms and legs. Wherever the eye may go, the body of the
policeman may not necessarily follow.
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Charles E. Moylan, Jr., The Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of
the Great "Search Incident" Geography Battle, 26 Mercer L. Rev. 1047,
1096 (1975); see also Dykstra, 84 Wn. App. at 192-93.
Therefore, although the open view doctrine may justify observing
an object located in a constitutionally protected area, it will not justify
seizing the object; the search is in the entry, not in the inspection. See
Dykstra, 84 Wn. App. at 191; State v. Mierz, 72 Wn. App. 783, 791, 866
P.2d 65, 71 (1994), aff'd, 127 Wn.2d 460, 901 P.2d 286 (1995) (view of
prohibited coyote pups from legal vantage point outside of the defen-
dant's fence did not justify an officer's warrantless entry onto property).
An "open view" sighting of contraband from a constitutionally unpro-
tected vantage point may, however, be used as a basis for securing a
search warrant. State v. Bobic, 140 Wn.2d 250, 259, 996 P.2d 610, 616
(2000) (open view look of stolen goods through preexisting hole between
adjoining commercial storage units not a search when manager gave po-
lice permission to enter); State v. Ferro, 64 Wn. App. 181, 182, 824 P.2d
500, 501 (1992).
If no entry or additional search is required, seizure of an object may
be permissible if an officer is virtually certain that a container holds con-
traband based on how "the appearance of the container itself [places] the
contents ... in effect in open view." State v. Courcy, 48 Wn. App. 326,
330, 739 P.2d 98, 101 (1987) (a paper "bindle" containing cocaine was
observed by an officer during a lawful investigative stop). Consequently,
the suspect does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy that would
prevent opening the container or field testing its contents. Id.
5.7 CRITERIA FOR FALLING WITHIN THE "PLAIN VIEW" EXCEPTION
The plain view doctrine has been used to justify the seizure of ob-
jects without a warrant. The following sections discuss the criteria for
falling within the exception to the warrant requirement in the second and
third situations mentioned at the beginning of section 5.6: (1) the discov-
ery and seizure of an object after entry into a constitutionally protected
area and (2) the entry into a protected area and the seizure of an object
that was viewed from an unprotected area.
5.7(a) Discovery of Object in Plain View Following Entry into
Constitutionally Protected Area
The most common plain view situation occurs when the officer
lawfully enters a constitutionally protected area and unexpectedly dis-
covers incriminating evidence. See, e.g., State v. Rodriguez, 65 Wn. App.
409, 416, 828 P.2d 636, 640 (1992).
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What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police offi-
cer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the
course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the
prior justification-whether it be a warrant for another object, hot
pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate
reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against
the accused-and permits the warrantless seizure .... [T]he exten-
sion of the original jurisdiction is legitimate only where it is imme-
diately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them;
the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to extend a general ex-
ploratory search from one object to another until something in-
criminating at last emerges.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,466,91 S. Ct. 2022,2038,29
L. Ed. 2d 564, 583 (1971).
For a warrantless seizure to fall within the plain view exception, the
following two requirements must be met: (1) The police must have a
prior justification for the intrusion into the constitutionally protected area
and (2) the police must immediately realize that the object they observe
is evidence-that is, the incriminating character of the evidence must be
immediately apparent. State v. Myers, 117 Wn.2d 332, 346, 815 P.2d
761, 769 (1991). Previously, courts imposed a third requirement: The
discovery of the incriminating evidence must be inadvertent. See id.
However, neither Article I, Section 7, nor the Fourth Amendment still
require inadvertent discovery to justify a seizure under the plain view
exception. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 130, 110 S. Ct. 2301,
2304, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112, 118-19 (1990) (concluding that inadvertent
discovery is no longer a requirement under the Fourth Amendment); see
infra § 5.7(a)(2) (discussing Washington's adoption of Horton).
5.7(a)(1) Prior Justification for Intrusion
The plain view doctrine applies only when the police are justified in
occupying the position from which they observe the illegal object or ac-
tivity. State v. Dykstra, 84 Wn. App 186, 191 n.4, 926 P.2d 929, 932 n.4
(1996). Thus, if an initial entry into a residence or onto property is ille-
gal, confiscation of evidence will constitute an illegal seizure. Id.; see
also State v. Daugherty, 94 Wn.2d 263, 269, 616 P.2d 649, 652 (1980),
rejected on other grounds in State v. Hill, 123 Wn.2d 641, 870 P.2d 313
(1994). Similarly, when the initial stop of a vehicle is unlawful-the po-
lice therefore having no right to be in a position to observe the vehicle's
interior-the observation of contraband within the vehicle constitutes an
unlawful search. State v. Lesnick, 84 Wn.2d 940, 942-43, 530 P.2d 243,
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245 (1975). See also Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 9, 102 S. Ct.
812, 818, 70 L. Ed. 2d 778, 787 (1982), on remand to 100 Wn.2d 814,
676 P.2d 419 (1984).
Because the plain view exception to the warrant requirement rests
on the lawfulness of the officer's presence, plain view cases will have
different outcomes under the federal and state constitutions when the two
constitutions differ as to that lawfulness. For example, when an officer
has accompanied an arrestee to the arrestee's dormitory room and fol-
lows the arrestee into the room, the inspection of objects within the room
may be lawful under the Fourth Amendment, yet unlawful under Article
I, Section 7. Chrisman, 455 U.S. at 9, 102 S. Ct. at 817-18, 70 L. Ed. 2d
at 785-87 (Fourth Amendment permits officer to accompany arrestee
wherever arrestee goes), on remand to 100 Wn.2d at 822 (Article 1, Sec-
tion 7 prohibits officer from entering misdemeanor arrestee's home
unless officer can demonstrate threat to own safety, possibility of de-
struction of evidence of misdemeanor charged, or strong likelihood of
escape).
5.7(a)(2) Inadvertent Discovery
Under the Fourth Amendment, the plain view exception previously
did not apply when an officer expected to find the incriminating object;
the officer had to discover the object inadvertently. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at
471, 91 S. Ct. at 2040-41, 29 L. Ed. 2d at 586. However, the United
States Supreme Court has held that, "even though inadvertence is a char-
acteristic of most legitimate 'plain-view' seizures, it is not a necessary
condition." Horton, 496 U.S. at 130, 110 S. Ct. at 2304, 110 L. Ed. 2d at
118-19. Thus, under Horton, an object may be seized under the plain
view exception if an officer has the subjective expectation that she will
find evidence in a location where she is conducting a lawful search. See
id. The discovery does not have to be an unexpected surprise. Id. at 138-
40, 110 S. Ct. at2309-10, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 124-25.
Washington courts have adopted the Horton approach to the plain
view exception and no longer require the inadvertence prong under Coo-
lidge. See State v. Hudson, 124 Wn.2d 107, 114 n.1, 874 P.2d 160, 164
n.1 (1994) (noting the Horton revision to the plain view test); State v.
Goodin, 67 Wn. App. 623, 627-30, 838 P.2d 135, 138-39 (1992) (dis-
cussing Horton and suggesting that the inadvertence requirement was
never explicitly required under Article I, Section 7). Recent cases set
forth the test for the plain view exception as articulated in Horton:
For evidence to be admissible under the "plain view" doctrine, the
prosecution must prove that (1) the officer lawfully occupied the
vantage point from which the evidence was discovered, (2) the offi-
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cer immediately recognized the incriminating character of the object
seized, and, (3) the officer had a lawful right of access to the object
itself.
State v. Tzintzun-Jimenez, 72 Wn. App. 852, 855-56, 866 P.2d 667, 669
(1994).
Thus, in Washington, the focus of the third prong of the test for
admissibility under the "plain feel" exception is now on the officer's
lawful access to the object seized, rather than his or her subjective state
of mind at the time of the search. See id.; infra § 5.9(c) for discussion of
"plain feel." But see State v. Mierz, 72 Wn. App. 783, 786 n.2, 866 P.2d
65, 68 n.2, 875 P.2d 1228 (1994) (listing the requirements of the plain
view exception as prior justification, immediate knowledge, and inadver-
tent discovery).
5.7(a)(3) Immediate Knowledge:
Incriminating Character Immediately Apparent
The plain view exception applies only when the police immediately
recognize the incriminating nature of the object seized. Coolidge, 403
U.S. at 466, 91 S. Ct. at 2038, 29 L. Ed. 2d at 583. For example, the dis-
covery of a shotgun in a bombing suspect's bedroom did not come within
the plain view doctrine, despite the validity of entry under warrant, be-
cause it was not immediately apparent to the FBI officers that the shot-
gun was evidence of a crime. State v. Cotten, 75 Wn. App. 669, 683, 879
P.2d 971, 979 (1994). See also State v. Murray, 84 Wn.2d 527, 534, 527
P.2d 1303, 1307 (1974) (a warrantless entry into an apartment to search
for stolen office equipment was justified because the owner gave con-
sent; however, seizure of a television under the plain view doctrine not
justified because evidence of the television being stolen was not readily
apparent--officers tilted the television to obtain serial numbers); State v.
Gocken, 71 Wn. App. 267, 278, 857 P.2d 1074, 1081-82 (1993) (a war-
rantless entry was justified under the emergency exception because evi-
dence of foul play was immediately apparent). See generally 2 Wayne R.
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.11 (d) (4th ed. 2004).
If an object has to be moved or tampered with in any way to deter-
mine whether it is evidence of a crime, the "immediately apparent" prong
of the plain view test will fail. See, e.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321,
328, 107 S. Ct. 1149, 1154, 94 L. Ed. 2d 347, 356 (1987) (the scope of
plain view was exceeded when police lifted stereo components to read
serial numbers). Police must connect items to a crime based solely on
what is exposed to their view; there is a distinction between "'looking' at
a suspicious object in plain view and 'moving' it even a few inches." Id.
at 325, 107 S. Ct. at 1152, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 354. See generally 2 LaFave,
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supra, §§ 4.11 (b), at 687-91, 4.11 (c), at 691-98 (suggesting that officers
must be aware of facts that justify a reasonable suspicion that the items
are incriminating in order to inspect items and that officers must have
probable cause in order to seize the items).
The officer's knowledge that the object is evidence of a crime need
not be certain to lawfully seize; it is sufficient that the officer has prob-
able cause to believe that the object or substance constitutes incriminat-
ing evidence. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741, 103 S. Ct. 1535,
1543, 75 L. Ed. 2d. 502, 513 (1983) (interpreting the term "immediately
apparent" to mean "requiring probable cause in the ordinary case"); State
v. Sistrunk, 57 Wn. App. 210, 214, 787 P.2d 937, 939 (1990). Thus, in
State v. Gonzales, a clear vial of capsules and pills, "viewed in context"
of other items of drug paraphernalia, was properly seized, even though
consent was given only for jewelry and other items. 46 Wn. App. 388,
400-01, 731 P.2d 1101, 1108-09 (1986). On the other hand, a closed
brown paper bag containing marijuana was improperly seized since its
weight immediately indicated that it could not contain items within the
scope of consent, and the marijuana was clearly not within plain view.
Id. at 400; see also Sistrunk, 57 Wn. App. at 214 (no probable cause to
seize empty beer cans in open view when the condition of cans was con-
sistent with driver's explanation that they had been picked up for recy-
cling); State v. Anderson, 41 Wn. App. 85, 96, 702 P.2d 481, 490 (1985),
rev'd on other grounds, 107 Wn.2d 745, 733 P.2d 517 (1987) (although
warrant was limited to a search for clothing, police properly seized
weapons and weapon components discovered within the allowable area
of the search that were probable instrumentalities of the crime under in-
vestigation).
A useful synthesis of Washington cases and doctrine pertaining to
the issue of when an object's incriminating nature is immediately appar-
ent is found in State v. Legas, 20 Wn. App. 535, 542, 581 P.2d 172, 176
(1978) (officers may inspect for serial numbers on radio equipment when
they have a well-founded suspicion that the equipment is stolen, based
upon knowledge of other stolen property on the premises, past criminal
activities of the person having access to the premises, and a peculiarly
large quantity of equipment). See also State v. McCrea, 22 Wn. App.
526, 528, 590 P.2d 367, 368 (1979) (when federal officers executing a
warrant for a machine gun came upon items they thought might be con-
trolled substances and called local officers to identify items, seizure was
unlawful because the incriminating nature was not immediately apparent
to the federal officers, and local officers had no prior justification for
intrusion); State v. Keefe, 13 Wn. App. 829, 832-35, 537 P.2d 795, 797-
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99 (1975) (a typewriter sample could not be seized under the plain view
doctrine while police executed a search warrant for a stolen gun).
Under the plain view doctrine, officers may seize objects that have
a "sufficient nexus" with the crime under investigation or that will aid in
apprehension or conviction of a suspect. State v. Stenson, 132 Wn.2d
668, 695, 940 P.2d 1239, 1254 (1997); State v. Terrovona, 105 Wn.2d.
632, 648, 716 P.2d 295, 303 (1986); State v. Turner, 18 Wn. App. 727,
729, 571 P.2d 955, 957 (1977).
An officer's knowledge and experience is relevant to determining
whether an object is legally seized under the plain view exception. An-
dresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 483, 96 S. Ct. 2737, 2749, 49 L. Ed.
2d 627, 644 (1976) (use of specially trained investigators supported the
seizure of business records with nexus to crime under investigation).
Thus, an officer's experience and knowledge that plastic baggies are
common receptacles for marijuana will enable the officer to immediately
recognize the incriminating nature of a baggie, even when its contents
are not observed. State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 13, 726 P.2d 445, 452
(1986).
5. 7(b) Seizure of Object from Protected Area After
Observing Object from Nonprotected Area
The "open view" doctrine applies where the police officer is in a
public or nonprotected area at the time of observation of contraband
within a constitutionally protected area. The officer's mere visual obser-
vation, without physical intrusion, does not constitute a "search" because
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in objects observed where
the open view doctrine is satisfied. State v. Rose, 128 Wn.2d 388, 392,
909 P.2d 280, 283 (1996); State v. Seagull, 95 Wn.2d 898, 902, 632 P.2d
44, 47 (1981). See also State v. Campbell, 103 Wn.2d 1, 23, 691 P.2d
929, 942 (1984) (when an officer peered into the defendant's car on a
public street and saw blood on the door handle and jewelry similar to that
observed at a homicide scene, his observation fell within the open view
doctrine); 1 LaFave, supra, § 2.2(a), at 448-49.
An officer who enters a constitutionally protected area to seize an
object observed from outside the area under the open view doctrine can-
not then justify his warrantless seizure under the plain view doctrine.
Mierz, 72 Wn. App. at 791 n.6; State v. Ferro, 64 Wn. App. 181, 182,
824 P.2d 500, 501 (1992) (lawful aerial observation of marijuana plants
did not justify a warrantless intrusion onto the property and seizure of the
plants).
[P]lain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure
of evidence. This is simply a corollary of the familiar principle...
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that no amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless search or
seizure absent "exigent circumstances." Incontrovertible testimony
of the senses that an incriminating object is on premises belonging
to a criminal suspect may establish the fullest possible measure of
probable cause. But even where the object is contraband, this Court
has repeatedly stated and enforced the basic rule that the police may
not enter and make a warrantless seizure.
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 468, 91 S. Ct. at 2039, 29 L. Ed. 2d at 584 (em-
phasis added). See also Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1, 5-6, 52 S.
Ct. 466, 467, 76 L. Ed. 951, 953 (1932) (although police were standing
where they had a right to be when they looked through a small opening
in a garage and saw contraband, their warrantless entry to seize the con-
traband was unconstitutional).
Thus, a police officer who lawfully observes contraband within a
constitutionally protected area may enter the area without a warrant only
if the officer can justify the entry by one of the other exceptions to the
warrant requirement. See State v. Drumhiller, 36 Wn. App. 592, 596-97,
675 P.2d 631, 633 (1984) (defendant was observed through a window
snorting cocaine; exigent circumstances justified warrantless entry); I
LaFave, supra, § 2.2(a), at 450-52. See also State v. O'Herron, 153 N.J.
Super. 570, 582-83, 380 A.2d 728, 734 (1977) (warrantless entry into
defendant's vegetable garden to seize lawfully observed marijuana plants
was unconstitutional where no warrant exception was shown).
5.7(c) Curtilage as a Protected Area
The curtilage of a residence is defined as that area "so intimately
tied to the home itself that it should be placed under the 'umbrella' of
Fourth Amendment protection." United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294,
300-01, 107 S. Ct. 1134, 1139-40, 94 L. Ed. 2d 326, 334-35 (1987). As
such, heightened Fourth Amendment protection extends to a home's cur-
tilage. State v. Ridgway, 57 Wn. App. 915, 918, 790 P.2d 1263, 1265
(1990). Visual and other open view observations made by police from
the curtilage have been upheld in Washington under both the Fourth
Amendment and Article I, Section 7. See State v. Smith, 118 Wn. App.
480, 484-85, 93 P.3d 877, 879 (2003) (a person does not have a reason-
able expectation of privacy in areas of a home's curtilage impliedly open
to the public). Police conducting legitimate business may enter areas of a
home's curtilage that are impliedly open. State v. Ross, 141 Wn.2d 304,
312, 4 P.3d 130, 135 (2000). In connection with an investigation, officers
may approach a residence from any common access route "apparently
open to the public, such as the driveway [or] the walkway." State v.
Dodson, 110 Wn. App. 112, 123, 39 P.3d 324, 331 (2002). In essence,
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officers may intrude to the same extent as any reasonably respectful citi-
zen and they may do so with their "eyes open." State v. Petty, 48 Wn.
App. 615, 620, 740 P.2d 879, 882 (1987); Seagull, 95 Wn.2d at 902. See
also Rose, 128 Wn.2d at 394 (no reasonable expectation of privacy in
what is viewed through uncurtained windows). For an in-depth discus-
sion of cases upholding intentional viewing by police officers at resi-
dences through unobstructed windows, see Rose, 128 Wn.2d at 394-97.
The facts of each case determine whether a portion of the curtilage
is impliedly open to the public. State v. Hornback, 73 Wn. App. 738,
743, 871 P.2d 1075, 1078 (1994). Factors to be considered in determin-
ing whether an officer exceeded the scope of "open view" include
whether the officer: (1) spied into the house; (2) acted secretly; (3) ap-
proached the house in daylight; (4) used the normal, most direct access
route to the house; (5) attempted to talk to the resident; (6) created an
artificial vantage point; and (7) made the discovery accidentally. Myers,
117 Wn.2d at 345. A court will not apply these factors as a fixed for-
mula. Ross, 141 Wn.2d at 309 n. 1. The posting of "no trespassing" signs
is not dispositive on the issue of privacy, but is an additional factor that
may be considered. State v. Gave, 77 Wn. App. 333, 338, 890 P.2d 1088,
1091 (1995); Hornback, 73 Wn. App. at 744; State v. Johnson, 75 Wn.
App. 692, 702, 879 P.2d 984, 990 (1994).
The open view doctrine applies when officers approach a suspect's
residence during daylight, by a direct access, and with no spying or se-
cretive actions, but not when police activity exceeds reasonable bounds.
See Myers, 117 Wn.2d at 345 (officer approached the home during day-
light via the most direct access route); Dykstra, 84 Wn. App. at 193
(open view inapplicable where police officers climbed onto the back
porch at 3:00 a.m., despite the homeowner's protests, yanked the door
out of the homeowner's hands, and entered the dwelling). See also
Hornback, 73 Wn. App. at 743 (scope of open view exceeded where of-
ficers substantially and unreasonably departed from the area of curtilage
impliedly open to the public by entering into a side yard); State v. Graf-
flus, 74 Wn. App. 23, 28, 871 P.2d 1115, 1118 (1994) (marijuana bud
observed in a partially opened garbage can in the curtilage area did not
exceed the scope of open view); State v. Hepton, 113 Wn. App. 673,
676-77, 54 P.3d 233, 236 (2002) (no reasonable expectation of privacy
in garbage bags left in front of neighboring abandoned house). Cf State
v. Sweeney, - P.3d __, No. 22439-2-III, 2005 WL 353246, at *4
(Wn. App. Div. 3 Feb. 15, 2005) (illegal search where suspect's curbside
garbage was collected separately by garbage collector, taken a block
away, and then made available for inspection by a police detective).
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5.7(d) Open Field as a Protected Area
Open fields are not entitled to protection from unreasonable search
and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Oliver v. United States, 466
U.S. 170, 179, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1741, 80 L. Ed. 2d 214, 224 (1984). In
contrast, Washington courts have accepted the notion that an open field
can be subject to an unreasonable search and seizure. See Johnson, 75
Wn. App. at 707. Under Article I, Section 7, a case-by-case analysis de-
termines whether a particular search and seizure unconstitutionally in-
trudes into a person's private affairs. Id.; see State v. Hansen, 42 Wn.
App. 755, 761, 714 P.2d 309, 314 (1986) (warrantless search of a garden
upheld under Article I, Section 7 and open fields doctrine where the field
was not posted and contents were clearly visible to any passerby); State
v. Myrick, 102 Wn.2d 506, 513-14, 688 P.2d 151, 155 (1984) (aerial
surveillance of marijuana from 1,500 feet without visual enhancement
devices did not violate Article I, Section 7). See also Johnson, 75 Wn.
App. at 707-08 (conduct of DEA agents violated Article I, Section 7
when they acted in concert with state officials and trespassed on prop-
erty, ignoring property owner's fence, gate, and no trespassing signs);
State v. Crandall, 39 Wn. App. 849, 854, 697 P.2d 250, 253 (1985) (iso-
lated trespass by a deputy into an open, unposted field frequented by
hunters did not violate Article I, Section 7). But see Dodson, 110 Wn.
App. at 123 (explaining that the presence of"no trespassing" signs is not
dispositive of homeowner's reasonable expectation of privacy); State v.
Thorson, 98 Wn. App. 528, 536, 990 P.2d 446, 450 (1999) (officers'
search of rural wooded property on island invalid because, "[u]nlike the
field in Crandall, Thorson's property was not frequented or traversed by
uninvited persons. Although part of the island's trail system crossed
Thorson's land, the unrebutted evidence is that the footpaths were used,
by permission, only by other residents of the island, and are not for use
as public ways").
5.8. PLAIN VIEW: AIDING THE SENSES
WITH ENHANCEMENT DEVICES
"It is clear that the police with legitimate business may enter areas
of curtilage which are impliedly open. In so doing, the police are free to
use their senses." State v. Thompson, 151 Wn.2d 793, 807, 92 P.3d 228,
235 (2004) (quoting State v. Seagull, 95 Wn.2d 898, 902, 632 P.2d 44,
47 (1981)). Under both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 7,
the police may use flashlights to aid their observations, provided that (1)
the observation is from a location where the officer has a right to be and
(2) the observation could have taken place without flashlights in day-
light. State v. Rose, 128 Wn.2d 388, 400-01, 909 P.2d 280, 287 (1996)
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(no unlawful search when police used a flashlight from the lawful van-
tage point of the front porch; marijuana was observed in plain view
through an unobstructed window). The use of flashlights is permitted on
the theory that what is observed with the aid of a flashlight is "no more
invasive than observations with natural eyesight during daylight would
have been." Id. See also State v. Young, 28 Wn. App. 412, 417, 624 P.2d
725, 729 (1981) (tools suspected of being used in a robbery were prop-
erly seized when an officer observed the tools after shining a flashlight
on the front seat of a car with the door left open). See generally United
States v. Booker, 461 F.2d 990, 992 (6th Cir. 1972); Marshall v. United
States, 422 F.2d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 1970); 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search
and Seizure § 2.2(b) (4th ed. 2004).
The rule governing magnification is similar to the one governing
the use of flashlights. Under both the Fourth Amendment and Article I,
Section 7, the police may use binoculars and telescopes to observe ob-
jects in the open and subject them to some scrutiny by the naked eye
from the same location, or to observe objects that they lawfully could
have observed from a closer location. State v. Jones, 33 Wn. App. 275,
277, 653 P.2d 1369, 1370-71 (1982); see also State v. Manly, 85 Wn.2d
120, 125, 530 P.2d 306, 309 (1975); State v. Ludvik, 40 Wn. App. 257,
264, 698 P.2d 1064, 1069 (1985). See generally 1 LaFave, supra, §
2.2(c). The magnification rule is based on the theory that the sense-
enhancing capability of binoculars and telescopes merely provides in-
formation that could have been otherwise obtained. State v. Young, 123
Wn.2d 173, 183 n.1, 867 P.2d 593, 598 n.1 (1994). Consequently, the
rule does not permit enhanced observations that enable an officer to ob-
serve objects or activities that could not have been observed by the naked
eye; in these circumstances, the defendant may have a legitimate expec-
tation of privacy in the objects or activities. See, e.g., United States v.
Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252, 1254-56 (D. Haw. 1976) (plain view exception
does not apply to FBI agents' use of 800-millimeter telescope to observe
activities in the defendant's apartment one-quarter mile away when no
observation was possible from a closer location); State v. Kender, 60
Haw. 301, 306-07, 588 P.2d 447, 450-51 (1978) (plain view exception
did not apply where an officer climbed a neighbor's fence to view the
defendant's backyard, which otherwise would have been concealed by a
fence and heavy foliage). But see Commonwealth v. Hernley, 216 Pa.
Super. 177, 180, 263 A.2d 904 (1970) (applying the plain view exception
to a binocular observation from atop a four-foot ladder of activity that
could not have been seen with the naked eye).
A particularly intrusive method of viewing that reveals evidence
not exposed to the general public may be considered a search. See Kyllo
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v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 2046, 150 L. Ed. 2d
94, 106 (2001) (holding that the use of a thermal imaging device that is
not in general public use to explore details of the home that would previ-
ously have been unknowable without physical intrusion turns surveil-
lance into a search and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant);
Young, 123 Wn.2d at 182-84. For example, the Washington Supreme
Court has held that the warrantless infrared surveillance of a home vio-
lates both Article I, Section 7 and the Fourth Amendment because the
heat distribution patterns detected were undetectable by the naked eye or
other senses. Id. at 183; cf United States v. Penny-Feeny, 773 F. Supp.
220, 225-28 (D. Haw. 1991) (upholding infrared surveillance of naviga-
ble airspace above defendant's residence).
Aerial surveillance is generally not considered to be an enhance-
ment that gives rise to a search violating the Fourth Amendment or Arti-
cle I, Section 7, so long as the search occurs from public, navigable air-
space and is conducted in a physically unintrusive fashion. California v.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-15, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1813-14, 90 L. Ed. 2d.
210, 217-18 (1986); State v. Myrick, 102 Wn.2d 506, 513-14, 688 P.2d
151, 155 (1984) (holding aerial surveillance of open fields at 1,500 feet
without the use of visual enhancement not unreasonably intrusive); State
v. Wilson, 97 Wn. App. 578, 581, 988 P.2d 463, 465 (1999) ("Aerial sur-
veillance is not a search where the contraband is identifiable with the
unaided eye, from a lawful vantage point, and from a nonintrusive alti-
tude."). But see Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451-52, 109 S. Ct. 693,
697, 102 L. Ed. 2d 835, 842-43 (1989) (suggesting an aerial surveillance
might violate the Fourth Amendment if it revealed "intimate details" or
caused "excessive noise or other disturbances"); Dow Chem. Co. v.
United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1827, 90 L. Ed. 2d
226, 238 (1986) (upholding high-altitude aerial photographic surveil-
lance by the EPA).
5.9 EXTENSIONS OF THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE
5.9(a) Plain Hearing
Courts in other jurisdictions have recognized a "plain hearing" ana-
log to the plain view doctrine. Defendants have been held to have no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy regarding motel room conversations that
are overheard with unaided ears in the motel room next door. See United
States v. Jackson, 588 F.2d 1046, 1051-52 (5th Cir. 1979); see also
United States v. Baranek, 903 F.2d 1068, 1071 (6th Cir. 1990) (inadver-
tently intercepted nontelephonic conversations were authorized under
"plain view" exception to the warrant requirement); State v. Texeira, 62
2005]
Seattle University Law Review
Haw. 44, 49, 609 P.2d 131 (1980) (aural observations of gambling activi-
ties admissible when overheard by officer who trespassed on adjacent
property to gain vantage point); State v. Gil, 208 Wis. 2d 531, 545-46,
561 N.W.2d 760 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (surveillance evidence of at-
tempted robbery and attempted homicide admissible under "plain hear-
ing" exception). Use of hearing enhancement devices may "raise very
different and far more serious questions" from visual enhancement de-
vices when determining the reasonable expectation of the privacy of de-
fendants and, consequently, when determining whether a warrant is re-
quired. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238-39, 106 S.
Ct. 1819, 1827, 90 L. Ed. 2d 226, 238 (1986).
In Washington, eavesdropping by means of an electronic device or
the interception of private telephone, telegraph, radio, or other electronic
communications is governed by Washington's Violating Right of Privacy
Act, RCW 9.73. Tape recordings made by federal agents pursuant to the
federal wiretap statute are inadmissible in state court when the recordings
are made in violation of the Washington statute. State v. Williams, 94
Wn.2d 531, 541, 617 P.2d 1012, 1018 (1980). Police testimony about
such recorded conversation is also inadmissible. Cf infra § 7.3(c) (dis-
cussing the use of illegally obtained evidence at probable cause hear-
ings); see also Tara McGraw Swaminatha, The Fourth Amendment Un-
plugged: Electronic Evidence Issues & Wireless Defenses: Wireless
Crooks & the Wireless Internet Users Who Enable Them, 7 Yale Symp.
L. & Tech. 51 (2004/2005).
5.9(b) Plain Smell
Courts have generally accepted the "plain smell" exception as a
branch of the plain view doctrine. Thus, odor has been used to justify
warrantless entries and seizures so long as the officer was lawfully in the
location where the odor was detected. See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, _
U.S. , -, 125 S. Ct. 834, 845, - L. Ed. 2d _, _ (2005) (war-
rantless search of car trunk valid when dog sniff of exterior of car de-
tected drugs inside trunk and when police lawfully pulled car over for
traffic stop); United States v. Morin, 949 F.2d 297, 300 (10th Cir. 1991)
(odor of marijuana can justify a search of an automobile or luggage);
United States v. Lueck, 678 F.2d 895, 903 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (contents of
packages could be inferred where the packages "reeked of marijuana");
United States v. Pagan, 395 F. Supp. 1052, 1061 (D.P.R. 1975) (explain-
ing that the plain view doctrine has been expanded to cover evidence
perceived by sense of smell); Mazen v. Seidel, 189 Ariz. 195, 200-01,
940 P.2d 923 (1997) (smell of burning marijuana is an exigent circum-
stance justifying warrantless entry); People v. Mendez, 948 P.2d 105, 108
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(Colo. Ct. App. 1997) (legislature never intended to bar a finding of
probable cause based on smell of burning marijuana); People v. Kaz-
mierczak, 461 Mich. 411, 413, 605 N.W.2d 667 (2000) (smell of mari-
juana alone by a person qualified to know the odor may establish prob-
able cause to search a motor vehicle). But see United States v. Fernan-
dez, 943 F. Supp. 295, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (odor of marijuana noticed
on defendant during Terry stop and frisk did not justify search inside
clothing). See generally 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure §
2.2(a), at 454-55 (4th ed. 2004).
Washington has permitted the warrantless seizure of an object
based on its odor when the odor established probable cause or when the
odor was in "open view." See State v. Myers, 117 Wn.2d 332, 345, 815
P.2d 761, 769 (1991) (odor of marijuana was in "open view"); State v.
Huckaby, 15 Wn. App. 280, 290-91, 549 P.2d 35, 42 (1976); see also
State v. Hammone, 24 Wn. App. 596, 599, 603 P.2d 377, 379 (1979)
(marijuana odor emanating from vehicle); State v. Compton, 13 Wn.
App. 863, 864-65, 538 P.2d 861, 861-62 (1975) (smell of marijuana and
discovery of greenish-brown vegetable substance was a legal warrantless
search). Odor can also support a warrantless entry and can serve as prob-
able cause for a search warrant. See State v. Gave, 77 Wn. App. 333,
336, 890 P.2d 1088, 1090 (1995) (odor of marijuana supported warrant
probable cause requirement); State v. Gocken, 71 Wn. App. 267, 278,
857 P.2d 1074, 1081 (1993) (odor of decaying flesh justified warrantless
entry at homicide scene).
5.9(c) Plain Feel
The "plain feel" or "plain touch" doctrine has been recognized as a
corollary of the plain view doctrine. Under the plain touch exception to
the warrant requirement, police may seize nonthreatening contraband
detected through the officer's sense of touch during a legitimate patdown
search so long as the search does not exceed the scope delineated by
Terry. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375-76, 113 S. Ct. 2130,
2136-37, 124 L. Ed. 2d 334, 345-46 (1993); cf Bond v. United States,
529 U.S. 334, 337-39, 120 S. Ct. 1462, 1464-65, 146 L. Ed. 2d 365, 338
(2000) (border patrol agent's exploratory manipulation of bus passen-
ger's opaque bag violated the Fourth Amendment). The object will be
admissible only if its "contour or mass makes its identity immediately
apparent." Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 365-76, 113 S. Ct. at 2136-37, 124
L.Ed. 2d at 345-46. However, any "squeezing, sliding or otherwise ma-
nipulating" the object extends the search beyond the scope of Terry, thus
rendering the search constitutionally invalid. Id. at 378, 113 S. Ct. at
2138, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 347.
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For examples of cases in other jurisdictions applying the Dickerson
plain touch rule, see United States v. Rivers, 121 F.3d 1043, 1047 (7th
Cir. 1997) (seizure of crack cocaine from pocket of defendant permissi-
ble under "plain feel" doctrine); State v. Ashley, 37 F.3d 678, 681 (D.C.
Cir. 1994) (crack cocaine was admissible when found in the defendant's
underwear during consensual search); United States v. Schiavo, 29 F.3d
6, 9 (1st Cir. 1994) (search was impermissible where the officer con-
cluded that no weapon was present and yet continued to explore the bag
in the defendant's jacket); State v. Denis, 691 So. 2d 1295, 1300 (La. Ct.
App. 1997) (finding no justification under "plain feel" for the seizure of
a bag of cocaine when the officer testified that he did not believe the
bulge in the defendant's waistband was a weapon).
5.10 CONSENT SEARCHES: INTRODUCTION
A warrantless search is constitutional when valid consent is
granted. Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 9-10, 102 S. Ct. 812, 818,
70 L. Ed. 2d 778, 787 (1982); State v. Cantrell, 124 Wn.2d 183, 187, 875
P.2d 1208, 1210 (1994). A valid consent search requires that (1) the con-
sent be "voluntary," (2) the consent be granted by a party having the au-
thority to consent, and (3) the search be limited to the scope of the con-
sent granted. State v. Hastings, 119 Wn.2d 229, 234, 830 P.2d 658, 661
(1992). See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.1 (4th
ed. 2004). Furthermore, while the Fourth Amendment does not require
targets of searches to be told they have the right to refuse the search,
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 2114, 153
L. Ed. 2d 242, 255 (2002), Article I, Section 7 of the Washington Consti-
tution provides heightened protection against unreasonable searches.
Thus, "where the State seeks to justify a search on the basis of consent, it
has the burden of showing that the consent was voluntary, an essential
element of which is knowledge of the right to refuse consent." State v.
Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d 103, 116, 960 P.2d 927, 933 (1998) (quoting State v.
Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 353-54, 346 A.2d 66 (1975) (alteration in origi-
nal)).
5.11. VOLUNTARINESS OF CONSENT: BURDEN OF PROOF
The State has the burden of proving that consent to a search was
given voluntarily. State v. Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d 103, 116, 960 P.2d 927,
933 (1998) (citing State v. Smith, 115 Wn.2d 775, 789, 801 P.2d 975,
983 (1990)). The level of proof required is "clear and convincing evi-
dence." Smith, 115 Wn.2d at 789. For a discussion of the distinctions
between voluntary consent and waiver of constitutional rights, see gener-
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ally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.1(a), at 598-606 (4th
ed. 2004).
5.12 FACTORS CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING VOLUNTARINESS
The validity or voluntariness of a consent to search is analyzed in a
similar manner as the voluntariness of a confession. See Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2058-59, 36 L. Ed.
2d 854, 875 (1973). But cf State v. Wethered, 110 Wn.2d 466, 471, 755
P.2d 797, 800 (1988) (consent to search is distinguished from testimonial
admissions since the former is consistent with innocence). In Washing-
ton, the issue "is clearly an interest of local concern . . . due to '[t]he
heightened protection afforded state citizens against unlawful intrusion
into private dwellings [that] places an onerous burden upon the govern-
ment to show a compelling need to act outside our warrant require-
ment."' State v. Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d 103,114, 960 P.2d 927, 932 (1998)
(quoting State v. Chrisman, 100 Wn.2d 814, 822, 676 P.2d 419, 424
(1984) (alteration in original)).
The Washington Supreme Court adopted the following rule to be
applied when consent to search a home under Article 1, Section 7 is at
issue:
[W]hen police officers conduct a knock and talk for the purpose of
obtaining consent to search a home, and thereby avoid the necessity
of obtaining a warrant, they must, prior to entering the home, in-
form the person[s] from whom consent is sought that [they] may
lawfully refuse to consent to the search and that they can revoke, at
any time, the consent that they give, and can limit the scope of the
consent to certain areas of the home. The failure to provide these
warnings, prior to entering the home, vitiates any consent given
thereafter.
Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d at 118-19; see also RCW 10.31.040 (codification of
knock and announce rule in arrest situation); supra § 3.7.
The Washington Supreme Court has declined to extend the Ferrier
knock and talk rule when police seek entry into a home only to question
a resident in the course of investigating a crime. State v. Khounvichai,
149 Wn.2d 557, 559, 69 P.3d 862, 863 (2003). In other words, police do
not have to give residents warning that they may refuse to consent to a
search or limit the search when the purpose of the visit is to question
residents and not to search for contraband or evidence of a crime. Id.; see
also State v. Tagas, 121 Wn. App. 872, 878, 90 P.3d 1088, 1091-92
(2004) (concluding that under Article I, Section 7, the validity of defen-
dant's consent to the search of her purse did not depend on the officer
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advising her of her right to refuse consent to search). See supra § 3.7 for
discussion of knock and announce rule.
5.12(a) Police Claim ofAuthority to Search
An express or implied claim by the police that they will proceed
immediately to conduct the search even without the individual's consent
is likely to indicate that the subsequent consent was involuntary. See
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550, 88 S. Ct. 1788, 1792, 20
L. Ed. 2d 797, 803 (1968); State v. Browning, 67 Wn. App. 93, 97-98,
834 P.2d 84, 86-87 (1992) (acquiescence to a claim of authority is not
equivalent to free and voluntary consent to a search). See generally 4
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.2(a) (4th ed. 2004).
A threat to seek a warrant if the person refuses to allow a search
does not, however, automatically invalidate consent. See State v. Smith,
115 Wn.2d 775, 790, 801 P.2d 975, 983 (1990) (no coercion where the
defendant was told officers would seek a search warrant if consent was
not given to search the trunk of car); State v. Murray, 84 Wn.2d 527,
534, 527 P.2d 1303, 1307 (1974) (initial intrusion justified where defen-
dant gave consent to enter apartment); State v. Bellows, 72 Wn.2d 264,
267-68, 432 P.2d 654, 656-57 (1967) (officer's search of motel room
justified when defendant gave consent); Thurston County Rental Owners
Ass'n v. Thurston County, 85 Wn. App. 171, 183, 931 P.2d 208, 215
(1997) (threats to obtain a search warrant may invalidate consent when
grounds for obtaining a warrant do not exist; coercion is a question of
fact determined from the totality of circumstances). See generally 4 La-
Fave, supra, § 8.2(c). Police misrepresentation regarding the existence of
a search warrant may invalidate consent to a search or seizure under the
Fourth Amendment. See Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548, 88 S. Ct. at 1790, 20
L. Ed. 2d at 802; State v. McCrorey, 70 Wn. App. 103, 112 n.8, 851 P.2d
1234, 1239 n.8 (1993).
5.12(b) Coercive Surroundings
If the police make a show of force at the time consent is sought, or
if the surroundings are coercive in other respects, the consent will gener-
ally not be considered voluntary. See McNear v. Rhay, 65 Wn.2d 530,
537, 398 P.2d 732, 737 (1965); State v. Dresker, 39 Wn. App. 136, 139,
692 P.2d 846, 848-49 (1984); State v. Werth, 18 Wn. App. 530, 535-36,
571 P.2d 941, 943-44 (1977) (when the defendant was placed under
physical restraint and not informed of the right to refuse consent to
search, and when the police had searched her home illegally without con-
sent two days previously, the defendant did not voluntarily consent to the
search of her home even if she verbalized consent); supra § 1.4(a); cf
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United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 203-04, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 2112,
153 L. Ed. 2d 242, 253 (2002) (surroundings not coercive when police
officers boarded a bus and obtained permission to search where "[t]here
was no application of force, no intimidating movement, no overwhelm-
ing show of force, no brandishing of weapons, no blocking of exits, no
threat, no command, not even an authoritative tone of voice"); INS v.
Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 219, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 1764, 80 L. Ed. 2d 247,
258 (1984) (INS agents in search of illegal aliens, moving systematically
through a factory asking workers about their citizenship while other INS
agents were stationed at the factory exits, did not create a coercive situa-
tion that constituted an illegal seizure to invalidate search). See generally
4 LaFave, supra, § 8.2(b). Coercive effects can, however, "be mitigated
by requiring officers who conduct [knock and talk searches] to wam
home dwellers of their right to refuse consent to a warrantless search."
Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d at 116.
The fact that a defendant is in custody when he consents to a search
does not by itself establish coercion or involuntary consent. United States
v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S. Ct. 820, 828, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598, 609
(1976); McNear, 65 Wn.2d at 538. Consent was held to be voluntary and
uncoerced where the defendant, arrested on the porch of his home in
midwinter wearing only pants and a T-shirt, consented to officers ac-
companying him into his home; the arresting officers had given the de-
fendant the alternative of proceeding to the police station as he was, but
indicated that if he returned inside, they would have to accompany him.
State v. Nelson, 47 Wn. App. 157, 163-64, 734 P.2d 516, 520 (1987).
Defendant's fear that his behavior might appear "crazy" if he accepted
arrest without his jacket and keys was not considered equal to coercion.
Id. at 163. Custodial restraint is, however, a significant factor in assess-
ing voluntariness. See State v. Avila-Avina, 99 Wn. App. 9, 14-15, 991
P.2d 720, 724 (2000) (no valid consent given by someone who was ille-
gally seized by being detained in patrol car four hours after the initial
purpose for detainment had been fulfilled); Werth, 18 Wn. App. at 535-
36; State v. Rodriguez, 20 Wn. App. 876, 881, 582 P.2d 904, 907 (1978).
5.12(c) Awareness of the Constitutional Right to Withhold Consent
Although an individual's knowledge of the right to refuse a search
is taken into account in determining whether consent to a search is volun-
tary, the State may prove that consent was voluntary without establishing
such knowledge. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227, 93 S. Ct. at 2048, 36 L.
Ed. 2d at 863; McCrorey, 70 Wn. App. at 112; see also State v. Shoe-
maker, 85 Wn.2d 207, 212, 533 P.2d 123, 125 (1975); Werth, 18 Wn.
App. at 535-36; cf Rodriguez, 20 Wn. App. at 880-81 (consent was vol-
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untary despite the defendant's assertion that he was not told and did not
know of the right to refuse consent). See generally 4 LaFave, supra, §
8.2(i). Where police seek to justify a warrantless search of a private
home, however, knowledge of the right to refuse consent is an essential
element. Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d at 116. "[T]he only sure way to give such a
protection substance is to require a warning of its existence." Id.
[Police officers] must, prior to entering the home, inform the person
from whom consent is sought that he or she may lawfully refuse to
consent to the search and that they can revoke, at any time, the con-
sent that they give, and can limit the scope of the consent to certain
areas of the home. The failure to provide these warnings, prior to
entering the home, vitiates any consent given thereafter.
Id. at 118-19. But see State v. Bustamante-Davila, 138 Wn.2d 964, 984,
983 P.2d 590, 600 (1999) (Ferrier rule not applicable because police did
not go to suspect's house to search for contraband without a search war-
rant; they simply provided backup to a requesting INS agent when sus-
pect permitted agent and officers into home where officers saw rifle in
plain view).
Washington and the majority of other jurisdictions hold that the
failure to give Miranda warnings to a defendant in custody does not
automatically invalidate a consent to search. Nelson, 47 Wn. App. at 162;
see also MeCrorey, 70 Wn. App. at 111 (whether Miranda warnings
were given is one factor to consider in the totality of the circumstances).
5.12(d) Prior Illegal Police Action
A prior illegal act by the police may suggest that the defendant's
consent was involuntary. See, e.g., Werth, 18 Wn. App. at 535 ("In view
of the additional circumstance that two days before, Werth's home had
been searched illegally without her consent, it is apparent that overall,
the situation was rife with coercion."). See generally 4 LaFave, supra, §
8.2(d). Thus, a prior illegal search or arrest may taint the subsequent con-
sent and thereby render the consent invalid. See generally McCrorey, 70
Wn. App. at 111-12 (prior illegal police activity is one factor when con-
sidering the totality of the circumstances); 4 LaFave, supra, § 8.2(d).
The State has the burden of proving that a consent search was not
obtained by the exploitation of a prior illegal search. Bustamante-Davila,
138 Wn.2d at 981-98.
Whether consent is freely given is a question of fact dependent upon
the totality of the circumstances which includes '(1) whether
Miranda warnings had been given prior to obtaining consent; (2) the
degree of education and intelligence of the consenting person; and
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(3) whether the consenting person had been advised of his right to
consent.' No one factor is dispositive.
Id. (citations omitted); see State v. Jensen, 44 Wn. App. 485, 488, 723
P.2d 443, 445 (1986) (although only two hours intervened between the
search and the consent, the consent was valid because, in the intervening
period, the defendant was advised of his right to refuse consent, had ver-
bally consented twice, was allowed to call his sister, and there was no
evidence that police did anything to frighten or intimidate defendant); see
also Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690, 102 S. Ct. 2664, 2667, 73 L.
Ed. 2d 314, 319 (1982); State v. Tijerina, 61 Wn. App. 626, 629, 811
P.2d 241, 243 (1991).
5.12(e) Maturity, Sophistication, and Mental or Emotional State
The sophistication and emotional state of the defendant are always
considered in assessing the voluntariness of the consent. Schneckloth,
412 U.S. at 248, 93 S. Ct. at 2058, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 875 ("The traditional
definition of voluntariness we accept today has always taken into account
evidence of minimal schooling [and] low intelligence .... "); Shoemaker,
85 Wn.2d at 212 (determination of voluntariness should include consid-
eration of "the degree of education and intelligence of the consenting
person"); see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 558, 100
S. Ct. 1870, 1879, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 512 (1980). See generally 4 LaFave,
supra, § 8.2(e). While the mental condition of a defendant is a significant
factor in determining voluntariness, the presence of mental illness itself
is insufficient to render a consent to search invalid. See State v. Sonder-
gaard, 86 Wn. App. 656, 662, 938 P.2d 351, 354 (1997); cf Colorado v.
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164, 107 S. Ct. 515, 520, 93 L. Ed. 2d 473, 482
(1986) (voices directing the psychotic defendant to confess to murder
were not the result of police coercion).
5.12(9 Prior Cooperation or Refusal to Cooperate
A prior voluntary confession or other type of cooperation with the
police will weigh in favor of a finding that the consent to search was vol-
untary. See State v. Raines, 55 Wn. App. 459, 462, 778 P.2d 538, 541
(1998). A prior refusal to consent to a search will suggest that a subse-
quent consent was not voluntary. See generally 4 LaFave, supra, § 8.2(f).
A suspect's behavior may indicate consent even when verbal con-
sent is withheld. See Raines, 55 Wn. App. at 462 (failure to expressly
object after police requested permission to enter "to look around"
amounted to implied waiver of right to exclude them); State v. Sabbot, 16
Wn. App. 929, 938, 561 P.2d 212, 218-19 (1977) (although the under-
2005]
Seattle University Law Review
cover investigator followed the defendant into the defendant's home after
the defendant had told him to wait outside, the investigator's presence in
house was with the defendant's tacit acquiescence).
5.12(g) Police Deception as to Identity or Purpose
The use of deception by a police officer does not necessarily affect
the voluntariness of a consent to search. Police may use a ruse to gain
entry to a residence to conduct a criminal investigation if they have a
justifiable and reasonable basis to suspect criminal activity within the
residence. State v. Hastings, 119 Wn.2d 229, 233, 830 P.2d 658, 660
(1992) (the defendant had no constitutionally protected expectation of
privacy in the residence where undercover officers had purchased co-
caine); State v. Hashman, 46 Wn. App. 211, 216, 729 P.2d 651, 655
(1986) (a police officer disguised as a building contractor gained entry
into a residence after another officer, who had lawfully been within the
residence, reported evidence of a marijuana-growing operation); see also
State v. Williamson, 42 Wn. App. 208, 211-13, 710 P.2d 205, 207-08
(1985) (the fact that officers concealed their identity and intent to effect
an arrest did not abrogate the validity of consent); State v. Huckaby, 15
Wn. App. 280, 285-88, 549 P.2d 35, 39-41 (1976). See generally 4 La-
Fave, supra, § 8.2 (m)-(n).
5.13 SCOPE OF CONSENT
A consensual search must be limited to the area covered by the au-
thority given by the consenting party. State v. Davis, 86 Wn. App. 414,
423, 937 P.2d 1110, 1115 (1997). The scope of consent may be reduced
in duration, area, or intensity by the express or implied limitation of the
consenting party. Id. Any search exceeding the scope of consent is inva-
lid, since exceeding the scope of consent is considered comparable to
exceeding the scope of a search warrant. Id.; see, e.g., State v. Hendrick-
son, 129 Wn.2d 61, 72, 917 P.2d 563, 568-69 (1996) (consent to search
a vehicle when used as transportation for a work release program did not
extend to a time when defendant was no longer involved in program).
See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8. 1(a) (4th ed.
2004).
Although an object may be outside the limits of a valid consent,
items may be seized so long as the requirements of the plain view doc-
trine are met. See State v. Murray, 84 Wn.2d 527, 534, 527 P.2d 1303,
1307 (1974) (when defendant consented to a search by officers who said
they were looking only for office and video equipment, search could not
include inspection of television serial numbers not in plain view); State
v.Cotten, 75 Wn. App. 669, 683, 879 P.2d 971, 979 (1994) (shotgun dis-
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covered during consensual search did not come within the plain view
doctrine when it was not immediately apparent to FBI officers that the
gun was evidence of a crime); State v. Rodriguez, 65 Wn. App. 409,
416-17, 828 P.2d 636, 640-41 (1992) (boots, towel, and shirt validly
seized during a consensual search of an apartment); supra § 5.7 for dis-
cussion of the plain view doctrine.
Whether a consent to search applies to a later search depends on the
time elapsed between the searches, whether the second search has the
same objectives, and whether the search is conducted by the same offi-
cers. State v. Koepke, 47 Wn. App. 897, 905-06, 738 P.2d 295, 299-300
(1987) (warrant was based on observations made following valid third-
party consent to search a room; later search validated by the original con-
sent, even though the warrant was defective, because the second search
was conducted by the same officer within 24 hours and with the same
objective as the first search).
A general and unqualified consent to search an area for a particular
type of material permits a search of personal property within the area in
which the material could be concealed. For example, in State v. Jensen,
44 Wn. App. 485, 723 P.2d 443 (1986), the defendant consented to a
"complete" search of his vehicle for materials of any evidentiary value.
Officers conducting the search found cocaine in the pocket of a jacket
found in the back seat of the defendant's car. Id. at 444. The court held
that the officers did not exceed the scope of consent since the defendant
had consented to the search for evidence of the size and nature of some-
thing that could reasonably be in the jacket pocket, and he never ex-
pressly or implicitly withheld consent to search his personal belongings
in the car. Id. at 492; see also State v. Mueller, 63 Wn. App. 720, 723-
24, 821 P.2d 1267, 1268-69 (1992) (search of vehicle, including trunk
and gym bag, did not exceed scope of unlimited consent given by defen-
dant). A consensual search is not invalidated if it results in the discovery
of evidence that the consenting party did not expect to be discovered.
State v. Johnson, 40 Wn. App. 371, 382-83, 699 P.2d 221, 229 (1985)
(evidence of suspect's involvement in murder admissible after suspect
signed a voluntary consent form permitting officers to search vehicle;
record did not support suspect's claim that consent was limited to search
for marijuana).
5.14 CONSENT BY THIRD PARTIES
Under appropriate circumstances, warrantless searches may be
based upon the consent of third parties and evidence discovered during
such searches may be used against a nonconsenting defendant. See State
v. Mathe, 102 Wn.2d 537, 543, 688 P.2d 859, 862 (1984). While police
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may legally retrieve and search voluntarily abandoned property, State v.
Reynolds, 144 Wn.2d 282, 287, 27 P.3d 200, 203 (2001), they may not
seize property found in a location where a third party gave consent to
search if police caused that property to be abandoned because of an
unlawful seizure of the property's owner. State v. Reichenbach, 153
Wn.2d 126, 136,101 P.3d 80, 87 (2004).
The validity of third-party consent is affected by both the relation-
ship between the defendant and the third party and by other, more gen-
eral considerations. The general considerations include the following: (1)
the antagonism between the defendant and the third party, 4 Wayne R.
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.3(b), at 149 (4th ed. 2004); (2) the spe-
cific instructions that the defendant may have given to the third party, id.
§ 8.3(b), at 152; and (3) the objection by the defendant when he or she
was present at the time the third party authorized the search, id., § 8.3(d),
at 155.
Under the Fourth Amendment, third-party consent is analyzed un-
der the "common authority" standard articulated in United States v.
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170, 94 S. Ct. 988, 993, 39 L. Ed. 2d. 242, 249
(1974). This standard has been adopted as the proper guide for analyzing
questions of third-party consent under Article I, Section 7. Mathe, 102
Wn.2d at 543. Under this standard, (1) the consenting party must be able
to permit the search in her own right and (2) it must be reasonable to find
that the defendant had assumed the risk that a person with joint control
might permit a search. Id. at 543-44; see also State v. Walker, 136
Wn.2d 678, 682, 965 P.2d 1079, 1082 (1998); Cranwell v. Mesec, 77
Wn. App. 90, 103-04, 890 P.2d 491, 499-500 (1995).
For a discussion of the significance of a police officer's reasonable
mistake that the third party had authority over the place searched, see
United States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522 (9th Cir. 1988); Schikora v.
State, 652 P.2d 473 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982). See generally 4 LaFave,
supra, § 8.3(g).
The following sections discuss the relationships between a defen-
dant and a third party that may give rise to third-party consent.
5.14(a) Defendant's Spouse
Washington cases involving spousal consent are consistent with the
"common authority" approach of Mathe, 102 Wn.2d at 543. The defen-
dant's spouse, having equal use of an object or equal right to occupation
of the premises, may consent to a search of the object or premises. See,
e.g., State v. Gillespie, 18 Wn. App. 313, 317, 569 P.2d 1174, 1176
(1977) (wife gave valid consent to search of husband's army field
jacket); see also Walker, 136 Wn.2d at 679 (wife's consent to search of
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home valid as to her, though invalid as to husband, who arrived prior to
search and was neither asked for consent nor objected to search).
When police request entry pursuant to knock and talk in conducting
a search pursuant to a warrant, see supra § 3.7, the admission of police
by either spouse is valid. See State v. Hartnell, 15 Wn. App. 410, 417-
18, 550 P.2d 63, 68-69 (1976) (wife's invitation to police officer to enter
defendant's house in response to officer's request was consensual entry
requiring no notice of authority or purpose be given to defendant, as or-
dinarily required under knock and announce statute or applicable consti-
tutional provisions). But see State v. Chichester, 48 Wn. App. 257, 261,
738 P.2d 329, 332 (1987) (exigent circumstances needed to justify non-
compliance with knock and announce rule). See generally 4 LaFave, su-
pra, § 8.4(a).
5.14(b) Defendant's Parents
A parent has authority over all rooms of a house and, consequently,
can consent to a search of a dependent child's room whether or not the
child is a minor. State v. Summers, 52 Wn. App. 767, 772, 764 P.2d 250,
253 (1988); see also State v. Cotten, 75 Wn. App. 669, 685, 879 P.2d
971, 981 (1994) (where plain view exception did not apply, defendant's
mother could give valid consent to seizure of shotgun found in defen-
dant's room); State v. Thompson, 17 Wn. App. 639, 644, 564 P.2d 820,
823 (1977) (when defendant's mother, knowing that defendant was to be
placed under arrest, consented without coercion to search of home in
which she and defendant were living, consent was valid). When the child
pays rent and the status of the parent is similar to that of a landlord rather
than a custodial parent, the parent has no authority to consent to a search
of a child's room. Summers, 52 Wn. App. at 771-73; see also State v.
Thompson, 151 Wn.2d 793, 807, 92 P.3d 228, 235 (2004) (adult son liv-
ing on a portion of his parents' property rent free did not have joint con-
trol over all his parents' property, and therefore police did not need to
obtain his consent to search parents' boathouse that he used).
5.14(c) Defendant's Child
The defendant's child, in appropriate circumstances, may consent to
police entry of the parent's home. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 22 Wn. App.
447, 451-52, 591 P.2d 796, 799 (1979) (reasoning that a minor child
may consent to entry, but declining to rule on the legal question of con-
sent to search). For a general discussion of the scope and limitations of a
child's consent to a search of the parent's house, see generally 4 LaFave,
supra, § 8.4(c).
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5.14(d) Co-Tenant or Joint Occupant
A co-tenant or other joint occupant of the defendant's dwelling with
common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or
effects sought to be inspected may give valid consent to a search of the
premises or effects. Matlock, 415 U.S at 171, 94 S. Ct. at 993, 39 L. Ed.
2d at 249-50. The theory behind allowing such a search is that the parties
have equal control over the premises and each assumes the risk that a
cohabitant may permit a search of shared areas in the individual's ab-
sence. Id. at 169-71, 94 S. Ct. at 992-93, 39 L. Ed. 2d at 248-50; Mathe,
102 Wn.2d at 543 (quoting Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7, 94 S. Ct. at 993
n.7, 39 L. Ed. 2d at 250 n.7); State v. Jeffries, 105 Wn.2d 398, 414, 717
P.2d 722, 732 (1986) (common authority rule applicable to validate con-
sent to search a "hobo" camp located outside the city of Wenatchee). See
generally 4 LaFave, supra, § 8.5(c).
Under the common authority rule, once the police have obtained
consent to search from an individual possessing equal control over the
premises, the consent remains valid against a cohabitant who also pos-
sesses equal control, while the cohabitant is absent. State v. Floreck, 111
Wn. App. 135, 142-43, 43 P.3d 1264, 1268 (2002) (quadriplegic home-
owner who had difficulty getting to all parts of the house gave valid con-
sent for search of room used by the homeowner's brother, the defendant,
who had placed a lock on the room without the homeowner's consent;
defendant was not present at time of search). Washington courts have
held that, if both cohabitants are present and able to object, the police
must obtain consent from both residents in order for a search to be valid.
Id; see also State v. Leach, 113 Wn.2d 735, 744, 782 P.2d 1035, 1040
(1989) (search invalid where premises of a business that defendant
shared with his girlfriend were searched; girlfriend consented, but police
failed to ask for defendant's consent when they realized he was present);
State v. Holmes, 108 Wn. App. 511, 520-21, 31 P.3d 716, 721 (2001)
(self-proclaimed coinhabitant's lack of key to residence should have
alerted police to necessity of further inquiry as to whether she had proper
authority to consent to search, given her interest in diverting attention
away from her own criminal activity). But see State v. Hoggatt, 108 Wn.
App. 257, 269, 30 P.3d 488, 494 (2001) (holding that a cohabitant could
consent to police officers entering the living room, as opposed to a bed-
room as in Mathe and Walker or a rear area of an office as in Leach, even
when defendant was present and not objecting because it was an area that
customarily receives visitors).
In some jurisdictions, the defendant's contemporaneous objections
do not invalidate the consent of a cohabitant. See, e.g., People v. Sand-
ers, 904 P.2d 1311, 1314-15 (Colo. 1995); People v. Cosme, 48 N.Y.2d
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286, 292-93, 397 N.E.2d 1319, 422 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1979). The dual con-
sent rule for cohabitants has not been extended to the common authority
shared by a driver and passenger in an automobile. State v. Cantrell, 124
Wn.2d 183, 192, 875 P.2d 1208, 1212-13 (1994) (passenger's consent to
search automobile was sufficient to support warrantless search even
though the defendant-driver did not consent to the search; court noted
that a situation where a co-occupant overtly objected to search was not
before the court).
5.14(e) Landlord, Lessor, or Manager
The lessor or manager of an apartment building may consent to a
search of an area that is not within the lessee's exclusive possession. See,
e.g., State v. Kreck, 86 Wn.2d 112, 123, 542 P.2d 782, 789 (1975)
(search of rented half of garage upheld when police, with permission of
rental manager, searched unrented half, pried off partition separating
halves, and observed bottle of chloroform inside the partition); State v.
Talley, 14 Wn. App. 484, 487, 543 P.2d 348, 351 (1975) (grounds out-
side apartment building were common areas not under exclusive control
of defendant, and thus police could lawfully search grounds with consent
of building manager). A landlord lacks authority to consent to a search
when a tenant has the sole or undisputed possession of leased premises.
State v. Birdsong, 66 Wn. App. 534, 537-39, 832 P.2d 533, 535-36
(1992). This rule applies as well to limited rental arrangements such as
those found in motels, boarding homes, and room rentals. Mathe, 102
Wn.2d at 544; see also George L. Blum, Annotation, Admissibility of
Evidence Discovered in Warrantless Search of Rental Property Author-
ized by Lessor of Such Property-State Cases, 61 A.L.R.5th 1, 124
(1998). Upon expiration of the tenancy, a tenant abandons his or her in-
terest in the property and, likewise, an expectation of privacy. State v.
Christian, 95 Wn.2d 655, 659, 628 P.2d 806, 808 (1981). See generally 4
LaFave, supra, § 8.5(a), at 214-15.
Tenants may consent to searches of common areas under the
"common authority" rule, even over the objection of the landlord. Cran-
well, 77 Wn. App. at 103-04. For additional discussion of consent by a
lessee, see generally 4 LaFave, supra, § 8.5(b).
5.1469 Bailee
A bailee may consent to a search of the bailor's belongings when
the bailee has a sufficient relationship to or degree of control over the
chattel. See State v. Smith, 88 Wn.2d 127, 139-40, 559 P.2d 970, 976
(1977) (when hospital had joint control over patient-defendant's cloth-
ing, hospital ward clerk could consent to police seizure of the clothing);
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cf State v. Bobic, 140 Wn.2d 250, 259, 996 P.2d 610, 616 (2000) (open
view search of stolen goods through a preexisting hole between adjoining
commercial storage units was valid when the manager gave police per-
mission to enter). See generally 4 LaFave, supra, § 8.6(a). For a discus-
sion of consent by a bailor, see generally 4 LaFave, supra, § 8.6(b).
5.14(g) Employee and Employer
Under some circumstances, an employee may give consent to a
search of an employer's premises, and an employer may consent to a
search of the place of employment, even when the belongings of an em-
ployee would be affected. Thus, under the common authority rule analy-
sis, see supra § 5.14, an employer may validly consent to a search of that
portion of the employer's premises used by an employee for personal
purposes. State v. Kendrick, 47 Wn. App. 620, 632-33, 736 P.2d 1079,
1086 (1987) (defendant leased a "crash pad" on premises owned by his
employer; employer controlled guard dogs on the premises, stored per-
sonal and business items there, had keys to the area, and allowed other
employees to use the area). For a discussion of the rules governing con-
sent within the employer-employee relationship, see generally 4 LaFave,
supra, § 8.6(c)-(d).
5.14(h) Hotel Employee
A hotel or motel employee may not grant valid consent to a search
of a guest's room because a motel guest generally has the same expecta-
tion of privacy during his or her tenancy as the renter of a private resi-
dence. State v. Davis, 86 Wn. App. 414, 419, 937 P.2d 1110, 1113
(1997); see also Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489-90, 84 S. Ct.
889, 893, 11 L. Ed. 2d 856, 860-61 (1964); State v. York, 11 Wn. App.
137, 141, 521 P.2d 950, 952 (1974). The hotel guest's expectation of pri-
vacy generally expires at check-out time. See Davis, 86 Wn. App. at 419
(motel guest loses expectation of privacy at the expiration of tenancy
unless late payment has been accepted by the motel or the motel has tol-
erated previous overtime stays).
5.14(i) Host and Guest
A host has the authority to consent to a search of a guest's bedroom
and any other room occupied by the guest. See State v. Rodriguez, 65
Wn. App. 409, 414-15, 828 P.2d 636, 639-40 (1992) (mother could give
valid consent for police search of apartment where son was a temporary
guest; consent extended to bathroom occupied by defendant); Koepke, 47
Wn. App. at 903-04 (apartment tenant gave valid consent to a search of
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the room in which defendant was residing as a guest; defendant paid no
rent). But see State v. Rison, 116 Wn. App. 955, 962, 69 P.3d 362, 365-
66 (2003), review denied, 151 Wn.2d 1008, 87 P.3d 1184 (2004) (ten-
ant's consent to search did not authorize police to search a guest's eye-
glass case, a closed container, when four to seven people were in the
room when the officer arrived, and the officer did not ask for the guests
to consent to the search of their personal property). For additional discus-
sion, see generally 4 LaFave, supra, § 8.5(e). See common authority rule,
supra § 5.14(d).
5.15 STATUTORY IMPLIED CONSENT
A statute may establish that particular conduct constitutes implied
consent to a search. For example, drivers of motor vehicles in Washing-
ton give implied consent to a blood test if they are arrested for vehicular
homicide. State v. Brokman, 84 Wn. App. 848, 850-51, 930 P.2d 354,
355-56 (1997); RCW 46.20.308(3).
5.16 ExIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES: INTRODUCTION
The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement
applies when police have established probable cause but do not obtain a
warrant because the need for an immediate search or seizure makes it
impractical to obtain a warrant. See State v. Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d 400,
405-06, 47 P.3d 127, 130 (2002); State v. Hoffman, 116 Wn.2d 51, 101,
804 P.2d 577, 603 (1991). Washington courts use the following six fac-
tors as a guide in determining whether exigent circumstances justify a
warrantless entry and search:
(1) the gravity or violent nature of the offense with which the sus-
pect is to be charged;
(2) whether the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed;
(3) whether there is reasonably trustworthy information that the
suspect is guilty;
(4) whether there is strong reason to believe that the suspect is on
the premises;
(5) the likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly appre-
hended; and
(6) whether the entry is made peaceably.
2005]
Seattle University Law Review
Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d at 406 (citing State v. Terrovona, 105 Wn.2d 632,
644, 716 P.2d 295, 301 (1986)); see Hoffman, 116 Wn.2d at 101 (same
factors used in determining justification of warrantless home arrest).
Not every factor must be met to find exigent circumstances, only
those sufficient to show that the officers needed to act quickly.
Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d at 408; see, e.g., State v. Patterson, 112 Wn.2d
731, 736, 774 P.2d 10, 13 (1989) (no one factor is conclusive; weight
varies with circumstances); State v. Flowers, 57 Wn. App. 636, 644, 789
P.2d 333, 338 (1990) (the fact that some factors are not present is not
controlling).
The courts have identified the following five situations where exi-
gent circumstances are present: "(1) hot pursuit; (2) fleeing suspect; (3)
danger to arresting officer or to the public; (4) mobility of the vehicle;
and (5) mobility or destruction of the evidence." State v. Counts, 99
Wn.2d 54, 60, 659 P.2d 1087, 1089-90 (1983); see, e.g., State v. Carter,
127 Wn.2d 836, 852-53, 904 P.2d 290, 297-98 (1995) (Alexander, J.,
dissenting) (exigent circumstances justified search of motel room when
police were afraid that drugs inside room would be destroyed if the
room's occupants were alerted to police presence by noises in hallway);
State v. Pressley, 64 Wn. App. 591, 598, 825 P.2d 749, 753 (1992) (po-
lice may seize evidence without a warrant if probable cause exists and
the actions of person detained give rise to a reasonable suspicion that
evidence is in danger of being lost or destroyed); 2 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 4.1 (b), at 447-48 (4th ed. 2004); see also Carter,
151 Wn.2d at 128 (holding, without deciding whether criminal investiga-
tors of a county prosecutor's office were state actors, that the investiga-
tors did not need a warrant to seize a gun placed in open view because of
exigent circumstances); State v. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144, 147, 720 P.2d
436, 438 (1986); Terrovona, 105 Wn.2d at 644-45; State v. Audley, 77
Wn. App. 897, 907, 894 P.2d 1359, 1364 (1995); Flowers, 57 Wn. App.
at 643-44. Exigent circumstances are not created merely because a seri-
ous offense has been committed. See Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S.
17, 21, 105 S. Ct. 409, 411, 83 L. Ed. 2d 246, 250-51 (1984); State v.
Stevenson, 55 Wn. App. 725, 732, 780 P.2d 873, 877 (1989); see also
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 2414, 57 L. Ed. 2d
290, 301 (1978); Counts, 99 Wn.2d at 59-61.
The exigent circumstances exception has been narrowly construed
when the search requires intrusion into the human body, Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 770, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1835, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908,
919 (1966), or entry into private premises, Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 587-89, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1380-81, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 651-52
(1980); State v. Solberg, 122 Wn.2d 688, 696-97, 861 P.2d 460, 465
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(1993). At the same time, under the Fourth Amendment, the exception
broadly encompasses searches of vehicles; thus, police may make a war-
rantless search of a vehicle even though the vehicle and its owner are in
police custody. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51-52, 90 S. Ct.
1975, 1981, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419, 428-29 (1970).
Article I, Section 7 of the Washington Constitution is not as broad
as the federal constitution in its acceptance of automobile searches. The
scope of the permissible search incident to arrest under the exigent cir-
cumstances exception is limited to the passenger compartment and any
unlocked compartments or containers. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d at 152. Under
this exception, the search is only permissible if conducted during the ar-
rest process and immediately subsequent to the suspect's arrest and
placement in the patrol car. See id.; 3 LaFave, supra, § 7.1, at 519-21.
When a crime is committed in the officer's presence after being
admitted into a residence, exigent circumstances need not exist in order
for the officer to lawfully make the arrest in the residence. See State v.
Dalton, 43 Wn. App. 279, 286-87, 716 P.2d 940, 944 (1986). Thus, in
State v. Dalton, an officer who had obtained entry into a student's col-
lege dormitory room under the pretense of buying drugs, but with the
intent of making an arrest, could make a warrantless arrest under RCW
10.31.100, which provided for an arrest without a warrant where the po-
lice officer has reasonable cause to believe a felony has been or is being
committed. Id.
5.17 EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING WARRANTLESS
ENTRY INTO THE HOME
5.17(a) Hot Pursuit
An arrest on the street does not create an exigent circumstance justi-
fying a warrantless search of an arrestee's house. See Vale v. Louisiana,
399 U.S. 30, 35, 90 S. Ct. 1969, 1972, 26 L. Ed. 2d 409, 414 (1970).
Both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 7 draw a firm line at
the entrance of the house and "that threshold may not reasonably be
crossed without a warrant." State v. Holeman, 103 Wn.2d 426, 429, 693
P.2d 89, 91 (1985) (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. 573, 590, 100 S. Ct. 1371,
1382, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 653 (1980)). However, police may make a war-
rantless entry into a home in the following circumstances: (1) when they
attempt to arrest the suspect in a public place; (2) when the suspect re-
treats into the home; and (3) when the police reasonably fear that delay
will result in the suspect's escape, in injury to the officers or to the pub-
lic, or in the destruction of evidence. See United States v. Weaklem, 517
F.2d 70, 72 (9th Cir. 1975) (injury); United States v. Bustamante-Gamez,
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488 F.2d 4, 8-9 (9th Cir. 1973) (escape; destruction of evidence);
Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (escape;
destruction of evidence); see also United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38,
43-44, 96 S. Ct. 2406, 2410, 49 L. Ed. 2d 300, 306 (1976) (White, J.,
concurring); Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,
298-99, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 1645-46, 18 L. Ed. 2d 782, 787 (1967). While
police are on the premises, the scope of the intrusion is limited to its pur-
pose; if the purpose is to prevent escape or harm, for example, the search
is limited to finding the suspect or weapons that could be used against
the police. Id. at 299, 87 S. Ct. at 1646, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 787-88.
Washington courts have deemed that the location of the arrestee,
not the location of the arresting officer, is critical for purposes of deter-
mining whether an arrest takes place in a home. Holeman, 103 Wn.2d at
429. Thus, absent exigent circumstances such as hot pursuit, an officer
may not arrest a suspect without a warrant-and, subsequently, conduct a
warrantless search incident to arrest-if the suspect is standing in the
doorway to his or her home, even when the officer is outside the home.
Id. However, the unenclosed front porch of a home is a public place for
purposes of arrest once probable cause has been established. State v. Sol-
berg, 122 Wn.2d 688, 699, 861 P.2d 460, 466 (1993). Therefore, a sus-
pect who voluntarily exits his or her home onto the unenclosed porch
may be arrested there, even in the absence of exigent circumstances. See
id. at 700; see also State v. Bockman, 37 Wn. App. 474, 481, 682 P.2d
925,931 (1984).
In determining whether a warrantless entry into a home is justified
by a hot pursuit exigent circumstance, courts have focused on the imme-
diate need to continue a promising criminal investigation, in addition to
factors listed in Cardenas, see supra § 5.16, and have noted that the
"exigency is said to be 'within the spirit, though not the text, of the "hot
pursuit" exception."' State v. Patterson, 112 Wn.2d 731, 736, 774 P.2d
10, 13 (1989) (citing McCary v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 219, 228-29,
321 S.E.2d 637 (1984), and quoting United States v. Robinson, 533 F.2d
578, 583 (D.C. Cir. 1975)) (giving significant weight to the fact that a
burglary took place only minutes before and the probability that the sus-
pect was nearby in finding exigency to search a secured, parked, unoccu-
pied car where there was no indication that the burglary suspect was
armed); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 752-53, 104 S. Ct.
2091, 2099, 80 L. Ed. 2d 732,745 (1984) (warrantless search in home not
justified by hot pursuit when police did not engage in immediate or con-
tinuous pursuit of defendant from the scene of the crime); State v.
Counts, 99 Wn.2d 54, 60, 659 P.2d 1087, 1089 (1983) (no hot pursuit
when police stood outside defendant's home for one hour after defendant
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retreated therein). Other Washington cases involving hot pursuit include
the following: State v. Bessette, 105 Wn. App. 793, 21 P.3d 318 (2001);
State v. Griffith, 61 Wn. App. 35, 808 P.2d 1171 (1991) (escape, destruc-
tion of evidence); State v. Hendricks, 25 Wn. App. 775, 610 P.2d 940
(1980) (escape); State v. Gallo, 20 Wn. App. 717, 582 P.2d 558 (1978)
(intent to kill).
5.17(b) Imminent Arrest
Even when a suspect has not been arrested, police may make a war-
rantless entry into a home when they reasonably believe that the suspect
has been alerted to his or her imminent arrest and is likely to destroy evi-
dence or escape. United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349, 1356 (9th
Cir. 1978), overruled on other grounds by United States v. McConney,
728 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir. 1984). The exception also applies when the po-
lice reasonably believe that the suspects are armed or the crime for which
they are to be arrested is one of violence. Hayden, 387 U.S. at 298-300,
87 S. Ct. at 1645-46, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 787; Flickinger, 573 F.2d at 1355-
56; Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d at 412 (holding that officers were excused
from complying with knock and announce statute where officers sus-
pected defendants were dangerous, evidence was easily destructible, and
officers observed defendants rushing toward back of the motel room fol-
lowing their knock). In addition, police may make a warrantless entry
when they believe an accomplice has been alerted to the arrest of another
accomplice, and the crime was one of violence. State v. Reid, 38 Wn.
App. 203, 209-10, 687 P.2d 861, 866 (1984). Police may not, however,
make a warrantless entry when the likelihood of escape is slight, the of-
fense is minor, and the police do not believe that the suspect is armed.
State v. Dresker, 39 Wn. App. 136, 139-40, 692 P.2d 846, 849 (1984).
Probable cause to believe a home contains contraband does not
constitute an exigent circumstance justifying the absence of a warrant;
police must have reason to believe the contraband will be destroyed be-
fore they are able to obtain a warrant. See United States v. Rubin, 474
F.2d 262, 268-69 (3d Cir. 1973); cf State v. Carter, 127 Wn.2d 836,
840, 904 P.3d 290, 292 (1995) (exigent circumstances justified war-
rantless entry of motel room where there was a risk of drugs being de-
stroyed if persons in motel room were alerted to police presence by
noises and scuffle in hallway); State v. Drumhiller, 36 Wn. App. 592,
596-97, 675 P.2d 631, 633-34 (1984) (exigent circumstances existed
when police observed occupants in the process of inhaling what police
reasonably believed to be cocaine); State v. Jeter, 30 Wn. App. 360, 362,
634 P.2d 312, 314 (1981) (presence of easily disposable contraband does
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not itself constitute exigent circumstances justifying noncompliance with
knock and announce statute).
5.18 EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING WARRANTLESS SEARCH
AND SEIZURE OF THE PERSON
Warrantless searches and seizures of persons may be justified by
the exigent circumstances exception when police reasonably fear injury
to themselves or others, flight, or the destruction of evidence. See, e.g.,
Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331-333, 121 S. Ct. 946, 950-51,
148 L. Ed. 2d 838, 848-49 (2001) (brief seizure of person outside his
home permissible when police had probable cause to believe the home
contained illegal drugs and police had reasonable belief that person could
destroy evidence before police obtained a search warrant); Ybarra v. Illi-
nois, 444 U.S. 85, 92-93, 100 S. Ct. 338, 343, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 246-47
(1979) (pat-down search unconstitutional absent reasonable belief that
suspect was armed and currently dangerous); Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 770-71, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1835-36, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908, 919-
20 (1996); see also Michael Gall, Note, Illinois v. McArthur: Forcing
Consent and Creating a "Backdoor" to the Warrant Requirement for the
Home, 35 U. Tol. L. Rev. 455 (2003). But see State v. King, 89 Wn. App.
612, 618-19, 949 P.2d 856, 860 (1998) ("[E]ven without probable cause
or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, it is reasonable for an officer
executing a search warrant at a residence to briefly detain occupants of
that residence, to insure officer safety and an orderly completion of the
search."). See supra § 1.4 for definition of what constitutes a seizure.
Police officers in Washington can engage in fresh pursuit of anyone
"who is reasonably believed to have committed a violation of traffic or
criminal laws." RCW 10.93.070(6), .120. But see State v. Rehn, 117 Wn.
App. 142, 149, 69 P.3d 379, 381 (2003) (noting that "[a]pparently, bar-
ring exceptional circumstances, a passenger is free to walk away from or
stay at the traffic stop scene"). The statutory definition of "fresh pursuit"
relies in part on the common law. City of Tacoma v. Durham, 95 Wn.
App. 876, 878-79, 978 P.2d 514, 516 (1999); RCW 10.93.120. The court
in City of Wenatchee v. Durham, 43 Wn. App. 547, 718 P.2d 819 (1986),
identified the following five criteria to be used when analyzing fresh pur-
suit:
(1) that a felony occurred in the jurisdiction; (2) that the individual
sought must be attempting to escape to avoid arrest or at least know
he is being pursued; (3) that the police pursue without unnecessary
delay; (4) that the pursuit must be continuous and uninterrupted,
though there need not be continuous surveillance of the suspect nor
uninterrupted knowledge of his location; and (5) that there be a rela-
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tionship in time between the commission of the offense, com-
mencement of the pursuit, and apprehension of the suspect.
Id. at 550-51.
However, under RCW 10.93, which took effect as part of the Wash-
ington Mutual Aid Peace Officers Powers Act after Wenatchee, "courts
are not limited by the common law definition, but may consider the
[l]egislature's overall intent to use practical considerations in deciding
whether a particular arrest across jurisdictional lines was reasonable."
Vance v. Dep't of Licensing, 116 Wn. App. 412, 416, 65 P.3d 668, 669
(2003), review denied, 150 Wn.2d 1004, 77 P.3d 651 (2003) (quoting
Durham, 95 Wn. App. at 881).
Warrantless search issues generally do not arise with respect to an
arrestee because the warrantless search of an arrestee may be justified as
incident to arrest. See 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.1, at 4
(4th ed. 2004). Exigent circumstances are used to justify the following
two other kinds of warrantless searches of persons: searches that pene-
trate the body, such as blood tests and other invasive medical procedures,
and searches of persons located on the premises being searched.
5.18(a) Warrantless Searches Involving Intrusion into the Body
For a medical procedure to be performed without a warrant and jus-
tified by exigent circumstances, the test selected to obtain evidence must
be reasonable. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767-68, 86 S. Ct. at 1834, 16 L.
Ed. 2d at 917-18; see 3 LaFave, supra, § 5.3(c), at 171-72. In addition,
the State must show more than probable cause because of the severity of
the search, and the method used to obtain the evidence must be reason-
able. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-72, 86 S. Ct. at 1835-36, 16 L. Ed. 2d
at 919-20; State v. Young, 15 Wn. App. 581, 584-85, 550 P.2d 689,
691-92 (1976) (police may use reasonable force to constrict throat to
prevent swallowing).
Where a serious crime involving intoxication is at issue, the natural
dissipation of alcohol in the blood of a suspect is an exigent circumstance
justifying the nonconsensual extraction of a blood sample to determine
the suspect's blood alcohol level. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71, 86 S.
Ct. at 1835-36, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 919-20. Blood tests without a warrant
have been upheld as reasonable searches under both the Fourth Amend-
ment and Article I, Section 7 as long as the test is performed in a reason-
able manner by a trained paramedic. State v. Curran, 116 Wn.2d 174,
185, 804 P.2d 558, 564 (1991), abrogated on other grounds, State v. Ber-
lin, 133 Wn.2d 541, 947 P.2d 700 (1997). In Washington, blood tests for
alcohol intoxication are also justified by statutory implied consent under
RCW 46.20.308(3). Curran, 116 Wn.2d at 185 (no violation of Article I,
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Section 7 when a blood sample is taken pursuant to RCW 46.20.308(3));
see also State v. Baldwin, 109 Wn. App. 516, 518, 37 P.3d 1220, 1222
(2001) (holding that Washington's implied consent statute, RCW
46.20.308, authorizes a police officer who reasonably believes that a
driver is under the influence of alcohol or drugs to ask the driver to take
a breath or blood test) (emphasis added). But see State v. Wetherell, 82
Wn.2d 865, 870-71, 514 P.2d 1069, 1073 (1973) (lawful arrest of motor-
ist is a prerequisite for operation of implied consent statute; express con-
sent is required for blood test of motorist who is not under arrest). Simi-
larly, the exigent circumstance of dissipation of blood alcohol has also
been used to justify a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a resi-
dence to arrest a suspect and seize a blood sample. State v. Komoto, 40
Wn. App. 200, 211-13, 697 P.2d 1025, 1032-33 (1985) (officer used a
passkey to enter apartment and arrest suspect following felony hit and
run). The fact that evidence is likely to be destroyed will not automati-
cally justify an intrusive medical procedure, even when a warrant is ob-
tained; the evidence must be essential to a conviction. See Winston v.
Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 765-66, 105 S. Ct. 1611, 1619-20, 84 L. Ed. 2d 662,
672-73 (1985) (no need to retrieve bullet from defendant's body under
circumstances where other substantial evidence was available to convict
him).
In order to deter recidivism and identify persons who commit
crimes, no warrant is required under the Fourth Amendment to collect a
DNA sample from every adult or juvenile convicted of a felony, stalking,
harassment, communicating with a minor for immoral purposes, or adju-
dicated guilty of an equivalent juvenile offense. See State v. Surge, 122
Wn. App. 448, 94 P.3d 345, 347 (2004) (holding that State v. Olivas, 122
Wn.2d 73, 856 P.2d 1076 (1993), is controlling on this issue and binding
on this court); RCW 43.43.754(1).
5.18(b) Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Persons Located
on Premises Being Searched
When a search warrant for premises is being executed, police may
conduct a warrantless search of a person located on the premises if they
have "reasonable cause" to believe that the person is concealing evidence
sought and immediate seizure is necessary to prevent its destruction.
State v. Halverson, 21 Wn. App. 35, 38, 584 P.2d 408, 410 (1978) (al-
though a specific warrant to search premises cannot automatically be
converted into a general one to search individuals, defendant's suspicious
conduct gave the police reasonable cause to search his person). For a
more complete discussion of when occupants may be searched during the
execution of a search warrant for premises, see 2 LaFave, supra, § 4.9.
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5.19 EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING ENTRY INTO THE HOME OR
SEARCH OF THE PERSON: ABSENCE OF LESS INTRUSIVE ALTERNATIVES
Courts have held warrantless home entries illegal when police
could have kept the residence under surveillance until a warrant was ob-
tained. State v. Bessette, 105 Wn. App. 793, 799-800, 21 P.3d 318, 321
(2001) (no exigent circumstances existed when officer, in pursuit of a
minor who committed a gross misdemeanor in officer's presence, entered
a home without warrant when suspect "was hardly a threat to the health,
safety, or welfare of citizens," not likely to escape without being swiftly
apprehended, homeowner insisted on a search warrant, and officer could
simply have obtained a telephone warrant to search and arrest minor);
State v. Werth, 18 Wn. App. 530, 536-37, 571 P.2d 941, 944-45 (1977);
cf People v. Vogel, 58 Ill. App. 3d 910, 374 N.E.2d 1152, 16 Ill. Dec.
377 (1978) (when threat of destruction of evidence in locker was mini-
mal or nonexistent and could be thwarted by stationing officer at locker
while warrant was obtained, warrantless search was not justified); State
v. Allen, 508 P.2d 472 (Or. App. Ct. 1973) (when no one who could dis-
pose of contraband remained on premises, police should secure premises
by stationing guard while search warrant is obtained); State v. McKenzie,
12 Wn. App. 88, 528 P.2d 269 (1974) (when police officers watched de-
fendant's house while other officers applied for search warrant, and
when defendant drove car out of garage, was approached by police, and
then sounded his horn, the officers were permitted to immediately enter
the house in order to detain occupants, provided the officers refrained
from searching the house until the search warrant was issued); State v.
Peele, 10 Wn. App. 58, 516 P.2d 788 (1973) (search warrant necessary
when the suspect was not fleeing, but might be expected to hide out on
the premises until morning). See generally 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search
and Seizure § 6.5(c) (4th ed. 2004) (discussing the impoundment alterna-
tive).
Similarly, the police may be required to keep occupants under sur-
veillance, instead of searching them, until a warrant is procured. See,
e.g., United States v. Grummel, 542 F.2d 789 (9th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Rosselli, 506 F.2d 627, 629-30 (7th Cir. 1974) (police failure to
apply for warrant was unlawful when police could have stationed officer
with informant to prevent him from calling and warning defendant of
imminent search); State v. Lewis, 19 Wn. App. 35, 40, 573 P.2d 1347,
1350 (1978). Police may use methods not involving any searching activ-
ity to secure premises in which they are legally present while awaiting
the issuance of a search warrant. Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326,
331-33, 121 S. Ct. 946, 950-51, 148 L. Ed. 2d 838, 848-49 (2001) (brief
seizure of defendant while awaiting the issuance of a search warrant for
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his home was permissible because (1) police had probable cause to be-
lieve that defendant's home contained unlawful drugs; (2) police had
good reason to fear that, unless restrained, defendant would destroy the
drugs before they could return with a warrant; (3) police merely pre-
vented defendant from entering home unaccompanied, and they neither
searched the trailer nor arrested defendant before obtaining a warrant;
and (4) police imposed the restraint for a limited period of time, namely,
two hours); State v. Terrovona, 105 Wn.2d 632, 645-46, 716 P.2d 295,
302 (1986) (prior warrantless entry and arrest of defendant in his resi-
dence was justified by exigent circumstances; nothing observed by the
police contributed to the issuance of the search warrant, nor was anything
in "plain view" used as evidence).
A suspect attempting to swallow evidence may create an exigent
circumstance justifying efforts to prevent the swallowing, even when the
evidence could be expected to pass through the digestive system and be
recovered. State v. Taplin, 36 Wn. App. 664, 665-67, 676 P.2d 504, 506
(1984).
5.20 EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING WARRANTLESS SEARCH
AND SEIZURE OF CONTAINERS
Generally, a container may be seized without a warrant when there
is probable cause to believe it is evidence of a crime; the container's mo-
bility is the exigent circumstance permitting the warrantless seizure. See,
e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 1300,
143 L. Ed. 2d 408, 414-15 (1999); State v. Jackson, 82 Wn. App. 594,
606-07, 918 P.2d 945, 952 (1996), review denied, 131 Wn.2d 1006, 932
P.2d 644 (1997) (positive reaction by dog trained to discover drugs es-
tablished probable cause justifying seizure of package). A warrantless
search of the container's contents, however, is permissible only if delay
would diminish the evidentiary value of the contents, prevent the appre-
hension of suspects, or endanger the public. United States v. Chadwick,
433 U.S. 1, 14-15, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 2485, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538, 550 (1997);
State v. McAlpin, 36 Wn. App. 707, 716, 677 P.2d 185, 191 (1984) (pub-
lic safety emergency justified search of briefcase in order to locate a
missing gun); see also State v. Smith, 88 Wn.2d 127, 137-38, 559 P.2d
970, 975 (1977); State v. Wolfe, 5 Wn. App. 153, 486 P.2d 1143 (1971).
Once the container is in the officer's exclusive control, there is no danger
of removal, and exigent circumstances no longer justify a warrantless
search of the contents. See, e.g., United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S.
249, 90 S. Ct. 1029, 25 L. Ed. 2d 282 (1970); State v. Johnston, 31 Wn.
App. 889, 891-92, 645 P.2d 63, 64 (1982) (seizure of purse valid, but
subsequent search without a warrant was illegal); State v. Moore, 29 Wn.
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App. 354, 628 P.2d 522 (1981) (warrantless seizure of luggage proper,
but warrantless search unlawful); cf State v. Kealey, 80 Wn. App. 162,
170, 907 P.2d 319, 324 (1995), review denied, 129 Wn.2d 1021, 919
P.2d 599 (1996) ("Purses, briefcases, and luggage constitute traditional
repositories of personal belongings protected under the Fourth Amend-
ment."). But see State v. Carter, 151 Wn.2d 118, 128, 85 P.3d 887, 891
(2004) (a gun is not like a purse, briefcase, or luggage, in which belong-
ings are stored or things are kept from public view; there is no privacy
interest in a firearm or the interior of a firearm that has been placed in
public view).
When a container is found in an automobile, the rule requiring a
warrant for the search of a container's contents does not apply if police
have probable cause to search the vehicle, and police may open contain-
ers discovered during a search so long as the container is large enough to
conceal the object of the search. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102
S. Ct. 2157, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1982); see also Houghton, 526 U.S. at
300, 119 S. Ct. at 1300, 143 L. Ed. 2d at 414-15; United States v. Johns,
469 U.S. 478, 105 S. Ct. 881, 83 L. Ed. 2d 890 (1985). See generally 3
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.5 (4th ed. 2004).
A warrantless inspection or testing of a container's contents is not
always considered a search. When the only fact that can be gleaned from
an inspection or test is whether the contents are contraband, the Fourth
Amendment is not implicated. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109,
123, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1661-62, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85, 100 (1984) (chemical
test that merely discloses whether a particular substance is cocaine does
not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy); accord State v.
Bishop, 43 Wn. App. 17, 20, 714 P.2d 1199, 1200 (1986) (subjecting
suspicious substance to chemical analysis to determine identity does not
invade privacy interests). Thus, a canine sniff does not constitute a
search under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Place, 462 U.S.
696, 707, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2644-45, 77 L. Ed. 2d 110, 121 (1983)
(trained narcotics dog sniffing exterior of luggage does not constitute a
search). For a discussion of canine sniffs under Article I, Section 7, see
State v. Boyce, 44 Wn. App. 724, 723 P.2d 28 (1986) (canine sniff of air
outside suspect's bank safe deposit box; court suggests Article I, Section
7 requires a case-by-case examination of the circumstances in order to
determine whether a canine sniff is a search). See generally 1 LaFave,
supra, § 2.2(g). See State v. Courcy, 48 Wn. App. 326, 739 P.2d 98, 102
(1987), for an application of the single purpose container rule in Wash-
ington. See also 3 LaFave, supra, § 5.5(f), at 249.
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5.21 WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES OF MOTOR VEHICLES
Automobiles and other motor vehicles are treated as a special cate-
gory in search and seizure law for two reasons: First, the reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in a vehicle is less than that in a home or on a per-
son; second, the mobility of a vehicle may make obtaining a warrant
prior to a search or seizure impractical. See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S.
419, 424, 124 S. Ct. 885, 889, 157 L. Ed. 2d 843, 851 (2004) ("The
Fourth Amendment does not treat a motorist's car as his castle."); Cali-
fornia v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392-93, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2069-70, 85 L.
Ed. 2d. 406, 414 (1985) (privacy expectation in vehicles is less than in
homes because of pervasive government regulation of driving and
roads); State v. Johnson, 128 Wn.2d 431, 449, 453-54, 909 P.2d 293,
303, 306 (1996); see also Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 49, 90 S.
Ct. 1975, 1980, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419, 427 (1970). Under both the Fourth
Amendment and Article I, Section 7, the fact that it is possible to sleep in
a vehicle does not give rise to the same privacy rights that attach to fixed
dwellings. Carney, 471 U.S. at 393, 105 S. Ct. at 2070, 85 L. Ed. 2d at
414 (motor home is treated like a vehicle when it is mobile); Johnson,
128 Wn.2d at 449 (lessened privacy interest for sleeper compartment of a
tractor-trailer rig); State v. Cantrell, 124 Wn.2d 183, 190, 875 P.2d 1208,
1211-12 (1994) (there exists "less expectation of privacy in an automo-
bile than in either a home or an office"). The reasonable expectation of
privacy in motor vehicles is discussed in 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search
and Seizure § 7.2(b), at 548-61 (4th ed. 2004).
The following sections, 5.22 to 5.29, focus on the warrantless
search or seizure of a vehicle and its contents when police have probable
cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence of a crime. Vehicles may
also be the subject of a warrantless search when the circumstances of the
search are consistent with other exceptions to the warrant requirement,
such as the search incident to arrest, or the Terry stop and frisk excep-
tions. See 3 LaFave, supra, § 7.1, at 502; see also 2 LaFave, supra, §
4.9(d) (discussing the Terry stop-and-frisk search).
5.22 SEARCHES AND SEIZURES OF VEHICLES
UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The search of a motor vehicle and its contents is treated differently
under the Fourth Amendment than it is under Article I, Section 7 of the
Washington Constitution. Compare New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,
460-61, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2864, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768, 774-76 (1981) (hold-
ing that police may, as a contemporaneous incident of lawful custodial
arrest of occupants in automobile, search passenger compartment and
contents of any container in passenger compartment) with State v.
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Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144, 148-52, 720 P.2d 436, 438-40 (1986) (holding
that, in warrantless search of automobile, actual exigent circumstances
must be balanced against whatever privacy interests individual has in
articles in vehicle). The next section sets forth federal and state law gov-
erning searches and seizures of automobiles and their contents. It then
addresses the general principles governing automobile impoundment and
inventory searches.
5.22(a) Probable Cause to Search a Vehicle: The Carroll Rule
The Carroll rule states that, under the Fourth Amendment, police
may conduct a warrantless search of an automobile when there is prob-
able cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or evidence.
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54, 45 S. Ct. 280, 285, 69 L.
Ed. 543, 551 (1925); Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467, 119 S. Ct.
2013, 2014, 144 L. Ed. 2d 442, 445 (1999) (holding that there is no need
for a separate finding of exigency in addition to a finding of probable
cause); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51-52, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 1981,
26 L. Ed. 2d 419, 428 (1970); State v. Huff, 64 Wn. App. 641, 648-49,
826 P.2d 698, 702 (1992). A warrantless search is permissible under the
Carroll rule because an automobile's mobility creates an exigency: The
contraband or evidence could be transported out of the jurisdiction while
officers are applying for a warrant. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153, 45 S. Ct. at
285, 69 L. Ed. at 551.
The special treatment of automobiles has been extended to permit
the warrantless search of a vehicle's trunk when the police reasonably
believe that the trunk contains weapons and the vehicle is vulnerable to
vandalism. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 448, 93 S. Ct. 2523,
2531, 37 L. Ed. 2d 706, 718 (1973) (holding that, in cases where sus-
pect's vehicle had been disabled in an accident and subsequently towed
to a private garage, suspect's vehicle can be searched without a warrant).
Similarly, police may make a warrantless search of a vehicle's trunk
when they reasonably believe a suspect may be hiding in it. State v.
Silvernail, 25 Wn. App. 185, 191, 605 P.2d 1279, 1283 (1980).
5.22(b) Application of the Carroll Rule When Actual
Exigency Is Removed
The Carroll rule permits a warrantless search even after a vehicle
has been taken into police custody and its contents are in no danger of
removal or disturbance. Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. 380, 382, 104 S. Ct.
1852, 1853, 80 L. Ed. 2d 381, 384 (1984); Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51-52,
90 S. Ct. at 1981, 26 L. Ed. 2d at 428-29 (actual exigent circumstances
not necessary to justify warrantless probable cause search). The rationale
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is that the initial justification for the warrantless search does not disap-
pear after impoundment. United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 484, 105
S. Ct. 881, 885, 83 L. Ed. 2d 890, 897 (1995). The vehicle, however,
must have been initially mobile or readily mobile at the time of arrest for
the Carroll rule to apply. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
460-62, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2034-36, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 579-81 (1971)
(holding that warrant was required when defendant had already been ar-
rested, his car was located in his driveway, no other individual was avail-
able to move the car, and police already had established probable cause
to search the car); see also California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390-91,
105 S. Ct. 2066, 2068-69, 85 L. Ed. 2d 406, 412-13 (1985).
The constitutional limits on the number of warrantless searches and
the length of time that may elapse before police are required to obtain a
warrant have not been clarified. See Johns, 469 U.S. at 484-88, 105 S.
Ct. at 886-87, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 897-99 (upholding the warrantless search
of containers in a vehicle under the Carroll rule when the containers
were stored in a government warehouse for three days prior to the
search).
5.22(c) Permissible Scope of Search or Seizure Under Carroll:
The Vehicle Itself and Containers Within the Vehicle
When police have probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains
contraband, they may conduct a warrantless search "of the same scope as
could be authorized by a magistrate." Johns, 469 U.S. at 483, 105 S. Ct.
at 885, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 896 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798,
825, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2171-72, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572, 594 (1982)). Thus,
when the exact location of the contraband within the vehicle is not
known, police may conduct a warrantless search not only of the vehicle
itself, but also of any of its contents, including locked and unlocked con-
tainers. Ross, 456 U.S. at 821, 825, 102 S. Ct. at 2171, 2173, 72 L. Ed.
2d at 592, 594. Formerly, police were required to obtain a warrant in or-
der to search a container found in a motor vehicle if the probable cause to
search was directed only at the container and not the car itself. Arkansas
v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 765, 99 S. Ct. 2586, 2594, 61 L. Ed. 2d 235,
246 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S. Ct. 2476,
2484-85, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538, 549-50 (1977). Currently, however, when
police have probable cause to believe that the contraband is hidden
within a particular container and the container is placed inside a vehicle,
probable cause automatically extends to the entire vehicle. California v.
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1991, 114 L. Ed. 2d 619,
634 (1991); see also Illinois v. Caballes, __ U.S. __, _, 125 S. Ct.
834, 837-38, 160 L. Ed. 842 (2005) (warrantless search of car trunk
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valid where narcotics-detection dog detected drugs inside the trunk when
police lawfully pulled the car over for a traffic stop). Further, the United
States Supreme Court has held that, even prior to arrest, police officers
with probable cause to search a car may inspect passengers' belongings
found in the car that are capable of concealing the object of the search.
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 307, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 1304, 143 L.
Ed. 2d 408, 419 (1999). In other words, if the police have probable cause
to believe contraband or evidence of a crime is present anywhere inside a
vehicle, they may search the entire automobile and any containers within
it. See id. The scope of the permissible search is limited to the size and
shape of the items sought and police may only search where it is reason-
able to believe the items sought may be hidden. See id. Note that
Acevedo and Ross apply only in the context of the automobile exception,
and a legitimate expectation of privacy in closed containers is retained
outside of the context of motor vehicles.
5.23 SEARCHES AND SEIZURES OF VEHICLES UNDER
ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 OF THE WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION
While the Fourth Amendment allows police to search anything in a
vehicle when there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains
contraband or evidence, Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467, 119 S.
Ct. 2013, 2014, 144 L. Ed. 2d 442, 445 (1999), the Washington Constitu-
tion provides greater protection against the warrantless search of an
automobile. State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61, 69-70 n.1, 917 P.2d
563, 567-68 n.1 (1996). Under Article I, Section 7, a warrantless vehicle
search incident to an arrest must occur immediately following the arrest
of the occupant of a vehicle. State v. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144, 152, 720
P.2d 436, 441 (1986); State v. Perea, 85 Wn. App. 339, 343-44, 932
P.2d 1258, 1260 (1997); see also State v. Cass, 62 Wn. App. 793, 795-
96, 816 P.2d 57, 58-59 (1991) (search of passenger compartment valid if
immediately subsequent to arresting, handcuffing, and placing suspect in
police car); State v. Fore, 56 Wn. App. 339, 347, 783 P.2d 626, 631
(1989) (for search to be valid, arrest must be sufficiently proximate, both
temporally and physically, to lawful arrest).
Under the heightened privacy protection of Article I, Section 7, the
warrantless search incident to arrest of locked containers located in the
passenger compartment is prohibited. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d at 152. This is
in contrast to the federal standard, which permits the warrantless search
incident to arrest of both locked and unlocked containers. See 3 Wayne
R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 7.1(c), at 519-521 (4th ed. 2004). "The
rationale for this departure from the federal standard is that use of a lock
demonstrates the individual's expectation of privacy and the presence of
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a lock minimizes the danger of an arrestee gaining access to the contents
of the container." State v. Johnson, 77 Wn. App. 441, 446, 892 P.2d 106,
109 (1995) aff'd, 128 Wn.2d 431, 909 P.2d 293 (1996) (discussing
Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144). Therefore, police in Washington must obtain a
search warrant prior to searching any locked glove compartment or other
locked container.
5.24 WARRANTLESS VEHICLE SEARCHES BASED
ON GENERALIZED SUSPICION
5.24(a) Spot Checks of Motorists
In the absence of a valid spot check program, police officers may
stop a motor vehicle to check for valid registration or possible automo-
bile violations only when they have a reasonable suspicion of unlawful
activity. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1401,
59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 673 (1979) (randomly stopping drivers to check regis-
tration violated the Fourth Amendment). To determine the reasonable-
ness of spot checks or vehicle checkpoints, the court will weigh the gov-
ernment's interest in the checkpoints, the extent to which the program
advances the government's goals, and the amount of intrusion on the in-
dividual motorist. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427, 124 S. Ct. 885,
890, 157 L. Ed. 2d 843, 852 (2004); State v. Marchand, 104 Wn.2d 434,
441, 706 P.2d 225, 228 (1985) (safety spot check invalid under the
Fourth Amendment). For police to institute general spot check proce-
dures, the procedures must constitute "a sufficiently productive mecha-
nism to justify the intrusion." Marchand, 104 Wn.2d at 437. In addition,
the spot check procedures must be such that "the exercise of discretion
by law enforcement officials [is] sufficiently constrained." Id. at 438; see
also City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48, 121 S. Ct. 447,
458, 148 L. Ed. 2d 333, 347-48 (2000) (holding that, absent individual-
ized suspicion, a highway drug checkpoint is unconstitutional where of-
ficers and drug-detecting canine would examine, through open view, a
predetermined number of drivers); Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d 454,
459-60, 755 P.2d 775, 778 (1988) (Seattle's sobriety checkpoint pro-
gram improperly "gave police officers unbridled discretion to conduct
intrusive searches" with no statutory constraints and the program in-
volved extensive invasions of privacy, such as smelling suspects' breath,
visual checks of automobiles for open containers, and physical tests de-
signed to elicit evidence of dexterity); cf Michigan Dep 't of State Police
v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990) (sobriety
checkpoint where all vehicles were briefly detained did not violate the
Fourth Amendment).
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The Washington Supreme Court has held sobriety checkpoint pro-
grams unconstitutional under both Article I, Section 7 and the Fourth
Amendment. Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d at 458, 460. Relying on Article I, Sec-
tion 7's explicit recognition of the privacy rights of the state's citizens
and requirements that all searches be conducted under "authority of law,"
the court rejected the city's argument that the stops fell within an excep-
tion to the warrant requirement. Id. at 457-58. In one of the cases relied
upon by the city, State v. Silvernail, 25 Wn. App. 185, 605 P.2d 1279
(1980), the court permitted a warrantless search when there was informa-
tion that a serious felony had been recently committed. Id. at 190. The
Mesiani court distinguished Silvernail, stating that notice that a felony
had recently been committed "is far different from an inference from sta-
tistics that there are inebriated drivers in the area." Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d
at 458 n.1. But see Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal. 3d 1321, 1331, 743 P.2d
1299, 241 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1987).
The California Supreme Court used the "administrative search"
doctrine to decide that sobriety checkpoints pass constitutional muster so
long as they are properly designed and operated. Id. at 1306. Such
checkpoints are intended primarily to deter intoxicated motorists from
taking to the road, not to discover evidence of crimes, and therefore may
be characterized as administrative searches that require no individualized
suspicion of illegal conduct. Id. at 1306-08. See generally 5 Wayne R.
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 10.8(d) (4th ed. 2004).
5.25 WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF VEHICLES SUSPECTED OF BEING THE
SUBJECT OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
Police officers may make a limited entry and investigation into a
vehicle that they have probable cause to believe has been the subject of a
burglary, tampering, or theft. State v. Lynch, 84 Wn. App. 467, 477-78,
929 P.2d 460, 465 (1996). Officers may search those areas they reasona-
bly believe to have been affected and those areas reasonably believed to
contain some evidence of ownership. Id. at 477-78; see also State v. Or-
cutt, 22 Wn. App. 730, 734-35, 591 P.2d 872, 875 (1979) (valid war-
rantless entry into vehicle to look in places where registration papers
might be kept if driver has fled vehicle and officer reasonably believed
vehicle had been stolen); cf Arizona v. Taras, 19 Ariz. App. 7, 11, 504
P.2d 548 (1972) (warrantless search for registration papers may be made
when occupant is detained and refuses to identify owner of vehicle).
5.26 FORFEITURE OR LEVY
Courts differ as to whether a vehicle that was used to transport con-
traband may be seized without a warrant. See 3 Wayne R. LaFave,
20051
Seattle University Law Review
Search and Seizure § 7.3(b) (4th ed. 2004); see also Gen. Motors Leas-
ing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 97 S. Ct. 619, 50 L. Ed. 2d 530
(1977) (IRS may impound car parked on public street for levy or forfei-
ture purposes without obtaining warrant when no legitimate privacy is
invaded; when car is on private property, a warrant may be required).
Courts in Washington, while recognizing that "searches and sei-
zures of motor vehicles used in drug transactions are an everyday occur-
rence," have held that warrantless inventory searches of vehicles for-
feited under drug laws are permitted under Article 1, Section 7. State v.
McFadden, 63 Wn. App. 441, 446, 820 P.2d 53, 54 (1991) overruled on
other grounds, State v. Adel, 136 Wn.2d 629, 965 P.2d 1072 (1998). In
Lowery v. Nelson, 43 Wn. App. 747, 719 P.2d 594 (1986), the court held
that, under the Fourth Amendment, police are not required to obtain a
search warrant before exercising the authority granted by RCW
69.50.505(1)(d) (subjecting vehicles to forfeiture when used for the de-
livery of controlled substances under the Uniform Controlled Substances
Act) to seize a vehicle used to transport a controlled substance. Lowery,
43 Wn. App. at 750; see also Rozner v. Bellevue, 116 Wn.2d 342, 350,
804 P.2d 24, 29 (1991); State v. Gwinner, 59 Wn. App. 119, 123, 796
P.2d 728, 730 (1990) (upholding seizure under Federal Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. § 881
(2000)). Under both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 7, po-
lice may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle seized pursuant to the
forfeiture statute on the theory that the search is a valid inventory or evi-
dentiary search. McFadden, 63 Wn. App. at 449; see 3 LaFave, supra, §
7.5(c), at 678-79.
5.27 IMPOUNDMENT
"Impoundment is a seizure because it involves the governmental
taking of a vehicle into its exclusive custody." State v. Coss, 87 Wn.
App. 891, 898, 943 P.2d 1126, 1129 (1997). The facts of each case de-
termine the reasonableness of each particular impoundment. Id. A vehi-
cle may be impounded without a warrant in the following circumstances:
(1) as evidence of a crime; (2) as part of the police "community
caretaking function," if the removal of the vehicle is necessary; and
(3) as part of the police function of enforcing traffic regulations, if
the driver has committed one of the traffic offenses for which the
[l]egislature has authorized impoundment.
Id. (citing State v. Simpson, 95 Wn.2d 170, 189, 622 P.2d 1199, 1211
(1980)); see also State v. Lynch, 84 Wn. App. 467, 477-78, 929 P.2d
460, 465 (1996); State v. Hill, 68 Wn. App. 300, 304, 842 P.2d 996, 998
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(1993); State v. McFadden, 63 Wn. App. 441, 448, 820 P.2d 53, 57
(1991).
A vehicle lawfully parked at one's home or even on a public street
may not be impounded simply because its owner has been arrested.
United States v. Squires, 456 F.2d 967, 969-70 (2d Cir. 1972). Similarly,
impoundment is improper when the arrestee's release is imminent and
the vehicle does not pose a safety hazard. See State v. Bales, 15 Wn.
App. 834, 836, 552 P.2d 688, 690 (1976). Also, when police conduct
warrantless impoundments and subsequent inventory searches, see 3
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 7.5(e) (4th ed. 2004), the
searches may not be a pretext for a search that the police otherwise could
not have made. State v. White, 83 Wn. App. 770, 774-75, 924 P.2d 55,
57 (1996), rev'don other grounds, 135 Wn.2d 761, 958 P.2d 982 (1998).
5.27(a) Evidence of Crime
"A car may be lawfully impounded as evidence of a crime if an of-
ficer has probable cause to believe that it was stolen or used in the com-
mission of a felony." State v. Terrovona, 105 Wn.2d 632, 647, 716 P.2d
295, 303 (1986). In Terrovona, the Washington Supreme Court held that
police properly impounded a vehicle that they had probable cause to be-
lieve was used in the commission of a felony, where the defendant had
lured the victim to the murder site by telephoning him and asking him to
bring gasoline to the defendant's empty vehicle. Id. at 647-48; cf State
v. Huff, 64 Wn. App. 641, 653, 826 P.2d 698, 705 (1992) (an officer who
has probable cause to believe a vehicle contains contraband or evidence
of a crime may seize and hold the car for the reasonable time needed to
obtain a search warrant; the car may be towed to an impound yard during
seizure).
5.2 7(b) Community Caretaking Function
The "community caretaking function" permits impoundment when
the vehicle has been abandoned, impedes traffic, poses a threat to public
safety and convenience, or is itself threatened by vandalism or theft of its
contents. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368-69, 96 S. Ct.
3092, 3097, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000, 1005 (1976); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413
U.S. 433, 441, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 2528, 37 L. Ed. 2d 706, 715 (1973); State
v. Sweet, 44 Wn. App. 226, 236, 721 P.2d 560, 566 (1986). In Sweet, for
example, impoundment was held to be proper under the community care-
taking exception when the arrestee was unconscious, items of value were
visible inside the vehicle, and the vehicle was in a high-crime area.
Sweet, 44 Wn. App. at 236-37.
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Under the community caretaking exception, the police need have no
reasonable belief that the vehicle is connected with criminal activity. See
State v. Chisholm, 39 Wn. App. 864, 866-67, 696 P.2d 41, 42-43 (1985).
However, police should first make an inquiry as to the availability of the
owner or the owner's spouse or friends to move the vehicle. See State v.
Williams, 102 Wn.2d 733, 743, 689 P.2d 1065, 1070-71 (1984); State v.
Houser, 95 Wn.2d 143, 153, 622 P.2d 1218, 1224-25 (1980); Simpson,
95 Wn.2d at 170. Police should also consider the alternative of parking
and locking the car. Williams, 102 Wn.2d at 743.
5.27(c) Enforcement of Traffic Regulations
Officers are permitted to impound a vehicle as part of enforcing
traffic regulations only when constitutionally reasonable and necessary to
prevent a continuing violation of a traffic offense for which the legisla-
ture has specifically authorized impoundment. See Hill, 68 Wn. App. at
305. Impoundment is unreasonable and improper if a reasonable alterna-
tive to impoundment exists, such as when the owner of the vehicle, or a
passenger in the vehicle, is available to transport it. Id. at 306. Police of-
ficers are to use discretion when deciding to impound a vehicle and,
while an officer need not exhaust all possibilities, the officer must at
least consider alternatives to impoundment. Coss, 87 Wn. App. at 899-
900 (impoundment improper where officer failed to consider alternatives
to impoundment; a validly licensed passenger could have driven vehicle
from scene of traffic stop); see also State v. Reynoso, 41 Wn. App. 113,
119, 702 P.2d 1222, 1225-26 (1985).
Officers are not required to use their discretion in deciding whether
to impound a vehicle when its driver is found to be driving with a license
that has been suspended or revoked. State v. Pulfrey, 120 Wn. App. 270,
277, 86 P.3d 790, 794 (2004) (explaining All Around Underground, Inc.
v. Washington State Patrol, 148 Wn.2d 145, 60 P.3d 53 (2002)), review
granted, 152 Wn.2d 1021; 101 P.3d 108 (2004). The Washington Su-
preme Court in All Around Underground held that the Washington State
Patrol exceeded its statutory authority by removing the discretion granted
by the legislature to individual troopers to decide whether to order a ve-
hicle impounded when the driver's license is suspended or revoked. 148
Wn.2d at 159-60. The court declined to reach the state and federal con-
stitutional issues raised by the parties. Id. In Pulfrey, an officer found
illegal drugs in a vehicle during a search incident to the driver's custodial
arrest for driving with a suspended license in the third degree, a misde-
meanor. 120 Wn. App. at 271. The officer testified that he "always"
made full custodial arrests of persons suspected of driving while their
licenses are suspended and "always" searched their persons and vehicles
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incident to such arrests. Id. In this case, the officer released the vehicle to
its registered owner, who showed up at the scene by the time the officer
finished the search. Id. at 272. The court, noting that it did not decide the
case on constitutional grounds, held that the officer acted lawfully be-
cause he had probable cause for the arrest. Id. at 281, 283-84 (citing At-
water v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 149 L. Ed. 2d
549 (2001); State v. Clausen, 113 Wn. App. 657, 56 P.3d 587 (2002);
and State v. Thomas, 89 Wn. App. 774, 950 P.2d 498 (1998). But see
Atwater, 532 U.S. at 372, 121 S. Ct. at 1567, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 589
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[A]s the recent debate over racial profiling
demonstrates all too clearly, a relatively minor traffic infraction may of-
ten serve as an excuse for stopping and harassing an individual. After
today, the arsenal available to any officer extends to a full arrest and the
searches permissible concomitant to that arrest."); Jason M. Katz, Atwa-
ter v. City of Lago Vista: Buckle-Up or Get Locked-Up: Warrantless Ar-
rests for Fine-Only Misdemeanors Under the Fourth Amendment, 36
Akron L. Rev. 491 (2003). See supra § 4.8(c) for a discussion of pretex-
tual traffic stops.
5.27(d) Warrantless Detention
Officers may make a warrantless detention of a vehicle by deflating
its tires during the time when officers are in pursuit of a suspect. State v.
Burgess, 43 Wn. App. 253, 259, 716 P.2d 948, 952 (1986). In Burgess,
the court held that, because the detention was unaccompanied by an ex-
ploratory search, the detention was reasonably restricted in time and
place and was necessary to prevent the suspect's flight from the scene.
Id.
5.28 INVENTORY SEARCHES OF IMPOUNDED VEHICLES
When a vehicle is lawfully impounded, police are permitted to con-
duct a warrantlesss inventory search. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367,
371, 107 S. Ct. 738, 741, 93 L. Ed. 2d 739, 745 (1987) (inventory
searches are a well-defined exception to the warrant requirement); State
v. White, 135 Wn.2d 761, 766-67, 958 P.2d 982, 984-85 (1998) (limiting
scope of inventory search to those areas necessary to fulfill its purpose).
Routine inventory searches are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
when police follow standard practices and the search is not a pretext for
obtaining evidence the police would not be able to obtain otherwise.
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 375, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 3100, 49
L. Ed. 2d 1000, 1008 (1976); State v. White, 83 Wn. App. 770, 775, 924
P.2d 55, 57 (1996), rev'd on other grounds, 135 Wn.2d 761, 958 P.2d
982 (1998).
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Washington courts have long held that a noninvestigatory inventory
search of an automobile is proper when conducted in good faith for the
purposes of (1) finding, listing, and securing property from loss during
detention that belongs to a detained person and (2) protecting police and
temporary storage bailees from liability due to dishonest claims of theft.
State v. Houser, 95 Wn.2d 143, 154, 622 P.2d 1218, 1225 (1980); White,
83 Wn. App. at 77; cf State v. Mireles, 73 Wn. App. 605, 612-13, 871
P.2d 162, 165-66 (1994) (routine inventory search by Department of
Social and Health Services did not violate owner's Fourth Amendment
rights; truck was seized to enforce lien for owner's unpaid child support;
search followed written standardized inventory procedures).
The scope of an inventory search is "limited to those areas neces-
sary to fulfill its purpose"; that is, "limited to protecting against substan-
tial risks to property." Houser, 95 Wn.2d at 155. For example, police in
Washington may not open and examine a locked trunk "absent a mani-
fest necessity for conducting such a search." Id. at 156 (no great danger
of theft to property left in trunk). Police also may not open luggage lo-
cated in an impounded vehicle absent consent or exigent circumstances.
Id. at 158. Police conducting an inventory search of a validly impounded
vehicle may not search a locked trunk, despite the fact that the trunk
could be opened by a switch located inside the passenger compartment.
White, 135 Wn.2d at 765-67.
In State v. Williams, 102 Wn.2d 733, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984), the
court suggested that police must obtain the owner's consent before con-
ducting an inventory search of an impounded vehicle pursuant to the
community caretaking exception. Id. at 743. However, an inventory
search of a vehicle impounded pursuant to the community caretaking
exception without the owner's consent was held to be valid in State v.
Sweet, 44 Wn. App. 226, 721 P.2d 560 (1986). In Sweet, the owner was
unconscious and unable to either give or withhold his consent; there was
also no evidence suggesting that the search was conducted in bad faith or
that it was a mere pretext for an investigatory search. Id. at 237.
5.29 WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF VEHICLES: MEDICAL EMERGENCIES
Police may enter a vehicle to aid a person in distress or to seek in-
formation about a person in distress. United States v. Haley, 581 F.2d
723, 725-26 (8th Cir. 1978); 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure §
7.4(f) (4th ed. 2004). At the time of publication, no published Washing-
ton cases directly addressed warrantless searches of vehicles because of a
medical emergency, though cases that have addressed the community
caretaking exception to the warrant requirement have not foreclosed cir-
cumstances involving vehicles. See supra § 5.5.
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5.30 WARRANTLESS SEARCHES IN SPECIAL ENVIRONMENTS
Warrantless searches have been permitted in special environments
when the danger to the public is severe and the degree of intrusion small.
Warrantless magnetometer (metal detector) searches are permitted at air-
ports to prevent hijackings and bombings. United States v. Skipwith, 482
F.2d 1272, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973). Similarly, brief stops are permitted at
courthouses to prevent bombings. Downing v. Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230,
1233 (6th Cir. 1972).
At the same time, the Washington Supreme Court has rejected as
unconstitutional the warrantless pat-down of patrons at rock concerts.
Jacobsen v. Seattle, 98 Wn.2d 668, 673-74, 658 P.2d 653, 656 (1983).
The court reasoned that there is a greater risk of danger at airports and
courthouses than at rock concerts, and pat-down searches constitute a
higher degree of intrusion than magnetometer and typical courthouse
searches. Id. For a discussion of warrantless searches in other special
environments, see 5 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure §§ 10.5 (4th
ed. 2004) (borders), 10.9 (prisons and jails), 10.11 (schools).
5.31 WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES OF OBJECTS IN THE
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MAILS
First-class mail and packages transported by private carriers may be
seized when law enforcement officers have probable cause to believe that
the mail or packages contain contraband. See United States v. Van Leeu-
wen, 397 U.S. 249, 251-52, 90 S. Ct. 1029, 1031-32, 25 L. Ed. 2d 282
(1970); see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 121-22, 104 S.
Ct. 1652, 1660-61, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85, 99 (1984). The contents of such mail
or packages may not be examined without a warrant, however, unless the
reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents no longer exists, or the
examination consists of a test that will only disclose the presence of the
contraband. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 121-22, 104 S. Ct. at 1660-61, 80 L.
Ed. 2d at 99; see also State v. Wolohan, 23 Wn. App. 813, 820, 598 P.2d
421, 425 (1979). A canine sniff may be used to establish probable cause
that a package lawfully held by police contains contraband. State v. Jack-
son, 82 Wn. App. 594, 606, 918 P.2d 945, 952 (1996); see also State v.
Boyce, 44 Wn. App. 724, 729, 723 P.2d 28, 31 (1986) (declining to adopt
the blanket federal rule that canine sniffs are never searches and suggest-
ing that Article I, Section 7 requires a case-by-case examination of the
circumstances in order to determine whether a canine sniff is a search).
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CHAPTER 6:
SPECIAL ENVIRONMENTS
6.0 SPECIAL ENVIRONMENTS AND PURPOSES:
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES AT SCHOOLS, PRISONS, AND BORDERS;
ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
This chapter discusses the differences in reasonable expectations of
privacy, burdens of proof, and warrant requirements in three special en-
vironments: public schools, detention and correction facilities, and the
international border. The section also discusses special considerations in
administrative searches.
For a brief discussion of warrantless searches in airports, court-
houses, and public concerts, see 5 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure
§§ 10.6, at 278, 10.7, at 313 (4th ed. 2004).
6.1 SCHOOLS
A student's legitimate expectation of privacy must be balanced
against the school's legitimate need to provide an environment condu-
cive to learning; consequently, schools are considered a special environ-
ment in search and seizure law in which the usual burdens of proof and
warrant requirements are slightly relaxed. Section 6. 1(a) discusses how
this balance permits a school official to search a student without a war-
rant or even probable cause so long as a reasonable suspicion exists. Sec-
tion 6. 1(b) discusses how this standard has been further relaxed in the
context of athletic drug-testing programs, a practice that has been upheld
under the Fourth Amendment. Finally, section 6.1(c) discusses how this
"reasonable suspicion" standard also applies to a search of a student's
physical property.
6. 1 (a) Burden of Proof and Warrant Requirements
School authorities may conduct a warrantless search of a student
without probable cause as long as the search is reasonable under all cir-
cumstances. State v. B.A.S., 103 Wn. App. 549, 553, 13 P.3d 244, 246
(2000) (citing New Jersey v. TL.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341, 105 S. Ct. 733,
742, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720, 734 (1985)). A search is reasonable if: (1) it is
justified at its inception and (2) it is reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances that justified the interference in the first place. Id. Addi-
tionally, there must be a nexus between the item sought and the infrac-
tion being investigated. Id. at 554 (holding that no connection existed
between school's closed campus policy that provided for searches of stu-
2005]
Seattle University Law Review
dents found violating the policy and the likelihood that a student was
bringing contraband onto school property). The special problem of
school discipline and the special environment of the school permit a
standard of proof less than probable cause. See TL.O., 469 U.S. at 341-
42, 105 S. Ct. at 743, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 734-35. This is true even when the
intrusion is more substantial than a frisk and the object of the intrusion is
the discovery of evidence in violation of a school rule and not the pre-
vention of physical harm. Id. Thus, this reasonable suspicion standard
and the balancing approach in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S. Ct.
1868, 1883, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 909 (1968), have been used to justify the
warrantless search of a student's purse by a school official. TL.O., 469
U.S. at 329-30, 105 S. Ct. at 736, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 727.
6.1 (b) Drug Testing of Student Athletes
The United States Supreme Court has more recently held that the
Fourth Amendment does not require school officials to have an individu-
alized suspicion before drug-testing student athletes. Vernonia Sch. Dist.
47Jv. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-65, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2396, 132 L. Ed.
2d 564, 582 (1995). Additionally, requiring all students who participate
in extracurricular activities to consent to urinalysis testing for drugs does
not violate the Fourth Amendment. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No.
92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 838, 122 S. Ct. 2559, 2569, 153 L. Ed. 2d 735,
749 (2002).
Washington has recognized the school as a special environment
and, consequently, permits a search of a student's person based on less
than probable cause. State v. McKinnon, 88 Wn.2d 75, 81, 558 P.2d 781,
784 (1977). Using the Terry reasonable suspicion standard and the bal-
ancing test articulated in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535,
87 S. Ct. 1727, 1734, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930, 939 (1967), the McKinnon court
set forth several factors for determining the reasonableness of a search:
"the child's age, history, and school record, the prevalence and serious-
ness of the problem in the school to which the search was directed, the
exigency to make the search without delay, and the probative value and
reliability of the information used as a justification for the search."
McKinnon, 88 Wn.2d at 81 (citations omitted). However, because
McKinnon was decided under federal constitutional law, the continuing
extent of its protection in Washington is uncertain. It has clearly been
limited under federal law in the context of random, suspicionless drug
testing of student athletes, a practice that has been upheld as constitu-
tional under the Fourth Amendment. Acton, 515 U.S. at 664-65, 115 S.
Ct. at 2396, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 582. The Washington Supreme Court has
yet to rule if such searches would constitute a violation under Article I,
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Section 7. However, the appellate court has shown that such testing
would likely not violate the Washington Constitution. See York v.
Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200, 110 Wn. App. 383, 386, 40 P.3d 1198,
1200 (2002) (stating that suspicionless searches are not unreasonable per
se and could be upheld under a special needs analysis where there is a
compelling state interest and the testing is narrowly tailored to meet that
interest).
6. 1 (c) Searches of Student Belongings
Although the reduced standard of proof of reasonable suspicion will
justify the search of a student or his or her belongings, the school still
must have particularized suspicion with respect to each individual
searched. Kuehn v. Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403, 103 Wn.2d 594, 599, 694
P.2d 1078, 1081 (1985) (en banc) (individualized suspicion required for
search of school band members' luggage). But see Acton, 515 U.S. at
664-65, 115 S. Ct. at 2396, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 582 (individualized suspi-
cion not required for drug testing of student athletes); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at
342 n.8, 105 S. Ct. at 743 n.8, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 735 n.8 (stating that excep-
tions to the individualized suspicion requirement generally require a
minimal privacy interest and the presence of additional "safeguards");
Wahkiakum School District, 110 Wn. App. at 385, 40 P.3d at 1199 (dis-
tinguishing random drug testing program for student athletes from a
suspicionless search of a particular student's belongings). See generally 5
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 10.11 (b), at 491-513 (4th ed.
2004).
6.2 PRISONS, CUSTODIAL DETENTION, AND POST-CONVICTION
ALTERNATIVES TO PRISON
Incarceration affects all aspects of an individual's search and sei-
zure protections: the reasonable expectation of privacy, the levels of
proof required for intrusions, and the warrant requirements. This section
will provide a sampling of some of the ways incarceration or even con-
viction alone alters search and seizure protections.
6.2(a) Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
A prisoner has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her
prison cell. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525-26, 104 S. Ct. 3194,
3200, 82 L. Ed. 2d 393, 402-03 (1984). Additionally, the warrantless
search of the home of a convict released pending appeal does not violate
constitutional protections. State v. Lucas, 56 Wn. App. 236, 240-41, 783
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P.2d 121, 124-25 (1989) ("[O]ne released pending appeal . . . should
expect close scrutiny.").
Pretrial detainees, like convicted prisoners, may be subjected to un-
announced searches of living areas. See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S.
576, 589-91, 104 S. Ct. 3227, 3234-35, 82 L. Ed. 2d 438, 449-50 (1984)
(unannounced searches of living areas held not violative of due process
or Fourth Amendment rights); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 555-57, 99
S. Ct. 1861, 1882-84, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447, 479-80 (1979) ("It is difficult to
see how the detainee's interest in privacy is infringed by the room-search
rule."). Additionally, jailed suspects have no expectation of privacy in
property located in the property room at the prison under both the Fourth
Amendment and Article I, Section 7 of the Washington Constitution.
State v. Cheatam, 112 Wn. App. 778, 785-87, 51 P.3d 138, 142-43
(2002), aff'd, 150 Wn.2d 626, 81 P.3d 830 (2003).
A convicted sex offender has only a minimal expectation of privacy
in personal body fluids; thus, the State may remove blood for testing
without the defendant's consent. In re Juveniles A, B, C, D, E, 121
Wn.2d 80, 92-93, 96, 847 P.2d 455, 460, 462 (1993) (upholding consti-
tutionality of RCW 70.24.340, which mandates HIV testing for adults
and juveniles who have been convicted of a sexual offense under RCW
9A.44). Additionally, under RCW 43.43.754, the state may obtain blood
samples and perform DNA tests without the defendant's consent follow-
ing conviction. State v. Olivas, 122 Wn.2d 73, 98, 856 P.2d 1076, 1089
(1993) (en bane) (constitutionality upheld under Fourth Amendment).
6.2(b) Levels of Proof
Neither probable cause nor individualized suspicion is required for
searches of prisoners, pretrial detainees, or prison cells. See Bell, 441
U.S. at 555-60, 99 S. Ct. at 1882-85, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 479-82 (pretrial
detainees); State v. Baker, 28 Wn. App. 423, 424-25, 623 P.2d 1172,
1173 (1981) (prisoners).
Furthermore, a parolee does not have the same search and seizure
protections as an ordinary citizen, and thus police may search a parolee's
vehicle based only on a "well-founded" suspicion of criminal activity.
State v. Coahran, 27 Wn. App. 664, 666, 620 P.2d 116, 118 (1980).
Lastly, convicts released pending appeal are also subject to a warrantless
search if the police have a "well-founded" suspicion of a violation of
release conditions. Lucas, 56 Wn. App. at 243-44, 783 P.2d at 126.
6.2(c) Warrantless Searches and Seizures
Warrants are not required for searches of prisoners or pretrial de-
tainees. See Block, 468 U.S. at 591, 104 S. Ct. at 3234-35, 82 L. Ed. 2d
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at 449-50; Hudson, 468 U.S. at 526, 104 S. Ct. at 3200, 82 L. Ed. 2d at
402-03.
Warrants also are not required for searches of parolees, probation-
ers, work release inmates, and convicts released pending appeal, or for
any of these groups' homes and effects. See generally United States v.
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 S. Ct. 587, 151 L. Ed. 2d 497 (2001) (dis-
cussing whether a parole condition pennitting the search of the "person,
property, place of residence, vehicle, [and] personal effects . . . with or
without a search warrant" satisfies the Fourth Amendment); see also Lu-
cas, 56 Wn. App. at 243-44; Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875-77,
107 S. Ct. 3164, 3169-70, 97 L. Ed. 2d 709, 718-19 (1987) (neither
probable cause nor warrant required for search of probationer's home);
State v. Campbell, 103 Wn.2d 1, 22-23, 691 P.2d 929, 941-42 (1984)
(en banc); Coahran, 27 Wn. App. at 666-67, 620 P.2d at 118; State v.
Simms, 10 Wn. App. 75, 85-86, 516 P.2d 1088, 1094-95 (1973). Persons
residing with prisoners who are released to a home-detention program
are required to sign consent forms that allow for warrantless searches and
seizures of the property where the person and the prisoner reside. State v.
Cole, 122 Wn. App. 319, 93 P.3d 209 (2004).
6.2(d) Strip and Body Cavity Searches Following
Custodial Arrest for Minor Offenses
In Washington, routine strip searches are governed by statute and
administrative regulation. See RCW 10.79.060-170; WAC §§ 289-02-
020, -100, -200. A defendant's state protections from a strip search under
Article I, Section 7 are coextensive with the defendant's Fourth Amend-
ment rights. State v. Audley, 77 Wn. App. 897, 904, 908, 894 P.2d 1359,
1363, 1365 (1995) (holding that RCW 10.79.130(l)(a) is constitutional
under Article I, Section 7 and the Fourth Amendment and that such
searches are permissible where they are supported by reasonable suspi-
cion that an arrestee is concealing contraband that poses a threat to jail
security). Only a reasonable suspicion is required to conduct a "dry cell
search" of prisoner. State v. Rainford, 86 Wn. App. 431, 433, 435 n.1,
936 P.2d 1210, 1211, 1212 n.1 (1997) ("dry cell search" typically in-
volves placing prisoner in private room under 24-hour observation until
prisoner has undergone three bowel movements and then examining the
feces for signs of drug use). For strip and body cavity searches conducted
prior to a detainee's first court appearance, probable cause and a warrant
are required unless one of the following occurs: (1) the detainee is
charged with a violent offense; (2) the detainee is charged with an of-
fense involving escape, burglary, use of a deadly weapon, or contraband;
or (3) police possess a reasonable suspicion that the detainee is conceal-
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ing on his or her person contraband, weapons, or fruits or instrumentali-
ties of crime. WAC §§ 289-16-100 to -200; cf State v. Brown, 33 Wn.
App. 843, 848, 658 P.2d 44, 47-48 (1983) (reasonable suspicion for strip
search of prisoner found after prisoner had personal contact with visitor);
State v. Hartzog, 96 Wn.2d 383, 396-97, 635 P.2d 694, 701-02 (1981)
(holding that visual and body cavity searches of prisoners leaving penal
institution for court appearance are permissible, and holding that where
the record fails to disclose that an inmate-defendant has undergone a
body cavity probe search immediately before leaving the penitentiary, a
second search at courthouse may also be imposed without a hearing to
determine its necessity).
6.3 INTERNATIONAL BORDERS
Searches and seizures of travelers at or near the international border
fall within the scope of the Fourth Amendment, but such intrusions gen-
erally do not have to meet the strict levels of proof and warrant require-
ments of ordinary searches and seizures. This section will briefly de-
scribe some of the situations in which traditional proof and warrant re-
quirements have been relaxed.
6.3(a) Permanent Checkpoints: Illegal Aliens
Provided the intrusion does not exceed the scope of a Terry stop,
law enforcement officers may conduct routine brief questioning of trav-
elers at permanent checkpoints to identify illegal aliens. United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566-67, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 3087, 49 L. Ed.
2d 1116, 1133 (1976). No warrant is required for such stops. See id. In
Washington, race or color alone is not a sufficient basis for making an
investigatory stop at a border patrol. See State v. Almanza-Guzman, 94
Wn. App. 563, 567, 972 P.2d 468, 470 (1999).
6.3(b) Roving Patrols: Illegal Aliens
To stop the vehicle, officers conducting roving patrols near borders
must have a reasonable suspicion, based on "specific articulable facts,"
that a vehicle contains illegal aliens. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. 873, 884, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 2582,45 L. Ed. 2d 607, 618 (1975).
For a roving patrol to search a vehicle, reasonable suspicion that the
vehicle contains illegal aliens is insufficient; the officers must have prob-
able cause. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 269-70, 93
S. Ct. 2535, 2537-38, 37 L. Ed. 2d 596, 600-01 (1973).
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6.3(c) Smuggling
The scope of a Terry stop at the border may be relatively intrusive
when smuggling of narcotics is suspected. See United States v. Montoya
de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 544, 105 S. Ct. 3304, 3312, 87 L. Ed. 2d
381, 393 (1985) (individual fitting courier profile of alimentary canal
smuggler may be detained for 16 hours pending bowel movement); cf
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502-03, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1326-27, 75 L.
Ed. 2d 229, 239-40 (1983) (officers who had only reasonable suspicion
that airport traveler was smuggling narcotics could not detain traveler in
a special room and seize his tickets and luggage); United States v. Place,
462 U.S. 696, 709-10, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2645-46, 77 L. Ed. 2d 110, 122-
23 (1983) (90-minute detention of luggage at international airport unrea-
sonable when law enforcement officers had only reasonable suspicion of
smuggling). But see United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 687-88, 105
S. Ct. 1568, 1576, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605, 616-17 (1985) (20-minute detention
of suspect based only on reasonable suspicion is permissible; Terry stop
unconstitutional in duration only when police do not act with due dili-
gence, not at expiration of any time period). However, a Washington
court has held that absent some independent legal justification, customs
officers may not conduct warrantless searches based on less than prob-
able cause at locations other than an actual border. See State v. Quick, 59
Wn. App. 228, 232, 796 P.2d 764, 766 (1990).
6.4 ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES
Searches conducted for administrative purposes, whether or not
criminal prosecution is anticipated, are governed by the Fourth Amend-
ment. See, e.g., Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 291-93, 104 S. Ct.
641, 646-47, 78 L. Ed. 2d 477, 483-84 (1984) (Fourth Amendment ap-
plies to inspection of home that was partially damaged by fire, even
when purpose of inspection is to determine fire's origin and no criminal
conduct is suspected).
6.4(a) Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
An individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not affected by
the fact that a search is part of an administrative or regulatory program or
has a purpose other than criminal prosecution. See Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-33, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 1732-33, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930,
937-38 (1967) (search of home for housing code violations); See v. Seat-
tle, 387 U.S. 541, 545-46, 87 S. Ct. 1737, 1740-41, 18 L. Ed. 2d 943,
947-48 (1967) (search of commercial premises for fire code violations).
Although there are a few pervasively regulated industries that are not
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permitted reasonable expectations of privacy, the general rule is that the
Fourth Amendment protections apply to civil as well as criminal searches
and to commercial as well as residential premises. See Marshall v. Bar-
low's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313, 98 S. Ct. 1816, 1820-21, 56 L. Ed. 2d
305, 311-12 (1978) (except for particular industries, such as those in-
volving liquor and firearms where no reasonable expectation of privacy
exists, the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable administra-
tive searches of commercial premises); see also Clifford, 464 U.S. at
291, 104 S. Ct. at 646, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 483; Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S.
499, 506, 98 S. Ct. 1942, 1948, 56 L. Ed. 2d 486, 496 (1978). In addi-
tion, some regulated industries are granted only a limited expectation of
privacy which must be balanced against the need for a particular admin-
istrative search. See Murphy v. State, 115 Wn. App. 297, 313, 62 P.3d
533, 541 (2003) (holding a patient has a limited expectation of privacy in
prescription records that is outweighed by the government's statutorily
mandated interest in monitoring the flow of drugs from pharmacies to
patients).
6.4(b) Warrant Requirements
Warrants generally are required for administrative searches of both
private and commercial premises. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 532-33, 87
S. Ct. at 1732-33, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 937-38. When the traditional excep-
tions to the warrant requirement apply, however, a warrant is unneces-
sary. See Clifford, 464 U.S. at 294-95, 104 S. Ct. at 646-47, 78 L. Ed. 2d
at 483-84 (warrant not required for entry onto premises when consent
given or exigent circumstances present: "[E]vidence of criminal activity.
. discovered during the course of a valid administrative search... may
be seized under the 'plain view' doctrine.") (citation omitted).
Warrants are not required in certain limited situations when the
searches are made pursuant to comprehensive and predictable legislative
schemes. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598-99, 101 S. Ct. 2534,
2537-38, 69 L. Ed. 2d 262, 268-69 (1981). Such situations are character-
ized by a substantial federal interest in inspection, as in the case of haz-
ardous industries, and by the necessity of a warrantless inspection to en-
force the legislative purpose. See id. at 598-99, 101 S. Ct. at 2538-39, 69
L. Ed. 2d at 269 (congressional scheme authorizing warrantless inspec-
tions of mines found constitutional); see also Murphy, 115 Wn. App. at
307-08, 62 P.3d at 538 (state statute requiring pharmacies to keep re-
cords of dispensed prescriptions and to make them available for inspec-
tion by state pharmacy board or other law enforcement officer does not
violate search and seizure provisions of either state or federal constitu-
tions). In addition, the scheme must prove to be an adequate substitute
[Vol. 28:467
Washington Search & Seizure
for a warrant by imposing certainty and regularity in the inspections and
by accommodating special privacy concerns. Donovan, 42 U.S. at 603,
101 S. Ct. at 2539-40, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 271-72.
Next, warrants are not always required for license, registration, and
equipment spot checks of vehicles. Compare Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 663, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1401, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 673-74 (1979)
(warrant required for random spot check of vehicles), with Michigan
Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2488,
110 L. Ed. 2d 412, 423 (1990) (holding that a highway sobriety check-
point program, under which all motorists passing through the checkpoint
were stopped and examined for signs of intoxication, did not violate the
Fourth Amendment), and State v. Marchand, 104 Wn.2d 434, 441, 706
P.2d 225, 228 (1985) (en banc) (holding unconstitutional a statute em-
powering state patrol officers to require the driver of any motor vehicle
being operated on any Washington highway to stop and display his or her
driver's license and/or to submit the vehicle to an inspection to ascertain
whether it complied with the minimum equipment requirements).
6.4(c) Level of Proof Requirements
To obtain an administrative warrant to search commercial or resi-
dential premises, law enforcement officers must either offer specific
proof of a violation, or show that "reasonable legislative or administra-
tive standards for conducting an . . . inspection are satisfied with respect
to a particular [establishment]." Marshall, 436 U.S. at 320-21, 98 S. Ct.
at 1824, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 316 (brackets in original) (citation omitted)
(quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 538, 87 S. Ct. at 1736, 18 L. Ed. 2d at
941).
When officers seek a warrant based on a general administrative
program, they must set forth sufficient details of the program to enable
the magistrate to determine whether the program is reasonable. Seattle v.
Leach, 29 Wn. App. 81, 85, 627 P.2d 159, 162 (1981). Conclusory
statements are inadequate. Id.
When an administrative warrant is sought to determine the recent
cause of a fire, "fire officials need show only that a fire of undetermined
origin has occurred on the premises, that the scope of the proposed
search is reasonable and will not intrude unnecessarily on the fire vic-
tims' privacy, and that the search will be executed at a reasonable and
convenient time." Clifford, 464 U.S. at 294, 104 S. Ct. at 647, 78 L. Ed.
2d at 484.
The following two factors affect the constitutionality of vehicle
spot checks: (1) whether the purpose is satisfied by the procedure-that
is, whether spot checks are "a sufficiently productive mechanism to jus-
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tify the intrusion" or (2) whether the checks involve the "unconstrained
exercise of discretion" by officers conducting the stops. Prouse, 440 U.S.
at 658-59, 663, 99 S. Ct. at 1399, 1401, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 670-71, 673-74
(officer's unconstrained and random discretionary stop of vehicle unjus-
tified by incremental contribution to highway safety); see also Mar-
chand, 104 Wn.2d at 439, 706 P.2d at 227 (officer's unconstrained dis-
cretion not justified where efficacy of procedure not shown by record).
However, where the officers have limited discretion, there is no constitu-
tional violation. See, e.g., Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451-52, 110 S. Ct. at 2486,
110 L. Ed. 2d at 420-21 (holding that a highway sobriety checkpoint
program, under which all motorists passing through the checkpoint were
stopped and examined for signs of intoxication, did not violate the Fourth
Amendment).
Since the Sitz case, the validity of Washington case law on the issue
of vehicle checkpoints prior to that decision has been imperiled. Com-
pare Seattle v. Yeager, 67 Wn. App. 41, 47, 834 P.2d 73, 76 (1992) (up-
holding constitutionality of statute authorizing stops of vehicles with li-
cense plates marked to indicate that the driver had previously been cited
for driving without a license; no particularized suspicion required), with
Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d 454, 460, 755 P.2d 775, 778 (1988) (en
banc) (sobriety checkpoint program established during holiday season
that involved the warrantless stopping of all oncoming motorists at
checkpoints violated state and federal constitutional guarantees against
seizure without authority of law), and Marchand, 104 Wn.2d at 441. Al-
though the Washington Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment in Mesiani has been overruled by the United States Supreme
Court's holding in Sitz, the state constitutional grounds of Mesiani have
not been expressly overruled.
As with the "area" warrants that authorize housing and fire code in-
spections, see Camara, 387 U.S. at 537-38, 87 S. Ct. at 1735-36, 18 L.
Ed. 2d at 940-41; See, 387 U.S. at 545, 87 S. Ct. at 1740, 18 L. Ed. 2d at
947-48, individualized suspicion is not necessarily required for spot
checks. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451-52, 110 S. Ct. at 2486, 110 L. Ed. 2d at
421; see also Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654-55, 99 S. Ct. at 1396-97, 59 L.
Ed. 2d at 668 ("In those situations where the balance of interests pre-
clude insistence upon some quantum of individualized suspicion, other
safeguards are generally relied upon.") (citations omitted). Furthermore,
it is clear that under certain circumstances and with certain procedures
the Washington Constitution allows vehicle spot checks. Compare Mar-
chand, 104 Wn.2d at 435 (procedure unconstitutional where random ve-
hicles are stopped for inspection while others were allowed to pass), with
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Yeager, 67 Wn. App. at 48 (procedure constitutional where the stops are
limited to vehicles with marked license plates).

Washington Search & Seizure
CHAPTER 7:
ADMINISTRATION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
7.0 INTRODUCTION
If a search or seizure violates a person's Fourth Amendment rights,
the exclusionary rule has traditionally provided that any evidence found
as a result of the search or seizure must be suppressed in the defendant's
criminal trial. State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 176, 43 P.3d 513, 518
(2002) (en banc); State v. Kinzy, 141 Wn.2d 373, 393, 5 P.3d 668, 680
(2000) (en banc). When physical evidence must be suppressed, testimony
regarding that physical evidence must also be suppressed if such testi-
mony is the fruit of the unlawful search or seizure. 6 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 11.6(a), at 396 (4th ed. 2004); see, e.g., State v.
Faford, 128 Wn.2d 476, 488, 910 P.2d 447, 453 (1996) (en banc); State
v. Salinas, 121 Wn.2d 689, 697, 853 P.2d 439, 442-43 (1993) (en banc).
To invoke the exclusionary rule, a defendant must make a timely objec-
tion, State v. Valladares, 31 Wn. App. 63, 76, 639 P.2d 813, 820 (1982),
rev'd in part on other grounds by State v. Valladares, 99 Wn.2d 663, 664
P.2d 508 (1983) (en banc), and have standing to object. See State v.
Jones, 146 Wn.2d 328, 331-35, 45 P.3d 1062, 1064-65 (2002) (en banc)
(explaining that although automatic standing has been abandoned in the
United States Supreme Court, it still maintains a presence in Washington
and that a person may rely on the automatic standing doctrine only if the
challenged police action produced the evidence sought to be used against
him); State v. Williams, 142 Wn.2d 17, 21-23, 11 P.3d 714, 716-18
(2000) (en banc); State v. Michaels, 60 Wn.2d 638, 640-41, 374 P.2d
989, 990 (1962) (en banc). The rule applies both to federal and state vio-
lations of the Fourth Amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660,
81 S. Ct. 1684, 1694, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 1093 (1961).
Historically, the exclusionary rule has had the following purposes:
(1) to deter unreasonable searches and seizures, id. at 656, 81 S. Ct. at
1692, 6 L. Ed. 2d at 1090-91; (2) to preserve judicial integrity by pre-
venting courts from becoming accomplices to the willful disobedience of
the Constitution, id. at 659, 81 S. Ct. at 1694, 6 L. Ed. 2d at 1092; and
(3) to sustain the public's belief that the government will not profit from
lawless behavior, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357, 94 S. Ct.
613, 624, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561, 576-77 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In
1984, the United States Supreme Court identified deterrence of police
misconduct as the principal justification for the exclusionary rule. United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3417, 82 L. Ed. 2d
677, 696 (1984). In fact, the Court declined to employ the rule to demon-
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strate judicial integrity or to deter magistrates from improper probable
cause determinations. Id. at 917, 104 S. Ct. at 3417-18, 82 L. Ed. 2d at
695.
Although most of the discussion in this section centers upon the ex-
clusion of evidence when compelled by the federal constitution, state law
can compel the exclusion of evidence from state courts that federal law
would hold admissible in federal courts. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 94
Wn.2d 531, 541, 617 P.2d 1012, 1018 (1980) (en banc) (recordings made
in violation of Washington privacy statute, although permitted under fed-
eral wiretap statute, are inadmissible in state court proceedings); see 1
LaFave, supra, § 1.5(b), at 159-61 (state may compel exclusion of ille-
gally seized evidence even when the federal constitution does not require
such exclusion).
The variations between the federal and state exclusionary rules are
largely based on the difference in wording and intent between the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of
the Washington Constitution. See, e.g., Duncan, 146 Wn.2d at 176-77
(explaining that the primary objectives underlying the exclusionary rule
are first, and most importantly, to protect privacy interests of individuals
against unreasonable governmental intrusions; second, to deter the police
from acting unlawfully in obtaining evidence; and third, to preserve the
dignity of the judiciary by refusing to consider evidence which has been
obtained through illegal means); State v. Rife, 133 Wn.2d 140, 148, 943
P.2d 266, 269 (1997) (en banc); State v. Crawley, 61 Wn. App. 29, 34,
808 P.2d 773, 776 (1991); State v. White, 97 Wn.2d 92, 110-12, 640
P.2d 1061, 1071-72 (1982) (en banc). Under the Fourth Amendment, the
application of the rule will depend largely on whether the exclusion of
evidence will deter future police misconduct; but, under Article I, Sec-
tion 7, the application of the rule focuses on protecting individual rights
and may even be automatic. Compare Crawley, 61 Wn. App. at 35, and
White, 97 Wn.2d at 109-12, with Leon, 468 U.S. at 918, 104 S. Ct. at
3418, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 695. Washington has even recognized deterrence of
legislative misconduct as a legitimate purpose for excluding illegally ob-
tained evidence. White, 97 Wn.2d at 112.
7.1 CRITICISM OF THE RULE
A number of judges and legal scholars have opposed a broad-
reaching exclusionary rule. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 484 n.21,
96 S. Ct. 3037, 3047-48 n.21, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067, 1082 n.21 (1976). See
generally 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.2(a)-(f), at 26-54
(4th ed. 2004). The arguments for and counterarguments against a
broader rule include the following:
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(1) Argument: The rule handcuffs the police by handicapping the
detection and prosecution of crime. Id. § 1.2(a), at 27.
Counterargument: The Fourth Amendment itself, not the rule, has
that effect. Id. That very argument was rejected when the amendment
was adopted. See id For citations to studies on the effects of the exclu-
sionary rule on felony prosecutions, see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 907-08 n.6, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3413 n.6, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677, 688 n.6
(1984). For the suggestion that illegally issued warrants cause the loss of
only a negligible portion of felony arrests, see 1 LaFave, supra, § 1.3(c),
at 61.
(2) Argument: The rule aids only the guilty. Id. § 1.2(a), at 29.
Counterargument: Because of the rule's deterrent effect, innocent
persons are spared unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at 30.
(3) Argument: The rule does not deter. Id. § 1.2(b), at 32.
Counterargument: After the rule's creation, there was a dramatic
increase in the number of warrant applications and the number of police
academy classes offering instruction on obtaining evidence in a manner
that does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Stone, 428 U.S. at 492, 96
S. Ct. at 3051, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1086-87.
Suggested alternatives to the exclusionary rule include: providing
civil damages as the sole remedy, limiting the rule to knowing violations,
or limiting the rule to minor crimes. See generally 1 LaFave, supra, §
1.2(a)-(f), at 26-54. See also Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should
Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. Ill. L. Rev. 363 (1999) (suggest-
ing an administrative damages regime wherein Fourth Amendment viola-
tions could be brought directly against police); L. Timothy Perrin, If It's
Broken Fix It: Moving Beyond the Exclusionary Rule, 83 Iowa L. Rev.
669 (1998) (providing an empirical study of the exclusionary rule and
suggesting a civil administrative remedy to partially replace the rule);
Stephen E. Gottlieb, Feedback from the Fourth Amendment: Is the Ex-
clusionary Rule an Albatross Around the Judicial Neck?, 67 Ky. L.J.
1007 (1979) (suggesting remedy solely in tort, with damages paid either
through insurance or governmental reimbursement).
7.2 LIMITATIONS IN THE APPLICATION OF THE RULE
This section will discuss two general categories of exceptions to the
exclusionary rule: (1) those based on the good faith of the police, and (2)
those based on the non-substantive use of the illegally obtained evidence.
Subsequent sections will discuss additional limitations on the application
of the rule that pertain to the following: (1) the type of judicial proceed-
ing, see 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.7(a)-(h), at 218-55
(4th ed. 2004); (2) the public or private status of the party conducting the
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unlawful search and seizure, see id. § 1.8(a)-(h), at 255-333; (3) the
nexus between the unlawful search or seizure and the evidence sought to
be suppressed, see id. § 1.6(a), at 187 n.4; and (4) the procedural re-
quirements, see 2 id, § 4.4(d), at 553-62.
7.2(a) Unlawful Searches and Seizures Conducted in Good Faith
The exclusionary rule does not apply in federal courts when evi-
dence is seized in reasonable, good faith reliance on a search warrant that
is later found to be unsupported by probable cause. See United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919-21, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3419, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677,
696-97 (1984). "The marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by sup-
pressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subse-
quently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of
exclusion." Id. at 922, 104 S. Ct. at 3420, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 698. Yet,
Washington courts have repeatedly refused to adopt the Leon good faith
exception to search warrants, holding that such an exception violates the
state constitution. See State v. Walker, 101 Wn. App. 1, 11- 12, 999 P.2d
1296, 1301-02 (2000) (with respect to a warrant improperly issued by a
court clerk, the court stated that to date, the Washington Supreme Court
has remedied all violations of Article 1, Section 7 by applying the exclu-
sionary rule, and that it has declined even to consider limitations parallel
to the federal ones); State v. Crawley, 61 Wn. App. 29, 35, 808 P.2d 773,
776 (1991) (recognizing that Washington has not adopted a "good faith"
exception, thereby allowing admission of evidence obtained using inva-
lid search warrant); State v. Huft, 106 Wn.2d 206, 212, 720 P.2d 838,
844 (1986) (en banc) (declining to adopt "good faith" exception due to a
lack of the substantial basis that is required for probable cause).
Similarly, in federal courts, evidence seized under the authority of a
technically invalid warrant may be admitted when the police reasonably
believed that the search they conducted was authorized by a valid war-
rant. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 987-88, 104 S. Ct. 3424,
3427-28, 82 L. Ed. 2d 737, 743 (1984). "Suppressing evidence because
the judge failed to make all the necessary clerical corrections despite his
assurances that such changes would be made will not serve the deterrent
function that the exclusionary rule was designed to achieve." Id. at 990-
91, 104 S. Ct. at 3429, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 745.
Federal courts may also admit evidence obtained during a search
incident to an unlawful arrest when the arrest is made in good faith reli-
ance on an ordinance subsequently declared unconstitutional. Michigan
v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 40, 99 S. Ct. 2627, 2633, 61 L. Ed. 2d 343,
351 (1979). This good faith exception has its own exception: The evi-
dence is inadmissible when the ordinance at issue is so similar to another
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ordinance or statute, which has been previously declared unconstitu-
tional, that it is "so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that any per-
son of reasonable prudence would be bound to see its flaws." Id. at 38,
99 S. Ct. at 2632, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 350. Even if the unlawful arrest was
based partly on a provision of a statute that was presumptively valid at
the time of the arrest because it had not yet been construed, evidence ob-
tained is inadmissible if the valid section of the statute could not be en-
forced without incorporating the grossly and "flagrantly unconstitu-
tional" section. State v. White, 97 Wn.2d 92, 104, 640 P.2d 1061, 1068
(1982) (en banc).
However, the DeFillippo good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule is inapplicable to claims brought under Article I, Section 7 of the
Washington Constitution. White, 97 Wn.2d at 109-12; State v. Wallin,
Wn. App. _, _, 105 P.3d 1037, 1044-45 (2005). Thus, when an
arrest is made pursuant to an unlawful statute, the good faith of police
and the presumptive validity of the statute at the time of arrest will not
render the fruits of the arrest admissible. White, 97 Wn.2d at 112 (recog-
nizing that the automatic application of the exclusionary rule "will add
stability to the rights of individual citizens, discourage the legislature
from passing provisions akin to [the unlawful statute], and will make law
enforcement more predictable").
Recently, Washington's good faith exception has been called into
question. In Wallin, a court extended the community placement period
for a defendant who, following a child molestation conviction, violated
his community placement terms. Wallin, 105 P.3d at 1038-39. During
the extended placement period, Department of Corrections officers and
police searched the defendant's apartment in good faith after a neighbor
reported that he was taking pictures of her teenage nieces from his
apartment window. Id. During the searches, officers found information,
including thousands of images portraying minors in sexually suggestive
poses or activities and homemade photos. Id. Although this information
was used to convict the defendant of various charges, including child
rape, the appellate court found that the evidence was inadmissible be-
cause it stemmed from the order extending his community supervision,
which was invalid. Id. at 1043-44. As part of its opinion, the court dis-
cussed Washington's rejection of the good faith exception and stated
"that the facts of [the] case illustrate a need for a [good faith] exception,"
but that "it is for the supreme court to decide whether it should re-
examine the exclusionary rule in light of the facts of this case." Id. at
1044-45.
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7.2(b) Nonsubstantive Use of Illegally Seized Evidence
Illegally obtained evidence may be used to impeach a defendant's
direct testimony at trial even when the evidence is inadmissible in the
government's case-in-chief. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64-65,
74 S. Ct. 354, 355-56, 98 L. Ed. 503, 506-07 (1954). A defendant's
statements made in response to proper cross-examination are also subject
to impeachment by illegally obtained evidence that is inadmissible as
substantive evidence of guilt. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620,
627-28, 100 S. Ct. 1912, 1917, 64 L. Ed. 2d 559, 566 (1980); State v.
Simpson, 95 Wn.2d 170, 179-80, 622 P.2d 1199, 1206 (1980) (en banc).
7.3 APPLICATIONS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS OTHER THAN TRIALS
7.3(a) Grand Jury Testimony
A person testifying before a grand jury may not refuse to answer
questions on the ground that the questions are based on evidence derived
from an illegal search. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349-50,
94 S. Ct. 613, 620-21, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561, 572 (1974). The exclusionary
rule is not applied to grand jury proceedings because its application
would have only a marginal deterrent effect. Id. at 351-52, 94 S. Ct. at
622, 38 L. Ed. 2d at 573. In determining whether to employ the rule, the
court weighs the deterrent value of applying the rule against the costs of
excluding the type of evidence in question. Id. at 349, 94 S. Ct. at 620-
21, 38 L. Ed. 2d at 572.
7.3(b) Indictment
The rule does not apply to indictments based on illegally obtained
evidence. Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 350, 78 S. Ct. 311, 318, 2
L. Ed. 2d 321, 330 (1958). Again, excluding the evidence, even if it
means dismissing an indictment, would have only marginal deterrent
value. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 351-52, 94 S. Ct. at 622, 38 L. Ed. 2d at
573.
7.3(c) Probable Cause Hearing
Illegally seized evidence may be considered in determining whether
there is probable cause to believe that the accused committed the crime
charged. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 488, 78 S. Ct. 1245,
1251, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1503, 1511 (1958) (holding that it would not be sound
judicial administration to send the case back to the district court for a
special hearing regarding probable cause, because illegally seized evi-
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dence was introduced at trial); State v. O'Neill, 103 Wn.2d 853, 867-72,
700 P.2d 711, 719-21 (1985) (en banc) (recordings by federal agents
made in a manner inconsistent with state law and thus inadmissible at
trial, nevertheless may be used to furnish probable cause for court-
ordered search).
7.3(d) Bail Hearing
Several cases in other jurisdictions suggest that illegally seized evi-
dence may be suppressed at bail hearings. See Steigler v. Super. Ct., 252
A.2d 300, 305 (Del. 1969) (conclusion of Superior Court was not invali-
dated by consideration of evidence later found to be inadmissible); State
v. Tucker, 101 N.J. Super. 380, 383, 244 A.2d 353, 355 (1968) (no need
to go into detail when considering the evidence for purposes of a bail
application). This question has not been presented to the Washington
Supreme Court.
7.3(e) Sentencing
Before the establishment of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, the
exclusionary rule had only been applied in sentencing hearings when the
illegal search was conducted for the express purpose of enhancing the
sentence or improperly influencing the sentencing judge. United States v.
Larios, 640 F.2d 938, 941-42 (9th Cir. 1981) (remanding case for resen-
tencing because judge abused his discretion by excluding evidence, when
the search was illegally based on a technical error, not because of an
overextensive or inappropriate search); United States v. Vandemark, 522
F.2d 1019, 1022 (9th Cir. 1975) (limiting exclusion of evidence when
customs agent was not aware that defendant was a probationer or that
evidence could be used for any other purpose than the possession convic-
tion); Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599, 613 (9th Cir. 1968) (ex-
cluding evidence from sentencing consideration when search conducted
without a warrant was "blatantly illegal" and the police needed to be de-
terred). But see United States v. Graves, 785 F.2d 870, 873 (10th Cir.
1986) (extending exclusionary rule to sentencing hearing would have
"deterrent effect so minimal as to be insignificant"); United States v. But-
ler, 680 F.2d 1055, 1056 (5th Cir. 1982) (deterrent effect minimal where
conviction obtained "without the evidence suppressed"); United States v.
Lee, 540 F.2d 1205, 1211 (4th Cir. 1976) (applying the exclusionary rule
to sentencing hearing would have minimal deterrent effect); United
States v. Schipani, 435 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir. 1970) (applying exclusionary
rule to sentencing hearing after it had been applied at trial "would not
add in any significant way to the deterrent effect of the rule"). See gener-
ally Michael K. Forde, The Exclusionary Rule at Sentencing: New Life
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Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 33 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 379
(1996).
Since the promulgation of the Sentencing Guidelines, the majority
of jurisdictions have maintained that the exclusionary rule does not apply
in sentencing hearings. See United States v. Kim, 25 F.3d 1426, 1432-36
(9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Montoya-Ortiz, 7 F.3d 1171, 1181-82
(5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Jenkins, 4 F.3d 1338, 1344-45 (6th Cir.
1993); United States v. Tejada, 956 F.2d 1256, 1260-61 (2d Cir. 1992);
United States v. Lynch, 934 F.2d 1226, 1234 (11th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Torres, 926 F.2d 321, 324-25 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v.
McCrory, 930 F.2d 63, 68-69 (D.C. Cir. 1991). In fact, the Ninth Circuit
has suggested that the Sentencing Guidelines and Title 18, Section 3661
of the United States Code may preclude the application of the Verdugo
exception to the rule against application of the exclusionary rule to sen-
tencing hearings, and may require that all evidence be considered during
sentencing. Kim, 25 F.3d at 1435-36; see also Forde, supra, at 388-92.
A small minority of jurisdictions have argued that the exclusionary
rule should apply at sentencing given the certainty of increased punish-
ment if illegally seized evidence is considered under the Sentencing
Guidelines. See United States v. Jewel, 947 F.2d 224, 238-40 (7th Cir.
1991) (Easterbrook, J., concurring); United States v. Gilmer, 811 F.
Supp. 578, 579 (D. Colo. 1993); United States v. Rullo, 748 F. Supp. 36,
43-45 (D. Mass. 1990) (exclusionary rule should apply because inadmis-
sible evidence is not permitted under the inevitable discovery rule); see
also Forde, supra, at 392-401. Failure to invoke the exclusionary rule
during the expansive sentencing process would create a greater incentive
for police officers to illegally search for additional evidence in order to
enhance sentencing such that the "constitutional ban on unreasonable
searches and seizures will become a parchment barrier." Jewel, 947 F.2d
at 240 (Easterbrook, J., concurring); see also Forde, supra, at 408-09.
Washington's Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, which became ef-
fective July 1, 1984, structured, but did not eliminate, discretionary deci-
sions affecting sentencing. RCW 9.94A.010. Because the sentencing
process is limited to the present conviction and the defendant's prior
convictions, Washington does not have the problems that exist under the
federal guidelines.
7.3(t) Revocation of Conditional Release
In the past there has been a split of authority on whether the exclu-
sionary rule extends to parole or probation revocation hearings. Compare
Vandemark, 522 F.2d at 1022 (exclusionary rule does not apply to proba-
tion revocation proceedings when officers conducting search did not
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know and had no reason to believe suspect was probationer), and
Richardson v. State, 841 P.2d 603, 605-06 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992) (rule
does not apply to revocation hearings, but may apply in cases of particu-
larly egregious misconduct), with United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d
1205, 1209 (4th Cir. 1978) (rule applies to probation revocation). How-
ever, the U.S. Supreme Court determined in 1998 that the exclusionary
rule does not apply to parole revocation hearings. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Pa-
role v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364-66, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 2020-21, 141 L.
Ed. 2d 344, 352-53 (1998). In Scott, parole officers found firearms, a
bow, and arrows when they entered the parolee's home based on evi-
dence of parole condition violations. Id. at 360, 118 S. Ct. at 2018, 141
L. Ed. 2d at 349. At the parolee's parole violation hearing, the hearing
examiner rejected his objection that introduction of the weapon evidence
was improper because the search was unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. Id. Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas explained that
applying the exclusionary rule would both hinder the functions of the
state parole systems and alter the traditionally flexible administrative
nature of parole revocation proceedings, while it would provide only
minimal deterrence benefits in this context because application of the
rule in the criminal trial context already provides significant deterrence
of unconstitutional searches. Id. at 364, 118 S. Ct. at 2020, 141 L. Ed. 2d
at 352. He went on to state that because the exclusionary rule precludes
consideration of reliable, probative evidence, it imposes significant costs
by detracting from the truthfinding process and allowing many who
would otherwise be incarcerated to escape consequences. Id. Although
these costs are worth bearing in certain circumstances, said the Court, the
rule's "costly toll" upon truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives
presents a high obstacle for expanded application of the rule, particularly
in the context of parole revocation proceedings because parole is a
"variation on imprisonment of convicted criminals." Id. at 364-65, 118
S. Ct. at 2020, 141 L. Ed. 2d at 352.
Some courts have suggested that the exclusionary rule should apply
when the arresting officer knows that the victim is on conditional release;
otherwise, a zealous officer would have less incentive to obey the Consti-
tution knowing that illegally seizing the evidence could send the parolee
back to prison. See Workman, 585 F.2d 1205; Vandemark, 522 F.2d
1019.
Washington courts are also divided on whether Article I, Section 7
requires the application of the exclusionary rule to probation revocation
hearings. State v. Murray, 110 Wn.2d 706, 708-09, 757 P.2d 487, 488
(1988) (en banc) (recognizing the division and uncertainty that exists
around Article I, Section 7's exclusionary rule in revocation hearings, but
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not resolving the uncertainty). Compare State v. Kuhn, 7 Wn. App. 190,
194, 499 P.2d 49, 51-52 (1972) (rule excluding evidence obtained as
result of an illegal search is not applicable to probation revocation hear-
ings), and State v. Proctor, 16 Wn. App. 865, 867, 559 P.2d 1363, 1364
(1977) (rule against illegal search only applies in probation revocation
proceedings if police are aware suspect is on probation and act in bad
faith in conducting search), with State v. Lampman, 45 Wn. App. 228,
232, 724 P.2d 1092, 1095 (1986) (requiring application without excep-
tion to probation revocation proceedings).
However, under Article I, Section 7, a parolee does have a dimin-
ished right to privacy, and a warrantless search of the parolee may be
made by a law enforcement officer with a well-founded suspicion that a
probation violation has occurred. Lampman, 45 Wn. App. at 233 (fact of
parolee's flight, in light of officer's knowledge, created a well-founded
suspicion that a parole violation had occurred). See 3 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 6.2(a), at 330 (4th ed. 2004).
7.3(g) Federal Habeas Corpus Proceeding
The exclusionary rule does not require habeas corpus relief when
the State granted the defendant a full and fair opportunity to litigate all
Fourth Amendment claims. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486, 96 S. Ct.
3037, 3048, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067, 1083 (1976).
7.3(h) Perjury
Illegally seized evidence may be used to support a perjury convic-
tion. See United States v. Raftery, 534 F.2d 854, 857 (9th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 667 (5th Cir. 1976) (cautioning
against per se admissibility; suggesting that exclusion may sometimes
have deterrent effect).
7.4 APPLICATION OF THE RULE IN QUASI-CRIMINAL, CIVIL, AND
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
The exclusionary rule has been applied in forfeiture proceedings,
requiring the suppression of any illegally seized evidence used to prove
the criminal violation justifying the forfeiture. See, e.g., One 1958 Ply-
mouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 702, 85 S. Ct. 1246, 1251,
14 L. Ed. 2d 170, 176 (1965) (exclusionary rule is applicable to forfei-
ture proceedings); Deeter v. Smith, 106 Wn.2d 376, 378-79, 721 P.2d
519, 520-21 (1986) (en banc) (holding that the exclusionary rule applies
for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment because civil forfeitures are
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quasi-criminal in nature); People v. Zimmerman, 44 II. App. 3d 601,
604, 358 N.E.2d 715,718, 3 111. Dec. 317 (1976).
7.4(a) Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings
The exclusionary rule has generally been applied in juvenile delin-
quency proceedings. In re Robert T., 8 Cal. App. 3d 990, 993, 88 Cal.
Rptr. 37, 38 (1970); In re Marsh, 40 Il1. 2d 53, 55, 237 N.E.2d 529, 531
(1968). However, some courts have recognized that the rule does not ap-
ply to juvenile dependency proceedings based on the potential harm to a
child who remains in an unhealthy environment. See, e.g., In re Christo-
pher B., 82 Cal. App. 3d 608, 615, 147 Cal. Rptr. 390, 394 (1978).
7.4(b) Narcotics Addict Commitment Proceedings
The exclusionary rule has been applied in narcotics addict com-
mitment proceedings. See People v. Moore, 69 Cal. 2d 674, 682, 446
P.2d 800, 72 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1968), overruled on other grounds by Peo-
ple v. Thomas, 19 Cal. 3d 630, 644-45, 566 P.2d 228, 139 Cal. Rptr. 594
(1977); but see Conservatorship of Susan T., 8 Cal. 4th 1005, 1019-20,
884 P.2d 988, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 40 (1994) (rule not applicable to conser-
vatorship proceedings because of concern for individual's well-being and
society's safety).
7.4(c) Civil Tax Proceedings
The exclusionary rule is not applied in civil tax proceedings when
state officials turn over illegally seized tax records to the IRS. United
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 457-60, 96 S. Ct. 3021, 3033-35, 49 L. Ed.
2d 1046, 1062-64 (1976). But see Pizzarello v. United States, 408 F.2d
579, 586 (2d Cir. 1969) (tax assessment invalid if based substantially on
illegally obtained evidence). See generally 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search
and Seizure § 1.7(d), at 229-35 (4th ed. 2004).
Nor does the exclusionary rule apply when IRS agents violate in-
ternal regulations as long as no constitutional or statutory rights are in-
fringed. United States v. Snowadzki, 723 F.2d 1427, 1430-31 (9th Cir.
1984) (involving seizure of documents by defendant's coworker who
was not acting as a government agent).
7.4(d) Administrative Proceedings
Most courts apply the exclusionary rule in administrative hearings
when the disposition is relatively significant and when application of the
rule is likely to deter unlawful searches and seizures. See New Brunswick
v. Speights, 157 N.J. Super. 9, 20-21, 384 A.2d 225 (1978) (policy of
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deterring unlawful governmental conduct may be significant when sub-
sequent disciplinary hearing directed at police officer charged with
criminal violations was foreseeable at time of search or seizure); Govern-
ing Bd of Mountain View Sch. Dist. v. Metcalf, 36 Cal. App. 3d 546,
551, 111 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1974) (recognizing rule may be applied in ad-
ministrative hearings, but holding that rule is not applicable in teacher-
dismissal proceeding based on immoral conduct because primary pur-
pose of proceeding is to protect school children). But see Thanhauser v.
Milprint, Inc., 192 N.Y.S.2d 911, 912, 9 A.D.2d 833, 833 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1959) (claimant's statement, taken while claimant under sedation
and in severe pain, is admissible in worker's compensation hearing, but
weight is for board to decide).
7.4(e) Legislative Hearings
Whether the exclusionary rule applies in a legislative hearing de-
pends on whether the evidence was seized with the intent to use it at the
hearing; if it was, then application of the rule will have a significant de-
terrent value. United States v. McSurely, 473 F.2d 1178, 1194 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (when defendant is prosecuted for contempt of Congress, court
must exclude evidence derived from unlawful search and seizure by con-
gressional committee investigator); see also Watkins v. United States,
354 U.S. 178, 205, 77 S. Ct. 1173, 1188, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1273, 1294 (1957)
("Protected freedoms should not be placed in danger in absence of clear
determination by House or Senate that particular inquiry is justified by
specific legislative need.").
7.4(t) Private Litigation
The exclusionary rule is not applied in suits between private parties.
Honeycutt v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 F.2d 340, 348 (7th Cir. 1975) (Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments do not require exclusion of evidence ob-
tained illegally by state police when private parties seek to introduce evi-
dence in civil proceeding); Sackler v. Sackler, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 42, 203
N.E.2d 481, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1964) (evidence of wife's adultery ob-
tained by illegal entry into wife's home by husband and private investi-
gators admissible in divorce action). Even evidence illegally seized by
the government may be introduced into a private proceeding, as exclu-
sion would have little deterrent value because the State is not a party to
the proceeding and would have nothing to gain from a Fourth Amend-
ment violation. Honeycutt, 510 F.2d at 348.
States, however, may rely on their own laws to bar the use of ille-
gally-seized evidence in private litigation to promote the following poli-
cies: (1) depriving transgressors of the fruits of their wrongs; (2) deter-
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ring lawless behavior; and (3) discouraging violence. See Kassner v. Fre-
ment Mut. Ins. Co., 47 Mich. App. 264, 266, 209 N.W.2d 490 (1973)
(unlawful search of premises destroyed by fire represents significant in-
vasion of privacy; thus, evidence seized as result of search not admissible
in civil case). The issue has not been reviewed under the Washington
State Constitution.
7.5 APPLICATION OF THE RULE TO SEARCHES BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS:
GENERAL PRINCIPLE
Because the Fourth Amendment is a limitation on the government
only, federal courts do not exclude the fruits of a private search. Burdeau
v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475, 41 S. Ct. 574, 576, 65 L. Ed. 1048,
1051 (1921) (papers obtained through theft by a private individual and
delivered to federal prosecutors admissible against defendant); see
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1658, 80
L. Ed. 2d 85, 96 (1984) (a private freight carrier notified government
agents that a damaged package contained a white powdery substance;
information held admissible, because "when an individual reveals private
information to another, he assumes the risk that his confidant will reveal
that information to the authorities, and if that occurs[,] the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of that information").
Article I, Section 7 does not apply to searches by private citizens
acting on their own initiative. State v. Clark, 48 Wn. App. 850, 855, 743
P.2d 822, 826 (1987). The protection from private searches afforded by
Article I, Section 7 is, thus, coextensive with the protection afforded by
the Fourth Amendment. State v. Dold, 44 Wn. App. 519, 524-25, 722
P.2d 1353, 1357 (1986). The fact that the person conducting the search
may be a public employee does not lend an element of state action to the
search if the search is not related to the employee's official duties and is
undertaken solely in his capacity as a private citizen. State v. Ludvik, 40
Wn. App. 257, 263, 698 P.2d 1064, 1068 (1985) (state game warden,
residing across the street from defendant, observed suspected drug trans-
actions and informed police). But see State v. Faford, 128 Wn.2d 476,
488-89, 910 P.2d 447, 453 (1996) (en banc) (independent basis required
for police search made pursuant to information obtained by the police
from a nosey neighbor who was eavesdropping on the defendant's cord-
less telephone conversations).
When a private party acting independently of the government con-
ducts a search and delivers the material to the police, neither the Fourth
Amendment, nor Article I, Section 7 require the police to obtain a search
warrant before examining the material if the government search does not
exceed the scope of that previously conducted by the private party. In re
2005]
Seattle University Law Review
Teddington, 116 Wn.2d 761, 766, 808 P.2d 156, 158 (1991) (en banc)
(no violation when sergeant inventoried defendant's locker after soldier
was arrested for murder and turned over incriminating letter to police);
State v. Walter, 66 Wn. App. 862, 866, 833 P.2d 440, 443 (1992) (no
violation when photo lab turns pictures over to police); State v. Bishop,
43 Wn. App. 17, 20, 714 P.2d 1199, 1200 (1986) (no violation when po-
lice reopened packets and tested substance that was found by private se-
curity guard in the telephone mouthpiece of defendant's hospital room);
Dold, 44 Wn. App. at 522 (no violation where police investigation of
defendant based on receipt of a letter addressed to defendant, but deliv-
ered to a private party, who forwarded it to police); cf Kuehn v. Renton
School Dist. No. 403, 103 Wn.2d 594, 600, 694 P.2d 1078, 1081 (1985)
(en banc) (when private person acts under authority of state, Fourth
Amendment applies; thus, lawfulness of school search of students' lug-
gage is not dependent upon whether person conducting search is band
director, principal, or parent); State v. Slattery, 56 Wn. App. 820, 826,
787 P.2d 932, 935 (1990) (recognizing "school search exception" for
teachers and when reasonably justified based on circumstances).
7.6 SEARCHES BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS: PARTICULAR APPLICATIONS
A private search becomes a state search if the private party acts as
an agent for the government or the two are engaged in a joint endeavor.
See State v. Swenson, 104 Wn. App. 744, 753, 9 P.3d 933, 938 (2000);
State v. Clark, 48 Wn. App. 850, 855-856, 743 P.2d 822, 826 (1987). A
private search may also be considered a state search when the party con-
ducting the search acts on behalf of the public or with the purpose of aid-
ing the government. See, e.g., In re Robert T., 8 Cal. App. 3d 990, 993-
94, 88 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1970) (entry by deceit considered government ac-
tion when landlord introduced plainclothes officer as companion in order
to gain access to apartment to search for stolen goods). A criminal de-
fendant has the burden of proving that a private citizen conducted the
search as an agent or instrumentality of the state. Swenson, 104 Wn. App.
at 754; Clark, 48 Wn. App. at 856. No agency relationship exists unless
the state actively encourages or instigates the citizen's actions. See Clark,
48 Wn. App at 856-57. Factors to be considered include the State's
knowledge of and acquiescence in the search and whether the citizen's
intent was to assist law enforcement efforts or to further his or her own
end. Swenson, 104 Wn. App. at 754-55 (father intended to assist police
by obtaining defendant's phone records, and although police knew of the
father's efforts, there was no evidence that they instigated, encouraged,
counseled, or directed the father to obtain the phone records); Clark, 48
Wn. App. at 856 (friend of defendant who had entered into an immunity
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agreement in return for testimony was not acting as agent of state when
he turned over to police incriminating evidence belonging to defendant).
A minority of jurisdictions hold that any illegally obtained evidence
is inadmissible, regardless of who performed the unlawful act. See Sack-
ler v. Sackler, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 45-48, 203 N.E.2d 481, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83
(1964) (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the admissibility
of evidence illegally obtained by a private person, see Paul G. Reiter,
J.D., Annotation, Admissibility, in Criminal Case, of Evidence Obtained
by Search by Private Individual, 36 A.L.R.3d 553, 575-84 (1971 &
Supp. 2004).
7.6(a) Agency Theory
Under agency theory, a search is not private if ordered or requested
by a government officer. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 474-75,
41 S. Ct. 574, 575-76, 65 L. Ed. 1048, 1050-51 (1921). For example, a
search by an airline employee was not private when conducted at the re-
quest and under the supervision of government agents. United States v.
Valen, 479 F.2d 467, 468-70 (3d Cir. 1973) (citing Corngold v. United
States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966)) (contrasting the airline employee ex-
ample in Corngold with the facts at hand to determine that a search was
private; the court found that the individual who conducted the search in
Valen, a shipping company employee, acted independently when he
searched a suspicious bag and delivered its contents to U.S. Customs
Agents, despite the fact that the government compensated the employee
for his assistance and that he had received compensation in the past for
providing other information). See also New Jersey v. TL.O., 469 U.S.
325, 336, 105 S. Ct. 733, 740, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720, 731 (1985) (holding that
a search by school officials is not a private search because school offi-
cials act as representatives of the state, not as surrogates for parents, and
they cannot claim the parents' immunity from Fourth Amendment stric-
tures); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 111-18, 104 S. Ct. 1652,
1655-59, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85, 92-97 (1984) (warrant not needed where the
employees of a private freight company invite government agent to ex-
amine contents of damaged package).
7.6(b) Joint Endeavor Theory
Under a joint endeavor theory, when the police accompany a citizen
on a search it becomes a government search. State v. Scrotsky, 39 N.J.
410, 415, 189 A.2d 23 (1963). "It is immaterial whether the official
originates the idea, or simply joins the search while it is in progress."
Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79, 69 S. Ct. 1372, 1374, 93 L. Ed.
1819, 1823 (1949). Tacit governmental approval of a private entry may
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also convert a private search into state action. State v. Becich, 13 Or.
App. 415, 419, 509 P.2d 1232 (1973).
A search will be considered private, however, if it is undertaken in
direct contravention to police instructions. United States v. Maxwell, 484
F.2d 1350, 1352 (5th Cir. 1973). Even if the police are summoned before
the search begins and are present as it occurs, the search may still be
considered private if a private purpose is served. United States v. Lamar,
545 F.2d 488, 490 (5th Cir. 1977) (heroin admissible when discovered by
airline agent who opened unclaimed bag to determine its owner, because
it was a private search even though a police officer was present during
search); see also United States v. Sherwin, 539 F.2d 1, 16 (9th Cir. 1976)
(allegedly obscene books admissible when discovered by shipping man-
ager and delivered to FBI); Berger v. State, 150 Ga. App. 166, 168, 257
S.E.2d 8, 10 (1979) (contraband discovered in briefcase by hotel man-
ager and security personnel admissible because purpose of search was to
determine owner of lost or misplaced property); cf Corngold v. United
States, 367 F.2d 1, 5-6 (9th Cir. 1966) (contraband discovered by airline
agents inadmissible when government agents actively joined in search).
7.6(c) Public Function Theory
Evidence obtained by store detectives, security officers, and insur-
ance investigators is generally admissible. See United States v. Lima, 424
A.2d 113, 121 (D.C. 1980) (en banc); Reiter, supra, at 567-71. Searches
by off-duty police officers are considered private if the officers acted as
private citizens and if the search or seizure was unconnected with their
duties as police officers. People v. Wachter, 58 Cal. App. 3d 911, 920-
21, 130 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1976) (deputy sheriff acted as private citizen
when he notified law enforcement officials of defendant's marijuana
plants).
But when a private party acts as a police officer, has a strong inter-
est in obtaining convictions, and is familiar with search and seizure law,
the purposes of the exclusionary rule are served by suppression and the
rule will apply. See Commonwealth v. Eshelman, 477 Pa. 93, 100, 383
A.2d 838 (1978) (off-duty police officer considered acting as govern-
ment agent when he trespassed, seized suspicious-looking package from
car, and handed package over to police); Stapleton v. Superior Court, 70
Cal. 2d 97, 102, 447 P.2d 967, 73 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1968) (police participa-
tion in planning car search that was conducted by credit card agent
marked subsequent actions of agent with imprimatur of state action).
For examples of private action constituting state action in contexts
other than search and seizure cases, see Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co.,
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419 U.S. 345, 95 S. Ct. 449, 42 L. Ed. 2d 477 (1974); Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501, 66 S. Ct. 276, 90 L. Ed. 265 (1946).
7.6(d) Ratified Intent and Judicial Action Theory
A majority of jurisdictions have decided that when evidence is
seized to aid the government and when the government had prior knowl-
edge that the seizure would occur, the taint of the illegal action is trans-
ferred to the government. See United States v. Mekjian, 505 F.2d 1320,
1327-28 (5th Cir. 1975) (copies of fraudulent claims allowed into evi-
dence because defendant failed to prove that federal investigators knew
nurse had illegally copied records for government use).
7.7 FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE: GENERAL RULE
The extent to which evidence related to an illegal search or seizure
may be suppressed depends on the extent to which the evidence derives
from exploitation of the illegality. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 488, 83 S. Ct. 407, 417, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 455 (1963) ("[T]he ...
question ... is whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality,
the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by ex-
ploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguish-
able to be purged of the primary taint.") (internal quote omitted); Silver-
thorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392, 40 S. Ct. 182,
183, 64 L. Ed. 319, 321 (1920) (when police unlawfully seized docu-
ments, made copies of the documents, and returned the originals, the
copies were inadmissible); State v. Byers, 88 Wn.2d 1, 10, 559 P.2d
1334, 1338 (1977) (en banc) (finding that where defendants' confessions
were obtained as a result of being in custody after an unlawful arrest and
as a result of being confronted with evidence seized in an unlawful
search pursuant to that arrest, confessions were inadmissible in evidence,
even if they were voluntary); State v. McReynolds, 104 Wn. App. 560,
571, 17 P.3d 608, 615 (2002) (court remanded for lack of findings re-
garding whether subsequently obtained evidence from valid warrants was
tainted by an illegal search); State v. Magneson, 107 Wn. App. 221, 226-
27, 26 P.3d 986, 989 (2001) (finding that evidence was not admissible
under the plain view doctrine when officers entered an individual's home
with what was later determined to be an invalid search warrant and
seized drugs from a third person in the home at the time of the search).
The following sections discuss three tests that have been used to deter-
mine whether a given piece of evidence constitutes "fruit of the poison-
ous tree" that should be suppressed. See generally 6 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search andSeizure § 11.4, at 254-58 (4th ed. 2004).
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7.7(a) Attenuation Test
The attenuation test suggests that at some point the taint of evi-
dence becomes so dissipated as to preclude suppression. 6 LaFave, su-
pra, § 11.4, at 256-57. That point arises when the detrimental conse-
quences of excluding the evidence becomes so attenuated that the deter-
rent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost. Brown v.
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 608-09, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 2264-65, 45 L. Ed. 2d
416, 430-31 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); State v. Spotted Elk, 109
Wn. App. 253, 262, 34 P.3d 906, 911 (2001) (finding that the defen-
dant's and parole officer's testimony was insufficiently attenuated from a
law enforcement officer's Miranda violation because the defendant's
improperly admitted incriminatory statements regarding heroin com-
pelled her to explain and later testify about why she was carrying the
substance); State v. Reid, 38 Wn. App. 203, 213, 687 P.2d 861, 868
(1984). For example, in Reid, the police arrested the defendant shortly
after he emerged from his apartment building and got into a car. 38 Wn.
App. at 205. When the defendant refused to identify which apartment
unit he had exited, police seized the defendant's keys from the car, en-
tered the building, and used the keys to unlock the door to one of the
apartments. Id. at 205-6. The police then entered the apartment, observed
evidence in plain view, and later returned and seized the evidence pursu-
ant to a warrant. Id. at 206. The court reasoned that even if the initial sei-
zure of the keys was unlawful, the evidence taken from the apartment
would be admissible because the seizure of the evidence "was so attenu-
ated that the taint of the seizure of the keys had dissipated." Id. at 208-
09. "Bystanders had identified the door through which the defendant had
often entered and exited. [Thus,] the keys were not utilized in the manner
of a divining rod to locate [the defendant's] apartment but rather to facili-
tate access to [the] residence and to confirm from which door the defen-
dant had exited." Id. at 209.
One commentator has suggested the following criteria for establish-
ing whether the fruit of the unlawful search or seizure is too attenuated to
warrant suppression.
(1) [W]here the chain between the challenged evidence and the
primary illegality is long or the linkage can be shown only by "so-
phisticated argument" exclusion would seem inappropriate. In such
a case it is highly unlikely that the police officers foresaw the chal-
lenged evidence as a probable product of their illegality; thus [the
discovery of the evidence would] not have been a motivating force
behind [the search].
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Comment, Fruit of the Poisonous Tree-A Plea for Relevant Criteria,
115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1136, 1148-49 (1967). Consequently, the threat of
exclusion would not operate as a deterrent when:
(2) [The evidence] is used for some relatively insignificant or
highly unusual purpose. Under these circumstances, it is not likely,
that, at the time the primary illegality was contemplated, the police
foresaw or were motivated by the potential use of the evidence and
the threat of exclusion would, therefore, effect no deterrence.
(3) [T]he unlawful police conduct is minimally offensive. Because
"the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter undesirable police
conduct, where that conduct is particularly offensive the deterrence
ought to be greater and ... the scope of exclusion broader."
Id. at 1149-51.
7.7(b) Independent Source Test
When evidence has been obtained lawfully, the fact that police also
came by the evidence unlawfully does not make it suppressible. Nix v.
Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 2509, 81 L. Ed. 2d 377,
387-88 (1984) (location of murdered child's body derived from coerced
statement was not suppressed when searchers would have located child
anyway); State v. O'Bremski, 70 Wn.2d 425, 429-30, 423 P.2d 530, 533
(1967) (when a missing child was found during an unlawful search of an
apartment, the child's testimony was admissible because she was not dis-
covered solely as result of unlawful search; witness had also informed
police that he knew where the child was); State v. Smith, 113 Wn. App.
846, 855-57, 55 P.3d 686, 690-91 (2002) (holding, not only that an ille-
gal search without an immediate seizure of observed marijuana plants
does not make the evidence suppressible because the plants were subse-
quently seized pursuant to a search warrant, but also holding that, if the
marijuana plants had been seized as part of the illegal search, the same
plants would still not be suppressible because they would have been sub-
ject to seizure pursuant to the subsequent execution of a valid search
warrant).
The case for admitting the evidence is stronger when the independ-
ent legal source is known prior to the police illegality. United States v.
Barrow, 363 F.2d 62, 66 (3d Cir. 1966) (testimony of witness found on
premises of gambling casino during illegal search admissible when wit-
ness' identity as casino patron was previously learned through observa-
tions made by federal agents); see also United States v. Giglio, 263 F.2d
410, 413 (2d Cir. 1959).
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Finally, when the unlawful search or seizure results in the police
only "focusing" their investigation on a particular individual, subse-
quently obtained evidence is not suppressible even if police would not
have been able to focus the investigation but for the illegality. United
States v. Friedland, 441 F.2d 855, 859 (2d Cir. 1971); see also United
States v. Bacall, 443 F.2d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 1971) (even when evi-
dence can be traced to leads resulting from illegal search, evidence is
admissible if government in fact learned of evidence from independent
source).
7. 7(c) Inevitable Discovery Test
Evidence obtained as a result of unlawful police action is admissi-
ble when the police inevitably would have obtained the evidence law-
fully. Nix, 467 U.S. at 444, 104 S. Ct. at 2509, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 387-88;
see also Somer v. United States, 138 F.2d 790, 792 (2d Cir. 1943); State
v. Warner, 125 Wn.2d 876, 888, 889 P.2d 479, 484 (1995) (relying on
federal precedent); State v. McReynolds, 117 Wn. App. 309, 324, 71 P.3d
663, 669 (2003); State v. Richman, 85 Wn. App. 568, 570, 933 P.2d
1088, 1090 (1997) (applying the inevitable discovery rule after conduct-
ing a detailed state constitutional analysis); Reid, 38 Wn. App. at 209
n.6, 687 P.2d at 866 n.6. The Inevitable Discovery doctrine has been
found to be in concert with the goals of the exclusionary rule (to deter
unlawful police conduct and protect individual rights), based on the logic
that if the outcome would have been the same without the illegality, ex-
cluding the evidence defies logic and common sense because police
would be in a worse position than if they had not performed an illegal
act. State v. Avila-Avina, 99 Wn. App. 9, 17-19, 991 P.2d 720, 726
(2000).
The State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered
through lawful means. Nix, 467 U.S. at 444, 104 S. Ct. at 2509, 81 L. Ed.
2d at 387; State v. O'Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 591-92, 62 P.3d 489, 504
(2003) (en banc); State v. Reyes, 98 Wn. App. 923, 926-34, 993 P.2d
921, 923-27 (2000); Warner, 125 Wn.2d at 889. Washington has recog-
nized that "absolute inevitability of discovery is not required[,] but sim-
ply a reasonable probability" that the evidence would have been discov-
ered from an untainted source. Id. (recognizing lengthy statute of limita-
tions for child rape increased likelihood of eventual discovery).
The inevitable discovery test applies even when the State cannot
show that the police acted in good faith in accelerating the discovery of
the evidence. Nix, 467 U.S. at 445, 104 S. Ct. at 2510, 81 L. Ed. 2d at
388 (under inevitable or ultimate discovery exception to exclusionary
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rule, prosecution is not required to prove absence of bad faith). But see
Richman, 85 Wn. App. at 572-573 (recognizing the additional require-
ments that the police must not have acted unreasonably or attempted to
accelerate discovery in addition to the inevitability of discovery). See
generally Robert F. Maguire, How to Unpoison the Fruit-The Fourth
Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule, 55 J. Crim. L. & Criminology
307, 315 (1964).
7.8 PARTICULAR APPLICATIONS OF THE FRUIT OF THE
POISONOUS TREE DOCTRINE
7.8(a) Confession as Fruit of Illegal Arrest
Generally, when the defendant confesses voluntarily, a court may
admit a defendant's confession into evidence consistent with the Fifth
Amendment. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 379, 84 S. Ct. 1774, 1782,
12 L. Ed. 2d 908, 917 (1964). However, when a confession is the fruit of
an illegal search or seizure, the court must also ensure that the distinct
policies of the Fourth Amendment are satisfied. Brown v. Illinois, 422
U.S. 590, 600-03, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 2260-61, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416, 425-27
(1975), see State v. Dane, 89 Wn. App. 226, 233-34, 948 P.2d 1326,
1329-30 (1997). For example, a confession made immediately upon an
illegal entry and arrest is excludable, but when a suspect is released after
an illegal arrest and later returns to the police station to make a confes-
sion, the confession is admissible because its taint has dissipated. Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491, 83 S. Ct. 407, 419, 9 L. Ed. 2d
441,454 (1963).
The factors considered in determining whether the taint of a confes-
sion has dissipated, hereinafter referred to as the Brown factors, are the
following:
(1) the giving of Miranda warnings, although the warnings taken
alone do not constitute a per se break in the causality between the il-
legality and the confession;
(2) the temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession;
(3) the presence of intervening circumstances; and
(4) the purpose and egregiousness of the official misconduct.
Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-05, 95 S. Ct. at 2262, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 428; ac-
cord State v. Byers, 88 Wn.2d 1, 8, 559 P.2d 1334, 1338 (1977) (en
banc); see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110, 100 S. Ct. 2556,
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2564, 65 L. Ed. 2d 633, 645 (1980); State v. Johnston, 38 Wn. App. 793,
800-01, 690 P.2d 591, 595 (1984).
When a person is unlawfully detained because probable cause is
lacking, but is not formally arrested, if his or her confession is causally
connected to the detention, the confession is not admissible even if the
person was first given Miranda warnings. Dunaway v. New York, 442
U.S. 200, 217-18, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 2259, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824, 839-40
(1979).
7.8(b) Confession as Fruit of Illegal Search
Dissipation of the taint and the Brown factors do not apply to a con-
fession following an unlawful search, as opposed to one following an
unlawful arrest, because a suspect is more likely to confess as a result of
a search. People v. Robbins, 54 111. App. 3d 298, 304-05, 369 N.E.2d
577, 12 I11. Dec. 80 (1977). Thus, a confession is suppressible if it would
not have been made but for the illegal search. See State v. White, 97
Wn.2d 92, 102-04, 640 P.2d 1061, 1067-68 (1982) (en banc). But cf
United States v. Green, 523 F.2d 968, 972 (9th Cir. 1975) (defendant's
admission allowed into evidence when admission followed government
agents' confronting defendant with both legally and illegally seized
products of search); United States v. Trevino, 62 F.R.D. 74, 77 (S.D.
Tex. 1974) (defendant's admissions allowed into evidence even though
they were the result of an illegal search; defendant testified at pretrial
hearing that he "probably would have" made admissions even in absence
of search).
7.8(c) Search as Fruit of Illegal Arrest or Detention
When a search is incidental to an illegal arrest, the fruits of the
search are suppressible unless intervening factors, such as a valid arrest,
occur between the illegal arrest and the search. United States v. Walker,
535 F.2d 896, 898-99 (5th Cir. 1976).
A search following an illegal arrest may be purged of the taint by
voluntary consent to the search as proven by the prosecution; the volun-
tariness of the consent may be determined by reference to the Brown fac-
tors, as outlined supra § 7.8(a). See generally 6 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 11.4(b), at 287-305 (4th ed. 2004). See State v.
Fortier, 113 Ariz. 332, 335, 553 P.2d 1206 (1976) (en banc); see also
State v. Shoemaker, 85 Wn.2d 207, 212, 533 P.2d 123, 125 (1975) (en
banc); Avila-Avina, 99 Wn. App. at 15-16 (stating that the "voluntariness
of the consent is a threshold requirement but is not alone sufficient to
purge the evidence of the primary taint"); cf 4 LaFave, supra, § 8.1(a)-
(c), at 4-50. Courts have also considered the totality of circumstances to
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determine whether voluntary consent to search existed. State v. O'Neill,
148 Wn.2d 564, 588-59, 62 P.3d 489, 502-03 (2003) (en banc) (stating
that repeated requests for consent is one factor to consider); State v. Ta-
gas, 121 Wn. App. 872, 876, 90 P.3d 1088, 1091 (2004) (agreeing that
totality of circumstances is normally the appropriate test).
Some courts have held that when the execution of a search warrant
is preceded by an illegal arrest of the person who lives at the place
searched, the evidence derived is automatically excluded. See, e.g., Peo-
ple v. Shuey, 13 Cal. 3d 835, 850, 533 P.2d 211, 120 Cal. Rptr. 83
(1975). But see State v. Fenin, 154 N.J. Super. 282, 289, 381 A.2d 364
(1977) (evidence of both possession and possession with intent to dis-
tribute a controlled substance is admissible although preceded by illegal
search because evidence was obtained pursuant to valid warrant and not
as the result of illegal search).
7.8(d) Search as Fruit of Illegal Search
When the issuance of a search warrant is based upon untainted evi-
dence, the fact that an illegal search took place prior to securing the valid
warrant will not invalidate the execution of that warrant, and evidence
seized during the execution will be admissible. Segura v. United States,
468 U.S. 796, 814, 104 S. Ct. 3380, 3391, 82 L. Ed. 2d 599, 614-15
(1984) (second search of home is not tainted by prior illegal entry).
Generally, warrants are considered valid if they could have been is-
sued based upon the untainted information in the affidavit. See United
States v. Marchand, 564 F.2d 983, 1001-02 (2d Cir. 1977) (when law-
fully obtained evidence is sufficient to justify issuance of warrant, the
fact that officer might not have sought warrant but for receipt of illegally
obtained evidence does not require suppression of fruits of search made
pursuant to warrant); United States v. DiMuro, 540 F.2d 503, 515 (1st
Cir. 1976); United States v. Nelson, 459 F.2d 884, 889 (6th Cir. 1972).
Yet, where a warrant is supported by tainted and untainted evidence in an
affidavit, and the untainted evidence alone does not establish probable
cause, evidence seized pursuant to the warrant must be excluded. State v.
Ross, 141 Wn.2d 304, 314-15, 4 P.3d 130, 136 (2000).
7.8(e) Arrest as Fruit of Illegal Search
If an arrest is based solely on information derived from an illegal
search, the arrest is tainted and void. Marchand, 564 F.2d at 1002; see
Sheffv. Florida, 329 So. 2d 270 (1976).
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7.8() Identification of Suspect as Fruit of Illegal Arrest
Courts differ as to whether to exclude suspect identifications made
as a result of an illegal arrest exemplified by the following four subsec-
tions:
7.8(f)(1) Lineup and Other Post-Arrest Identification
Courts have reached conflicting conclusions on the suppression of
lineup and other post-arrest identifications resulting from illegal arrests.
See Commonwealth v. Garvin, 448 Pa. 258, 266, 293 A.2d 33, 37-38
(1972) (permissible to introduce lineup evidence obtained as result of
illegal arrest). But see State v. Le, 103 Wn. App. 354, 362-65, 12 P.3d
653, 657-59 (2000) (finding that a post-arrest identification by one offi-
cer immediately after warrantless arrest was not attenuated from the ille-
gal arrest and disagreeing with the Garvin rationale "for it erases the taint
by conveniently assuming that the police would eventually effect a law-
ful arrest of the defendant ... such a result would eviscerate the exclu-
sionary rule by readily excusing police failure to obtain a warrant").
Some courts have used the Brown factors in determining whether lineup
identifications are admissible. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356,
365, 92 S. Ct. 1620, 1626, 32 L. Ed. 2d 152, 161 (1972) (defendant may
consent to lineup and hence break taint); State v. McMahon, 116 Ariz.
129, 133, 568 P.2d 1027 (1977) (en banc) (post-arrest discovery of in-
formation connecting defendant with another crime dissipates taint of
illegal lineup if new information comes to light before lineup occurs and
illegal arrest is not made with intent to obtain lineup evidence). Courts
have also examined the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.
See generally 6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11 .4(a)-(j),
258-380 (4th ed. 2004).
7.8(0(2) At-Trial Identification
When both the police officer's knowledge of the accused's identity
and the victim's independent recollection of the accused antedate the
unlawful arrest, an in-court identification of the accused by the victim is
untainted by either the arrest or the pretrial identification arising there-
from. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474, 100 S. Ct. 1244, 1251,
63 L. Ed. 2d 537, 547-48 (1980); State v. Mathe, 102 Wn.2d 537, 546-
47, 688 P.2d 859, 864 (1984) (en banc). Other factors to be considered in
determining whether the at-trial identification is admissible include the
following:
(a) the witness' prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal
act;
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(b) the existence of any discrepancy between any pre-lineup de-
scription and the defendant's actual description;
(c) any identification of another person as the perpetrator prior to
the lineup;
(d) the identification of the defendant by picture prior to the lineup;
(e) the failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion; and
(f) the length of time between the alleged act and the lineup identi-
fication.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 1940, 18 L.
Ed. 2d 1149, 1165 (1967). Compare Payne v. United States, 294 F.2d
723, 725 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (no taint), with Garner v. State, 314 A.2d 908,
912 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973) (in-court identification inadmissible when
based solely upon lineup identification that was result of illegal arrest),
and In re Woods, 20 Ill. App. 3d 641, 649, 314 N.E.2d 606 (1974) (six
month lapse between identification that was result of illegal arrest and in-
court identification insufficient to purge the primary taint).
When police have made flagrantly illegal arrests for the purpose of
securing identifications that otherwise could not have been obtained, the
identifications are inadmissible. United States v. Edmons, 432 F.2d 577,
584 (2d Cir. 1970).
7.8(0(3) Photo Identification
A photo identification produced by an unlawful arrest is not admis-
sible. Crews, 445 U.S. at 474, 100 S. Ct. at 1251, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 547-48.
But see Johnson v. State, 496 S.W.2d 72, 74 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973)
(photo identification not fruit of illegal arrest when discovery of out-
standing warrant was intervening circumstance).
Courts have allowed photos taken during illegal arrests to be used
on subsequent occasions to connect suspects with additional, unrelated
crimes when the suspects were not originally arrested for the sole pur-
pose of acquiring the photo. See People v. Mclnnis, 6 Cal. 3d 821, 826,
494 P.2d 690, 100 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1972) (use of photo identification
permitted after an illegal arrest by law enforcement agency when (1) the
arrest was made in good faith; (2) the ultimate charge was wholly unre-
lated to the charge in the illegal arrest; (3) a different agency pressed
charges; and (4) there is no evidence of exploitation of the original ar-
rest); cf People v. Pettis, 12 111. App. 3d. 123, 128, 298 N.E.2d 372, 376
(1973) (testimony identifying defendant as perpetrator of offense admis-
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sible, even though photo was taken after illegal arrest for unrelated of-
fense).
7.8(0(4) Fingerprints
Fingerprints must be suppressed when the unlawful arrest was for
the purpose of obtaining and using the fingerprints for prosecuting the
suspect for the crime that he or she was arrested for. Davis v. Mississippi,
394 U.S. 721, 727, 89 S. Ct. 1394, 1397-98, 22 L. Ed. 2d 676, 681
(1969); see also Paulson v. Florida, 257 So. 2d 303, 305 (Fla. App.
1972) (because police did not arrest defendant for sole purpose of obtain-
ing fingerprints, fingerprints obtained from arrest for public drunkenness
not suppressible at trial for grand larceny).
7.8(g) Identification of Property as Fruit of Illegal Search
Testimony concerning an object seized during an illegal search is
inadmissible when the identification of the object is established by use of
the illegally seized object. State v. Swaite, 33 Wn. App. 477, 484 n.4,
656 P.2d 520, 525 n.4 (1982); People v. Dowdy, 50 Cal. App. 3d 180,
187, 123 Cal. Rptr. 155 (1975).
7.8(h) Testimony of Witness as Fruit of Illegal Search
Testimony and physical evidence are treated differently for pur-
poses of the exclusionary rule. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268,
277-79, 98 S. Ct. 1054, 1061-62, 55 L. Ed. 2d 268, 278-79 (1978). Ver-
bal testimony carries with it an exercise of free will, and the costs of ex-
cluding the evidence are great. Consequently, the ability to suppress a
derivative witness's testimony depends on several of the following fac-
tors:
(1) whether the witness testified freely, see United States v. Kara-
thanos, 531 F.2d 26, 35 (2d Cir. 1976) (testimony by illegal aliens ob-
tained as result of illegal search inadmissible because testimony was
prompted by government statements concerning future prosecution);
(2) whether the physical fruits of the illegal search were used in
questioning the witness, see State v. Rogers, 27 Ohio Op. 2d 105, 198
N.E.2d 796, 806 (1963) (testimony about gun suppressed because wit-
ness would not have been questioned about gun but for unlawful search);
(3) whether the search and testimony were close in time, see Cec-
colini, 435 U.S. at 277-78, 98 S. Ct. at 1061, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 277-78
(witness testimony not excluded where "substantial periods of time" had
elapsed between the illegal search and the government's first contact
with the witness);
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(4) whether the witness's identity and location were known before
the search, see State v. O'Bremski, 70 Wn.2d 425, 429-30, 423 P.2d 530,
533 (1967) (when parents had sought help from police, police questioned
boy, and boy stated girl was in apartment; girl's testimony admissible
although girl was found in apartment during illegal search); and
(5) whether the search was made with the intent to find witnesses,
see People v. Martin, 382 Ill. 192, 201, 46 N.E.2d 997, 1001-02 (1942)
(testimony of witnesses suppressed when witness' names were obtained
from papers found during illegal search of defendant's premises); see
generally Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 98 S. Ct. 1054, 55 L. Ed. 2d 268.
7.8(i) Crime Committed in Response to Illegal Arrest or Search
Generally, evidence that the defendant attempted to bribe or attack
an officer is admissible even if the arrest was illegal. United States v.
Perdiz, 256 F. Supp. 805, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); State v. Mierz, 127
Wn.2d 460, 473-475, 901 P.2d 286, 292-93 (1995) (en banc). In addi-
tion, evidence of a suspect speeding away from an unlawful traffic stop
has been found admissible at trial because it is considered sufficiently
distinguishable from the unlawful intrusion. State v. Owens, 39 Wn. App.
130, 135, 692 P.2d 850, 853 (1984).
The rationale for admitting the evidence is that acts of free will
purge the taint; thus, the application of the exclusionary rule would fur-
ther deterrence only marginally. In addition, exclusion would permit per-
sons unlawfully arrested to assault officers without risk of criminal liabil-
ity. Mierz, 127 Wn.2d at 474. Yet, the evidence would be inadmissible if
it were the product of questionable police action. See id. at 475; People v.
Cantor, 36 N.Y.2d 106, 114, 324 N.E.2d 872, 365 N.Y.S.2d 509 (1975)
(without identifying themselves, three officers encircled defendant; evi-
dence of defendant pulling gun inadmissible).
7.80) Procedural Violation of Warrant Procedures
"[A]bsent a showing of prejudice to the defendant, procedural non-
compliance does not compel invalidation of an otherwise sufficient war-
rant or suppression of its fruits." State v. Aase, 121 Wn. App. 558, 567,
89 P.3d 721, 725-26 (2004); State v. Kern, 81 Wn. App. 308, 311, 914
P.2d 114, 116 (1996) (holding that suppression of evidence is not com-
pelled where a copy of the warrant and the items seized are not given to
the defendant resident before commencing an otherwise lawful search
because the defendant was not prejudiced by receiving the warrant sev-
eral minutes after the search began and the search would not have been
less intrusive had the defendant been able to immediately see the war-
rant).
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7.9 WAIVER OR FORFEITURE OF OBJECTION
A defendant may waive or forfeit his or her constitutional objection
and thus render the objectionable evidence admissible in the following
three ways: (1) by failure to make a timely objection, see 6 Wayne R.
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.6, at 396 (4th ed. 2004); (2) by testify-
ing at trial about the evidence, see id. § 11.1(c), at 19; and, (3) by entry
of a guilty plea, see id. § 11.1(d), at 24.
7.9(a) Failure to Make Timely Objection
Jurisdictions have their own rules for what constitutes a timely ob-
jection. Washington court rules provide that a defendant's failure to ob-
ject at the omnibus hearing may constitute a waiver of the objection if
the party had knowledge of the illegality of the search or seizure prior to
the hearing. See Wash. CrR 4.5(d). A defendant's failure to move to sup-
press evidence at trial that he later contends was illegally gathered con-
stitutes a waiver of any error associated with the admission of the evi-
dence. State v. Mierz, 127 Wn.2d 460, 468, 901 P.2d 286, 290 (1995) (en
banc). However, a failure to timely object does not waive error when the
illegality "is of such a flagrant or prejudicial nature that any curative
measure would have been futile." State v. Van Auken, 77 Wn.2d 136,
143, 460 P.2d 277, 282 (1969).
7.9(b) Testimony by Defendant Concerning Suppressed Evidence
A defendant may not raise a Fourth Amendment claim on appeal
challenging the admission of evidence, notwithstanding a timely objec-
tion, if the defendant gave testimony at trial admitting to the possession
of that evidence. See State v. Peele, 10 Wn. App. 58, 67, 516 P.2d 788,
793 (1973); Jones v. Texas, 484 S.W.2d 745, 747 (Tex. Crim. App.
1972). A claim may be raised, however, if the defendant's testimony was
induced by the erroneous admission of the evidence. See Harrison v.
United States, 392 U.S. 219, 224-25, 88 S. Ct. 2008, 2011, 20 L. Ed. 2d
1047, 1052-53 (1968); Peele, 10 Wn. App. at 67-68. The rationale for
the general rule is that the testimony may make the admission of the ille-
gal evidence harmless error. See id at 66; see also LaRue v. State, 137
Ga. App. 762, 764, 224 S.E.2d 837, 839 (1976); 6 LaFave, supra, §
11.1(c), at 19.
7.9(c) Guilty Plea
A defendant who has knowingly and voluntarily entered a guilty
plea may not thereafter obtain post-conviction relief on Fourth Amend-
ment grounds even though he or she made a timely motion to suppress in
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advance of the plea. Sanders v. Craven, 488 F.2d 478, 479 (9th Cir.
1973); see Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S. Ct. 1602, 1608,
36 L. Ed. 2d 235, 243 (1973). Because the conviction is based on the
plea, the defendant cannot directly challenge the evidence. See Sanders,
488 F.2d at 479. But if the plea itself can be characterized as the fruit of
illegally obtained evidence and, consequently, should have been sup-
pressed upon the defendant's timely motion, then the plea was not en-
tered voluntarily or knowingly. See A.E. Korpela, Annotation, Plea of
Guilty as Waiver of Claim of Unlawful Search and Seizure, 20 A.L.R.3d
724, at *2(a) -4 (1968 & Supp. 2004). At least one state has adopted a
statutory provision assuring appellate review of convictions based upon
guilty pleas where evidence has been illegally obtained. Id. § 2(a). How-
ever, the rule in most jurisdictions is that by pleading guilty the con-
victed persons waive all nonjurisdictional objections to the proceedings
against them, including objections to the manner in which evidence
against them has been gathered. Id. Where a voluntary, counsel-advised
plea of guilty was not upheld when attacked on the grounds that the peti-
tioner had been the victim of unlawful search and seizure activity, the
appellate court sent the case back to the trial court for a hearing on
whether it had been made with knowledge of legal position and constitu-
tional rights, without defining what constitutes, and who has the burden
of establishing, such knowledge. Id.
7.10 HARMLESS ERROR
Even when illegally seized evidence has been improperly admitted
at trial, a conviction will not be reversed if the defendant would have
been convicted without its admission. See State v. Smith, 93 Wn.2d 329,
352-53, 610 P.2d 869, 883 (1980) (en banc); State v. Flicks, 91 Wn.2d
391, 396, 588 P.2d 1328, 1332 (1979) (en banc). Where an error in-
fringes on a constitutional right, the error is presumed prejudicial, and
the State bears the burden of proving the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. See State v. Thompson, 151 Wn.2d 793, 808, 92 P.3d
228, 236 (2004); State v. McReynolds, 117 Wn. App. 309, 326, 71 P.3d
663, 670 (2003); State v. Spotted Elk, 109 Wn. App. 253, 261, 34 P.3d
906, 911 (2001). To make this determination, the "overwhelming un-
tainted evidence test" has been used, meaning that the untainted evidence
admitted at trial is considered to determine if it is so overwhelming that it
necessarily leads to a finding of guilt. Thompson, 151 Wn.2d at 808.
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CONCLUSION
Particulars of search and seizure law may change based upon the
circumstances of each case, but the types of issues raised and considered
are likely to remain much the same. An attempt has been made to expand
upon basic issues by referencing additional and more recent Washington
search and seizure cases. While this survey is not comprehensive and
will require continual updating, we hope it will continue to be a useful
tool for practitioners and judges who must assess the scope of protection
that the Washington Constitution and the United States Constitution af-
ford against unlawful searches and seizures.
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abandoned property





application to exclusionary rule, 709
administrative searches
automobile spot checks as, 505, 678
of business and commercial premises, 494
California approval of as applied to checkpoints, 679
expectation of privacy pursuant to, 693
generally, 693
housing and fire code inspections as, 488, 693, 696
level of proof in, generally, 539, 695
premises, privacy expectation in, 693
vehicle checkpoints, level of proof in, 695
vehicles, need for warrant in search of, 695
warrant requirements for, 552, 694
See also warrantless searches; inspection of fire scenes
admissions against interest
informants, information as, 534
aerial surveillance
aiding observation with, 647
as constituting search, 493
of open fields and privacy expectation in, 492
affidavit for search warrant
administrative warrants, requirements for, 552
challenging content in, generally, 581
challenging content of informant's identity, 581
challenging content, misrepresentations and omissions in, 582
information supplied to magistrate in, 550
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misrepresentations and omissions in, 582
oath or affirmation in, 549
omissions in, 550, 582
oral testimony or oral warrants in, 552
probable cause requirements for, 518, 551
affirmation




warrantless searches at, 685
alcohol
underage possession or consumption of, "in the presence" test for,
592
answering machines
consent to search, 487
expectation of privacy in, 482
apartments
expectation of privacy in, 486




booking and crime charged in, 595
custodial for minor offense, propriety of, 596
effect of illegal arrest on prosecution, 588
fruit of illegal search, 721
"in the presence" requirement for, 592
judicial review of, 595
minor offenses, propriety of, 596
pretextual booking, use of, 595
probable cause for, 516
search prior to, 627
Terry stop distinguished from, 598
traffic violations, 597
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use of force in, 593
warrantless, for felony, 591




See also warrantless arrest
arrest record
probable cause, as factor in determining, 523
arrest warrant
execution of, identification of arrestee in, 593
execution of, procedure for, 593
probable cause basis for, 516
standards, similarity to search warrants, 546
articulable and reasonable suspicion
as basis for stop and frisk, 540
association






exclusionary rule, applicability in, 705
bailee
consent to search by, 661
bank records
expectation of privacy in, 499
basis of knowledge
for informants, generally, 531
for informants, hearsay as, 532
for police informants, 537
test for, 535
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beeper monitoring
expectation of privacy in, 500
binoculars
aiding observation with, 646
blood sample
consent to, implied by driving vehicle, 663
exigent circumstances for, 669
expectation of privacy in, 497
probable cause for taking, 584
search incident to arrest pursuant to, 622
See also bodily intrusions
bodily intrusions
due process considerations for, 584
exigent circumstances for, 669
prisoners or pre-trial detainees, search of, 585, 691
probable cause for, 542
search incident to arrest, pursuant to, 622
searches generally, 584
sex offenders, search of, 690
border crossing
checkpoints, propriety of, 692
exception to individualized suspicion at, 600
questioning at checkpoint, propriety of, 692
roving patrols, vehicle search, standards for, 692
searches and seizures, requirements for, 692
searches of persons or vehicles, expectation of privacy in, 501
smuggling as basis of suspicion, 693
brief detention
See stop and frisk
business and commercial premises
expectation of privacy in, 494
canines
illegal substances, probable cause for, 526
sniffing by dog as constituting search, 481, 673
sniffing by dog, expectation of privacy in mail, 500
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sniffing by dog of packages to establish probable cause, 685
Carroll rule
vehicle search, application of, 675
checkpoints
as form of seizure, 506
border searches at, 692
constitutionality of, 492
exception to individualized suspicion requirement at, 521, 600
level of proof for, 678
sobriety for, 695
warrantless search, test for reasonableness of, 678
child
consent to search parent's property, propriety of, 659
citizen informants, 534
civil offenses
seizure of person triggered by, 507
See also administrative searches
commercial premises
See business and commercial premises
common areas
as adjoining land, 491
as protected area, 488
common authority rule
See consent searches, third party
community caretaking
See emergency and community caretaking
community living rule
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confession
as fruit of illegal arrest, 719
as fruit of illegal search, 720
consent and consent searches
answering machine message as, 487
awareness of right to refuse, necessity of, 653
behavior as, 655
consensual encounters as seizure, 504
coercive surroundings affecting, 652
generally, 650
implied consent, use of, 663
landlord, lessor, or manager giving, 661
maturity, sophistication, mental or emotional state affecting, 655
police claim of authority as affecting, 652
police deception as to identity or purpose affecting, 652, 656
premises where police explain right to refuse giving, 484
prior cooperation or refusal to cooperate affecting, 655
prior illegal police action tainting, 654
recording of communications as, 482
scope of, 656
search warrants, execution of, 564
speakerphone, use of, 487
statutorily implied use of, 663
third party
bailee authority to give, 661
child authority to give, 659
common authority standard, 660
co-tenant or joint occupant authority to give, 660
employee or employer authority to give, 662
generally, 657
host or guest authority to give, 662
hotel employee authority to give, 662
landlord or manager authority to give, 661
parents authority to give, 659
spouse authority to give, 658
vehicle passengers' authority to give, 661
voluntariness of, burden of proof, 650
voluntariness of, factors, 651




Washington Search & Seizure
homes, generally, 483
open fields as, 491
plain view, discovery within, 637
plain view, seizure based on, 642
See also expectation of privacy; protected areas and interests
containers
canine sniffs of, 685
exigent circumstances warranting search of, 672
immediate control analysis affecting validity of search of, 620
inventory search of, 684
and search incident to arrest, propriety of, 620, 623, 625
within vehicle
expectation of privacy in, 496
federal law governing scope of search of, 676
Washington constitutional provisions governing search of, 677
contraband
detection of, establishing probable cause for, 526
exigent circumstances warranting search for, 672
co-tenant
consent to search given by, 660
courthouses
warrantless search at, 685
curtilage
of business and commercial premises of, 495
defined, 489
determination of, factors, 489
expectation of privacy in, 489
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danger








persons on premises during warrant execution, 573




constitutionality of searches of, 585
expectation of privacy in, 497








increase use of as evidence for probable cause, 524
electronic communications
search warrant requirements for, 560
emergency and community caretaking
exception for warrantless arrest involving, 590
vehicle impoundment based on, 681
propriety of
warrantless search, 631, 633
warrantless vehicle search, 684
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employee, employer
See also workplace
consent to search by, 662
enhancement devices






civil tax proceedings, 709
drug commitment proceedings, 709
federal habeas corpus proceedings, 708
forfeiture cases, 708
grand jury testimony, 704
indictment, 704
juvenile delinquency proceedings, 709
legislative hearings, 710
narcotic addict commitment proceedings, 709
parole or probation revocation, 706
probable cause hearing, 704
sentencing hearings, 705
tax proceedings (civil), 709
criticism of and suggested alternatives to, 700
generally, 699
good faith reliance on invalid warrant as exception to, 702
impeachment to evidence exception, 704
limitations on the application of the rule, 701
nonsubstantive use of illegally seized evidence, application of for,
704
perjury, exception to support conviction of, 708
private litigation, application of in, 710
private searches, generally, 711
private searches, joint endeavor theory, affecting application of, 713
private searches, public function theory, affecting application of, 714
private searches, ratified intent and judicial action theory, affecting
application of, 715
private searches, state agency theory, affecting application of in, 713
purposes for, 699
purposes for, Washington law governing, 700
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quasi-criminal, civil and administrative proceedings, application of
at, 708
state-federal law relationship (Washington) in application, 700
See also fruit of the poisonous tree
exigent circumstances
bodily intrusions based on, 669
containers, warrantless search and seizure based on, 672
execution of search warrant, destruction of evidence based on, 569
execution of search warrant, police or public safety based on, 570
generally, 663
hot pursuit as, 665, 668
imminent arrest as, 667
person, justifying warrantless search or seizure, based on, 668
premises, warrantless arrest, based on, 589
premises, warrantless search, based on, 665
premises entry, justification, based on, 671
premises search, search of person in context of, 670
vehicles, search of based on, 665, 674
warrantless arrest based on, 589
expectation of privacy
in abandoned personal effects, 499
administrative search, as affecting, 693
in apartments, 486
beeper monitoring as violating, 500
in blood sample, 497
in business and commercial premises, 494
in common areas, 488
community living rule affecting, 486
in curtilage structures, 489
in garbage, 500, 577
generally, 480
in handwriting, 497
in hotel rooms, 486
legitimacy of, 480
in mails, 500
in mobile motor home, 486
observable activity as relinquishing, 485
in open fields, wooded areas, 490
open view and plain view, doctrine affecting, 635
of passenger, 509
in personal characteristics, 496
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in personal effects and papers, 498
of prisoners, 501, 689
in property, 508
reasonableness of, 480
in residential premises, 485
in telephone and telephone records, 487
in vehicles, 509
in workplace, 509
See also constitutionally protected areas
expertise of officer
as establishing probable cause in search for illegal substances, 526
federal officers
compliance with state protections, necessity for, 514
feel
See plain view, smell and hearing
fellow officer rule




effect on cartilage, 489
effect on open fields doctrine, 492
fingerprints and nail scraping
as fruit of illegal arrest, 724
pursuant to Terry stop, 606
fire scenes
See inspection of fire scenes
flashlight
as aid to observation, 645
flight
See furtive gestures and flight
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force
use of in arrest, 593
forfeiture of objection
See waiver of objection
forfeiture or levy of vehicles
seizure without warrant, propriety of, 679
fresh pursuit
See exigent circumstances; warrantless searches
frisk
See stop and frisk
fruit of the poisonous tree
arrest as fruit of illegal search, 721
attenuation test, as exception to application of, 716
confession as fruit of illegal arrest, 719
confession as fruit of illegal search, 720
crime committed in response to illegal arrest or search as constitut-
ing, 725
failure to make timely objection, as waiver to, 726
fingerprints as fruit of illegal arrest, 724
generally, 715
guilty pleas based on, 726
harmless error as grounds for affirming conviction based on, 727
identification of property as fruit of illegal search, 724
identification of suspect as fruit of illegal arrest, 722
independent source test as exception to application of, 717
inevitable discovery test as exception to application of, 718
search as fruit of illegal arrest or detention, 720
search as fruit of illegal search, 721
testimony by defendant concerning suppressed evidence as waiver
of, 726
testimony of witness, standards in applying as, 724
violation of warrant procedures, standards in applying as, 725
waiver or forfeiture of objection based on, 726
furtive gestures and flight
observation of, as probable cause, 528
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garbage
expectation of privacy in, 500, 577




as limitation to exclusionary rule, 702
searches, community caretaking function as exception to warrant
requirement, 631
guilty pleas
as fruit of poisonous tree, 726
handwriting
expectation of privacy in, 497
harmless error
fruit of poisonous tree, discounted in affirming conviction based on,
727
hearing
See plain view, smell, and hearing
hearsay
as basis of knowledge, 532
as evidence to corroborate probable cause, 523, 533, 535
informants, use of admissions against interest and motive, 534
police information, use of multiple hearsay, 531, 537




consent by to search guest's room, 662
hotels
consent to search room by employee of, 662
consent to search room by manager of, 661
expectation of privacy in, 486
lobby area, expectation of privacy in, 488
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hot pursuit




at trial, as fruit of illegal arrest, 722
fingerprints as fruit of illegal arrest, 724
as fruit of illegal arrest, 722
photo montage as fruit of illegal arrest, 723
property identification as fruit of illegal arrest, 724
refusal to supply, 529, 541
request for as seizure, 503
Terry stops, legislation regarding, 609
See also lineup or photo montage
immediate control standard
search incident to arrest, application of, 620
implied consent




use of enforcement of traffic regulations, 682
inventory searches, pursuant to, 683
vehicles, community caretaking function use of, 681
vehicles, evidence gathering, use of, 681
vehicles, warrantless, 680
independent source test
See fruit of the poisonous tree
individualized suspicion
at checkpoints, lack of requirement of, 678
exceptions to requirement of, 521
prisoners or pre-trial detainees, lack of requirement of, 689
probable cause, requirement of, 520
students, generally, requirement of, 689
student athletes, lack of requirement of, 688
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inevitable discovery test
as exception to fruit of the poisonous tree, 718
informants
admissions against interest by, 534
Aguilar-Spinelli test, applied to, 530, 531
anonymous or unknown, tests for reliability, 538
basis of knowledge by, 530, 531, 535
citizens as, 534
corroboration of by independent investigation, 532
hearsay, use of by, 523, 531
identity, challenge to, 581
named but unknown, reliability of, 538
nature of (criminal, citizen, or police), 530
partial corroboration of information supplied by, 536, 538
police as, 537
probable cause standards for, 514
stops based on probable cause, information from, 601
sufficiency of information supplied by, 536
veracity of, 530, 533
inspection of fire scenes
administrative searches, level of proof required for, 695
warrantless entry resulting from fireman's discovery pursuant to, 634
"in the presence" requirement
See arrest
Internet




warrantless arrest based on, 597
inventory searches
of impounded vehicles, 683
post detention use of, 629
scope of, 684
without probable cause, 540
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joint occupant
consent to search by, 660
judges




court boundary, warrant issued outside of, 547
juvenile delinquency proceedings
exclusionary rule, applicability to, 709
Katz test
See expectation of privacy; constitutionally protected areas
knock and announce requirement
See search warrants
knock and wait rules
See search warrants
landlord
consent to search given by, 661
legitimate expectation of privacy
See expectation of privacy
lessor
consent to search given by, 661
lie detectors
See polygraphs
lineup or photo montage
as fruit of illegal arrest, 722
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magistrate
burden of proof as to neutrality, 549
district court (state) judge's jurisdiction, 547
issuance of warrant by, 546
neutrality of, 548




as aid to observation, 646
mails
expectation of privacy in, 500
warrantless searches of, 685
manager, apartment, building, or motel
consent to search, 661
marital privilege
statements supporting probable cause, 522
Miranda warnings





affecting findings of probable cause, 515




informant's in establishing probable cause, 534
neutral and detached magistrate
See magistrate
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"no trespassing" signs




search warrant for evidence in possession of, 586
notice of authority requirement
See search warrants; execution; notice requirement
oath
See affidavit for search warrant
objections




See plain view, smell, and hearing
open fields
as constitutionally protected area, 491, 645
business and commercial premises, doctrine applied to, 495
expectation of privacy in, 490
open view
See plain view, smell, and hearing
outbuildings




consent to search given by, 659
parolees and probationers
expectation of privacy for, 501, 689
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revocation hearing, exclusionary rule applicability for, 706
revocation hearing, exclusionary rule, Washington applications for,
707
search and seizure of, 690
partial corroboration
informant's credibility, supported by, 536
particularity
See search warrants, generally
passengers and passenger compartments
consent to search vehicle given by, 661
detention of pursuant to Terry stop, 608
expectation of privacy in vehicle by, 509
frisk of, 613
ordered to exit vehicle, 614
passenger compartment search, legality of, 614
request for identification of, 541
search incident to arrest of, 623, 625, 626
search of, generally, 496
search of, Washington applications for, 677





as constituting search, 482
defined, 488
personal characteristics
expectation of privacy in, 496
personal effects
expectation of privacy in, 498
search warrants for, 576
personal privacy interest
expectation of arrestee in, 621
generally, 508
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pharmacy records
administrative searches of, 694




See lineup or photo montage
plain hearing
See plain view, smell, and hearing
plain smell
See plain view, smell, and hearing
plain touch
generally, 649
plain view, smell, and hearing
constitutionally protected areas, entry into based on, 637
of curtilage, 490, 643
enhancement devices, used pursuant to, 645
feel, generally, 649
hearing, generally, 647
immediate knowledge of officer, application to, 640
inadvertent discovery, requirement for, 639
incriminating discovery in constitutionally protected area, applica-
tion of, 637
justification of intrusion for application of, 638
odor as probable cause, 526
odor, generally, 648
open fields, application of, 645
plain view and open view distinguished, 635
premises, application of, 485
privacy interest relinquishment based on, 487
protected area, curtilage, application of, 643
protected area, seizure of object based on, 642
seizure based on, 637
seizure of unnamed items based on, 578
smell, generally, 648
vehicles, application to, 627
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poisonous tree
See fruit of the poisonous tree
police
action by as affecting consent, 654
as informants, 537
business premises, investigative entry by, 495
claim of authority by to search, 652
deception of in obtaining consent, 656
plain view doctrine, utility by, 638
police information, multiple hearsay, use of, 537
safety of as grounds for search and seizure, 542
seizure of unnamed items by, 578
See also expertise of officer
polygraphs




and adjoining lands, expectation of privacy in, 490
and adjoining lands, aerial surveillance of, 492
administrative searches of, privacy expectation in, 693
buildings within curtilage open to public by implication, 489
circumstances of warrantless arrest at, 589
curtilage, factors used to determine, 489
detention of persons on, 573
exigent circumstances justifying warrantless entry of, 671
homes
as constitutionally protected areas, 483
consent searches of, 651
expectation of privacy in, 485
plain view at, 485
search of, absence of less intrusive alternatives, 671
seizure within, 506
warrantless arrest at, 589
invitation to enter, 487
pre-Katz, applications to, 489
search incident to arrest at, 620
search of persons on at, 571
search under warrant
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area included at, 575
scope and intensity at, 574
search warrants
description in, 555
particularity in description, 555
vehicles at, search of, 556, 578
warrantless entry at





See also business and commercial premises; inspection of fire
scenes; expectation of privacy; search warrants
pretext
arrest to obtain evidence of different offense as, 595, 618
community caretaking or emergency as, 632
frisk as, 610
inventory search as, 630, 681
traffic stops as, 505, 608
prior arrests and convictions
consideration of in probable cause determination, 523
prisoners or pre-trial detainees
bodily intrusions of, 585, 691
expectation of privacy by, 501, 689
parole hearing for application of exclusionary rule, 706
searches, level of proof for, 690
warrantless searches or seizures of, 690
privacy
See expectation of privacy
private papers
expectation of privacy in, 498
private searches
exclusionary rule, application generally to, 711
exclusionary rule, Washington applications to, 711
joint endeavor theory in, 713
public function theory in, 714
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ratified intent and judicial action theory in, 715
state agency theory in, 712
store detectives, security officers, or insurance investigators, as
constituting, 714
probable cause
administrative searches, necessity for, 539
affidavit requirements for, 518
Aguilar-Spinelli test for, 514
anonymous or unknown informants as supporting, 538
arrest, need for, 516
association, persons and places, as constituting, 527
bodily intrusions, need for, 542
characteristics of, 517
citizen informant, basis of knowledge supporting, 535
criminal reputation establishing, 523
electrical consumption as evidence of, 524
first hand observation, stolen property, as evidence of, 525
flight or furtive gesture as element of, 528
generally, 513
hearing, application of exclusionary rule to, 704
hearsay supporting, 523
illegal substance detection as supporting, 526
individualized suspicion, necessity for, 520
informant's information
as evidence of
admissions against interest, 534
basis of knowledge, 530, 531, 535
corroboration by independent investigation, 532
lineup or photo montage, 537
partial corroboration, 536, 538
past performance, 533





information considered in determining, 521, 549
inventory searches, necessity for, 540
judicial review of, 595
mistake or omission of facts as evidence of, 515
objective test for, 517
observations by law enforcement officer as evidence of, 525
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odor of illegal substance as evidence of, 526
police informants, generally, 537
police information, multiple hearsay, used to establish, 537
polygraphs, used to establish, 525
post-detention searches, necessity of, 628
power consumption establishing, 524
presence in high crime area as evidence of, 528
prior arrests and convictions as evidence of, 523
quantum of evidence required to establish, 519
questioning, responses to as evidence of, 529
racial incongruity as evidence of, 528
reputation as evidence of, 523
requirements for, 513
response to questioning as evidence of, 529
search and arrest compared, necessity of, 516
staleness of information used to establish, 549
Terry stop and frisk, necessity for, 540, 599
totality of the circumstances standard used to establish, 531
vehicle search at border crossing, necessity of, 692
vehicle search under federal law, necessity of, 675
victim-witness information, generally, 534
victim-witness information, sufficiency of evidence to establish, 536
warrantless arrest, generally, 589
See also informants
probationers
See parolees and probationers
property
expectation of privacy in, 508
seizure of, 507, 619
protected areas and interests
commercial property as, 494
homes, generally, 483
open fields as, 645
protective searches
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questioning
compulsion to answer during Terry stop, 609
responses to as probable cause, 529
race
as evidence of probable cause, 528
as basis for border stop, 692
as basis for reasonable suspicion, 603
reasonable belief standard
See stop and frisk
reasonable expectation of privacy
See expectation of privacy
reasonable suspicion standard
See stop and frisk
recording of conversation
as constituting search, 482
reputation








expectation of privacy in, 502, 687
school officials as state agents, 713
searches and seizures by officials of, 502
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scrupulous exactitude standard
See search warrants, targets to be seized
search incident to arrest
bodily intrusions as, 622
containers, applicability of, 623, 625
custodial requirement for, 619
defined, 618
generally, 617
"immediate control" standard used in, 620
inventory searches as, 629
lawful arrest requirement for, 618
permissible scope of, 621
post-detention searches as, 628
premises, applications of in, 620
property seized, use of in, 619
scope of Washington applications, 622
"second look" searches as, 629
strip or body cavity search as, 691
test for, 618
vehicles and containers within, applicability of, 623
search warrants
administrative searches, requirements for, 552, 694
affidavit supporting, 549
affidavit supporting, challenging content for, 581
bodily intrusions, probable cause for, 584
burden on party challenging, 555
content of, 549
description of place or target of, generally, 553
documents or electronic communications, necessity for, 560, 575
execution of,
area, covered by, 575
consent to enter, 564
delivery of warrant, 580
detention of persons on, 573




scope and intensity, 574
search of persons on premises, 571
time of, 561
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unnamed items, seizure of, 578
generally, 545
information considered in obtaining, 549
items searchable under, 546
applications of rule, 566
exceptions
exigent circumstances, 569




location, description of, 553
location, particularity of description and exceptions, 555
mere evidence as object under, 546
multiple applications for, 549
nonsuspects possessing evidence under, 586
oath or affirmation in, 549





persons, particularity of description in, 557
purposes of, 545
requirements for, 545
severability of multiple locations, 553
staleness of information in, 549
targets to be seized under
documents or electronic communications, 560, 575
generally, 559
particularity of description, 558
particularity of description, first amendment applications, 561, 582
scrupulous exactitude requirement, 583
time of execution of, 561
vehicles, generally, 556
vehicles at premises, applicability to, 578
See also administrative searches; affidavit for search warrant;
neutral and detached magistrate
searches
bodily intrusions as, 584
bodily intrusions of prisoners, 585, 691
bodily intrusions of sex offenders, 690
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constitutionally protected areas, 483
as fruit of illegal arrest, 720
as fruit of illegal search, 721
of prisoners, 689
prisoners
bodily intrusions of, 585, 691
level of proof required for, 690
reasonable expectation of privacy, pursuant to, 480
at schools, 687
in special environments, 687
standing to raise claim, challenging, 507
strip searches, execution of, 557





See fruit of the poisonous tree
security officers, store detectives, and insurance investigators
public function theory as applied to, 714
seizure
civil offense, of person, 507
constitutionally protected areas, when plain view used as basis for,
642
forfeiture as basis for, 679
of items unnamed in search warrant, 578
lawful, factors, 593
of person, civil offense triggering, 507
of person, generally, 502, 587
of person in automobile, 505
of person in home, 506
of person, what constitutes seizure, 502
plain view as basis for, 637
police stop as constituting, 504
of prisoners, 689
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of property, possessory interest defined, 507
within special environments, 687
spoliation of evidence as basis for, 611
standing to raise claim, challenging, 507
of vehicles, 505
warrantless, plain view as basis for, 637
within homes, 506
See also arrest; protected areas and interests; warrantless searches
sensory-enhanced searches
use of analysis, 481
use of hearing, generally, 648
use of homes as constitutionally protected areas, 483
use of homes, generally, 485
use of plain view, use of 635
thermal imaging device used in, 635, 647
sentencing




evidence for probable cause, 529
smell
See plain view, smell, and hearing
speakerphone
as consent to search, 487
spouses
consent to search given by, 658
standing
automatic standing in Washington, 508, 510
raised on appeal, 511
search and seizure claims, generally, 507
stolen property possession
probable cause based on, 525
20051
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stop and frisk
additional actions extending Terry search beyond, 614
compelled response to, 609
danger as factor in, 603
duration of, 605
factual basis and individualized suspicion, reasonable suspicion
standard required for, 600
"fellow officer" rule, in applying to, 602
fingerprinting during, 606
frisk
community caretaking function as grounds for, 611
grounds for, 609
proximity to suspect as grounds for, 613
scope of, 612
spoliation of evidence as grounds for, 611
Washington applications for, 610
generally, 598
incidental to premises search, 571
individualized suspicion requirement for, 600
individualized suspicion, exceptions to requirement, 600
information from informants as basis for, 601
intrusiveness of, 605, 606
investigatory stop, generally, 605
level of proof required, 540
nature of the offense, applications to, 603
passenger compartment search, pursuant to, 614
of persons within suspect's proximity, 608
probable cause considerations in, 599
protective measures other than frisk, 613
proximity to suspect as grounds for detention, 608
purpose of rule, 599
reasonable suspicion standard for, 598, 600, 603
scope of permissible frisk, 612
self-protective alternative to frisk, 613
standards generally, 540
stop as constituting seizure, 504
time, place, and method, 605
traffic violations, detention related to, 608
transporting suspect, during, 607
Washington applications for, 604, 607
store
See business and commercial premises; premises
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street encounters





suppression of confessions and admissions
See exclusionary rule
tax records
expectation of privacy in, 499
telephone
answering service, expectation of privacy in, 482
phone numbers, privacy interest in, 487
See also pen registers
telescope
aiding observation with, 646
Terry stop
See stop and frisk
testimony
defendant's as fruit of poisonous tree, 726









impoundment of vehicle, 682
search incident to arrest, 619
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hot pursuit following, 668
trepass
effect on validity of police search, 492, 494, 645
trunk
search of with probable cause, 626, 676
urine samples
expectation of privacy in, 497
useless gesture exception
See search warrants, knock and announce
vehicles
administrative searches, level of proof requirement for, 695
checkpoints, 506
checkpoints, level of proof for, 695
containers in, 496, 673
exigent circumstances to search, 665
expectation of privacy in, 495, 509
impounded auto, inventory search of, 631, 683
impoundment, enforcement of traffic regulations as grounds for, 682
impoundment, warrantless search of, 680
inventory searches of, 631
motor home, search of, 486
mobile home as, 496
personal privacy interest in, 509
scope of warrantless search of, 676
search and seizure of
federal law, 674
exigency removed, 675
probable cause, federal law, 675
search of, 495
probable cause, 674
incident to arrest, 623
under warrant for premises, 578
search warrant for, particularity of description, 556
searches and seizures, Washington constitutional provisions govern-
ing, 677
seizure of persons in, 505
spot checks of, 678
spot checks of, administrative requirements for, 694
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subject of criminal activity, warrantless search of, 679
trunk, search of, 626, 676
warrantless detention, 683
warrantless impoundment of, community caretaking function, 681




scope, federal law, 676
warrantless seizure of, for forfeiture or levy, 679
See also search warrants; passengers
veracity
of anonymous or unknown informants, 538
as evidence of
informants' admissions against interest and motive, 534
informants' past performance, 533
informants' partial corroboration, 536
police informants 537
victim-witness information
probable cause, basis for knowledge of, 535
probable cause, generally, 534
probable cause, sufficiency of information by, 536
view
See plain view, smell, and hearing
voice exemplars
expectation of privacy in, 497
voluntariness
awareness of right to refuse as affecting, 653
coerciveness in obtaining, 652
consent searches based on, 650
consent searches, police claim of authority, as affecting, 652
mental or emotional state in evaluating, 655
police deception as to identity or purpose as affecting, 656
prior cooperation or refusal as affecting, 655
waiver
invitation to enter premises as, 487
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waiver of objection
failure to make timely objection as constituting, 726
guilty plea as, 726
testimony by defendant concerning suppressed evidence as, 726
warrantless arrest
emergency exception as basis for, 590




vehicle, detention of, pursuant to, 683
when permissible, 589
warrantless searches
bodily intrusions, exigent circumstances for, 669
use of border crossing, 692
use of checkpoints, 692, 678
community caretaking and medical emergency as basis for, 631




hot pursuit as basis for, 665, 668
imminent arrest as exigent circumstance supporting, 667
inventory searches as, 629
mail inspections as, 685
miscellaneous exceptions allowing for, 627
person, exigent circumstances allow for of, 668, 671
plain view, seizure based on, 642
post-detention, 628
premises
community caretaking and emergency as basis for, 634
exigent circumstances justifying, 665
home, absence of less intrusive alternatives, 671
premises search, search of person in context of, 670
prior to arrest, 627
of prisoners or pre-trial detainees, 690
at schools, 687
as "second look" searches, 629
as search incident to arrest, 617
at special environments, 685
of vehicles
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generally, 674
inventory search, 683
medical emergency justifying search, 684
federal law governing
vehicles, probable cause, 675
vehicles, scope of search, 676
vehicles, subject of criminal activity, 679
vehicles, Washington applications in, 677
See also consent searches; exigent circumstances; search incident to
arrest; stop and frisk; plain view, smell and hearing
warrants
appellate review standard for, 514
execution of, 593
invalid, effect of, 593
issuance of, 513
tainted evidence supporting, 721
violations of procedure in obtaining, 725






expectation of privacy in, 509
2005]
